Among the three major battles of the Liberation War, the Huaihai Campaign was quite important to the strategic posture of the left and right Kuomintang and the Communists. Judging from the analysis of the so-called "hindsight", the Kuomintang side is completely able to do so without losing so embarrassingly. What happened doesn't happen a second time, but some people don't think about the possible variables.
The Central Committee had also made such a worry, but Su Yu said: To come is to die!
If Bai Chongxi joined the battle in the Huaihai Campaign, would it be a variable in the situation of the entire Huaihai Campaign? What preparations did Su Yu make?
Today Leng Brother will take everyone to talk about this matter, new friends do not forget to pay attention to it, both to review the past articles, but also not to miss the wonderful content after that.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="3" > the disadvantages of Bai Chongxi's participation in the war</h1>
As the largest decisive battle between the Chinese communists in the War of Liberation, the Battle of Huaihai determined the basic direction of the entire strategic situation in the future. In this battle, there was considerable discussion about the reasons for the defeat of the Kuomintang army, but no matter what aspect it was, the confusion at the command level was a point that could not be avoided in the discussion of the causes of defeat.
In the midst of many discussions, it has been suggested that if Bai Chongxi had accepted Chiang Kai-shek's appointment and served as the commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang side for the entire duration of the Huaihai Campaign before the Huaihai Campaign began, the outcome of the Huaihai Campaign might have been different. But in fact, even if Bai Chongxi took up the post of commander-in-chief, the problem of command confusion would not improve.
Let's briefly analyze the problems that Bai Chongxi may face after taking over as commander-in-chief.
First, there are differences in the chain of command.
If this problem is not solved, even if Bai Chongxi has the ability, the troops below will not obey his command, and the entire strategic vision and layout will not be realized.
However, the Kuomintang troops in the direction of Huaihai and Bai Chongxi's own troops belonged precisely to two different command systems, and these two command systems originated from two different factions within the Kuomintang. The two factions themselves had skirmishes before the war, and there was no trust between them. In view of this, Bai Chongxi was bound to carry his command system to the front line of the Huaihai battlefield, and the reality was that he simply did not have time to do so.
Second, subordinate units cannot be commanded.
There are many factions within the Kuomintang, and factions and factions themselves despise and despise each other. Bai Chongxi, one of the leaders of the Gui clan, came to Xuzhou, and the surrounding troops were all from Chiang Kai-shek's concubines, and most of the generals were members of the so-called "Huangpu clan", so they naturally did not obey Bai Chongxi's command and dispatch. In addition, Xuzhou's "suppression of the general" itself was specially set up by Chiang Kai-shek before the Battle of Huaihai to offset the influence of the Gui clan, and now that you have Bai Chongxi parachuted into Xuzhou to take command, will these concubine troops obediently obey the orders? If Bai Chongxi could not command the troops, then letting Bai Chongxi command it could only be a good thing, not to mention trying to strategically arrange a decisive battle with the two major field armies in the Central Plains and East China in Huaihai.
Third, the problem of Chiang Kai-shek's command overstepping his ranks.
As a decision-making figure at the central level, Chiang Kai-shek should have decided on the formulation and decision-making of major strategic plans, and the actual operation of the local and frontline was left to the frontline commanders to make decisions and implement. However, Chiang Kai-shek often intervened in front-line war arrangements, and even bypassed the front-line command organs and issued orders directly to front-line troops. As a result, senior Kuomintang commanders often waited for Chiang Kai-shek's warrants.
However, the situation on the battlefield is ever-changing, and if the front-line commanders who have the most say in the front-line battle situation do not have the right to make a decision on the spot, and let Chiang Kai-shek, who is remotely controlled in the rear, make arrangements, even if the situation on the battlefield is favorable to the Kuomintang, he will also fall into an unfavorable situation because of such an operation, and Bai Chongxi will not be able to hide from this at all.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="70" > the actual situation of the Battle of Huaihai</h1>
After analyzing the unfavorable factors of Bai Chongxi's command, let's take a look at the actual situation of the Huaihai Campaign.
Many people's first impression of the Huaihai Campaign is that the 600,000 troops of the People's Liberation Army against the 800,000 troops of the Kuomintang. If on this basis Bai Chongxi's 200,000 troops in Central China were added, one million to six hundred thousand, the Kuomintang side had basically achieved twice the level of strength of the People's Liberation Army, and there would be basically no problem in this battle.
However, the actual situation on the battlefield cannot only look at the paper data, although the strength of the Kuomintang army exceeds that of the Platon, but in fact, at some key points, the strength of the Kuomintang has not formed a complete overtake of the PLA.
According to the data, the layout of the Kuomintang's troops on xu beng's front line was roughly as follows: Qiu Qingquan Corps, composed of 6 armies, Li Yannian Corps, composed of 4 armies, Huang Baitao Corps, composed of 5 corps, Liu Ruming Corps, which consisted of 2 corps, Li Mi Corps, which consisted of 4 corps, and Sun Yuanliang Corps, which consisted of 2 corps. In addition, there were 4 armies under the jurisdiction of Feng Zhi'an, the Huang Wei Corps that came to support from other places, and the direct subordinate units of Xuzhou's "Suppression General", with 30 corps and 75 divisions participating in the battle, with a total number of 800,000 people participating in the battle.
From an objective point of view, if these 800,000 troops can form an organic whole and be arranged in the Xuzhou area, it will be difficult for the two major field armies of Huaye and Nakano to annihilate them all, and they will also face the risk of heavy casualties.
However, the 800,000 troops were not assembled in one place, and due to the Kuomintang's ability to command and dispatch, these heavy army groups were scattered along the longhai and Jinpu railways, forming a cross array. There is a natural disadvantage in the local superiority of the two major field armies, Nakano and Huaye.
Chiang Kai-shek was not unaware of the problems of an overly dispersed arrangement before the war, so at the suggestion of Du Yuming, Chiang Kai-shek decided to concentrate his forces on the south bank of the Huai River centered on Bengbu.
But Chiang Soon realized that the implementation of this plan would completely expose Xuzhou to the plausible force of the People's Liberation Army. If the People's Liberation Army takes Xuzhou at a very small cost, it will greatly shake the hearts and minds of the people and the army, and second, it will enable the People's Liberation Army to use the Longhai Road to achieve rapid troop mobilization, which in turn will make the Kuomintang fall into a passive situation. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek temporarily changed the arrangement, decided to take Xuzhou and Bengbu as the two major points of adherence, and changed the deployment of troops to a two-point and one-line plan.
Chiang Kai-shek's plan seemed to have no problem: the west side of the Jinpu Railway was guarded by Qiu Qingquan and Sun Yuanliang's corps, and the east side was arranged by Huang Baitao's corps and Li Mi's corps. In the area around Bengbu, which is the core, it is guarded by Li Yannian's corps and Liu Ruming's corps. In this all-round echo, the PLA will face the risk of being defended if it wants to attack any place.
Chiang Kai-shek, however, overestimated the abilities of his men.
The Kuomintang army has always been inferior to the Plaksmen in commanding, dispatching, and grasping fighters, and these people have no understanding of Chiang Kai-shek's arrangements at all. In order to achieve Chiang Kai-shek's combat intentions, his men must achieve the corresponding execution ability, which chiang kai-shek did not expect. If the Kuomintang troops around Huaihai can really achieve the same executive power as Huaye and Nakano, then Chiang Kai-shek's idea can really be realized. Unfortunately, there is nothing that happened ifsoever.
So what made Chiang Kai-shek's strategic vision fail to materialize, which led to the eventual defeat of the Kuomintang army on the Huaihai battlefield?
First, Huang Baitao's corps was besieged by the East China Field Army and annihilated in the shuangduiji area, resulting in a loophole in the Kuomintang's defense in the east, thus putting it in a passive situation.
Secondly, Sun Yuanliang's corps abandoned the defense of Mengcheng on the spot, allowing the Central Plains Field Army to occupy Suxian County, cutting off the middle part of this "two-point line", so that Xuzhou and Suzhou no longer echoed each other and completely lost contact.
Judging from the battlefield situation, Su Yu and Liu Bocheng understood Chiang Kai-shek's strategic intentions more thoroughly than Liu Zhi, Huang Baitao, and others, thus enabling the two major field armies to seize the opportunity on the battlefield.
Huang Baitao did not quickly move his corps closer to Xuzhou in time, but delayed time on the east side of the canal, waiting for the forty-fourth army, a new unit that had just come under his jurisdiction, to be rebuilt. And this period of time also allowed the East China Field Army to grasp it, thus completing the strategic deployment and completely encircling Huang Baitao's corps.
And Sun Yuanliang's army abandoned the defense of Mengcheng, and a big reason was because of Liu Zhi. Faced with Chiang Kai-shek's order to rescue Huang Baitao's corps, Liu Zhi did not dare to disobey. He did not want to bear the guilt of sitting by and watching Huang Baitao's army being annihilated, so he asked Sun Yuanliang to go north to rescue Huang Baitao.
By this time, the Kuomintang troops around Huaihai had been divided into three parts, and although the overall strength of the army was still more than 700,000 people, each small part was obviously at a numerical disadvantage compared with the Plaths liberation army that besieged them. According to the situation of this battlefield, it is probably not generally difficult to rely on additional troops to achieve the effect of overturning.
Militarily, however, nothing is absolute. If Bai Chongxi really threw his 200,000 main army into the Huaihai battlefield and supported the besieged Huang Wei or Du Yuming, it would cause a change in the balance of strength between the Kuomintang and the Communists in the local area. Originally, Nakano and Huaye joined forces to besiege the entire Huang Wei Corps, and the gap between the two sides in the comparison of troop strength was not obvious, if it were not for Huang Wei being limited by various factors, the entire corps would not have reached the point where the whole army was destroyed. If Bai Chongxi had joined and taken over the command of the shuangdui group, the Kuomintang army might still have a chance to turn the tables.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="73" > the possibility of Bai Chongxi's participation in the war</h1>
So, does Bai Chongxi have the conditions and possibilities to change the situation on the Huaihai battlefield?
If Bai Chongxi became the commander-in-chief of the Huaihai front, then the two major groups of the Kuomintang in Wuhan and Xuzhou could nominally form a joint force, and Bai Chongxi could also throw his main army into the Huaihai battlefield to engage the People's Liberation Army. When Su Yu planned the Battle of Huaihai, he took advantage of the contradiction between Liu Zhi and Bai Chongxi so that Bai Chongxi would not pour his full strength into Huaihai. When Bai Chongxi became the commander-in-chief, this issue could at least be shelved for the time being, which greatly increased the total number of troops invested in Huaihai. At this point alone, the convergence of the two major groups clearly increased the uncertainty on the Huaihai battlefield.
In addition, Bai Chongxi's command ability was obviously stronger than Liu Zhi's, and his judgment ability was also superior to That of Du Yuming, and the two major military groups would at least not be so embarrassed under his command.
There were two reasons why Liu Zhi defended Xuzhou at that time: First, there was really no more suitable person in Xuzhou to appoint him, and second, Liu Zhi obeyed Chiang Kai-shek's words and would not cause him any "trouble." Even if Chiang Kai-shek later sent Du Yuming to assist Liu Zhi, in terms of effect, the effect of these two people with different abilities acting together was not as good as that of Bai Chongxi, who was fierce.
Liu Zhi did not have the experience and awareness of such large-scale battles, often panicked at critical junctures, and was not at all suitable for assuming the command responsibility of large corps operations. Although Du Yuming had his own views and ideas on the war situation, and would also have the so-called "up, middle, and bottom" three strategies, he was not decisive enough, and he was also restrained by Chiang Kai-shek, even if the aura on his body shined no matter how bright, it would be difficult to play on this Huaihai battlefield.
Bai Chongxi was better than these two men, at least under his command, the Kuomintang army should not be said to be passive most of the time, at least it should achieve good results in some key parts.
Overall, if Bai Chongxi is put in charge of commanding the Huaihai Campaign, it will only increase the overall difficulty of the Huaihai Campaign, and the time of the campaign will also increase, and the number of casualties of the People's Liberation Army will also increase, but the outcome of the campaign will not change much, and perhaps Bai Chongxi will not let the participating troops be reimbursed, but it still cannot change the defeat of the Kuomintang.
Since a series of battles such as the Battle of Eastern Henan and the Battle of Jinan, the Kuomintang army has fallen into decline. In the grand strategic direction, the People's Liberation Army entered a counter-offensive posture, while the Kuomintang army had shrunk to large cities and strategic points, and was no longer able to launch a large-scale attack like in 1946. In addition, Bai Chongxi said privately: "The Battle of Xu Beng is irreparable, even if two more corps are added, it will not be useful." For the communists, we come to a corps to send a corps. ”
Although Bai Chongxi's joining would not change much for the entire Huaihai Campaign, if he sent troops to rescue Du Yuming later in the campaign, could the PLA's strategy of resisting the enemy effectively prevent all this from happening?
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="75" > SuYu's response</h1>
Before Du Yuming's clique retreated westward from Xuzhou, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram to the Former Committee of the Huaihai Campaign to remind Su Yu to pay attention to Du Yuming's whereabouts and not to rule out the entire Du Yuming clique retreating in the direction of Wuhan.
Implicitly, the CMC was worried that Bai Chongxi had joined the Huaihai battlefield during this period, thus leaving Nakano and Huaye exhausted, allowing Du Yuming, Huang Wei, and Bai Chongxi to escape from afar. In this way, the entire Huaihai battlefield, and even the entire situation in East China, will produce changes that are extremely unfavorable to the PLA.
With this in mind, would the Front Committee of the Huaihai Campaign encircle and annihilate Du Yuming's clique as planned, or would it send troops to intercept Bai Chongxi's possible eastward route?
By December 1948, Huaye and Nakano had concentrated the vast majority of their available forces in the Shuangduiji area, with no excess force to deal with Bai Chongxi's forces that might advance eastward.
To make accurate decisions in complex situations, the key lies in how to judge and confirm the key points.
The 200,000 Gui troops in Wuhan seem to be a factor of instability, but compared with Du Yuming's group, Bai Chongxi's threat and value are not as good as the former. Moreover, only if the direction of the retreat of Du Yuming's group is consistent with the direction of Bai Chongxi's reception, Bai Chongxi's rescue can be considered meaningful.
So, as the commander-in-chief of HuaYe, how should Su Yu deal with the possible situation?
First, abandon the defense of maritime routes.
If you want to quickly break away from the Huaihai battlefield in a short period of time, a feasible way is to start from Xuzhou, go east to Lianyungang via the Longhai Railway, and then take a boat south to the Jiangnan area. But in practice, this is not possible. In order to prepare ships for 300,000 people in a short period of time, the Nationalist Navy obviously did not have the time and strength. If Du Yuming wanted to take this route, he would definitely be besieged by the People's Liberation Army in the port.
Expecting that Du Yuming would not choose this escape route, Su Yu simply dispatched all the troops on the Longhai Railway to the south, pressed them to the southwest with all his might, and let go of the defense of the Lianyungang front line, so that Du Yuming could go as he wanted.
Before the Battle of Huaihai, Du Yuming's mother had just celebrated her seventieth birthday. At the birthday banquet, Du Yuming specially arranged a play of "Empty City Plan". However, Du Yuming's "empty city plan" was seen through by Su Yu, who treated him with his human way and used his troops to support the battle in the south.
Second, take into account the defense of the southeast direction.
Du Yuming's second escape plan was to move forward in the southeast direction of Xuzhou, through the shortest route taken by Su Zhongyi and approaching in the direction of Nanjing. However, this route also had problems, the rivers in central Suzhou were dense and mostly muddy, and the mechanized troops of Du Yuming's group took a long time to pass through here, and it was easy to be caught up by HuaYe. If Du Yuming really chooses to take a route, then HuaYe will take advantage of the opportunity of Du Yuming's group struggling in the mud to quickly catch up, and then he will not be able to escape if he wants to.
Third, an interception was set up in the southwest direction.
The first two plans have their own unfavorable factors, so there is only one plan in front of Du Yuming's eyes: starting from the southwest direction of Xuzhou, going around a circle in central China to reach the south bank of the Huai River, so as to achieve the predetermined idea of evacuating Xuzhou and relieving Huang Wei.
This route has few rivers and flat roads, which is conducive to the rapid passage of Du Yuming's group, but the disadvantage is that it will enter the defensive position of Nakano, and it is easy to be attacked from two directions by Nakano and Huaye. Su Yu placed all the forces he could mobilize on this escape route, with the purpose of trapping Du Yuming here and making it impossible for him to escape.
Du Yuming also expected that Hua Ye and Nakano would block him and rush into the encirclement, and before escaping, he ordered his troops to advance in the direction of Yongcheng, avoiding Hua Ye's blocking troops in the area of Shuangduiji, and deliberately turned off the radio for communication. Originally, Du Yuming's plan was well implemented, but after Chiang Kai-shek learned through front-line reconnaissance that Du Yuming's intention to first report himself and then break the siege, he sent a special plane to airborne and forced Du Yuming to change to the south to rescue Huang Wei. Du Yuming did not advance or retreat, and could only lead his troops headlong into the encirclement of Huaye and Nakano.
Su Yu's adventure made him uneasy, and he did not rest well for several days and nights, waiting for the report of Du Yuming's group advancing towards the predetermined encirclement.
When the news came that Du Yuming's group was besieged by two major field armies at a designated location, Su Yucai was finally relieved.
Du Yuming's helpless change of course this time also made any ideas and plans for changes in the Huaihai war situation completely meaningless. Even if Bai Chongxi discharged his 200,000 troops from Wuhan to come to his aid, what awaited him was nothing more than another round-up attack, and it was very likely that they would be surrounded and annihilated.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="78" > the final outcome of the Battle of Huaihai</h1>
On January 10, 1949, the Platon Army invaded Du Yuming's group, and the Battle of Huaihai came to an end.
The Battle of Huaihai lasted a total of 66 days, annihilated a total of 550,000 Kuomintang troops, and suffered 134,000 CASUALTIES. Among the three major battles, the Huaihai Campaign had the largest number of casualties, the largest number of annihilated Kuomintang troops, the most complex form of warfare, and the most far-reaching political impact.
After the Battle of Huaihai, the Kuomintang almost lost the main force and elite troops on which it relied to start a civil war, and lost the ability to start another major war north of the Yangtze River. With the exception of a few places, the north of the Yangtze River is already under the control of the People's Liberation Army, and the fact that Nanjing is a foregone conclusion.
Looking at the entire process of the Huaihai Campaign, serious problems arose one after another on the Kuomintang side in terms of strategic decision-making, command and dispatch, and troop coordination, which made the possible dawn of victory fleeting and inevitably moving toward the road of defeat. On the other hand, the Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army commanded properly among the troops, the planning and decision-making were bold and careful, and all the officers and men were united in their efforts, regardless of whether they were you or me, so that the balance of victory would finally tilt in the direction of the Communist Party.
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