Author 丨 Luo Chao
Responsible editor 丨 Luo Chao
Editor 丨Zhu Jinbin
"We are confident that by 2025, we will achieve the sales target of 300,000 vehicles and achieve the goal of ranking among the top three domestic pure electric car brands." Two years ago, the troubled Yundu car chose to start again, and Lin Mi of the "Second Palace" swore in Xiamen about his "five-year plan".
However, two years later, when the news came again, it was not the good news of "Yundu's return to the track", but the announcement of "the capital chain was broken and the production was announced".
In two years, the new energy market has been soaring, with industrial pattern, technology iteration, operation system, manufacturing concept, market scale... Everything has long been in the vicissitudes. Standing in a corner of the cloud can only sigh lonely, the noise is always someone else's, they are just going around in an insoluble circle, waiting to enter the next cycle, or directly into the dust of history.
When Lin Mi returned, there were two "white knights" standing next to him. In 2020, Putian SDIC and the new funder Fujian Longtou Industry Equity Investment Fund Partnership (Limited Partnership) undertook all the equity of Fuqi Group, and after undertaking, Putian SDIC rose to the single largest shareholder, with the shareholding ratio rising to 43.44%, and the new shareholder Fujian Longtou Fund holding 30%.
The "generosity" of these two is the absolute support of Lin Mi shouting out the "2025 goal", the former's state-owned asset background is clear at a glance, and the latter's back is also standing citic trust co., LTD., Fujian Industrial Equity Investment Fund Co., Ltd. and other strong capital, the strength is naturally unquestionable.
Subsequently, the founder Liu Xinwen withdrew his shares and ran away, and his shareholding was taken over by Zhuhai Yucheng Investment Center (Limited Partnership), and the actual controller of this enterprise was Lin Mi, who looked like he wanted to do a big job.
However, the adjustment of the equity structure and the injection of new capital have not been exchanged for the rebirth of Yundu. Under the sharp shock of the internal and external market environment, in April this year, Yundu's fourth largest shareholder, Haiyuan Composite, issued an announcement that it would transfer all 11% of the shares held by Yundu New Energy Automobile Co., Ltd. to Zhuhai Yucheng Investment Center Limited Partnership.
In the announcement, Haiyuan Composite also revealed the recent situation of Yundu - the capital chain was broken, and it was in a state of suspension since February. Always hovering on the edge of the market, the nearly "invisible" Cloud degree has once again returned to the public eye as a loser.
With the change of equity again, there are voices that this time Yundu recovered external shares, in order to package and sell to JuneYao Group, Yundu has been acquired by JuneYao Group, and the two sides have signed relevant agreements. "The people sent by JuneYao have taken office, taken over Yundu Automobile in its entirety, and also dug up a technical team from a leading car company."
Yes, Yundu seems to be "difficult not to die" again, as to whether JuneYao's takeover is a sign of "there will be a blessing", it has to start from how Yundu has come to such a situation step by step.
Death of Yundu
In fact, as a well-deserved "front wave" among the new forces, Yundu was established in 2015, obtained production qualifications in 2017, and released the first model of small pure electric SUV "Yundu π1" in the same year.
With a low-end strategy, Yundu preemptively, saying that the advance layout is good, saying that catching up with the subsidy dividend, 2018 Yundu does look like breaking out of a summer, with annual sales of 9,300 vehicles, and that year's Weilai is only able to hand over 11,300 vehicles.
In a year' time, from manufacturing to delivery, in the "too fast" a voice of doubt, Yundu's sales immediately took a sharp turn, sales in 2019 fell to 2,566 vehicles, and then fell into a state of suspension of work and production, the cumulative sales of Yundu in the first quarter of this year were only 516 vehicles, and most of them were inventory models. From the highlight to the trough, it is only a year, and the sadness of "debut is the peak" is not exhausted.
The price of market stagnation is that Yundu inevitably falls into the quagmire of continuous losses. From 2017 to 2020, Yundu's net loss was 0.95 billion yuan, 138 million yuan, 177 million yuan and 204 million yuan, respectively. According to the financial report, in 2021, Yundu Automobile's revenue was 67.7632 million yuan, with a net loss of 213 million yuan, and the revenue in the first quarter of this year was 6.6025 million yuan, with a net loss of 0.56 billion yuan.
Perhaps in the eyes of the mainstream new forces, it is only the amount of loss of "small fights and small troubles", and for the cloud degree of "small steps and fast walking", it is already an unbearable weight of life, it is impossible to make a profit for many years, the financing and transfusion channels are blocked, and the fragile capital chain is shattered as soon as it is touched.
What is swinging this heavy fist is undoubtedly the severe situation of the new energy industry today. On the one hand, policy subsidies have relentlessly declined, and the market has been tested by the supply chain level such as chip shortages and rising raw material prices; on the other hand, large manufacturers such as millet and Huawei have entered the game, and traditional car companies have opened a new energy "all-out war", and the market competition has become increasingly fierce.
There is no doubt that for Yundu, which missed development opportunities and over-relied on subsidy policies, it is really difficult to create an effective response mechanism for travel, and in the face of strong competitors, its comprehensive competitiveness is weak, and having no right to speak in the market is the "original sin". When the dust of the times poured down, the mountains above Yundu's head were bound to overwhelm it.
"Yundu car building is serious." At the beginning, in Liu Xinwen's view, where the opportunity for a new brand is, mainly depends on what kind of mechanism the company is, what kind of attitude it has towards manufacturing products, and these two can determine the future of the enterprise.
But looking back, Yundu's internal operating mechanism has been in a rather unstable environment for a long time. Frequent adjustment of the equity structure makes the decision-making and communication mechanism of Yundu torn apart to varying degrees internally, and it is difficult to form a unified centripetal force within the enterprise, and the company's operational efficiency is naturally decreasing.
Externally, the adjustment of the equity structure has also greatly affected the choice confidence of consumers and dealers, resulting in the inability of Yundu to form a stable brand image and channel system.
Compared with the chaotic operating mechanism, Yundu's performance at the product manufacturing level should be more deadly. Since the first car π1 was launched and delivered in 2017, Yundu is still relying on two small cars to support it.
Although derivatives of π1 and π3 were launched during the period, the lackluster product strength has long been unable to keep up with the pace of market iteration, and the once-sensational Yundu X-π concept car and π7 model have not been found.
In the face of the continuous expansion of products of a number of second-tier new forces such as zero running and Nezha, the product matrix of Yundu's single lack of products appears to have no ability to fight back, not to mention that in the quality of the product itself, whether it is embarrassing collision results, or continuous brake failures, endurance virtual standards and other product complaints, Yundu has lost the qualification to participate in the mainstream new energy market competition.
Although Lin Mi proposed a set of technical solutions in the fields of pure electricity platform, three-electricity technology and intelligent network connection when lin mi returned, and tried to test the water travel business, create a user service system and innovate the channel model, but it was like a breeze and water, there was no trace. The value chain system conceived by Lin Mi has long been full of holes in the nibbling of the capital chain.
Slow iteration of product technology, difficult to stabilize the internal operating mechanism, weak sales channels and user service system, making the fall of Yundu a "necessity".
JuneYao, gambling strong
At this time, Yun Du, who had entered a desperate situation, once ushered in his own "savior" - JuneYao Group. However, the clear-eyed people can see that now that Yundu is a chicken feather, why does JuneYao have to clean up this "mess"?
The three wang family brothers who founded JuneYao should like the four big words hanging on the wall of Zeng Yuqun's office: Gamble Strong.
From the beginning, riding on the east wind of the 1991 Asian Games, earning the first bucket of gold by making flags and badges, and auctioning the permanent operating warrants of nearly 100 taxis in Wenzhou at a sky-high price of 688,000 yuan in 1998, the establishment of JuneYao Group carried some gambling ingredients.
Subsequently, in 2004, JuneYao Group acquired the shares of the listed company building (now Great Eastern) held by Wuxi State-owned Assets, completed the listing of Juneyao Airlines in 2015, and in 2018, through the transfer of shares and the fixed increase into the main Aijian Group, promoted the healthy listing of JuneYao in 2020 and completed the capital layout.
In the capital market, JuneYao's capital operation logic often looks a little rough. This diversified business model and extensive capital operation mode have also made JuneYao Group questionable, believing that it "does what makes money, without market deep cultivation, to put it bluntly, JuneYao is gambling." ”
JuneYao's most recent impressive gamble was to form a 30 billion joint team to try to acquire HNA Group, which seems to the outside world to be a crazy snake swallowing elephant. It should be known that JuneYao Group's annual revenue in 2020 is only 26 billion yuan, while the net assets of HNA Holdings are -30 billion yuan.
Although HNA finally chose fangda group engaged in the steel industry, JuneYao Group returned home, but JuneYao Group's "bold and bold" bet still attracted the attention of everyone.
However, in the view of JuneYao Group, in the future long-term operation, it is difficult for the company to predict what kind of risks it will encounter, and if all its business is pressed into one industry, problems will inevitably arise.
"Our design logic is that JuneYao Group will always be there, so we chose the path of diversified investment and professional management, hoping that these pillars can thrive." JuneYao Group President Wang Junhao once said.
Diversifying investment is the strategic direction that JuneYao has adhered to for a long time, and unintentional gambling has become one of the most distinctive corporate personalities.
Nowadays, everyone knows that the trillion-dollar new energy market is a treasure buried everywhere, JuneYao wants to tap new growth points, and then create brilliance, the automotive industry is not only an area that cannot be bypassed, but also the best choice for JuneYao to integrate its air transport, financial services, large consumption and technological innovation businesses to form complementary advantages.
What's more, in the case of hidden worries in the major "pillars" of JuneYao, it does need to expand its strong areas to find new business growth points and revitalize existing assets.
It can be seen that whether it is JuneYao Health, which has been pinned on high hopes, or Juneyao Airlines, which has been tested, or Aijian Group, which is no longer highlighted, they are all suffering from the pain of industry transformation to varying degrees.
The golden period of rapid growth of the ambient lactic acid bacteria beverage market is gradually gone, coupled with the fierce competition pattern of the low-price dimension, the "taste power" normal temperature lactic acid bacteria series products that occupy more than 90% of JuneYao Health will naturally not be better.
The performance report shows that JuneYao Health's operating income in 2020 was 852 million yuan, down 31.62% year-on-year, and the net profit attributable to the mother was 214 million yuan, down 27.6% year-on-year.
In the air transport industry under the influence of the epidemic, there is no need to say more. In 2020, Juneyao Airlines' net profit attributable to the mother was about -473 million yuan, following a year-on-year decline of 19.34% in net profit in 2019, and once again encountered Waterloo, a sharp decline of 147.64% year-on-year.
In a previous interview with the media, Wang Junjin, the actual controller of JuneYao Group, said that the aviation business accounted for about 40% of the profits of the "JuneYao system". There is no doubt that under the impact of the epidemic, half of JuneYao's territory is experiencing strong shocks.
Not only that, as the development trend of the trust industry is changing, aijian Group, whose main performance depends on trusts, has gradually shown a downturn. Although from 2018 to 2020, the net profit attributable to the parent of Aijian Group was 1.158 billion yuan, 1.319 billion yuan and 1.352 billion yuan, respectively, all of which achieved positive growth.
However, from the perspective of net profit, the growth rate has slowed down from 39.57% and 13.88% in the previous two years to 2.51% in 2020.
Therefore, when Evergrande, Skyworth and other enterprises have quickly established R&D and production capabilities through the acquisition of weak car companies, and plunged into the new energy track, JuneYao, whose development of its own pillar sector is blocked, will inevitably be eager to move.
In fact, at the end of last year, there were rumors that Aiways Automobile was in contact with JuneYao Group, which may invest in Aiways Automobile.
It is worth noting that JuneYao Group has a layout and experience in the automotive business. Its subsidiary Great Eastern has laid out "Dongfang Automobile", focusing on the regional market, establishing cooperative relations with 25 automobile brand manufacturers, with a total of 43 4S stores in Wuxi and surrounding cities, and has also been continuously listed in the top 100 Chinese automobile dealer groups, which shows that the strength is not bad.
However, because Dongfang Automobile is mainly based on the operation of low-end 4S points, except for a few BMW, Lexus and other brand 4S stores profitable, most of the remaining low-end 4S stores are greatly affected by the downturn of the traditional automotive industry and are in a state of loss, so Great Eastern's automobile sales and service business was divested, and the 51% equity of Orient Automobile and New Era Automobile was sold to the controlling shareholder Building Group for 1.095 billion yuan.
However, since it is the controlling shareholder, once JuneYao takes over Yundu, it is possible to use the distribution channels of shareholders and the sinking channels of the low-end market to open up a part of the C-end market for Yundu.
In addition, as long as you review the entity business of JuneYao Group, whether it is Juneyao Airlines or JuneYao Health, it is obvious that JuneYao has many years of operating experience in the low-cost and low-line market, and the degree of grasp of the low-end or sinking market is supported by JuneYao, which is also the market segment where Yundu is located.
As for whether the competitors that still adopt the low-price and low-quality strategy have undertaken the exit share of other core brands, or whether they have embarked on the road of high-end like JuneYao Health, this is one of the issues that JuneYao needs to consider after taking over Yundu.
Of course, the market positioning of products and brands is not yet a top priority, and the top priority is how much fresh blood can be stationed after JuneYao enters the main cloud?
It should be known that Yundu is now in a state of waste, product technology iteration, sales channels, user service system, every link is a "bottomless pit" of capital. Looking around the market, "Wei Xiaoli" has more than 50 billion cash flow in his hands to feel unhurried, although JuneYao Group has a wide range of layout, but it is difficult to come up with a capital that can bring Yundu back to life.
Taking JuneYao Group's 2019 financial report data, its total operating income was 31.767 billion yuan, an increase of 15.35% year-on-year; although the net profit attributable to the parent company increased by 26.17% year-on-year, it was only 348 million yuan.
Unless JuneYao shows the courage to annex HNA, if it is only to "repair and repair" in a small range, or embark on the old road of "enclosure" and leverage, the final outcome will be self-evident.