As early as before the outbreak of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China paid great attention to this armed force of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, and sent a traffic officer to the Tonggu Garrison of the Third Regiment of the Autumn Harvest Uprising To make contact. The party organization of the three regiments also sent Song Renqian, who was then serving as a clerk in the secretariat of the regimental headquarters, to the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee with the traffic officers to ask for instructions on the next move. Soon after Song Ren was gone, the Autumn Harvest Uprising broke out.
On September 25, 1927, Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops to break through the enemy's ambush at Luxi and entered Lianhua County. Just after the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was being ambushed by the enemy and escaping from the enemy's tail chase, Song Renqian caught up with the autumn harvest rebel troops moving south at Chen Jiafang in Lotus, and presented Mao Zedong with a letter from the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee to Mao Zedong.
According to Song Renqian's recollection during a conversation at the Jinggangshan Revolution Museum in October 1974: "After I left, Member Mao came to Tonggu and led the troops to hold an autumn harvest uprising. Therefore, I was unable to attend the Wenjia City Meeting. The traffic officer appointed by Jiangxi Province was a little older than me, in his 20s. After the Nanchang uprising, the enemy's white terror was very serious, he was engaged in secret work, and I was inconvenient to ask his name. They went to Nanchang City together, and the provincial party committee office was set up in a small alley in the city. There I met Wang Zekai and Liu Shiqi, secretaries of the provincial party committee (Hunan people, bald head, later became the secretary of the special committee in Ganxi, and also arrived in Eyuwan). Wang Zekai read the letter I had brought, and he replied with a letter, which was written with potion, and he did not know what he had written. He only said to me verbally, 'You are operating in the area of Lianhua County, and there are armed forces of our party in Ninggang County, there are dozens of guns, and everything else is written in the letter.' ’”
The letter from the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee to Mao Zedong contained some very important information and played a great role in guiding and making decisions on the direction of the autumn harvest uprising troops.
First of all, Ninggang is mentioned in this letter. In the case of Ninggang, Mao Zedong had heard Wang Xingya speak at the Zhangjiawan Military Conference in Anyuan, and he already had a preliminary understanding. Today, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee has further clarified, "Ninggang has the armed forces of our party and has dozens of guns." This undoubtedly had a major impact on Mao Zedong's introduction of troops to Jinggang and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army's subsequent establishment in Maoping, Ninggang, and the establishment of an armed division of workers and peasants centered on Ninggang.
Former site of the Zhangjiawan Military Conference
Second, when Mao Zedong listened to the reports of Gan Mingshan and He Guoqing at Gaotan, he, in accordance with the contents of the letter from the Jiangxi Provincial CPC Committee, once again investigated the terrain and relevant situations in the Ninggang and Yongxin areas, and had a clear idea of the direction of action of the troops.
Third, on September 26, after the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army laid the foundation of Lianhua County, Mao Zedong held a meeting of the heads of party organizations in Lianhua County at the Binxing Hall in the county seat. At the meeting, reports were heard from Zhu Yiyue and others. According to the instructions in the letter of the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee, Mao Zedong once again inquired about the situation in Yongxin, Ninggang, and other places, and together with the comrades in Lianhua County, studied the marching route of the troops, and immediately made the decision to "attract troops to Jinggang." It can be seen that at the Zhangjiawan Military Conference in Anyuan, Mao Zedong had a certain understanding of the terrain of the Jinggang Mountains on the border of Xianggan and the situation of Yuan and Wang, and the defeat of the Autumn Harvest Uprising caused an inevitable trend of retreating troops to the mountains, and the letter from the Jiangxi Provincial CPC Committee at this time further strengthened Mao Zedong's determination and confidence in attracting troops to Jinggang.
Early the next morning, the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army braved the rain to attack the city of Lianhua County. Since there were no regular Kuomintang troops in the city, only Li Chengyin's security team, it took less than half an hour to capture the county seat of Lianhua County.
bibliography:
Song Renqian: "Recalling Some Past Events of the Jinggangshan Struggle", Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area, CPC Party History Materials Publishing House, 1987 edition.
Note: This article is the original content of the public account, and it is forbidden to reprint it at will without the authorization of the account