The Dictionary of Marxist Thought | human nature

Human nature

The concept of human nature involves believing that all individuals have certain characteristics in common. The concept of human nature is descriptive if these characteristics can be interpreted as characteristics which are in fact manifested, and normative if the underlying qualities contained in this concept are bound to manifest under appropriate conditions.

The concept of descriptiveness encompasses an increasingly rich body of reliable objective information about human history. These materials provide an empirical scientific basis for any sound theory of human nature. However, a purely descriptive approach has the weaknesses that empirical science and historiography usually possess: (1) the academic division of labor and the narrow division of professions produce a tendency to reduce human nature to only one aspect of it, such as biological aspects (aggression, coveting territory, obedience to dominant men), sociological aspects (Lévi-Strauss believed that the prohibition of incest was an example), or psychological aspects (Freud's "Libido" and other instincts). (2) Descriptive concepts are considered unworthy, but this view is often wrong; empirical scientific research is always guided by certain interests (somewhat less consciously), at least implicitly involving some concept that contains value. If, however, the above view is correct, then the concept of descriptiveness lacks an important practical insight into the basic binding force and the best possibilities of human development. (3) In the descriptive concept, the dichotomy between structuralism and historicism cannot be overcome. The analytical, structure-guided empirical approach interprets human nature as a series of patterns of behavior unrelated to history; the historicist approach emphasizes differences in behavior patterns, differences in habits and norms, and differences in time and place. It ended in relativism.

That normative view avoids relativism and provides a theoretical basis for critical analysis and evaluation. However, it often has a metaphysical character, that is, it envisions the structure of man, yet its effects cannot even be tested in principle. For example, Hobbes believed that the basic characteristic of man is the lust for power. This desire can manifest itself only in a state of nature, which is a hypothetical conception that, therefore, hobbes's theory can neither be affirmed nor overturned. The preference for such a theory is largely determined not by having a good reason to prove that it is more realistic than other theories, but by a particular interest. In this sense, normative concepts tend to have an ideological function. By interpreting as natural, eternal and necessary certain modes of human life, as defined by history, this concept rationalizes and legitimizes the special interests of the ruling groups of some societies. There is hardly any great thinker who does not try to "draw" his own theories from the "image" of a suitable person. Machiavelli had advised his imaginary prince not to rule solely by law, but also by force, for according to him man was "ungrateful, capricious, deceitful, cowardly, and insatiable"; he also considered cruelty to be desirable, because "it is far safer to be afraid than to be admired". All conservative figures who maintain law and order believe that human nature is selfish, aggressive, greedy, and primarily concerned with satisfying their own desires, deduce from this point of view the legitimacy of the coercive state apparatus. All thinkers of laissez-faire capitalism agree with Malthus (Demographics, 1798) that man is "by nature lazy, idle, and labor-averse, and does not do it unless he is forced by life to do it." As liberalism gradually gave way to state bureaucracy, the concepts of domination and hierarchy were increasingly emphasized as the main genetic characteristics of human beings. According to Desmond Morris, "As primates, we already have a hierarchy, which is the basic way of life for apes." ”

The interrelationship between ideology (see the ideological article) and the concept of human nature can be expressed by three simple rules: (1) existing ideology tends to develop a skeptical point of view; (2) one variant of this skepticism is the reluctance to support any structural change, since human animal instincts are inadmissible; and (3) another is to negate the idea of human nature itself as a metaphysical concept. In the absence of any anthropological basis for the long-term planning of radical social change, the only proper approach is to be cautious about development dominated by experimental and even erroneous methods. Some theorists with an eye on the future are radically opposed to the inequities of existing societies, and they show a very optimistic tendency in their own conception of human nature. Sometimes, this confidence that man is essentially good compensates for the hopeless situation and the difficulties of the revolutionary task. As for the ideology that looks at the past, it reflects the interests of those who wish to restore the historically obsolete ruling structures, and as long as it focuses more on the past, its view of man is darker and more disrespectful, and it regards man as basically bad (laziness, aggression, selfishness, greed, possessiveness, and even bestiality). The worse it imagines, the less promising the programme of social progress is, and the more grounds for restricting freedom.

Marx's view was the unity of naturalism and humanism. Naturalism is the view that man is part of nature. Man was not created by some transcendent deity, but was the product of a long process of biological evolution. At a certain stage of biological evolution, a new form of development, that is, the emergence of human history, is characterized by independent, self-reflective and creative activity-practice. Therefore, man is essentially a person who practices. As for humanism, it is the view that man, as a practicing man, both changes nature and creates man himself. Man is able to constantly exercise control over the blind forces of nature and to create a new natural environment that meets human needs. Man, on the other hand, creates wealth by virtue of his talents and according to his own needs, and this wealth becomes the starting point for a new kind of self-development.

Marx did not develop the question of human nature into a systematic theory, but he made a number of permanent contributions (including his early philosophical writings and his mature scientific treatises). First, he showed that human nature can constitute a dynamic concept of history without falling into relativism. This concept contains both immutable components of universal significance and those that change with the passage of time. "To evaluate all human actions, movements, relations, etc., according to the principle of utility, it is necessary first to study the general nature of man, and then to study the nature of man, which has historically changed in each epoch" (Capital, vol. 1, p. 669). Second, Marx transcended the dichotomy that intervened between egomatic individualism and abstract, primitive collectivism. The individual man is both a special person who is concerned with confirming himself and objectifying his subjective forces, but also a social being, because all his forces are molded by society, and his creative activity is to meet the needs of others. "First of all, we must avoid re-establishing 'society' as an abstraction against the individual. The individual is [b] a social being [/b]" (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 42, p. 122). Third, Marx gave New Life to Aristotle's distinction between reality and possibility. He believed that no matter how depraved and alienated the actual existence of man was, man always retained a capacity for emancipation and creation. Fourth, Marx elaborated on the conditions under which man's abilities are thwarted and wasted: the division of labor, private property, capital, state oppression, hypocritical ideology, and so on. The abolition of these conditions is necessary for the liberation of all mankind.

If Marx's various views expounded at different stages of development, against different opponents, and in different passages are brought together, then some rather difficult problems will appear obviously. In the Philosophical Manuscripts of Economics, human nature is explained in terms of human freedom, productive capacity, creativity, sociality, great needs, and the ability of man to grow intellectually, which is a normative concept. A year later, however, in his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx defined the essence of man as "the sum of social relations." The latter is a descriptive concept that cannot be used to critique existing societies. The concept of normativeness is entirely optimistic, interpreting the negative characteristics of man only as factual phenomena, as ephemeral characteristics which seem to disappear with the elimination of the unfavorable conditions which gave rise to them. Yet in the turbulent and exciting century since Marx's death, many experiences have shown that evil may be much more entrenched than originally estimated. Moreover, the concept of human nature lacks an intrinsic dialectic. Since it is a historical concept, and its development cannot be determined by external causes, the source of man's self-creation must come from the internal contradictions of man's nature. One should recognize that in the "essence" itself there is a conflict between the general characteristics of man, rather than that the "essence" is positive and the "factual phenomenon" is negative.

There is a fundamental difference between the Marxists who argue for human nature and Marx's humanistic tradition. In some "genuinely socialist" countries, the official ideology denies the idea of the general nature of man itself, since it is said to be incompatible with the model of the base and superstructure and with the theory of class struggle. According to the requirements of historical materialism, the only general characteristics of man are those which are determined by a definite mode of production and which must have a class character. Marxist structuralism (in the case of Althusser) follows such a line, but its method of argument is more esoteric, using the idea that there is an insurmountable gap between the different forms of social structure, and thus that there is no human nature that has undergone a process of totalization (see the generalization entry) and transcended the times.

For Marxists who call themselves humanists and critical theoreticians, the concept of human nature is so extremely important for at least two reasons. First, radical social criticism is, in the final analysis, a critique of man's condition, but without understanding what man is, it is impossible to determine what is negative in man's condition in different historical epochs. Secondly, if there is nothing immutable in the course of all change, that is, man in history, then the concept of man's history loses any meaning and divides it into several periods of history in different epochs. Some Marxist humanists give a less critical orthodox explanation of the fundamental problems, posing them; others try to solve them by reconstructing historical materialism and Marx's philosophical anthropology. The strict determinism of historical development was rejected, and the view was adopted that the emancipation of man, the self-realization of man as a being of free and creative activity (practice), was not inevitable, but only possible. The analysis of man's practical capacity leads to the identification of a series of universal human abilities (e.g., the infinite faculties cultivated by the intellect, the symbolic constructive abilities, the conceptual thinking and problem-solving abilities, the ability to engage in independent creative activities, the ability to coordinate relations with other individuals in society). None of the above is the essence, but only the underlying tendencies, and what is often in conflict with them are those that are opposed (e.g., acting in a perverse, repetitive, and destructive way, replacing creativity with dominance, not using means of communication to build bridges with other communities, but using them to erect obstacles, and to take aggressive actions, etc.). The conflict between these two opposing tendencies, both of which are included in the descriptive conception of human nature, constitutes the source of historical dialectics.

The normative conception of human nature provides the basis for the critique of humanism as a whole, which envisages in advance a basic criterion for the evaluation of different conflicting tendencies. Those tendencies judged to be positive and worthy of contemplation are: (1) exclusive to mankind; and (2) functioning in a truly meaningful period of historical development. Therefore, in all living organisms, only man can communicate with symbols and think with concepts. Peaceful living, freedom and creativity have accelerated evolution and made cultural prosperity possible. Aggression and destructiveness have brought stagnation and decline in historical periods. While recognizing that all of this is a component of man's nature that constitutes a real existence, man's practical capacity is an ideal goal, which gives man the idea of self-creation in history to guide.

（MM）

bibliography

Louis Althusser: Defending Marx, 1970 in English.

Erich Fromm: Marx's Concept of Man, 1961 in English.

Ibid., Anatomy of The Destructiveness of Man, 1973, English Edition.

Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, 1951, Part I, Chapter 13.

Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, 1923 in English, reprinted in 1971.

Mihailo Markovich: Contemporary Marx, 1974, Chapter 4.

Gayo Petrovich: Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, 1967 in English.

Adam Schaff: The Philosophy of Man, 1963 in English.

Vernon Venabourg, The Nature of Man: A Marxist Perspective (1945), 1966.

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