Article source:
Arab World Studies, No. 5, 2023
Executive summary
The question of Western Sahara is one of the longest-running conflicts on the African continent. Third-party involvement, which had been a constant presence throughout the question of Western Sahara, was an indispensable part of understanding the protracted nature and complexity of the conflict. The existing doctrine of third-party involvement in conflicts still fails to fully explain the phenomenon that third-party intervention is often questioned. Taking Algeria's will to act in the case of Western Sahara as a case, this paper takes the mutual construction of behavioral existence and behavioral environment as a breakthrough to explain the generation mechanism of controversial intervention in global conflict affairs, and develops a three-dimensional explanatory model of the justification of "motivation-action-performance". This is not only of positive practical significance for an in-depth understanding of the long-standing status quo of the Western Sahara issue and innovative conflict resolution methods, but also provides a theoretical explanation and observation window for better promoting conflict management and conflict resolution in global conflict affairs, and at the same time has enlightening significance for how we can participate more constructively in global security and peace and development issues.
keyword
Algeria; Western Sahara; global conflicts; Third-Party Involvement
About the Author
Qiuyi Lu, Ph.D., is an assistant researcher at the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University
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The Western Sahara issue (hereinafter referred to as the "Western Sahara Question") can be traced back to the period of Spanish colonial rule in Western Sahara in 1884~1975, and was formed in the mid-to-late 70s of the 20th century, but its development has not been solved so far. In the past, regional forces dominated by Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania, the extra-regional countries dominated by the United States, France and Spain, and international organizations dominated by the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union all contributed to the development and evolution of the Western Sahara issue to varying degrees, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Among them, third-party intervention is generally considered to be an important influencing factor that has led to the long-term unresolved issue of Western Sahara, especially the controversial role of Algeria as a third party deeply involved in the Western Sahara issue. In addition, the existing conflict doctrine has not yet explored a general explanatory framework for the formation mechanism of controversial intervention in global conflicts. The analysis of the emergence of controversial intervention in the Western Sahara issue and the formation mechanism of controversial phenomena in global conflict affairs can not only deepen the understanding of the long-term and complex nature of the Western Sahara issue, but also improve the explanatory power of the existing controversial intervention at the theoretical and empirical levels, and have positive practical significance for exploring the path of promoting peace and development in North Africa.
1. Literature review
Intervention is one of the key issues in global conflict. Third parties are actors other than the subject of the conflict, and States and international organizations are usually the main external intervening forces. Third-party intervention generally refers to forces other than the subject of the conflict playing an influential but not decisive role in the conflict process or conflict resolution through political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion and other means. "Involvement" can be either non-coercive or coercive. "There are abundant existing research results on third-party intervention in conflicts, but it is still difficult to fully explain why third-party intervention is often questioned, and the logic of the generation of controversial intervention in global conflicts is insufficient, and relevant research needs to be further strengthened.
(1) Third-party intervention in the question of Western Sahara
Third-party intervention has been an indispensable part of understanding the protracted and complex nature of the conflict throughout the development of the Western Sahara issue, and is an important concern of the existing literature.
In the past, international organizations such as the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Union played an active role in the management of conflicts in Western Sahara and in promoting peace and stability in North Africa. For example, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), established by the United Nations in 1991, has played a key role in maintaining the ceasefire, containing the conflict, and preventing its expansion. While acknowledging the EU's contribution to humanitarian assistance to refugees in Western Sahara, some of the literature also notes that while the EU has important political concerns, strategic and economic interests in the North African region, its role in conflict resolution in Western Sahara is limited due to the EU's complex policy-making process and the difficulty of balancing the diverse interests of its members. There is not much overall analysis of the AU and Western Sahara, but the role of the AU in assisting the United Nations in conflict management and resolution is recognized, and the literature shows that scholars have focused on the impact of Western Sahara on the cohesion of the AU within the AU, but there has been no in-depth analysis.
Compared with the involvement of international organizations, the involvement of the United States, France, Spain and other countries in the Western Sahara issue is generally considered to have had a negative impact on conflict resolution. Most of the existing studies believe that the U.S. policy of Western Sahara is a kind of purposive rationality, and geopolitical and economic interests are the main focus of its Western Sahara policy. Some scholars have pointed out that the global hegemonic structure of the United States has been influencing the direction of the Western Sahara conflict and the strategies of its participants since the late Cold War to the present. There is not much specific discussion of France's policy in Western Sahara in the existing literature, but the fact that most of the successive French governments pursued the practice of defending the claims of Western Sahara in favor of Morocco has attracted the attention of scholars. It has been noted that the support of the United States and France for Morocco is a reward for Morocco's long-term role as a proxy in the fight against nationalism and communism in the African region and for its "contributions" to the "global war on terror". Spain's policy of Western Sahara was not too ideological. Some scholars believe that Spain has been trying to balance international relations in the Maghreb region with an "ambiguous position" and maximize national interests. In short, the concern of countries outside the region, such as the United States, France, and Spain, is focused on geopolitical and economic interests rather than the conflict itself, which deepens the complexity of conflict resolution in Western Sahara.
As for the intervention of neighboring countries, existing studies generally regard Algeria as an important third party influencing the development and evolution of the Western Sahara issue, and its policy motives have received extensive attention. The first is the dominant theory of material interests. Many analysts see the conflict in Western Sahara as part of the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb and in Africa. Under this logic, the conflict in Western Sahara has been described as a "proxy war" between the two countries for regional dominance and a grip to maintain the regional balance of power. The pursuit of access to the Atlantic Ocean and access to the mineral resources of Western Sahara were considered economic considerations for Algeria's intervention in the conflict. The second is the theory of nationalist ideology. According to some views, Algeria's posture with regard to Western Sahara was rooted in the principles of self-determination and legal appropriation that guided its independence from French colonization. As the Algerian scholar claims, his government's position "is based on the principles of revolutionary emancipation". It was also noted that Algeria's concerns were also expressed in curbing the threat posed by Morocco's expansionism to its territorial sovereignty and in consolidating its domestic legitimacy and building its international influence by supporting the cause of self-determination. Finally, there is the comprehensive consideration of the centrists. Some scholars believe that absolute ideology or material interest theory cannot fully explain Algeria's behavior pattern in the Western Sahara conflict, and propose that understanding Algeria's role in the Western Sahara conflict is the key to breaking the stagnation of the Western Sahara peace process, and also point out that understanding Algeria's Western Sahara policy is of great significance for a comprehensive understanding of the Western Sahara issue.
In short, the topic of third-party intervention in Western Sahara has received extensive attention in existing studies. However, due to the long-term unresolved issue of Western Sahara, there have been voices of skepticism in the international community about the involvement of third parties in the issue, especially on the question of the extent to which Algeria should play and what role it should play in the settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara. The existing research fails to provide a strong explanation for the controversial nature of third-party intervention in the Western Sahara issue, which is not conducive to a comprehensive understanding of the difficulty and complexity of the Western Sahara issue. Therefore, it is of positive practical significance to strengthen the analysis of the behavior of third parties such as Algeria and understand the logical mechanism of their controversial behavior, so as to deeply understand the long-standing status quo of the Western Sahara issue and innovate conflict resolution methods.
(2) Third-party involvement in global conflicts
In the existing research on third-party intervention in conflict, the results related to the decision-making, implementation and impact of intervention policies provide a basis for this paper to theoretically explain the formation mechanism of controversial intervention in global conflicts.
Research on influencing decision-making in conflict intervening. In terms of methodology, a group of scholars such as Benjamin A. Most, Harvey Starr, and Randolph M. Siverson have developed the organizational concepts of "Opportunity" and "Willingness", focusing on the influence of the organic relationship between environmental and structural factors at the macro system level and decision-making behaviors at the micro individual level on the decision-making of intervention behaviors. It provides a mature analytical paradigm for exploring the decision-making behavior of third parties in international conflicts. In terms of factors influencing decision-making, geographical boundaries and alliance relationships, identity connections, conflict distances, power and institutions are common analytical variables in the existing explanations.
Analysis of the effectiveness of intervention policy implementation. Some studies suggest that biased third parties are more effective in ending conflicts because their gains and losses are related to the outcome of the conflict. It has also been argued that biased third parties lack legitimacy or are unable to implement effective conflict management strategies in the eyes of the parties to the conflict; It was also argued that it was pointless to talk about the impartiality or partiality of third parties in the abstract, and that the success of mediation depended critically on the acceptance of the mediator by the parties to the conflict. In terms of management conditions, some scholars believe that effective crisis management requires not only the willingness of managers, but also the resources and ability levers of managers to influence the crisis. In addition, the timing and strategy of intervention are also considered to be important influencing factors at the operational level.
Discussion of the consequences of interventions. Most of the existing studies focus on the influence of intervention behavior, such as whether the intervention motivation is legitimate, whether the intervention outcome is positive, and whether the contribution to the conflict is judged. These studies broadly divide the role of third parties in conflict into three categories: "troublemaker", "conflict manager", and "peacemaker" according to the impact and consequences of their actions. In addition, the impact of intervention on international public goods such as international order, international values, and international norms has also become an important concern.
In conclusion, the topic of third-party intervention conflict has been widely discussed, and different studies have tried to explain the intervention behavior of relevant third parties by analyzing different variables. However, the existing theories are still difficult to fully explain the phenomenon that third-party intervention is often questioned, and some empirical studies simply regard the controversial source of third-party intervention as the result of the lack of legitimacy of intervention, and relevant studies have not yet developed a universally accepted theoretical explanatory framework. Clarifying the causal mechanism of contentious intervention in conflict affairs can not only provide a more effective analytical path for analysts to explore the intervention behavior of third parties, but also provide a clearer reference idea for third parties to participate in conflict management and conflict resolution.
In view of the above review, this paper attempts to provide a general explanatory framework for the controversial nature of third-party intervention, and analyzes the causal mechanism of controversial intervention in global conflict affairs by focusing on Algeria's behavioral will in the Western Sahara issue. It can not only provide theoretical explanations and empirical support for how to better promote conflict management and conflict resolution, but also provide an observation window for a comprehensive understanding of the Western Sahara issue and the controversial intervention in the issue, and also provide a useful exploration of the solution path of the conflict.
2. Theoretical explanatory model of controversial intervention
In the reciprocal construction relationship between the self and the other, the meaning of the existence of the act is constructed based on the act itself and its impact on the environment. Based on this, in the given spatio-temporal context, the interpretation of controversial intervention needs to consider the three interrelated perspectives of the third party, the conflicting party, and other scrutinizers, and the influence of the interaction between behavior and the environment. Legitimacy, on the other hand, can be used as a key measure throughout the examination of the existence and impact of behavior. From the perspective of organization and implementation, the source of legitimacy for third-party involvement in the conflict can be reflected at any stage of the act. Therefore, considering the relationship between the actor and the examiner, as well as the decision-making, implementation and influence process of the behavior, the sources of justification of the intervention behavior can be roughly summarized into three categories: the justification of motivation, the justification of action and the justification of performance.
(1) Justification of motives and controversial involvement
Motivation is the intrinsic driving force of the actor's action, so the motivation of the actor in a conflict matter is "good" or "evil", which is usually an important indicator to measure the legitimacy of the intervention and is an indispensable part of understanding controversial intervention. Timothy D. Sisk argues that national interests are the motivations for third-party intervention, the former can include consideration of the consequences of citizen and ally security, conflict refugees, and economic recession, and international morality, which can be the maintenance of global or regional moral norms. According to Robert Nalbandov, third-party involvement is usually based on the calculation of the costs and benefits of intervention and the consideration of moral commitment to the parties to the conflict. Jacob Bercovitch argues that these motivations are mainly driven by defensive interests such as maintaining international stability and protecting the diplomatic and security interests of mediators, as well as offensive interests such as expanding and increasing one's own influence in conflicts.
Based on this, the third-party intervention in the conflict can be broadly divided into two categories: offensive intervention and defensive intervention, according to whether the third party focuses on realizing "altruistic" interests or realizing "self-interested" interests as the ultimate goal. Defensive intervention refers to the intervention of a third party in order to avoid or reduce the occurrence of a situation similar to "fire at the city gate, affecting the fish in the pond", taking into account the fact that the spillover nature of the conflict may lead to direct, indirect or potential adverse effects. The intended goal of defensive intervention is usually the desire to gain "self-interested" benefits from the realization of "altruistic" behaviors, so as to achieve a win-win situation. Such interventions therefore place more emphasis on the question of how conflicts can be resolved. Offensive intervention refers to the intervention of a third party in an attempt to use the conflict to contain or weaken its competitors, or to use the conflict as a tool to obtain some geopolitical or economic advantage. Such interventions tend to focus on the acquisition of "self-interested" interests, and pay more attention to whether the conflict can develop in a direction conducive to the realization of its goals and self-interest, rather than whether its intervention is in line with international rules and international moral standards, and whether it will have a negative impact on the conflict itself. Therefore, in terms of motivation, defensive intervention is more justified than offensive intervention and is relatively less controversial.
(2) Legitimacy of action and controversial intervention
The legitimacy of the action refers to the reasonableness and appropriateness of the relevant action that does not deviate from the constraints of the existing environment and the acceptable range of others in the process of the behavior, which is an important entry point for analyzing the controversy of the intervention behavior. In international politics, legitimacy comes from collective perception and belief, and is a manifestation of collective will, expectation and collective consensus. Some analysts have pointed out that most of the explanations of the basic connotation of legitimacy emphasize the contribution of social actors to the normative qualities of oughtness such as rules, institutions, or regimes, so justification can be broadly defined as oughtness. Therefore, whether the intervention meets international legal principles and procedures, as well as the standards of the examiner, is often the focus of judgment.
It can be seen that the legitimacy of action can be derived from a series of international systems and the criteria of judges. From the perspective of the subject, the intervention of the third party needs to be subject to institutional and institutional constraints. It is not only required to follow the relevant decision-making procedures established by international organizations and institutions; It also requires compliance with relevant international regulations, including formal international treaties and international law, as well as informal international practices and consensus. From the object point of view, acceptance by other actors or permission from the international community can also be an important source of legitimacy. For the former, Katatharina Coleman argues that there are at least four types of scrutinists that cannot be ignored: the public of the intervening country, the public of the intervening party, the neighboring countries of the intervening country, and the international community. With regard to the latter, Hu Wenxiu believes that interventions within the UN system, with the consent of both parties to the conflict, and interventions based on international consensus (such as those aimed at opposing genocide and terrorism) are all within a reasonable range. It can be said that the legitimacy of the action is to a certain extent based on "permission".
(3) Performance legitimacy and controversial intervention
Performance legitimacy refers to the potential or known value that the intervention of a third party can contribute to the maintenance of the existing order and the operation and development of the system, and more emphasis is placed on the meaning and function of the behavior. The different perceptions of justification by scholars of different theoretical camps are, to some extent, derived from the contribution value of behavior. For example, when discussing legitimacy, the British school emphasizes the ideal pursuit of maintaining order, implementing international law, and maintaining the balance of power, which can ensure the orderly operation of the international community. Constructivism emphasizes normative factors when discussing legitimacy, while realism emphasizes the material and behavioral basis of legitimacy. In universalism, the core value of the international community lies in justice, and if the intervention can uphold international justice, it is justified. Although the focus of different schools of thought is different, the interests of the state and the international community, satisfying the "small self" and realizing the "big self" are usually the focus. Therefore, whether the contribution value of the third-party intervention meets the requirements and expectations of the judging body will also become a source of controversy.
In terms of the impact of the intervention on the conflict, whether the parties to the conflict have ended the state of hostilities, or whether the outcome of the conflict has achieved lasting peace, is usually used as the central reference value for the success of the third-party intervention. However, this "peace outcome-oriented" method of judging largely ignores the consideration of the intention of the third party to intervene, and is prone to form one-sided judgments, leading to excessive denial or exaggeration of the role of the third party in conflict affairs. In response, it was suggested that durable peace should not be used as the central criterion for measuring the success of third-party involvement in conflicts, but rather that the third-party achieved its engagement agenda and objectives. For peace cannot be seen as a measure of contribution or positive impact on conflict when it is not the primary objective of intervention. For example, the primary purpose of peacekeeping interventions is to stop conflicts, not to resolve them. Therefore, the "goal-oriented" approach can more objectively judge the contribution and impact of the intervening party to the conflict, and can also reduce unnecessary controversy. Whether the relevant behavior can produce recognized performance is also an important basis for evaluating the legitimacy of intervention.
(4) Theoretical assumptions and case selection
This paper takes the behavior itself and the impact of the behavior as the logical starting point for interpreting controversial intervention, and takes the third party, the conflicting party and other examiners as the main considerations, and clarifies the generation mechanism of third-party controversial intervention from three dimensions: motivation justification, action justification, and performance legitimacy. This paper argues that the legitimacy of intervention is the core concept to explain the controversial nature of third-party intervention in global conflicts. Generally speaking, in the same spatio-temporal dimension, the possibility of controversy is relatively small for third-party intervention with a higher degree of legitimacy. On the other hand, the involvement of a third party with a lower degree of legitimacy is more likely to cause disputes. The judgment of the degree of legitimacy can be measured from the three dimensions of motivation, action and performance. Based on the above arguments, a general logical explanatory framework has been developed (see Figure 1).
It should be further clarified that in the same time and space, the lack of legitimacy in any dimension may lead to controversial intervention. Among the free combinations of the three, the combination that lacks the legitimacy of the action is the most likely to be controversial, because whether the intervention is in line with the international mechanism and the expectations of the reviewer is the most direct and easily observable judging factor. In different spatio-temporal dimensions, the strength of the three evaluation indicators can also change with time and environment. In reality, there is usually an intrinsic relationship between motivation, action, and result, and motivation gives rise to action and outcome, which in turn can verify motivation. In addition, since the basic unit of the subject of controversial intervention is a rational person, the theoretical interpretation proposed in this paper has certain limitations in clarifying the justification of the motive of third-party intervention, but this limitation does not prevent it from becoming a dimension for understanding the emergence of controversial intervention. At the same time, the theoretical analysis model proposed in this paper is mainly applicable to explain the controversy caused by the substantive intervention of a third party as a state or an international organization, and is not applicable to indirect intervention under the framework of the United Nations. For example, in a peacekeeping operation in which a country participates, the evaluation model is not applicable because the third party responsible for the actual operation is the United Nations, and it is difficult to directly quantify and evaluate the performance of the participating countries under the framework.
In this paper, we will use the three-dimensional theoretical explanatory model of the justification of "motivation-action-performance" to analyze Algeria's volitional behavior and its controversial nature in the Western Sahara issue. This case was chosen for two reasons: first, the controversial nature of third-party intervention has always been throughout the entire Western Sahara issue (Algeria is one of the more controversial third parties), which is an indispensable part of understanding the long-term, complex and intractable nature of the conflict, and can be used as a case choice to verify the internal mechanism of contentious intervention; Second, the question of Western Sahara is one of the longest conflicts on the African continent, and it has been nearly 50 years since its formation, which is conducive to observing the changes in the strength and weakness of Algeria's intervention in the legitimacy of motives, actions and performance from the perspective of time, so as to better test the validity of the above theoretical hypothesis.
Algeria's policy and position on the question of Western Sahara
Policies and positions are the most direct external manifestations of the legitimacy of Algeria's actions in the Western Sahara issue. As one of the third parties in the evolution of the question of Western Sahara, Algeria has long regarded the issue as an important concern in its national politics, and its relevant policies and positions reflect a high degree of continuity and stability. For Algeria, supporting the political aspirations of the Saharawi is not only a political commitment, but also an attitude. To a certain extent, the relevant actions have obtained the "permission" of the parties to the conflict and have not violated international legal principles, so the degree of legitimacy is relatively high.
(1) Intervention policy
Algeria has long provided stable and strong support to the Saharavian people in their quest for self-determination, in terms of political and military support, humanitarian assistance and diplomatic solidarity.
In terms of political and military guarantees, the commitment to support the cause of Saharawi self-determination was a political issue for Algeria. Historically, Algeria's relations with Morocco have been relatively bumpy due to border conflicts, the Western Sahara issue, and mutual mistrust and hostility. In 1963, there was a modest armed conflict between the two sides over a border dispute. In 1976, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Algeria over Algeria's recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The two sides were reconciled in 1988 through the Algerian-Moroccan Joint Declaration on the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations. The statement also reflected Algeria's political commitment to the cause of self-determination in Western Sahara. Algeria considers the commitment contained in the Joint Declaration "to hold an appropriate and free vote of self-determination with a view to achieving a just and definitive settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara, in absolute sincerity and without any restrictions", as one of the four bases for the normalization of relations between the two countries. In addition, Algeria allowed the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" to have its administrative center located in the Tindouf region of its territory and provided military support to the Frente POLISARIO in the early stages of the armed confrontation in the Western Sahara conflict.
In the area of humanitarian assistance, Algeria was one of the earliest supporters of the Saharavi refugees and provided continuous assistance. From the mid-70s of the twentieth century to the present, most of the Saharawi refugees have been accommodated in five camps near Tindouf in western Algeria. The Afghan government has long provided some basic social services to the camps, including investment in camp facilities, secondary education and limited higher education opportunities for refugees, and supplementary health services. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) began to intervene in the Saharavi refugee camps in the mid-80s of the 20th century. In addition, the Algerian Red Crescent Society (ALRC) has a long history of providing important coordination and logistical work for the international community's humanitarian assistance to Saharavi refugees, and is the counterpart of relevant United Nations organizations. The Government also makes an annual donation to the World Food Programme through the organization to help the refugees in Western Sahara. It can be seen that Algeria has long provided strong support for the operation of the Saharawi refugee camps.
In terms of diplomatic solidarity, Algeria has been an important driving force in the continuation of the question of Western Sahara in international political issues. Algeria has brought the question of Western Sahara to the attention of international organizations in multilateral forums such as the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and others. For example, the overwhelming adoption of a resolution calling on Morocco and Mauritania to withdraw from Western Sahara at the 1976 summit of the Organization of African Unity was inseparable from the difficult lobbying and active performance of the Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs and his delegation of 66. The accession of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic to the Organization of African Unity in 1982 was one of the landmark victories of Algeria's active international solidarity and lobbying. This led Morocco to withdraw from the Organization of African Unity in 1984 in protest of the Frente POLISARIO's attendance at the OAU summit and to remain outside the AU system for 33 years before rejoining in 2017. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic remains a full member of the AU. It can be said that the international recognition achieved by the Frente POLISARIO is closely linked to Algeria's diplomatic support.
The latest manifestation of Algeria's continuation of this political commitment was in August 2021, when Amo fell into a storm of severing diplomatic relations again due to old and new contradictions. According to the statement issued by the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Nationals, Ramtane Lamamra, Morocco's long-standing and continued "hostile behavior" against the Algerian side was the reason for its decision to sever diplomatic relations, and further stated that "Morocco has systematically or partially renounced the reference and fundamental obligations that constitute the process of normalization of relations between the two countries", including Morocco's failure to fulfill its commitment to hold a referendum on self-determination at the Organization of Western Sahara. In addition, the December 2020 U.S. recognition of Morocco's full sovereignty over Western Sahara in the context of Morocco-Israeli normalization of relations is also seen by Algeria as one of the "hostile acts" that undermine the basis for the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel.
(2) Intervention stance
Algeria's support for Western Sahara's self-determination within the framework of the United Nations had long been Algeria's consistent position on the issue, and a high degree of continuity and stability had been maintained in the changing internal and external environment. The more recent manifestations can be seen in the context of the multiple challenges faced by the Afghan government in the early stages of the pandemic and the new changes in the situation in Western Sahara at the end of 2021, and its policy position has not been shaken by these changes, but has demonstrated its consistent determination to support the Saharavian people in realizing their political aspirations.
In 2020, Algeria's economic development and social stability faced severe challenges. On the economic front, the structural crisis of the previous government, the economic and fiscal crisis under the epidemic, and the fall in hydrocarbon prices were the main reasons for the aggravation of the domestic economic crisis in Afghanistan that year. Algeria's national economy is heavily dependent on oil and gas production, and the fall in international oil prices in the second half of 2014 led to a gradual downturn in the country's economy. Its foreign exchange reserves fell from US$180 billion in 2014 to US$60 billion at the end of 2019. The trade deficit widened sharply from US$4.47 billion in 2018 to US$6.11 billion in 2019, a year-on-year increase of nearly 48%; Domestic public debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 26% in 2017 to 45% in 2019, exceeding the international alert value of 40%. Algeria's economy is facing an unprecedented shock from the twin effects of the 2020 pandemic and the collapse in hydrocarbon prices, with a widening fiscal deficit, a loss in tourism, and a decline and slowdown in foreign direct investment, weighing heavily on its fiscal and foreign exchange earnings. In addition, in 2020, Algeria was under tremendous pressure to maintain social stability. In 2019, several rounds of large-scale popular demonstrations broke out in many parts of Algeria to protest against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth term, which has been in power for 20 consecutive years. But this change is mainly driven by the unresolved livelihood demands in Afghanistan and the strong desire of the people to change. Following the election of the new President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in December 2019, he introduced a number of political, social and economic reforms aimed at quelling social instability. However, in the external environment of the global fight against the epidemic and the difficult recovery of the world economy, the Afghan government shouldered the arduous task of responding to the public health crisis, promoting structural reforms, and maintaining macroeconomic stability.
Against the backdrop of multiple challenges, Algeria's plight and public health crisis have not shaken its consistent position on Western Sahara. It is mainly reflected in three points:
First, political support that is not swayed by the situation. In November 2020, the Frente POLISARIO declared the end of a 30-year ceasefire in response to Moroccan troops' entry into the buffer zone in El Guerguerart. In December of the same year, the United States reversed its "official neutrality" stance on the issue of Western Sahara over the past 40 years and recognized Morocco's sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara. In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan reaffirmed its "firm support for the just cause of the Saharawi people".
Second, a firm will to deliver on commitments. In the wake of Algeria's announcement of the severance of diplomatic relations with Morocco in August 2021, Lamamra said Algeria was "strongly committed to supporting the organization of a referendum to determine the fate of the Saharawi people," explaining that the commitment was political and one of the conditions that Morocco must provide to rebuild relations with Algeria.
Third, continue the practice of supporting refugee camps in the past. In the early days of the pandemic in 2020, UN humanitarian agencies called on the international community to jointly respond to urgent public health needs and escalating humanitarian consequences in camps. The Algerian Red Crescent Society responded to the United Nations appeal in the form of material assistance within a short period of time. As the situation in Western Sahara escalated, the Red Crescent Society of Afghanistan provided humanitarian supplies to the camps as a sign of its consistent and continued support for the Saharavi people.
It can be seen that Algeria's policy on Western Sahara has maintained considerable stability, and its policy and stance on the issue of Western Sahara depend more on "attitude" than on "variables". At the operational level, even if it is opposed by Morocco, because Algeria's policy and position on Western Sahara do not deviate from the constraints of the existing environment and are within the scope of international law, it is more legitimate and less controversial. The legitimacy of its actions stems from three main points: first, the political commitment to support the Saharawi in realizing their political aspirations; second, the Algeria-Morocco Joint Declaration, adopted in 1988; The third is relevant support within the framework of the United Nations.
Motivation for Algeria's involvement in the question of Western Sahara
For a long time, Algeria's goal of supporting Western Sahara's "self-determination" coincided with the goal of "self-preservation" to safeguard its own interests. Although self-interest and altruism are not entirely binary in the motives for intervention, the legitimacy of their motives has been weakened by the long-term failure of the peace process on the Western Sahara issue to make breakthroughs. This paper finds that Algeria's position and policy on the Western Sahara issue is more of a moral behavior based on nationalism and national interests, and has both value rationality and instrumental rationality, which is the result of a rational choice that takes into account national interests and international morality.
(1) Value rationality
In international relations, value rationality refers to the fact that actors pay attention to the rationality of the values represented by the behavior itself, that is, whether the justice, fairness, and order of the international community can be realized, rather than the interests of the behavior. For example, "international morality" reflects the "ought-to-be" norms in the international community's dealings with each other, and reflects the international community's basic requirements for fairness and justice. Support for and uphold internationally recognized norms, principles and practices is often seen as an essential element in measuring the international morality of State actors. Algeria's policy on Western Sahara has a value and rational aspect, and embodies a certain normative and principled nature, mainly in the two footholds of "international law" and "decolonization".
First, the normative and principled nature formed by international legitimacy and international consensus. The first is to take United Nations resolutions and international law as guiding principles. In 1963, the United Nations recognized the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and added it to the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, and subsequent resolutions had clearly expressed the position that the question of Western Sahara should be self-determined in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in resolution 1514 (XV). The International Court of Justice had also given an advisory opinion in 1975 on the right of Western Sahara to self-determination. The second is the relevant principles and resolutions of the African Union. The Organization of African Unity adopted in 1964 the Resolution on Border Disputes between African States, which emphasized the commitment of all member States to respect the borders that existed at the time of independence, providing the basic principles for border disputes among African States. Most of the relevant decisions, resolutions and communiqués of the previous sessions of the African Union on the question of Western Sahara have focused on promoting and implementing the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination in order to get rid of "colonization", and have also adopted a number of resolutions emphasizing the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity to promote the realization of self-determination in Western Sahara. Therefore, Algeria's support for the self-determination of Western Sahara is internationally moral, judging by its support for and upholding the norms, principles and practices recognized by the international community.
Second, normative and principled, shaped by revolutionary traditions and anti-colonial experiences. Algeria's long experience of colonial rule (1830~1962) and the history of the difficult and bloody national liberation struggle (1954~1962) are indelible revolutionary wounds for its people, which also makes Algeria's domestic and foreign policies after the establishment of the state have a strong nationalist color. Internally, nationalist ideology is an important part of Algeria's political mobilization and political stability. Externally, self-determination, sovereignty and non-interference have become important guiding principles and normative principles of Algerian nationalist diplomacy. After independence, Algeria actively defended national independence and promoted national liberation struggles around the world, and played an important role in supporting African liberation movements and liquidating colonialism. At the same time, it emphasizes sovereignty externally and advocates the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. As a result, Algeria became the "benchmark" of the nationalist revolution in the Third World and one of the important leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, which had a wide influence in the Third World.
In the past, the Saharawi people's aspirations for self-determination had also benefited from Algeria's sense of moral imperative to actively support the liberation revolution and oppose colonialism. In particular, the emphasis on the principle of self-determination had received strong support from Algeria, which had experienced a heavy experience of colonization. Declassified United States documents show that Algeria had claimed that the provision of weapons and shelters to the Frente POLISARIO was out of respect for the "sacred cause" of self-determination. Scholars also said that since the question of Western Sahara was resolved by the international community, Algeria had always regarded it as a "colonial reckoning issue", with the Argerian position based on the "principles of revolutionary liberation" and the Frente POLISARIO as "a struggle movement seeking independence and liberation and working to liberate its homeland from colonial rule". On that basis, Algeria believed that "it can be resolved only through the application of international law and the principles recognized by the United Nations and the African Union on this issue", and stated that its consistent position was "in line with the international consensus and the doctrine of the United Nations on decolonization". It can be said that the norms and principles that Algeria followed in the question of Western Sahara were nourished to a certain extent by the "soil" of its nationalist ideology.
(2) Instrumental rationality
From the perspective of international politics, instrumental rationality can refer to the effect or ability of an actor to obtain a certain value by using things, things, and concepts through the way of calculating utilitarianism, and emphasizing more on the purposefulness of the behavior itself, rather than the pursuit of justice, responsibility, and equal value meaning. In fact, it is not convincing to understand the motivations of Algeria's policy of Western Sahara in terms of "morality for its own sake" interpretive framework, since consideration of the interests of the nation-state is also one of the important factors in the firmness of its policy, which goes beyond its concerns about the Saharavi's demand for self-determination.
First, based on security considerations. Algeria's support for the Frente POLISARIO was a vigilant response to Moroccan national irredentism. In Morocco's historical narrative, Western Sahara, Mauritania, and parts of western Algeria were part of the geography of "Greater Morocco" before it was ruled by colonial powers. In addition to Western Sahara, Morocco has claimed sovereignty over Mauritania and Algeria's Tindouf and Béchar in order to recover their "historic territories." There is an argument that supporting Morocco's territorial claims to Western Sahara would fuel its "expansionist" ambitions. Moroccan scholars agree that Algeria has similar concerns. Thus, Algeria's support for self-determination in Western Sahara was not only motivated by concerns about Morocco's "expansionism", but also by a rational defense against external threats to its territorial sovereignty.
After independence, Algeria and Morocco still had the problem of territorial boundaries left over from colonization. Algeria's position on self-determination in Western Sahara was relatively vague until the border issue was resolved, and it was only after Morocco signed an agreement in 1972 that it formally renounced its claims to Tindouf and Beshar that Algeria explicitly supported Western Sahara nationalism. However, Morocco's renunciation of its claim to its "historic territory" and recognition of Algeria's borders were conditional on the Argerian side in exchange for its support for Morocco's territorial claims to Western Sahara. Although unrealized, Algeria's early gestures were instrumental in inducing Morocco to recognize the borders. It can be said that Algeria's policy of Western Sahara was, to a certain extent, the result of confrontation with Moroccan national unityism.
Secondly, based on the consideration of regional dominance. There is a view that supporting the Frente POLISARIO is the strategic core of Algeria's pursuit of the status of a North African power, and that containing Morocco's regional forces through the conflict in Western Sahara has become an important means for the Algerian side. "Algeria's consideration is that supporting Morocco's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara would strengthen Morocco and upset the balance of power between the two countries," a former Argerian official said. It is undeniable that if Western Sahara were to be annexed, Morocco would not only be able to expand its territory, but would also have access to more land and sea resources, and that a "friendly country" under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO would be more beneficial to Algeria. It is not surprising, then, that the Frente POLISARIO can easily be seen as an "agent" of the political and military conflict between Amo in the discourse of the struggle for regional dominance.
Regional rivalries and disputes over Western Sahara have given rise to a "cold peace" between Morocco and Algeria, with a long history of paramilitary operations between the two countries. The military concerns of the Moroccan side are mainly focused on the control and protection of the Western Sahara under its control, and the maintenance of a strong defensive line against the Afghan side in the northern Sahara; Increasing defense spending and modernizing its land, sea and air systems have hardly dispelled Morocco's perception that Algeria intends to become a dominant force in the region. The ongoing rivalry between the two countries also extends to the diplomatic realm, with both sides trying to win over allies from the African Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations on Western Sahara in order to move it in their favor. Thus, Algeria's support for the Frente POLISARIO can be considered part of its rivalry with Morocco.
Finally, many analysts believe that Algeria's coveting access to the Atlantic Ocean to export its natural resources was one of the key motivations of its Western Sahara policy, but this interpretation is controversial. Some scholars have analyzed the content of the draft of the 2001 "Baker Plan", its geographical route, and its geoeconomic situation, and have concluded that Algeria's policy motives for Western Sahara have almost nothing to do with the acquisition of access to the sea. Overall, however, Algeria's deep-seated motivation for Saharawi self-determination stems more from historical and political factors than from economic ones.
In summary, international morality and self-interest are the two key points for understanding Algeria's policy resilience and behavioral stalemate on the Western Sahara issue. From the perspective of international norms, international principles and international law, the motive of intervention policy has considerable morality, but at the same time, the self-interested motive shows that it weakens this morality, which weakens the legitimacy of its motive to a certain extent, and thus becomes a foreshadowing of its controversial intervention.
V. The Controversy and Commentary on Algeria's Role in the Question of Western Sahara
Algeria is widely recognized as an important intervening force in the Western Sahara issue, but its role in the Western Sahara issue is controversial, and behind the controversy is the gap between the performance expectations of the scrutinizers, especially Morocco, and the substantive contributions of third parties. In terms of performance, the lack of contribution to the peace process in Western Sahara has led to the "self-interest" character of Algeria's relevant volitional behavior being highlighted and the "altruistic" character weakened, which is the key to understanding its controversial role in the conflict.
(i) "Parties" or "observers"
On the issue of Western Sahara, Algeria and Morocco have different understandings of the focus of conflict resolution and peace talks, and the two sides have a-for-tat position on what role Algeria should play in the conflict. From the perspective of intervention performance, Algeria's failure to live up to the value expected by its examiners in the Western Sahara issue is an important foothold for understanding the controversial nature of its role.
For Morocco, Algeria is the main "party" and "responsible party" to the "man-made dispute" that has caused regional instability and created the question of Western Sahara. In Moroccan discourse, the question of Western Sahara is a question of Morocco's internal sovereignty influenced by external factors. Algeria is the most important "external influence"; The Frente POLISARIO is a "mercenary group financed by Algeria"; The refugee camps near Tindouf were used as "tools" for the "separatists" to achieve their political goals. Therefore, Algeria under the Moroccan discourse is a pure egoist, a "major party" to the Western Sahara question, and should be directly involved in the negotiations. In 2014, in his national message on the occasion of the 39th anniversary of the Green March, King Mohammed VI reiterated that "there will be no solution unless Algeria, the main party to this conflict, is held accountable". In 2018, the representative of Morocco also stated at the UN General Assembly that "the 'man-made dispute' related to Western Sahara remains the main source of instability in the region, hindering joint action and the integration of the Maghreb region" and that the Arab side "should participate effectively and directly in this regard, as the country bears historical and political responsibility for creating, fuelling and prolonging this dispute". Morocco is therefore convinced that Algeria has a key role to play in resolving the conflict and overcoming obstacles and should be directly involved in the negotiations on the conflict.
Contrary to Morocco's constant emphasis on the centrality of Algeria in the negotiation process and in the settlement of the conflict, Algeria has clearly positioned its role in the settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara as a "neighbouring country" and "observer", rather than as a "party" in the peace process. On several occasions, Aermen has publicly emphasized its role as an "observer" in the question of Western Sahara and its coordinating role in the settlement process. As stated in 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of China said, "As a neighbouring country and observer of the settlement process, Algeria reaffirms its support for the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Personal Envoy and pledges to cooperate with them in their efforts to promote a solution between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO that will enable the people of Western Sahara to freely exercise their right to self-determination". Moreover, Algeria rejects the assertion of responsibility in the question of Western Sahara. Lamamra has publicly stressed that Algeria is not a "party to the conflict" and that "since 1975 the parties to the conflict have been Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO" and "rejects Morocco's attempts to 'bilateralize' the conflict in Western Sahara and make it a 'regional dispute' between Amo." ”
Before analysing the role that Algeria should play in conflict resolution and the extent to which it should play in the peace process in Western Sahara, it is important to point out that "the origin of the conflict" and "why the conflict persists" are not the same proposition. While the incompatibility between Morocco's goal of "recovering its historic territories" and the Frente POLISARIO's goal of self-determination had been evident at all stages of the development of the conflict in Western Sahara, it was no longer the only factor contributing to the persistence of the problem in Western Sahara. The development of the political and economic situation in the world, the changes in the forces of the main forces of the conflict, and the intervention of stakeholders have gradually become a non-negligible part of the sustainable existence of the Western Sahara issue. This means that the factors that need to be considered in conflict resolution should not be limited to the subject of the conflict itself, but also need to consider the impact of other sequential factors on the development and resolution of the conflict. This is important for understanding Algeria's role in the question of Western Sahara.
What is certain is that Algeria's actions and decisions, whether intentional or unintentional, have become one of the important forces driving the development and evolution of the Western Sahara issue. In recent years, the United Nations has called on Algeria to contribute to the negotiation process as a neighbouring country, and it has also demonstrated the international community's expectation that Algeria will play a greater role in conflict resolution. Therefore, although it is not a party to the direct conflict on the question of Western Sahara, Algeria, as an important force in the development and evolution of the question of Western Sahara, is deeply involved in its neighbours and the countries of the Maghreb region, and it is incumbent upon it to play a greater role in promoting the political process and maintaining peace and development in the region on the basis of multilateralism.
(ii) "Significant Force" or "Determinating Force"
Although Algeria is one of the major forces driving the evolution of the Western Sahara issue, its importance in the conflict may be exaggerated. In the past, there was no shortage of analysts who held the view that the Frente POLISARIO would resume armed conflict only with the permission and support of Algeria. The differing views on the extent to which Algeria could influence the question of Western Sahara reflect the differences in the expectations of the examiners of Algeria in terms of the intervening function. However, the fragile peace in Western Sahara was shattered at the end of 2020 showed that it would be rather incomplete to equate the willingness and ability of the Western Saharan nationalists to rearm with Algeria's support for the Frente POLISARIO. The main reasons are as follows:
First, the stagnant political process has increased the desire of the Saharavi population to pursue their political demands through violence. Since 1988, when the parties to the conflict agreed to accept a ceasefire agreement, the question of Western Sahara has not been resolved for more than 30 years and has not received the attention it deserves, and the Saharavian population has become increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress in the political process under the framework of the United Nations. Ibrahim Gali, the leader of the Frente POLISARIO, has said that "the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council have failed to take strong action ... This undermines the credibility of the United Nations and makes the Saharawi people even more discouraged from the already fragile United Nations peace process. "Moreover, the continuing deterioration of conditions in the Saharawi camps, the protracted humanitarian crisis and the fatigue of the international community are all having an increasingly negative impact on the general psychology of the camps. Studies have shown that there is a widespread belief in refugee camps that war may be the best way to increase aid, not only to attract the attention of the international community, but also to donors who are considered more likely to contribute to areas of violent conflict. As a result, the voices of the Saharawis, especially local youth, for the resumption of armed hostilities with Morocco are growing louder.
Secondly, the Frente POLISARIO was under pressure to change its tactics of struggle. For too long, the Frente POLISARIO, as the representative of the Saharawi people's political forces in their quest for self-determination, had failed to lead the Saharawi people in their aspirations for self-determination. On the contrary, Morocco has an increasing advantage in the conflict in Western Sahara. This was a great challenge to the Frente POLISARIO's strategy of abandoning armed fighting and maintaining a non-violent struggle for a long time. The call of the Saharavian population for a change in the status quo was, to a large extent, the main reason for the change in the Frente POLISARIO's mode of struggle. The leader of the Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, has said that those calling for a return to hostilities believe that the ceasefire is conditional on a referendum and that it can be declared null and void without a referendum.
Finally, the legitimacy of the Frente POLISARIO was challenged from within. On April 22, 2020, the creation of The Movement of "Sahrawis for Peace" (MSP) broke the Frente POLISARIO as the sole political force for the Saharawi to pursue and achieve their goal of self-determination for the past half-century. The emergence of this force was not only the result of a series of problems such as the stagnation and poor prospects of the political settlement process in Western Sahara, the endless exodus of the Saharavies and the deterioration of living conditions in the refugee camps, but also the product of the declining legitimacy and credibility of the Frente POLISARIO. According to the North African Post, the Saharawi peace movement "was born out of the frustration, anger and resentment of the Saharavian people at the corruption, incompetence and oppression of the leaders of the Frente POLISARIO, who had failed to reach a lasting solution to the problem of Western Sahara and put an end to the suffering of the Saharavies", and instead the Frente POLISARIO leaders continued to benefit from the plight of the Saharavies.
In short, Algeria's support did not in fact have a decisive impact on the new dynamics in Western Sahara at the end of 2020. The declaration by the Frente POLISARIO of the resumption of armed hostilities was largely the result of the interplay of a number of factors, including the indifference and inaction of the international community, the growing dominance of Morocco and the challenges within the Saharavi. But with or without Algeria's involvement, Western Sahara's nationalism existed as early as the Spanish colonial period, and the Saharawi people's desire for self-determination persisted. Recognizing this is essential to understanding the role that Algeria can play in the question of Western Sahara. However, although Algeria's role in the question of Western Sahara was not decisive, given its status as an important force in the development and evolution of the question of Western Sahara, it was difficult to eliminate or reduce the controversial nature of its involvement if it actively strengthened its contribution to the peace process.
VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes Algeria's will to act in the Western Sahara issue and shows the causal mechanism of controversial intervention in conflict affairs. The case shows that the three-dimensional justification framework of "motivation-action-performance" can provide a generalizable theoretical explanation model for analyzing the controversy of third-party intervention in conflict affairs. At the level of motivation, Algeria's intervention motives do not conform to the context of "pure altruism" that it has always shown to the outside world, nor does it conform to the image of "absolute egoist" constructed in the Moroccan discourse system, on the contrary, its intervention has the dual characteristics of "altruism" and "self-interest". In terms of upholding international legitimacy, Algeria's motives for intervention are quite moral, but its self-interested aspect weakens the morality of its actions to a certain extent. In particular, with the long-term unresolved issue of Western Sahara, external doubts about the self-interest of its intervention have increased, reducing the degree of legitimacy of its motives, and becoming a formative factor for controversial intervention. At the operational level, Algeria's policy and stance on Western Sahara are not only in line with the relevant resolutions and principles of the United Nations, the African Union and other international organizations, but also in line with its revolutionary tradition and its usual practice of opposing colonialism. At the performance level, as an important but non-decisive third party in promoting the development and evolution of the Western Sahara issue, although Algeria has always played an important role in maintaining the normal operation of the Saharavi refugee camps, its intervention is also considered to have made insufficient contribution to the promotion of the political settlement process and regional peace and development in Western Sahara, which makes the "self-interested" character of Algeria's relevant volitional behavior more prominent and the "altruistic" nature weakened. The lack of justification for performance is therefore a key point in understanding its controversial role.
It is worth mentioning that, as the global security posture is relational in nature, it requires coordination and cooperation among different stakeholders to achieve good governance in global security governance. Therefore, the intervention of a third party in a conflict matter is not unnecessary, but the relevant act must meet the most basic threshold for intervention, that is, it must have sufficient legitimacy, otherwise it is easy to be questioned. In addition, in the context of conflict resolution, it is important to note that "the origin of the conflict" and "the persistence of the conflict" are not identical. Because the correlation between the causes of the initial occurrence of the conflict and the reasons for its persistence can change dynamically over time and in the case of Western Sahara, the correlation between the causes of the conflict and the reasons for its persistence can change dynamically, and has even diminished in the case of Western Sahara. This shows that in conflict resolution, we should not only focus on the subject of the conflict itself and overemphasize the primary problem of the conflict, but also consider the impact of other posterior factors (such as third-party intervention) on the development and resolution of the conflict. In this way, the negative impact of third-party intervention on conflicts can be reduced to a certain extent, and the positive effects of third-party intervention can be better explored. The above findings are not only applicable to the case of Western Sahara, but can also provide inspiration for other regional conflict cases, such as the equally protracted Palestinian-Israeli issue, to innovate conflict resolution paths.
(The views in this article are only the author's personal views and do not represent the position of the Institute of Middle East Studies and this WeChat subscription account.) ）
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