The Taiping Rebellion was undoubtedly a major upheaval that shook the foundations of Qing rule. In the face of this torrent of turmoil that swept through the Central Plains, the Qing court had to take extreme measures to decentralize power in the military, financial, and judicial fields, so that the actual authority of the local governors was unprecedentedly expanded. Although this approach allowed the Qing court to cope with the crisis in the short term, it planted a new curse in the long run. What kind of power did the governor gain at that time? How far-reaching is the impact? Can all this really be seen on the same level as the Tang Dynasty feudal towns? Let's find out.
Background and reasons for decentralization
In the middle of the Qing Dynasty, the national strength gradually declined, and the ruling foundation became increasingly precarious. The defeat in the Opium War triggered the gunboat policy of the Western powers, and external worries arose; In China, the Taiping Rebellion broke out. This peasant uprising, launched by Hong Kong native Hung Xiuquan, clearly opposed the rule of the Qing Dynasty, and its influence spread rapidly, and as the Taiping army continued to expand its territory, it soon captured important provinces such as Shaanxi, Anhui, and Jiangxi, and once surrounded Beijing.
Seeing that the great rivers and mountains were looted and destroyed, the Qing emperor's family was panicked, and in desperation, he had to personally supervise the formation and mobilize all available forces to suppress the Taiping army. However, the Qing court's Green Battalion army was rotten and extremely incapacitated, and often retreated in the face of the well-trained and high-morale Taiping army. After several years of war of attrition, the Qing Dynasty's military strength was gradually weakened, and the government and the opposition were in chaos.
At this critical juncture, Qi Jiguang, Fu Nai, and other commanders and ministers requested that power be delegated to local governors and rely on local forces to recruit and train Yong to contain the Taiping army's attack. Emperor Xianfeng of the Qing Dynasty had no choice but to appoint Que Leak one after another, allowing local governors to recruit village warriors on their own, and delegating part of the power to levy funds and command to enrich his strength.
Decentralization of fiscal authority
In order to cope with the military expenditures of the Taiping Rebellion, the Qing court had to delegate some financial power to the local governors. This approach, while expedient, has far-reaching consequences.
As early as the Kangxi period, in order to cope with temporary financial expenditures, the Qing court adopted the method of "donation", that is, auctioning off officials to collect money. At that time, the central government also had the control over donations. By the time of Xianfeng, the situation had changed.
In the first year of Xianfeng (1851), in order to pay for the military expenses of "suppressing bandits", the Qing court had to agree to Guangdong and other places to temporarily organize their own donations, and the right to collect donations was delegated to the localities. Shortly thereafter, Huguang and other places were also allowed to set up their own bureaus to collect donations. Although the household department once wanted to take back the right to donate, Xianfeng had to give up after facing a huge military spending gap in the second year.
In the third year of Xianfeng, Lei Yihe, Zeng Guofan and other commanders of the army directly asked for donations wherever the military array went, and the central government had no time to stop it. During the Tongzhi period, when Zeng Guofan reported the source of his military needs, in addition to the regular tax, he actually listed items such as "Cao Fold", which shows that he misappropriated the state's positive tax.
In addition to donations, the centigold also became the largest financial power delegation in the Qing court. The so-called "centijin" is a temporary tax that appeared in the Xianfeng period to collect merchants, which was originally to solve the problem of military spending beyond their means. Its biggest feature is that it has escaped the control of the household department, and the collection standard is left to the discretion of the local government.
There are many checkpoints and tax rates in different provinces, and the tax rate can reach up to 20 percent. Moreover, the number of tax collection points set up in where is completely subject to the governor's own arrangement, and it is difficult for the household department to restrain it. This makes it an important source of taxation that can be levied at will by local governors.
In general, the decentralization of the expropriation power of the Qing court, whether it was a donation or a levy, marked the gradual liberalization of the Qing court's fiscal autonomy over the local government, which greatly expanded the fiscal power of the governors.
Decentralization of military powers
Faced with the unprecedented crisis of the Taiping Rebellion, the Qing government had to significantly delegate military power and grant greater military power to local governors.
According to the old military system, although the central government sent senior officials such as economic strategists and counselors to command the army, in practice local governors were still strictly limited to the scope of "receiving orders and preparing for responses." However, as the war worsened, the Qing court had to break this rigid system.
The first to break the deadlock was recommended by Zeng Guoquan, the governor of Hunan. He went to the imperial court and asked for a new army to be trained in Wuling County, recruit indigenous warriors, and lead them himself. Despite the opposition at one point, the Qing court finally had to agree under the pressure of the approaching Taiping army.
This later famous "Hunan Army" grew stronger and stronger under the training of Zeng Guofan, and was not only well-equipped, but also had strict military discipline, and its combat quality was far from comparable to that of the regular army of the Qing Dynasty. His later active operations became the mainstay of saving the Qing court from danger.
The success of the Hunan army made the Qing court realize the weakness of its old system, so it decentralized military power on a larger scale. For example, Ye Mingchen, the governor of Anhui Province, Zhang Muqing, the governor of Sichuan, and others were allowed to recruit regiments to train local brave soldiers on their own.
This new army, which was recruited and trained by the localities themselves, has an extremely high will to fight, and is able to adapt to local conditions without being subject to the rigid restrictions of the old army. Later, he made many miraculous achievements in battles with the Taiping army in various places and became the mainstay of the Qing Dynasty.
At the same time, the governor was also allowed to wield his own army and was not subject to the constraints of the central government. Some generals who led troops even directly skipped the central government and asked for the nearby requisition, requisition, and distribution of materials, grain and grass on the way to the military formation, which was difficult for the central government to stop.
All these practices marked the gradual loosening of the Qing court's military command. Far from being limited by the old system, the governor's military power was able to build up his own local armed forces and control a considerable amount of actual military power.
Expansion of executive power
With the decentralization of financial and military powers, the Qing court had to gradually delegate power to local governors in the administrative field.
According to normal circumstances, although the governors of various provinces have certain administrative powers, they need to report to their superiors for approval in major matters such as the trial of major cases and the imposition of criminal punishments. However, during the Taiping Rebellion, this system was also inevitably attacked.
The first to break the old system was Jiangsu Fusui Zeng Guoxing. In 1853, he petitioned that all thieves in Jiangsu Province be tried without review. The reason is that the officers and men are on an expedition and have no time to listen to the remote control, and if the review is carried out as usual, it will greatly delay military affairs.
Although the imperial court did not allow it for a time, it was soon forced to agree and extend this privilege to several tunlian areas. The governors of the ruling side can hold trials on the spot and do not need to report to the imperial court for approval.
Immediately after that, some superintendents applied for the establishment of special trial institutions such as the "Prison Office" to handle thieves and other military cases, which further broke through the traditional examination and approval procedures.
As a result of this workaround, not only did the governors concentrate military power, but they also expanded their judicial power. The old review system of the Qing court also basically existed in name only.
In 1861, even by Jiangsu, Zhang Xiusheng played Brigadier General Zhengyin "Revolution in the Six Departments". This move completely negated the authority of the imperial court in administrative justice, and the status of the governor was unprecedentedly elevated.
At the same time, the governors were empowered much more than that. They can command the resident officials at will, even the senior officers sent by the central government. If they do not obey the dispatch, they can directly be "questioned" or "dismissed".
All these measures mean that the centralization of power that the central government has long adhered to has been broken, and the local governors have gained far more autonomy than the norm, and their status is extremely special and their influence is increasing day by day.
Consequences Impact
The Qing court's large-scale decentralization of power during the Taiping Rebellion was undoubtedly a stopgap measure. But in the long run, it dealt a profound blow to the centralized rule of the Qing Dynasty and laid the foundation for future turmoil.
First, the decentralization of power greatly weakened the centralized rule of the Qing court, and the old system of the imperial dynasty existed in name only. By virtue of the financial, military, and administrative powers in their hands, the governors of various localities have actually become a "dictatorship of one technique" at the local level.
They can collect their own taxes, recruit the brave, and try the criminals, and it is difficult for the central government to check them. Some powerful governors can even override the central government's dispatch and command the entire local government.
This phenomenon caused many people to worry at the time. Lin Zexu once bitterly stated that "the local governors are becoming more and more arrogant, and the central government is quite bullied." The Hong Dynasty shouted, "It's really surprising, how many years will China return to centralization!" ＂
Second, the growing power of the local governors has also exacerbated the contradictions and struggles among them. Due to the lack of strong restraint from the central government, local governors often fought each other for financial and military power, triggering chain struggles.
What is more, although some governors have great power, their ethics are not good, and they even take the opportunity to do evil, wantonly extort the people, and increase the burden of servitude on the local people. The central government of the Qing Dynasty could only turn a blind eye to this.
In the end, this practice of the Qing court in times of crisis, although it temporarily solved the urgent need, in the long run, it planted a greater bane. Because the special status of the governor has seriously shaken the sacredness of imperial power, coupled with the constant warlord war, the foundation of the centralized power of the Qing Dynasty has been unprecedentedly impacted, and the bane has been laid for the warlord secession and rebellion in the late Qing Dynasty.