From the perspective of international law, the declaration of war is a constituent element of the legal process and an important symbol of the beginning of the war. In ancient times, solemn ceremonies were also held to declare war between the two countries, but in modern times, these ceremonies have ceased to exist, and the declaration of war between the two sides is often achieved by simple notification.
Since the outbreak of the "918" incident in 1931, Chinese people fought bloody battles with the Japanese invaders for 14 years, and finally won the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan at the cost of more than 35 million casualties. According to the international practice at that time, when the two countries engaged in a protracted war, they would declare the severance of diplomatic relations and enter a state of war, that is, "declare war."
However, during the more than ten years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Chinese Government and the Japanese Government did not even declare a severance of diplomatic relations or officially declare a state of war. It was not until December 1941, when the Pacific War broke out, that China officially declared war on Japan, and Japan did not declare war for a long time. This state of "war without declaration" is very rare in the international community, why?
Since the two sides have not broken off diplomatic relations and have not declared war, what kind of foreign policy did China adopt toward Japan during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression? After the outbreak of the Pacific War, why did you change your strategy and declare war on Japan? Today we explore from the perspective of the Republic of China the truth about the delay in declaring war between the two sides and Japan. Before getting to the point, new friends can pay attention to it a little bit, not miss the wonderful content of the future, and review the previous videos.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="5" > the "918" incident - no war declared</h1>
The September 18 Incident broke out, the crowd was indignant, the enthusiasm for resisting Japan and saving the country in society rose rapidly, and there were also voices within the Kuomintang and the National Government declaring war on Japan and breaking off diplomatic relations. On September 20, the Seventh Branch of the Kuomintang in Shanghai first sent a telegram to the central authorities, requesting the central authorities to declare war on Japan.
Subsequently, many senior officials also requested a declaration of war, saying that "the country can be changed, and this ambition will not be changed." He Xiangning, a kuomintang elder, He Jian, chairman of Hunan Province, and Chen Shaokuan, commander of the Navy, all made generous statements, saying, "To the imperialists with the last death," "Xiang Province is ready to send 300,000 troops," and "to fight the last death battle with the Wunu."
The voices of war have been repeated, and countless people have been determined to be generous. In the face of the September 18 Incident, what was the attitude of the highest authorities of the National Government?
First, recourse to "axioms.". After the September 18 Incident, Chiang Kai-shek was shocked and indignant at the behavior of Japanese militarism. However, Chiang Kai-shek is the supreme leader of the Nationalist government, and he must not let emotions sway his thoughts, and he must formulate countermeasures. In his diary that day, Chiang Kai-shek not only wrote down Japan's heinous acts of aggression, but also thought about the current situation, china's national strength is not caught, and it is not advisable to resist strongly.
At that time, many senior officials also agreed with Chiang Kai-shek's views. In order to cope with the September 18 incident and formulate an appropriate foreign policy, at 8 p.m. on the 19th, the Ruling Committee of the Kuomintang Central Committee urgently held the 160th executive meeting. At the meeting, the Standing Committee put forward four resolutions, which did not mention armed resistance and self-defense, but only determined the counterattack at the diplomatic level.
After the meeting, the Central Executive Committee issued a directive to the whole country, calling on party members of all ministries to cooperate sincerely, proposing that "an arbitrary Japan will be punished by world justice." It can be seen from this that the recourse to "world justice" is the policy adopted by the Executive Committee at this time. Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward this policy was fully supportive, and after returning to Nanjing, he held a meeting and said that "at this time, the only way to appeal to justice is also." Since then, recourse to "justice" has become the main policy of the National Government in response to the September 18 Incident.
Secondly, no war will be declared. Since it was decided to practice "justice," "no intercourse" and "no declaration of war" naturally became the foreign policy practiced by the Kuomintang government. On September 28, the Kuomintang Central Committee drafted a "Letter to Students throughout the Country", which showed the basic attitude of the Nationalist government not to declare war. The article was published in the Central Weekly, and the Declaration also confirmed the attitude of the National Government.
Since then, Chiang Kai-shek has explained many times the reasons for not declaring war. On October 12, 1931, Chiang delivered a speech entitled "Supporting Justice and Resisting Power", which strongly condemned Japan's arbitrary aggression and made a suggestive explanation of the reasons why war could not be declared against Japan. Generally speaking, it can be summarized into three points: First, the disparity in strength between the two sides is so great that China's national strength is not enough to resist Japan; second, declaring war will cause Japan to expand its aggression, but it will be caught in the tricks of the Japanese army; third, avoiding war is a moral responsibility, and not declaring war is to safeguard justice.
In November, at the Fourth Kuomintang General Assembly, Chiang Kai-shek added another reason not to declare war: If war were declared, China would lose the sympathy of the international community. Chiang Kai-shek mentioned that after the September 18 incident, League officials told him that international forces would help China and that if China declared war, it would lose the sympathy of world pacifists.
Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek came to the diplomatic conclusion of "in fact tough and formally moderate", thus avoiding China's disadvantage in the international community. On January 13, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek made it clear that not ending diplomatic relations and not declaring war was the bottom line of Japanese diplomacy, and he was very firm in this bottom line. Therefore, even if the "1.28" incident broke out afterwards and the security of the capital was threatened, the Nationalist government preferred to move the capital to Luoyang rather than adopt a tough attitude in diplomacy.
Third, the proposal of diplomatic relations to break up. There were different voices from the outside world about the Kuomintang's policy of "dying and not declaring war," and differences also arose within the Nationalist government. The delegation to the League of Nations headed by Gu Weijun held that if it is to resort to "justice," China must take action, at least by declaring a severance of diplomatic relations with Japan. Gu Weijun and others also held that the announcement of the cessation of diplomatic relations would be beneficial to China and would allow the United States to invoke the "China Legislation" to impose an arms embargo on Japan.
Originally, Gu Weijun believed that the embargo of neutral countries was aimed at both warring sides, and if the United States embargoed Japan, it would also impose an embargo on China. U.S. Secretary of State Stimson said that in order to maintain its honor, the United States will participate in almost any international sanctions imposed on the aggressors. Therefore, Gu Weijun judged that if China and Japan broke off diplomatic relations, Japan, as an aggressor, would become the target of US sanctions, and the United States might even unilaterally embargo arms against Japan.
The Kuomintang did consider the important suggestions of Gu and others, repeatedly mentioning the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations, and even consulted Gu Weijun's suggestions on the policy of renunciation on February 26, 1933. However, the Nanjing side did not take action for a long time, and Gu and others were once indignant and demanded resignation.
In Gu Weijun's view, the Most important reason why the Nationalist Government has been unable to make a decision to break diplomatic relations with Japan is whether the great powers will sanction Japan as mentioned before. The Foreign Ministry also believes that the severance of diplomatic relations will deprive the two countries of all opportunities for negotiation, and no longer negotiating means that war will start.
Moreover, the United States and Russia have not joined the League of Nations, so how can they impose sanctions on Japan? The reasons why the League of Nations could not sanction Japan were complex, the most important of which was that the constraints of the covenant were weak, and the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan could not guarantee the implementation of the sanctions regulations. In the international environment at that time, asking the great powers to commit themselves to openly confronting Japan was no different from seeking skins against the tiger.
Coupled with the defeat of the Great Wall Resistance, the Nationalist government did not have the confidence to oppose Japan, so it eventually abandoned the proposal to break off diplomatic relations. Since then, the National Government's attitude toward Compromise with Japan has intensified, almost losing its bottom line, and even "going against the grain" in the face of north China independence, causing strong resentment among the masses of the people.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="22" > "July 7 Incident" - war undeclared</h1>
On July 7, 1937, the Lugou Bridge Incident broke out. At first, the Nationalist Government was still unclear about the nature of the Lugou Bridge Incident, hesitated on the issues of "peace" and "war," and even appeared inside the "low-key club," believing that the future of the Anti-Japanese Resistance was not optimistic and that it absolutely could not rush into the war. Faced with a complicated situation, the KMT determined the basic policy:
First, war should be fought without a declaration of war. As soon as the Lugou Bridge incident occurred, Chiang Kai-shek realized the seriousness of the problem. Originally, Jiang had decided to prepare for the formalities for declaring war, but soon hesitated. In his diary, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly mentioned his concerns about declaring war on Japan, and after much thought, it was still difficult to make up his mind.
The Kuomintang's senior military command organs have also held many consultations on the "declaration of war" and have not reached a precise conclusion. On July 16, the Headquarters of the Nationalist Government held a discussion on the "partialization" and "comprehensiveization" of the war, and many people believed that the declaration of war without diplomatic relations was unfavorable to China.
The next day, the conclusions of the conference's research were released. Taking into account that after the declaration of war, Japan, as an enemy country, will notify its countries with diplomatic relations to stop sending military supplies to China. Even if there were countries that wanted to supply, they would go through shipping, and at that time, the sea control was in the hands of Japan, and China would certainly not be able to replenish it. A country, economically backward, backward in armaments, will be very embarrassing at critical junctures. Therefore, the meeting finally decided: no intercourse, no declaration of war.
On August 7, at the Joint Conference on National Defense, Chiang Kai-shek and others expressed their determination to resist the war. There were still two voices at the meeting on the issue of the declaration of war on the break, and it was finally decided not to adopt the method of declaring war on the break. At this time, Japan's aggressive ambitions were clearly revealed, and the Nationalist Government was also well aware of it, and adopted a positive and tough military response, but after careful consideration, it decided not to easily close the door to negotiations.
Second, vigilance against Japan's declaration of war. After the beginning of the all-out War of Resistance, the Japanese government also considered whether to declare war on China. After careful study by all sides in Japan, they all believe that declaring war on China will do more harm than benefit. First of all, Japan believes that once war is declared on China, the United States will stop the delivery of materials in accordance with the "China Legislation", and even if the terms are unfavorable to China now, the United States will definitely take measures to revise them;
Second, Japan would suffer even greater losses economically; finally, the declaration of war would seriously worsen International Public Opinion in Japan. Based on all the above, the Japanese government also refused to take action to declare war. Interestingly, the Nationalist government has always believed that Japan's declaration of war poses a great threat to China and has paid close attention to Japan's movements.
On January 26, 1940, the U.S.-Japan Commercial Pact was abrogated, and The ambassador to the United States, Hu Shi, was very excited about it, but the Nationalist government was still very vigilant. Did Japan retaliate as a result? Will war be declared on China? The Nationalist government drew up a strategy to deal with Japan's declaration of war, that is, to take precautions and seize the delivery of supplies. Zhang Zhongfu believes that the more the United States imposes an embargo on the most important factor in determining Japan's declaration of war, the more likely It is that Japan will take risks.
In January, the U.S. and Japan tightened embargoes, and in February, the U.S.-China Loan Contract was signed. These unfavorable news for Japan stimulated the Japanese government, and even threatened to declare war on China. However, the Japanese side has never declared war, and in fact is still worried about the embargo provisions of the US legislation. The impact of the declaration of war on China is still the blockade of Shanghai, and in addition to stepping up the transportation of materials, China should also strengthen its diplomacy with Britain and the United States.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="32" > Pearl Harbor – the official declaration of war</h1>
At 3:30 a.m. on the day of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Wang Shijie, minister of central propaganda, received a phone call from Vice Minister Dong Xianguang and immediately informed the Central Daily. At about 4 o'clock, Chiang Kai-shek, who was living in the countryside of Chongqing, also received a phone call from Dong Xianguang, informing him that the Japanese army had secretly attacked Pearl Harbor, and Chiang immediately went down the mountain to return to the city.
On the morning of the same day, Chiang Kai-shek held a special meeting to discuss strategies for dealing with Pearl Harbor. On counter-aggression, there is considerable agreement within the National Government, but there are still considerable differences on whether to declare war. At Wang Shijie's suggestion, Chiang Kai-shek decided to declare war, but the two disagreed on when to declare war.
Chiang Kai-shek wanted to take this opportunity to force the Soviet Union to declare war with China, but Wang Shijie thought that he could not wait any longer. Under the constraint of various factors, Chiang Kai-shek still changed his mind and officially issued a declaration of war against Germany, Italy, and Japan the next day. The main reason for this was that the Soviet Union declared war. After Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram on the 8th, he received a reply on the 9th that the Soviet Union had no intention of participating in the war, and Roosevelt also persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to declare war quickly and did not have to wait for the Soviet Russia to reply. Forcing the Soviet Union to declare war had to be abandoned.
In addition to Su's unsatisfactory reply, Jiang's change of mind had other implications. For example, Chiang Kai-shek's cronies and staff members also had a greater impact on Chiang Kai-shek's decision. In addition, there is the influence of public opinion. The "JoongAng Daily" firmly stated that at this time, the Japanese Kou had declared war on the United States, and China did not have to be scrupulous. In addition, the day after the outbreak of the Pacific War, Britain and the United States declared war on Japan, and then more than 20 countries, including Canada, followed.
At 5 p.m. on December 9, Chiang Kai-shek summoned Lin Sen, Sun Ke, Wang Shijie, and others to talks and decided to issue a declaration of war on the same day. The proposal was swiftly adopted and sent to the National Government for release. At 7 o'clock, Foreign Minister Guo Taiqi received Chinese and foreign reporters and explicitly declared war on Japan and abolished all treaties involving Sino-Japanese relations. At this point, the government of the Republic of China went from the undeclared non-declaration of war in the "918" incident to the undeclared war of the "July 7" incident, and finally completed the "formal declaration of war" after the outbreak of the Pearl Harbor incident.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="38" > the reason why the two sides did not declare war on each other</h1>
After a brief analysis of the Attitude of the Nationalist Government toward Japan, it is not difficult to find that the fundamental reason for the Nationalist Government's refusal to declare war since the September 18 Incident is that it believes that China's strength is insufficient. It is an indisputable fact that there is a huge gap in strength between China and Japan, which was already an imperialist power at that time, but China was still very weak.
At that time, China was not only backward in economic and military strength, but also weak in the political organization ability of the Nationalist government. Needless to say, the mobilization of the entire population, the provinces in which the central government's decrees actually take effect are not even half of the country's. For many provinces, the Nanjing government is equivalent to non-existence, or only nominal existence.
Proceeding from this fact, coupled with the principle of warlords preserving their strength, the Nationalist government has always been jealous of Japan and has no intention of being more powerless to confront it. Chiang Kai-shek has also repeatedly bluntly stated that China's strength is weak, expressing the rationality of the policy of not declaring war and not making no intercourse. In order to carry out this foreign policy to the end, Chiang Kai-shek's speeches often exaggerated the poverty and weakness of China's national strength. However, from the National Government's diplomacy with Japan, we can see the fundamental reason why it believes that it is inferior to others and does not dare or is unwilling to fight the war, so it insists on humiliating compromise.
For Japan, the delay in declaring war on China is taking into account the US "China Legislation" and is worried that the United States will no longer send military supplies to Japan after the declaration of war. Materials were the most worrying issue during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and Japan could not find out the true intentions of the United States and did not know which side the United States would stand on, so it did not dare to declare war hastily. In addition, China and Japan have signed a number of treaties, and if they declare war, they will recognize these treaties as invalid, and for the sake of their own vested interests, Japan has never declared war.