At the end of the Liberation War, after our army completed the Great Southwest Campaign, Lao Chiang had only less than 600,000 troops left, and he retreated to Taiwan and the island areas along the coast of eastern Zhejiang and Fujian and Zhejiang. At this time, although Lao Chiang was isolated overseas and temporarily blocked the offensive of our army, the island lacked resources, lacked materials and strategic depth, the living space was gradually compressed, the grain was mostly imported, and the island lacked strategic materials such as steel, coal, and oil.
In fact, at that time, in addition to Taiwan, Lao Chiang had another choice, that is, Myanmar.
It itself was a grain-producing area, and strategic materials were even more abundant, and Japan, which lacked strategic resources at the time, also set its sights on this region, and even did not hesitate to go to war with the Allies for this purpose.
So, when Lao Chiang was defeated, why did he choose to go to Taiwan to become the owner of the island rather than occupy Burma, which is 20 times the area of the island?
Lao Jiang on the occasion of the defeat of the treasure island (stills)
The Nationalist Army had considered passing through Burma
In fact, as early as August 1949, when our Liu Deng army had not yet begun to sweep the southwest and the national army still controlled the five southwestern provinces, Song Xilian, a famous general of the national army, proposed this plan to occupy Burma.
On August 15, 1948, Song Xilian, then director of the Sichuan-Hunan-Hubei Border Region Pacification Office, found Hu Zongnan, a classmate of the first phase of Huangpu who was the director of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Pacification Office, to discuss how to deal with Liu Deng Erye, who was preparing to enter the southwest to fight.
Song Xilian, who advocated retreating to Myanmar (still)
At that time, Song Xilian's proposal was
At that time, Song Xilian had been stationed in western Yunnan for 4 years during the Anti-Japanese War, and was quite familiar with the customs, terrain and products of western Yunnan, and the Baoshan, Tengchong and Longling areas in western Yunnan and other places were easy to defend and difficult to attack, surrounded by Gaoligong Mountain, and on both sides were the turbulent Lancang River and Nu River, which were dangerous enough to block a million male soldiers.
In order to implement this plan and ensure that Liu Wenhui of Xikang and Lu Han of Yunnan could not make peace with it, Song Xilian also asked Hu Zongnan to transfer two armies to Leshan and other places to station and control first, and at the same time sent a part of the troops to be stationed in Luzhou to control the passage into western Yunnan.
In fact, at that time, the soldiers of the southwest country were in danger, and Song Xilian and Hu Zongnan, with a total of 450,000 troops, retreated into western Yunnan, and it was difficult for anyone to stop them.
The National Army in the Southwest (stills)
The second step is the control point of the Yunnan-Burma-Thailand border.
Song Xilian believes that although there is a natural danger in western Yunnan, if Liu Deng cannot be captured, our army will definitely send a more powerful field army to support, and it is a matter of time before western Yunnan is lost.
Once the Nujiang defense line is lost, the 450,000 troops can all retreat to the Yunnan-Burma-Thailand border area, relying on the primeval jungle environment here, continue to fight with our army, and even as a counteroffensive base, and in order to prevent the border troops of the two countries from blocking, Song Xilian suggested that Hu Zongnan must bring heavy artillery and armored vehicles and other troops in case of emergency.
The Nu River in western Yunnan is dangerous
The third step is to take control of Burma and northern Thailand
In Song Xilian's view, during the Anti-Japanese War, the national army had fought against the Japanese army here, such as Lashio, Mandalay and other places have stubbornly resisted the Japanese army, and the relationship between overseas Chinese and the national army here is very good, and the government army in Myanmar was very weak at that time.
As an aside, how weak was the Burmese army at that time?
In 1950, the remnants of the 3,000 remnants of the national army Li Guohui who withdrew from Yunnan into Burma defeated more than four times the national defense force of Burma, and even the Indian mercenaries invited by the Burmese government were not their opponents, so it was completely feasible for the national army to control Burma, at least in terms of combat effectiveness.
In the Indochina Peninsula, not to mention the Burmese National Defense Force, even the French army in Thailand and Vietnam were not the opponents of the national army, at that time, in addition to the 450,000 descendant Central Army in the southwest, Bai Chongxi also had 100,000 troops in Liangguang, as well as Huang Jie's 1st Corps, etc., counting the national army troops in Taiwan, there were at least about 700,000 elites in total.
Li Guohui's remnants who violently beat the Burmese army and the Indian army's ace troops
However, Song Xilian's proposal was still vetoed by Lao Chiang, after all, it was not appropriate to give up the southwest without fighting, and Lao Chiang still imagined that he could hold the southwest at that time, so the first time the national army passed through Burma was stopped by Lao Chiang.
In 1950, with the remnants of Li Guohui's defeat of the allied forces of the two countries on the Thai-Burmese border, the remnants of the Nationalist army finally found a foothold.
And Li Mi, who was the commander of the 8th Corps at that time, once again proposed to Lao Chiang that since the national army was fighting so well, why not take the opportunity to occupy Burma and northern Thailand and manage them into his own sphere of influence?
You must know that the resources of Myanmar and northern Thailand at that time were simply a relief for the national army.
The remnants of the Burmese army of the national army are very energetic
Although the northern part of Thailand is densely covered with primeval jungles, the plains are located in the south, and you can pass through the large granary of Thailand. Not to mention Burma, where there is a large amount of oil and iron ore, coupled with the previous British management, the degree of richness is not worse than that of the southeast coast, coupled with a large population, it can provide sufficient military resources, which is naturally incomparable to Taiwan. Moreover, there are a large number of overseas Chinese in the local area, as well as merchant groups who trade with us, etc., these people are not disgusted with the national army, and the national army still has a great centripetal force here.
But even if it is such a good opportunity, Lao Chiang still chooses Taiwan instead of going through Myanmar, why is this?
The remnants of the National Army in Myanmar pose for a group photo
Myanmar's constraints are all too obvious
Although Lao Chiang was a last-class military strategist, he was an out-and-out master of settling accounts, and of course he knew the importance of occupying Burma and northern Thailand, and he was moved when Song Xilian first proposed it.
But if you really manage Myanmar as a strategic location, it will do more harm than good.
Why?
Here, we can make a hypothesis, how is the national army going to run Burma?
As a result, they could easily defeat the Burmese army and even take control of Thailand.
The remnants of the national army preparing to return home
But they really went, first of all, they had to face the Myanmar government's complaint in the UN General Assembly (Li Guohui violently beat the Burmese army, he was complained), and the US military, which has been very active in the UN General Assembly, must be managed, although there is a high probability that it will not directly send troops, but it will also make Lao Chiang have no place in the international community, which is unacceptable for Lao Chiang who wants to rely on international aid for a counteroffensive.
Of course, if Lao Chiang pressed all the treasures in Burma, the US military was more worried that Lao Chiang's move might be used by our army - to "drive away the wolf and devour the tiger".
Indeed, after Li Guohui retreated to Burma at that time, our army did not pursue across the border, and our army itself has always respected the sovereignty of neighboring countries.
But if Lao Chiang really occupies the Thai-Burma region and uses it as a counteroffensive base, at the request of the two governments, our army enters Burma to fight in a form similar to the formation of a volunteer army to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and the remnants of Lao Chiang's army alone will not be able to stop our army's advance at all, and not only that, our army really crosses the border to fight, and the US military is also afraid that these two countries will become our army's sphere of influence, which is not conducive to its suppression and encirclement of us, so naturally it will not agree.
In the southwest ready to go, the second field
Moreover, not to mention that the US military did not agree, even Lao Chiang did not think that just one Burma could block the advance of our army.
The northern part of Burma is good and the western part of Yunnan is surrounded by Song Xilian, and there are many turbulent jungles everywhere, and there are a large number of turbulent water currents, which is not conducive to the operation of large armies. However, in terms of defense, it was still not as good as coming to the southeast strait, because Lao Jiang knew that as long as they controlled the islands in eastern Zhejiang, as well as the strait, it would be difficult for our army to land at that time with the initial naval force.
But Myanmar is different, the national border is long, and in addition to the Nu River, it is connected by land, our army can easily cross the border to fight, turn to endure hardships and difficult conditions to fight, our army is the ancestor of the national army, so it really gave our army this opportunity, he Lao Jiang can't prevent it at all, give up the treasure island with the natural danger of the strait, and choose Myanmar, which may be broken through by our army at any time, and know how to choose with his toes.
Our troops on the Thai-Burmese border in Vietnam
Under this assumption, the national army can use the two roots of Taiwan and Burma as a guide to frequently harass China's southeast and southwest coasts.
This idea looks vicious, but in fact it is not very easy to implement, like the first one, the first to come out to obstruct must be the US military, after all, Myanmar is a sovereign country, as the younger brother of the US military, Lao Chiang to occupy, it is not reasonable, in case someone puts it forward, as the US military manipulator of the United Nations General Assembly, will it be "tears and slash horses"?
Moreover, this second hypothesis is likely to be during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and the task of the US military for Lao Chiang at this stage is to send a large number of intelligence personnel and militants to attack and harass the southeast coast and to sabotage the southwest region to contain the deployment of our army; on the other hand, it is necessary to train and expand the army well to prevent our army from suddenly launching an amphibious landing while the US forces are being pinned down, and at the same time cooperate with the US military operations at any time and join the battlefield to resist US aggression and aid Korea when necessary.
A unit of the Treasure Island National Army in training in 1952
In this strategic sense, it is much more efficient to put all troops on Taiwan than to divide the troops into two routes and then counterattack from Burma.
Therefore, Lao Chiang did not have time to occupy Burma as a base for counterattack.
At the same time, if Lao Chiang wanted to occupy Burma at that time, he had to form an expeditionary force from Taiwan, and from the air, on the one hand, it would be intercepted by these two countries from the air, and the capacity and long-range delivery capacity of the national navy at that time could not reach that standard by sea, so the idea of two counteroffensive guidance was really good, but it was not feasible at all.
Of course, the above assumptions are based on the premise that Lao Chiang dared to occupy Burma.
But in fact, Lao Chiang has always been obedient to European and American countries, and he did not dare to resist the US military at all, and the Indochina Peninsula itself is the backyard of the US military, in which there are also France in Vietnam, and the British behind Thailand and Burma are manipulating behind the scenes, so Lao Chiang, who is afraid of offending European and American countries, dares to think about occupying Burma, but does not dare to do it.