The author | Wang Yunpeng
The source | Auto Grand view
Beiqi Blue Valley, the first stock of new energy vehicles in the past, has lost money again.
On March 26, the annual performance report of Beiqi Blue Valley was released. According to the annual report data, its operating income in 2021 was about 8.697 billion yuan, an increase of 46.95% year-on-year; the net profit attributable to the shareholders of the parent company was -5.244 billion yuan, a loss of 19% less than the same period last year. Net cash flow from operating activities was $4,985 million, a positive cash flow.
Judging from the annual report data, the performance of Beiqi Blue Valley in 2021 improved slightly, but it still failed to reverse the status quo of huge losses in performance. In this regard, Beiqi Blue Valley said that the reason for the huge loss is mainly due to the impact of the epidemic, and the production and sales data have not met expectations.
It is worth mentioning that this is not the first "thunderstorm" of Beiqi Blue Valley's performance. In 2020, due to the epidemic and the intensification of market competition, it has already lost 6.482 billion yuan. Counting the net profit attributable to the mother in 2021 of -5.244 billion yuan, the loss of Beiqi Blue Valley has reached 11.726 billion yuan in two years.
"According to the latest rules, although we have suffered losses for two consecutive years, there will be no ST situation, nor will it wear stars and delist," said Zhao Ji, secretary of the board of directors of Beiqi Blue Valley, saying that the current regulatory thinking of the CSRC has been adjusted, no longer only looking at the net profit ability of listed companies, but paying more attention to the ability to continue to operate, Beiqi Blue Valley has core capabilities in continuous operation, and the operating conditions are stable.
In fact, I am not surprised by the huge loss of Beiqi Blue Valley again, because the loss of new energy vehicle companies in 2021 is more common, of which Weilai lost 4.0169 billion yuan and the ideal loss was 1.02 billion. However, compared with other new force car companies, the loss of Beiqi Blue Valley is really a little hopeless.
In addition, combined with the sales performance of 26,127 vehicles in 2021, people can't help but worry about where the way out of Beiqi Blue Valley is.
A benchmark for yesteryear
Although the current situation is difficult to describe in a tragic word, this does not hide the glory of Beiqi Blue Valley.
Turn the clock back 11 years. On November 14, 2009, BAIC BJEV, as the core subsidiary of BAIC Blue Valley, was established. In December of the following year, BAIC BJEV's first batch of pure electric vehicles EV150 rolled off the production line. Public data shows that in the first year of sales, BAIC BJEV sold only 1,600 vehicles. However, thanks to the fact that the establishment time was 5 years earlier than the first year of the domestic new energy vehicles recognized by the industry (2014), BAIC BJEV successfully stood at the forefront of leading the development trend of domestic new energy vehicles in the subsequent development.
Time to 2015, as the concept of sharing economy began to spread in various industries, as a car time-sharing leasing industry under the sharing economy, under the guidance of the rapid development of the new energy automobile industry and policies such as purchase restrictions, travel restrictions, and number restrictions, it has also developed rapidly. This also gave BAIC BJEV the opportunity to pay attention to the B-end market, and its product sales began to increase rapidly.
In 2017, BAIC BJEV's cumulative sales reached 103,100 units, accounting for 23% of the domestic market share of new energy vehicles that year, and it was the first pure electric vehicle company in China to produce and sell more than 100,000 vehicles per year. Looking at the global new energy vehicle market, BAIC BJEV's sales volume that year was second only to Tesla, ranking second.
It is worth mentioning that this year, BAIC BJEV also successfully broke through the mixed network sales model, forming a national layout of 280 sales stores, 249 service stations, and a sales network covering 25 provinces and 139 cities.
In 2018, BAIC BJEV continued to grow at a high speed, with its cumulative sales of more than 10 pure electric vehicle models in 6 series, including EH, EU, EX, EV, EC, and LITE, exceeding 158,000 units throughout the year, an increase of 53% year-on-year, and achieving operating income of about 16.438 billion yuan, an increase of 43.02% year-on-year.
At the same time, relevant statistics show that by 2018, compared with 2013 in the early stage of marketization, BAIC BJEV's personnel scale increased by 12 times, the scale of assets increased by 47 times, and product sales increased by 97 times. Years of rapid growth have also allowed BAIC BJEV to land on A-shares in September 2018 through a backdoor listing of S Blue Valley (the securities company said it was changed to BAIC Blue Valley).
Then in 2019, BAIC BJEV's sales once again exceeded 150,000 vehicles, winning the title of domestic pure electric vehicle market sales champion for 7 consecutive years.
The brilliant performance of BAIC New Energy has also made BAIC Blue Valley the limelight for a while and has become a benchmark in the industry.
The aura faded rapidly
At this point in time in 2019, the annual sales of 150,000 vehicles can not be described as outstanding.
However, behind the achievement of Beiqi Blue Valley, there are not no hidden worries. The data shows that at the end of 2019, the sales volume of Beiqi Blue Valley fell by 4.69% year-on-year. And that's just the beginning of its declining sales. In 2020, Beiqi Blue Valley's sales "fell and fell" to another level, falling to 25,900 vehicles, a drop of 83%, and the market share fell from 23% at its peak to less than 1%.
If the plunge in sales in 2020 can also be attributed to the impact of the epidemic, then in 2021, the domestic new energy vehicle market is hot, with sales reaching 3.521 million units, an increase of 160% year-on-year, and the performance of Beiqi Blue Valley's cumulative 26127 vehicles seems to be difficult to find excuses.
The continuous decline in sales has made the operating performance of Beiqi Blue Valley more and more ugly. Specifically, if you count the net profit attributable to the mother in 2021 - 5.244 billion yuan, Beiqi Blue Valley lost 11.726 billion yuan in two years.
As a former industry giant, why did Beiqi Blue Valley fall into such a field? In fact, its decline is traceable. According to the data, as a subsidiary of Baiqi Blue Valley, BAIC BJEV put the main target market on the B-end at the beginning of its establishment, that is, large clients such as taxis, online car-hailing, and car rental industries, and its high sales in 2013-2019 are also the times when these industries are developing rapidly.
Take 2019 as an example. Of the 150,000 units sold that year, 70% of the contribution came from the B-side, and the products were mainly for online ride-hailing, taxis and official cars, and the contribution rate of the private car market accounted for less than 30%.
However, with the collapse of the new energy B-end market in 2020, the sales of Beiqi Blue Valley, which walks on "one leg", are also almost "collapsing" overnight. Of course, in the face of the decline in sales in 2020, Beiqi Blue Valley has not made no efforts, but the C-end market at that time has no foothold.
It is worth mentioning that due to the impact of sluggish sales and performance, personnel changes in Beiqi Blue Valley have also been quite frequent in recent years.
In February 2019, Ma Fanglie took over as the general manager of BAIC BJEV, but served for less than a year. In June 2020, He Zhangxiang, then deputy general manager of BAIC BJEV, was the interim general manager, and on July 24 of the same year, Liu Yu officially succeeded Ma Fanglie.
What is more embarrassing is that liu yu has been in office for less than a year, and the position of general manager of BAIC BJEV has been transposed again. On June 9, 2021, Beiqi Blue Valley issued an announcement that Liu Yu, the former manager of the company, has submitted a written resignation report and no longer serves as the manager of the company, but still serves as the chairman of Beiqi Blue Valley and the chairman of the strategic committee of the board of directors. The position of general manager of BAIC BJEV was succeeded by Dai Kangwei, former vice president of BAIC BJEV Engineering Institute.
In addition to frequent changes in senior personnel, in 2021, Zhongbei Qi Blue Valley also fell into a layoff storm, and was anonymously reported by employees for "illegal layoffs".
When will the inflection point occur?
From the perspective of time dimension, Beiqi Blue Valley can also be regarded as an "old player" in the domestic new energy vehicle market.
But as far as the current situation is concerned, this "early catcher" has not only been overtaken by new car-making forces such as Weilai, Ideal, and Xiaopeng, but also the gap between tesla and BYD, the industry leaders, is also getting bigger and bigger.
So, where is the inflection point of Beiqi Blue Valley? The answer to this question depends more on its sales performance.
In this regard, BAIC Blue Valley and BAIC Group have a clearer understanding. "In 2022, the sales target of Beiqi Blue Valley is 100,000 vehicles, including 40,000 Jihu, and strives to impact 300,000 vehicles in the future." At the communication meeting held by BAIC Group a few days ago, Zhang Xiyong, general manager of BAIC Group, revealed to the outside world.
At the same time, Dai Kangwei, manager of BAIC Blue Valley and general manager of BAIC New Energy, also said, "In order to get out of the trough, Beiqi Blue Valley will further focus on the main business and focus on the two brands of Jihu and BEIJING." ”
It is worth mentioning that shouting out the above sales targets, Zhang Xiyong has a certain confidence.
Let's take the Polar Fox brand as an example. According to Beiqi Blue Valley, by the end of 2021, it has completed more than 120 authorized construction outlets. In the 15 key cities where sales account for more than 80% of the high-end pure electricity market, 100% coverage has been achieved, and 35 stores have been completed in 21 cities with potential. It is expected that in 2022, the number of marketing stores will reach 150, and it is planned to achieve a marketing service network covering 100+ cities and 380+ outlets in 2025. In terms of services, 73 authorized service centers have been authorized, covering 54 cities across the country, and the directly subordinate teams provide 24-hour online services.
In terms of R&D investment, "in order to cope with more fierce market competition in 2023 and 2024, Beiqi Blue Valley's R&D investment in 2021 will account for more than 20%, and it will double in 2022." Dai Kangwei said.
Although a lot of investment has been invested, Beiqi Blue Valley does not seem to have made much progress in terms of sales. According to public data, the cumulative sales of the two brands of Beiqi Blue Valley And BEIJING in 2021 are only 26,127 vehicles, of which the BEIJING brand sales are 21,134 vehicles, and the high-end route of the Polar Fox is 4,993, far below the target of 12,000 vehicles.
Even if it enters this year, the sales volume of Beiqi Blue Valley has still not improved. According to the sales data, as of the end of February, the cumulative sales volume of Beiqi Blue Valley was only 3385 vehicles, although it increased by 62.43% compared with 2084 units in the same period of 2021, but the target completion rate was only 3.4% based on the target of 100,000 vehicles.
In addition, the Alpha S HI version, which has won considerable attention with "Huawei Made Car", has been delayed again and again. This also has to worry about whether the car can be delivered smoothly in batches, and whether it has the ability to compete with competitors when delivered.
It can be said that in the face of the current difficulties, it remains to be seen when the inflection point of Beiqi Blue Valley will appear, and whether the Jihu brand can achieve the goals proposed by Zhang Xiyong.