The First Battle of Shimogamesuri
At 14:00 on November 26, 1950, the 9th Corps decided to launch a full-scale offensive against the American troops in the Chosin Lake area on the evening of the 27th, and the 58th Division of the Volunteer Ace Division was ordered to first capture Fushengli and Shangpingli, and then attack and annihilate the enemy in Hagaru-ri with all its might. The 58th Division was formerly known as the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of the New Fourth Army, and later the 1st Column 1st Division of the East China Field Army, and was then the commander and political commissar of the division, Huang Chaotian (Major General in 55 years). During the Liberation War, Yizhong successively participated in the Battle of Laiwu, the Battle of Subei, the Battle of Lunan, the Battle of Menglianggu and the Battle of Huaihai, and his performance was very outstanding, and he was known for his good at fighting hard battles and vicious battles. As the 1st Division of the First Column, the 58th Division is the trump card of aces.
The 58th Division, according to the orders of the corps, braved the wind and snow to cross the Dongbai Mountain, because the army reconnaissance battalion only reported that it could cross based on the map drawn in the fourteenth year of Taisho (1925) without conducting field surveys, and the 58th Division found that the actual terrain had changed greatly during the march, coupled with the heavy snow blocking the road, it was impossible to cross the Dongbai Mountain, and urgently requested a one-day delay in launching the attack, and reported to the chief of the volunteer army to agree to postpone the launch of the attack again to the 27th. From the night of the 27th to the early morning of the 28th, the 58th Division reached Fushengli, Shangpingli, Shuitieli and other places around Xiaqiyuli.
Hagaru-ri is about 2 kilometers from the southern end of the Chosin Reservoir, and the north-south highway passes through this small town and splits off a branch road to the west, forming a hub for road traffic, and a narrow-gauge railway also passes through Shimogaru-ri. Hagaru-ri is located in a basin surrounded by mountains, but the mountains around Yokita-ri are relatively high, while the lower hills around Hagaru-ri are more gentle and low-rise hills, and only a continuous hill with a height of about 150 meters in the northeast direction known as Dongshan can barely serve as a defensive barrier.
Schematic diagram of the U.S. Army's Lower Kigaru-ri Defense Line
After the Volunteers cut off the main supply line of the U.S. Army, there were supply warehouses, hospital facilities, and the partially completed C-47 airstrip in Shimogaru-ri was the only base from which the 1st Marine Division was expected to integrate its divisional forces. The U.S. army had to hold Hagaru-ri at all costs, but by the 27th, the defenders of Hagaru-ri had 3,378 marines and navy hygienists, 267 U.S. Army personnel and roon personnel, for a total of 3,645 men, but the main force of the defenders was only one reinforced infantry battalion (that is, the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, missing one-third of the infantry company and the gun company, and due to the lack of vehicles, one platoon of the G Company and the Gun Company was still in the ground) and two artillery companies. Commander Smith said: "According to the situation, considering the tasks given to the 1st Marine Division, only one battalion could be drawn out to guard Hagaru-ri, which was strongly supported by aviation and had enough artillery and tanks to defend. ”
Ritchie, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, was appointed defensive commander in Hagaru-ri. Ritchie decided to also deploy his forces based on terrain and intelligence. He commissioned intelligence staff officer Richard Carey to inquire into the military. The South Korean agents sent by Kairi disguised as Ordinary North Koreans went out to reconnoiter, and the South Korean agents met the volunteers outside the village, and the volunteers said that they would take Kiyu-ri on the night of the 28th. South Korean plainclothes agents brought back valuable information, and the U.S. military decided that the volunteers would launch an attack on Hagaru-ri with the strength of 1 division, and the southwest and south sides would be the focus of the volunteers' attack, and the attack time might be 21:30 p.m. Ritchie therefore decided to concentrate his two rifle companies, H Company and I Company, deployed southwest of the unused airstrip.
At about 10:30 p.m. on the 28th, the 58th Division of the Volunteer Army launched an attack with the 173rd Regiment from the southwest and south, and the 172nd Regiment from the east to Xiajieli, with the 174th Regiment as a reserve. The 173rd Regiment of the 58th Division reinforced the 2nd Battalion of the 174th Regiment and the Special Service Battalion of the Division headquarters, for a total of 5 combat battalions, and the focus of the attack was on the vicinity of the temporary airfield south and southwest of the village of Hagaru-ri. Assisted by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 172nd Regiment of the 58th Division, the target of the attack was Higashiyama in Hagaru-ri.
Two U.S. artillery companies played an important role in defending Shimogaru-ri, pictured here firing shells from a 105mm howitzer near the airfield
U.S. military war history records that it was snowing lightly at the time, and two companies of the U.S. military were on 100% alert. At about 22:30, three red flares and three whistles indicated that the Volunteers were about to attack. Mortar shells, mixed with white phosphorus, high-explosive mortar shells began to fall toward the Forward Positions of the Americans. (The Volunteers' mortars prepared for fire for 30 minutes, with the 58th Division concentrating 18 82mm mortars and 54 60mm mortars, and preparing 90 and 120 shells for each 82mm and 60mm mortar, respectively, the strongest of the Volunteers' fire preparations in the entire Battle of Chosin Lake.) Marines' support weapons—artillery, but mostly mortars and machine guns—brought the Volunteers under fire, but did not stop them from approaching the range of grenades and submachine guns.
The southwestern direction of the Volunteers' main offensive was the strongest point of the American defensive line, and the H and I companies blew up the frozen soil in C-3O explosives, built bunkers and machine gun positions, the soil was used to fill sandbags, and barbed wire was laid, and five gallon gasoline cans were assembled with white phosphorus grenades to draw ropes to detonate grenades and ignite gasoline. Anti-single-soldier mines were laid on all three roads leading to Marine Positions.
The attack lasted an hour, with the volunteers attacking in battle groups of about 50 men each. Most of the Marines' defensive lines were held, but the Volunteers managed to break through the central position of Company H. Company Commander Captain Clarence Corley called a temporary squad and tried unsuccessfully to close the gap. A small number of volunteers broke through to the vicinity of the airstrip, and the sappers who were working on the airport overnight eliminated them.
Richie sent a mixed platoon of Marines and Army soldiers, led by Grady W. Bush. Led by Lieutenant P. Mitchell to support H Company. Lieutenant Mitchell was killed in battle and was replaced by Lieutenant Horace L. Johnson. Johnson deployed his platoon in a ditch behind the H Company's breached line. The volunteers, who had already broken through, spun around their positions and seemed more keen to grab supplies and food for their tents than to exploit their breakthroughs. They fought for food, for warm clothes and american ammunition. At least one wounded Marine pretended to be dead and survived, and the Volunteers stripped him of his winter coat. Richie sent another platoon of temporary personnel to reinforce Johnson's defenses. By around 01:30, the situation seemed to be under control. The sappers rekindled their floodlights, returned to their bulldozers, and resumed work on the airstrip.
At 5:45 a.m. on 29 November, the 173rd and 174th Regiments withdrew from the battle, and all positions occupied or breached that night were lost. On the night of the 28th, the 58th Division's attack to the southwest and south of Hagaru-ri failed, and the troops suffered heavy casualties. Before dawn, the U.S. Company H resumed its position. According to the history of the US military, the H Company, which suffered the heaviest casualties, lost 16 people and wounded 39 people in the battle on the night of the 28th.
However, in the east, although the Volunteer 172nd Regiment did not invest many troops, the American army on this side was not strong in will to fight, and its main force, the D Company of the 10th Army Engineer Battalion, failed to hold Dongshan under the attack of the 172nd Regiment of the Volunteer Army, and Captain Shernat, deputy company commander of the 3rd Battalion Gun Company, was killed. Wu Chengxiang, deputy battalion commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment, firmly controlled all of Dongshan with the 9th and 5th Companies at 4:00 a.m., and due to the heavy casualties of the 3rd and 2nd Battalions, the 1st Battalion of the Reserve Brigade was dispatched at dawn to continue to maintain the offensive posture on the top of the mountain, and Yang Gensi, commander of the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion and a first-class people's hero in East China, was subsequently killed in the Battle for Dongshan.
At 05:30, Ritchie made the decision to strike back, and the 31-year-old deputy battalion commander, Reginald M. Lt. Col. R. Miles volunteered to lead a column up the hill, and the counterattack consisted of a temporary company of about 250 men, mostly Marines, but also some Army soldiers. Miles reached the main peak in the military sense, but the geographical main peak remained firmly in the hands of the Volunteers. 1st Engineer Battalion A Company was under the command of George W. Bush. Led by Captain W. King, he made an assist, and his company entered a counter-slope defensive position that night, about 500 yards away from Miles' team. Richie had to settle for King and Miles to hold these positions, and the Volunteers continued to occupy the main peak in the geographical sense. At this point, the U.S. army and the 172nd Regiment of the 58th Division formed a confrontation at Dongshan.
The 58th Division attacked Hagaru-ri for the second time
At noon on 29 November, 1st and 3rd Platoons of Company A of the 1st Engineer Battalion of the 1st Marine Division returned to Hagaru-ri and took part in the defense of Higashiyama. On the night of the 29th, the "Dreisdale Task Force" – consisting of the 3G Company of the 1st Marine Regiment, the 41st Commando Regiment (Company Level) of the British Marine Corps, the Division Headquarters Battalion, the 1st Communications Battalion, the 7th Transport Battalion, the Maintenance Company of the 1st Tank Battalion, the B Company of the 5th Regiment, the D Company, and the Anti-Tank Platoon of the 5th Regiment, the B Company of the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment – under the strict orders of Commander Smith, broke through the blockade of the 179th Regiment of the 60th Division and the 174th Regiment of the 58th Division to reach Hagaru-ri, and the column set out with 141 vehicles, 29 tanks, and 922 men. 74 vehicles and 1 tank were lost in the battle, and 321 casualties were inflicted. The defenders were reinforced by a tank company of nearly 100 men and nearly 300 infantry with combat experience. After the defenders of Xiayuli were reinforced, they immediately deployed the G Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the Army at Dongshan, with the British commandos as a reserve and the tanks as the main defensive force. The fighters were fleeting, and when reinforcements from U.S. troops arrived at Shimokusuri, the opportunity for the 58th Division to capture Shimogaru-ri was gone.
Loss of Contingent personnel and vehicles in Dresdale
Lieutenant Colonel Richie's command group had the exact picture of what was going on outside the Lower Osumuli Line, South Korean plainclothes agents ventured in and out of the line, bringing intelligence about the Volunteers, and the 58th Division's attempt to attack Hagaru-ri again appeared to have been stopped by American daytime air raids and nighttime artillery and mortar fire. Ritchie's close-range fire coordinator also experimented with nightly close-range fire support, using machine-gun tracer bullets to guide air strike targets at Pirate aircraft.
At 08:00 on November 30, Richie ordered the newly arrived G Company to continue the offensive through Miles' position at East Hill, with Dreisdale's 41 Commando as reserve. Company Commander Stehl sent his 1st and 2nd platoons through Miles' foothold to attack the sides of the ridge, followed by the 3rd Platoon and the two platoons of A's Engineer Company. The attack was slow, and Stehl used reserves to encircle the volunteers' right flank. The attack was bogged down, Stehl asked permission to set up positions on the territory previously occupied by Miles, and the Pirate planes attacked again, but G Company failed to take the Volunteer position. During the day on November 30, the U.S. Army's 31st Regiment Tank Company, 31st Regiment headquarters, and 15 tanks withdrew from the back hole to The Lower Corner, further strengthening the defense of the Lower Mile.
On November 29, Song Shilun, commander of the Ninth Corps, and Tao Yong, deputy commander of the Ninth Corps, decided to concentrate the main forces of the 80th Division and the 81st Division to annihilate the American troops in Xinxingli on the east side of Chosin Lake, based on the battlefield situation. In order to cooperate with this operation, the Ninth Corps asked the 79th And 59th Divisions to contain the American troops in Liutanli, and at the same time ordered the 58th Division to contain the American troops in Xiayuli. Since the main forces of the 16th Artillery Regiment and the 81st Division failed to reach the starting point of the operation on the night of the 29th, the attack on Xinxingli was postponed to the evening of the 30th. On the morning of the 30th, the 9th Corps again sent a telegram to the 58th Division, ordering it to "be sure to exhaust Yuri under tonight's attack" and cooperate with the 27th Army's attack on Xinxingli; at the same time, in order to support the 58th Division's attack on Xiaquanyuli, the Ninth Corps also arranged for two regiments of the 27th Army to seize the Chosin Bridge and Surabaya- north of Xiaquanyu-ri.
The 58th Division organized 14 companies to engage in the 30th night offensive (called 12 companies in military history) - 6 companies of the 174th Regiment were transferred to the east of the Chosin River, and 2 companies of the 172nd Regiment attacked From the northeast, due east and southeast; 2 companies of the 173rd Regiment west of the Chosin River attacked from the northwest, and 2 companies of the 174th Regiment attacked from the southwest. This time, the 58th Division coordinated the attack time of the various units, and the troops of Jiangdong and Jiangxi simultaneously launched an attack at 11:35 p.m.
The Hexi forces of the Volunteers attacked the southwestern part of the defensive line, and unfortunately they ran into I Company, which was the most well-defended position, and Lieutenant Joseph Fisher estimated that his company had killed as many as 500 to 750 Volunteer officers and men, and his losses were only 2 killed and 10 wounded.
The Hedong Volunteer Army, which was attacking downhill along the western slope of Dongshan Mountain, attacked the anti-slope positions defended by Stel G Company and Company A and Company B of the First Engineer Battalion, and the battle progressed relatively smoothly, because the 1st Lu Division was insufficient, and only a platoon of engineer A Company was arranged at the foot of the mountain, and the entire hillside was a large gap in the defensive line, mainly blocked by artillery fire. The casualties of Company G and its reinforcements are estimated at 60. Fortunately for the U.S. army, the tank company of the 31st Regiment of the Army on the east bank of Chosin Lake had just withdrawn to Shimoku-ri in the evening of the same day, and all 16 tanks were deployed at the foot of Dongshan, just in the offensive route of the volunteer army. The 58th Division attacked with anti-tank weapons such as bazookas and explosive packs, but although the ammunition was exhausted, they were ineffective, and they could only rush forward, and the troops suffered heavy casualties. In the end, only a few people broke through the tank line, entered the depth and engaged the personnel of the tank company of the 31st Regiment, and finally all of them were killed, and the battle was extremely fierce.
A shell fired by the Volunteers detonated 50 barrels of gasoline in a warehouse in the U.S. supply area, illuminating the battlefield like a giant torch, and Commander Smith watched the battle from the door of his command post, just 1,200 yards from the battlefield. Several bullets hit the roof and walls of the command post that night. The Americans lost some of their positions, and Richie sent a valuable part of his reserve, the Royal Marines 41 Commando, to reinforce G Company, and the lost positions were retaken the next morning. Therefore, on the night of the 30th attack, although the troops of the 58th Division's Jiangdong Successfully broke through the Dongshan Defense Line of the 1st Lu Division, they eventually withdrew at dawn due to their inability to deal with tanks.
On the night of 30 November, the second volunteer offensive against Xiaquanyuli ended in failure, and the 58th Division was seriously wounded and was unable to attack thereafter.
Based on the confessions of volunteer prisoners of war, the U.S. military deduced that the casualties of the 172nd Regiment of the 58th Division were 3300, and the casualties of the 173rd Regiment and the 174th Regiment were 1750 each. The casualties of the 176th Regiment of the 59th Division were 1750 (combined with the post-war summary of the 20th Army, the diary of the 20th Army's Changjinhu Position, and other information, it is basically possible to figure out the deployment of the 176th Regiment during this period, and it can be generally confirmed that the 176th Regiment did not participate in the attack under the exhaustion of Yuri, and the volunteer prisoners of war are most likely to lie about the unit number. ）。 At least 1,500 men were killed in two nights of attacks, and at least three or four times the number wounded, such a heavy casualty could render a division of 7,500 to 10,000 men incapacitated. In addition, given the inadequate supply and medical conditions of the Volunteers, hundreds of people could be killed behind the Volunteer front.
The two Battles of Hagaru-ri inflicted casualties on the U.S. forces
According to the U.S. military history, the casualties of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment from November 28 to December 1 were 43 killed, 2 missing, 270 wounded, and a total of 315 casualties. There are no casualty figures for U.S. Marines or Army service units, but the casualties of these units are estimated to exceed those of the 3rd Battalion.
However, one can infer from Division Smith's post-war letters to the Secretary of the Navy that the two Battles of Hagaru-ri inflicted casualties on the U.S. Forces.
Commander Smith said in his letter that on the night of November 28 and 29, the enemy launched a fierce attack on Hagaru-ri. The attack began at 21:30 and lasted all night. The enemy attacked first from the south, then to the west, and then to the east. Our defensive force consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment (missing G Company), as well as personnel from our headquarters and service units. Our casualties were 500, of which about 300 were from infantry units and 200 from headquarters and service units. The headquarters battalion alone suffered 60 casualties.
We realized early on the importance of Usumari as a base. On November 16, Rear Admiral Field Harris, Marine Corps 1st Air Wing Commander, and I tentatively approved the location for the Douglas C-47 improvised runway in Hagaru. Our 1st Engineer Battalion began work on 19 November, and on 1 December, the C-47 used the airstrip for the first time, even though only 40 percent of the work was completed at that time. This airstrip is essential for evacuating the wounded and resupplying the air in case our roads are interrupted by weather or enemy movements. In order to protect this airstrip and the supplies we have accumulated there, We must control Hagaru-ri.
The march of the Dreisdale contingent from Guturi to Hagaru-ri not only opened the way, but also provided us with the reinforcements needed to defend Hagaru-ri. The Dreisdale contingent set out from Guturi on the morning of November 29 and engaged in a fierce firefight with the enemy halfway through to Hagaru-ri. At one point, Dreisdale wanted to return to Guturi, but I sent him a message asking him to keep going as far as he could. He had the convoy of trucks return to Guturi under the protection of the tank company and some infantry units, while the rest of the column continued to advance to the lower yuri. The convoy of trucks returning to Guturi was attacked by enemy forces once again approaching the main supply line. Before they returned to Gutuli, mortar shelling was fierce, tanks and trucks were severely damaged, and there were considerable casualties. Dreisdale continued to fight as he advanced down to Hagaru-ri, and by late afternoon, about 150 British Royal Marine Commandos and G-Company had arrived in Hagaru-ri.
By December 1, the situation for the treatment of the wounded had become grim. Divisional medic Navy Captain Dr. Eugene Green said there were 600 U.S. casualties waiting to be evacuated in Hagaru. The wounded were the responsibility of the C and E Medical Company. If the army camp east of the reservoir breaks through, it is estimated that it will bring more than 400 casualties. (In fact, we even transported more than 900 wounded from these battalions.) We estimate that the 5th and 7th Regiments of the Marine War will bring 500 casualties. (In fact, they brought 1,500 casualties.) ）
Most of the 600 casualties were apparently generated during the battle with the 58th Volunteer Division in the early hours of November 28 to December 1 (about fifty or sixty wounded by reinforcements from Guturi, of which 25 were identified as 41 Commandos). According to the 1:4 casualty ratio, the number of AMERICAN casualties in this battle should be about 150. Therefore, the U.S. army suffered about 750 casualties in the two-day and three-night battle with the 58th Division.