Transferred from: Roof Now Research
Philosophical Garden acknowledges
Hara: Ontological and Postal: Jack Derrida (1998)
Author: Hiroki Higashi
Translation: Chicken Farm Guest Secretary
This article is an excerpt from the first section of the fourth chapter of the original book, "Existential and Postural" () () "Theoretical", entitled "The Translator's Play", [] is the part that the translator makes up according to the meaning of the text
*This article is based on CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 and is for personal study only, if there is any infringement of your bourgeois legal rights, please contact and remind me to roll up and delete the article
Hiroki Azuma: B., 1971, Japanese cultural ratification artist Kazu philosopher, 继继统绖统绖统绳绳 绳 绳绳 end of submission of a doctoral degree from Kyoto University, The Existence and Political Nature (Ontological and Postal: Jack Derrida) His book, "Empress Houyo" (Animalized Postmodern) (2001) This is a very erudite plucksion.
Uncle East
In his famous 1932 paper, Rudolf Carnap criticized Heidegger from the point of view of logical positivism.[1] This critique is succinct. In Carnap's view, Heidegger's metaphysical discourse has no logical significance. Why? Carnap argues that [Heidegger's philosophy] is not a question of the right or wrong of content, and that Hayes's philosophy is first and foremost formally incorrect [ill-formed]. This formal error, that is, the error of confusing propositional forms and propositional arguments, that is, confusing grammar and nouns. When we reflect on Heidegger, we may wish to take carnap's critique as a precursor.
Parting Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger
For example, Heidegger asked "how nothing is intact".[2] But this doubt, in Carnap's view, is not logically valid. To clarify this, Carnapp attempted to convert Heidegger's natural language into a formal language. For example, the sentences "x is outside" and "where is x" can be expressed functionally such as "Ou(x)" and "?(x)". In this provision, we can paraphrase the following:
natural language:
- What's out there? （what is outside?）
- There's rain outside. （Rain is outside.）
- How about this rain? （what about this rain?）
Formal Language:
——Or(?)
——Or(rain)
——?（rain）
In this example, the sentences are all meaningful and make perfect sense. However, if we make an analogy and replace "rain" with "none", the following situation arises:
- Nothing outside. (nothing is outside.)
- How about this "nothing" (nothing)? （what about this nothing?）
——Ou(nothing)
——?（nothing）
At first glance it looks like the same thing. What Carnap means is that heidegger's philosophy is based on this analogy. But on closer inspection, the formal transcription of nothing is meaningless. Karnap put it this way: Natural language "has nothing out there." "(nothing is outside.) cannot be transcribed to a function like Ou(nothing). In other words, "there is nothing out there" does not mean "there is a 'nothing' out there.". The correct formal transcription is "~ xOu(x)", i.e. "x does not exist if it satisfies the condition of being outside". ( is a logical sign that indicates existence, ~ is a logical sign that indicates a negative). Although nothing is a noun in natural language English, in logic it simply indicates the logical form "~x". The word nothing can never act as a propositional argument. therefore? (nothing) Such a proposition does not hold at all. and? (nothing) corresponds to natural language "How about this nothing?" "It doesn't make any sense. Therefore, Heidegger's question, "How is nothingness immaterial?", is not logically valid.
Carnap's critique points out that Heidegger's use of grammar as a noun and the form of proposition as a propositional argument is a materialized error of thinking. And Carnap chased after it, arguing that the core of Heidegger's thought was actually this objectification/materialization. As we all know, the core of Heidegger's philosophy is existence (Sein). According to Carnap's line of thinking, this is to grasp "as a quantifier" as a noun.[3] It is because of this grasp that Heidegger was able to say the words "existence is P", which was transcribed into the formal language of P (Sein). And P (Sein) is not a meaningful proposition at all.
But if we follow Carnap's philosophical path of thought, we cannot define "existence" as the object of thought. "Existence" (the existence of something) in natural language, once transcribed by a formal program of logic, can only become a grammatical/existential quantifier of logic. In short, "being" is at the grammatical level of the sentence, not the word content of the sentence. If we insist on thinking of "existence" as an object, such as giving a sentence like "existence is P", we can only transphrase it as a [fallacious] functional form like P( ( ) . This function is the same as the messy mathematical equation "2++=5" (the plus sign "+" is filled with the position of the equation "2+x=5" as an Arabic numeral). All in all, the conflict between Heidegger and Karnap, the conflict between existentialism and logical positivism, is condensed on different understandings of "being"—The See as a noun and Thein as a grammatical form.
This philosophical controversy in the early 1930s was actually a symbol of the "Taoism will split the world" in the 1940s and 1970s. This is the split between continental existential philosophy and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. In fact, Carnap's above critique, the "materialized thinking of language," represents a typical critique of continental philosophy, including French philosophy, and continued into the late 20th century. And Carnap's ideas have been appropriated by many other thinkers, such as Habermas, Roti, and Shangu Pedestrian, all three of whom are not typical analytic philosophers and have different positions with each other, but their ideas for criticizing Derrida are actually much the same, and they are all variations of Karnap's ideas. "Continental philosophy is playing with rhetoric". The critical line of thought that Carnapp put forward in the 1930s still exists today. Thus, those of us who are actively tapping into the intellectual resources of the mid-period Derrida [1972-1985] are actually confronting the Carnappian critique—Derrida is the French philosopher who "materializes" language to the extreme, and the mid-term Derrida is the pinnacle of this paradigm. If we believe that doactic theories can be extracted from the text of the mid-term Derrida, then we should fully understand the Karnapian critique and make it our duty to refute this questioning. The question that arose in this book is "Why did Derrida write such a wonderful text [in the middle]," a phrase I have repeated many times. This sense of uncoordinated dissonance is actually not limited to Derrida, which is a common problem of Continental philosophy since the thirties.
In general, logical positivism began with Wittgenstein's 1921 treatise on the Philosophy of Logic. As we all know, Vickers clearly distinguishes between "what can be said" and "what cannot be said". The former is the scope of philosophical speculation, and the latter is the field where philosophical trespassing is not allowed. Here I briefly sort out Vickers' thinking. Wittgenstein referred to the totality of facts as the "world", and all facts have corresponding propositions (logical images). The so-called thinking is to deal with such a set of propositions, which reflect the world. Therefore, the boundaries of the world, the boundaries of thinking, and the boundaries of logic are strictly consistent. (Treatise on the Philosophy of Logic, Propositions 5.6 and 5.6.1) Philosophy operates within this boundary. These are wittgenstein's definitions. But Wittgenstein also defined the "ineffable," the Grenze of propositions. He clearly states: "Propositions can express all reality, but they cannot express what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to express reality—that is, logische Forms." In order to be able to express logical forms, we must be able to be outside logic with propositions, that is, outside the world. (Philosophical Theory of Logic, Proposition 4.12) We can only rely on logic to know the world, in other words, logic supports the world and thinking. Thus logic itself becomes something that transcends the world and thinks.
Wittgenstein referred to the "ineffable," the world-thinking boundary, as a logical form. Carnap followed this way of thinking (Carnap called logical forms syntactic forms in Clearing Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language). The so-called logical forms, specifically, are actually the devices that underpin the logic of predicates, namely quantifiers and function operators and the like. Existence as a category is reduced to an existential quantifier. In other words, they treat the category of existence as a prescriptive form of thinking, rather than as an object of thought. That is, the category of existence cannot enter the world-thinking interior. Of course, we can think about specific beings (such as Pegasus), and sentences like "Pegasus exists" make sense. This is to ask whether "x Pegasus(x)" (the function Pegasus(x) indicates that x has the characteristics of Pegasus). But once one takes note of the statement in The Theory of Logical Philosophy (Philosophy of Logic, below proposition 4.05), it becomes clear that x Pegasus(x) itself "exists" regardless of truth or falsehood. That is to say, if the existence of the object Pegasus itself is directly interrogated, that is, the meaning of x itself, then it is actually equivalent to interrogating the existence basis of the proposition x Pegasus(x), and it is also equivalent to questioning "Why do we talk about Pegasus?". This inquiry has transcended the boundaries that Vickers has drawn for philosophy. We can meaningfully talk about the truth or falsity of a proposition, but we cannot answer why it exists. The difference between the truth and falsity of propositions and the existence of propositions is actually what Wittgenstein said: "The point of how the world is is not mysterious, but the existence of the world is mysterious." (Treatise on the Philosophy of Logic, Proposition 6.44) What should we do with what Vickers calls "mystery"? Rather, "mystery" is something that Wittgenstein pre-defined. Thus, The Treatise on the Philosophy of Logic ends with "We must remain silent about what cannot be said." Both logical positivism, and the analytic philosophy that inherits the legacy of the former, reject the "ineffable" [4].
But Heidegger took a completely different path of thought to deal with the "ineffable"/limits of thought. Here's a quick breakdown. The first thing to understand is that Heidegger, like the Philosophy of Logic, made a strict distinction between the realm of logic and the realm of super-logic, that is, the distinction between being (the object of existence) and existence (existence itself). In the 1920s, at the same time as The Theory of Logical Philosophy, Hayes had made it very clear in Existence and Time. Various kinds of science or knowledge (Wissenschaften) are active in the realm of beings. With a pre-understanding of "the object already exists," one then explores the nature of each being (essentia). In other words, it's just a question of the essence. Philosophy, on the other hand, is precisely the discipline of inquiring into existence itself, of the question of the existence of each being. This is called the "questioning of existence." Specifically, philosophy explores the presuppositions of science with the existence as the object, i.e., obscure things such as "the knowledge of existence" and "the original meaning of the word 'existence'". (Existence and Time, v. 3) Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of logic. Hayes says, "Science can generally be defined as a whole established through the interconnection of the propositions of truth" (Existence and Time, v. 3), and the questioning of existence precedes the logically connected whole in definition and has a foundational significance for the latter. Dealing with the science of beings / the understanding of existence that lays the foundation for the former, the domain of logic / the neighborhood of hyper-logic, this is Heidegger's dichotomy. This corresponds to Wittgenstein's dichotomy of divisions of the world and its group of propositions/logical forms that support the former. Although both Heidegger's ideas and logical positivism proceeded from here, the philosophical plans of the two were very different.
For logical positivism, philosophy is enclosed in the inner side of the boundary. Philosophy simply makes the sciences clearer (Treatise on the Philosophy of Logic, proposition 4.1 below). But for Heidegger, philosophy is precisely the mental activity of thinking about this boundary, thinking about "ineffable things." In 1935, Heidegger said, "Philosophy is by no means a member of the sciences. Philosophy, before the sciences, was not simply 'logical' in the system of the sciences"[5]. The questioning of existence transcends the realm of sciences and leads to the inquiry into the foundations of transcendence (Grund) that support the totality of sciences.
But the comparison above does not mean that Heidegger's paradigm is superior. It is true that heidegger's treatment of problems (mystery) is avoided by logical positivism, but in practice logical positivism cannot completely avoid the discourse of "mystery". However, from the latter point of view, there can be no philosophical, that is, rigorous and universal method of discourse (sagen) for "mystery". In the mystical realm, there are still ways of speaking in ethics, aesthetics, art, etc., and [Wittgenstein] uses the verb zeigen to represent these speeches. Why does Vickers affirm Hayes' philosophy? It is precisely because the latter has a sense of the former in literary, intuitive and personal terms. For example, Wittgenstein in Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? After its publication, although he accused "[Hay's] whole theories of being inherently meaningless", he also expressed sympathy for Heidegger's explorations. Moreover, in the above-mentioned Carnap's treatise, Nietzschean thinking is in fact allowed, i.e., "not to choose the theoretical form that leads the person astray, but to openly choose the form of art, the form of poetry." (Heidegger is accused of using theory rather than poetry) In short, logical positivism and Heidegger's need to think about "the ineffable" are in fact basically the same. The difference between the two is whether or not the "ineffable things" can be thought of in a rigorous (streng) way. That is, there are conflicts in the methodology of thinking. In the view of logical positivists, "ineffable things" can only be touched through art. But here in Heidegger, the "ineffable" can be approached by some rigorous method of speculation. So we have glimpsed the differences in the methodologies of the two in this place, and it is necessary for us to continue to think about the fundamental structural differences between the two. Fundamentally, it lies in how Heidegger constructs a new rigorous way of thinking on questions that go beyond the "question of existence" of scientific thinking, beyond logic and intellect.[7]
We might as well use the illustration. Logical positivism defines the boundaries of thinking, i.e., the forms that support specific objects, as meta-levels. Meta level cannot be defined as an object level. This conception, beginning with Kant's dichotomy between intellectual and rational, became a kind of traditional thinking in the history of philosophy.
Under this framework, it is impossible to think about boundaries in definition. Heidegger, on the other hand, confronted this tradition (i.e., against the Kant tradition, inheriting the German Romantic orthodoxy) and hoped to reconstruct a philosophical approach that would break through Kant's/Wittgenstein's prohibition on boundary-foundational thinking. This new philosophical approach, in the sense of logic, is an attempt to recapture the meta level (Grund, which is actually über=meta) as an object, i.e., to conceive of a rigorous method capable of breaking through meta and object levels. At first glance, this ideological subject is extremely absurd. In fact, both Karnap and the main wave of analytic philosophy after the forties agreed that Heidegger's speech lacked philosophical rigor. (For example, Russell's History of Western Philosophy directly ignores Heidegger) But Heidegger, in the preface to Existence and Time, prepared some methods of operation in advance in order to avoid the circular structure of the "question of existence". Heidegger's thinking about boundaries is actually extremely rigorous. But what do these methods of operation look like, specifically?
Heidegger's thinking is actually very simple. He found a special being in the totality of the objects of thought (i.e., the world), in the collection of beings. In this place of being, there is an overlap between the object of thought and the form of thinking. Heidegger called this overlapping state "Zwiefalt".[8] Using the being of this unique double-fold structure as a medium, we can indirectly think about the boundaries of the "world." When thinking about this being, that is, when thinking about it as an object of thought, it can at the same time induce the question of the form (existence) of thinking. Specifically, this being is human, in Heidegger's terms " Dasein " . (Existence and Time, v. 4) Logical forms are produced by human beings. At the same time, human beings, as ordinary things, follow logical forms. Thus, the questioning of the world-thinking boundary (Frage) can actually be explored through the existence of the human being who produces the world-thinking itself. This is an analysis of the "existential construct" of human beings. "The questioning of existence is actually to refine this grasp of existence in existence, that is, to refine the pre-existential understanding of existence." There are actually two forms of questioning of human beings, with Heidegger distinguishing between "befragen" and "fragen" (fragen). (Existence and Time, section 2) Taking human beings as objects of thought is to ask what is asked, to ask the boundaries/foundations, to ask why and why to ask. In this way, Hayes's philosophy can think of existence in terms of existence itself, think about meta level in terms of meta level itself, and create another way of thinking on top of objectified (existential) thinking. Whether or not to admit such a "nother realm of thinking"[9] and whether to admit to being able to think in an indirect way [the question of boundaries] is the only indicator of distinction between Heidegger's paradigm and "logic"/"metaphysics"/"thinking of the sophisticer"/"thinking of modern science". This was true until Heidegger's later years.
We can still express it graphically. The logical form (existence) can now be accessed with a special being, i.e., this being. That is, we can use the structure of existential theory to reach existence. This is a system that directly opens up the meta-level and object-level systems, so that the two levels undergo short circuits. We may wish to appropriate the illustration "Klein Bottle" in Structure and Force by Akira Asada (あさだ あきら) in Structure and Force.
1, Metallevel (existence)—meta level(existence)2, object revell (set of beings = world)—object level (member set = world),3, present existence—Dasein
1. Existential structure (the mediation of two levels)—-Two-Two-level-no-go;2,3,3-existent (entrance to Metallevel)—this (entry to Metalevel)—this (entry to Metalevel)
In the figure, Heidegger's relationship between the object of thought and its form is represented by the bottleneck of Klein's bottle. Hayes rejects logic because the usual logic is blind to the distortion of Klein's bottle bottleneck. Although Heidegger rejected logic, his thinking still had a logical rigor. why? For Heidegger's ideas, both in terms of content and period, correspond to Gödel's incomplete theorem of 1931. Gödel's incomplete theorem is an intrinsic critique of axiomatic mathematical systems (mathematical counterparts of logical positivism). Heidegger, like Gödel, found the difference between the levels of Meta and Object levels, i.e., that the consistency claimed by [Russell's] type theory actually had flaws. Hayes discovered the structure of existentialism, and Gödel discovered the "Gödel number".
As explained in the first two chapters of the book, lacan psychoanalysis after Heidegger combines the ideas of Heidegger and Gödel to construct a more concise theoretical schema. In Existence and Time, described above, the dual nature (both meta-level and object level) held by the specific point (this presence) is derived from the human being as an entity. But the Lacanists completely destroyed the remnants of Heidegger's theory of substance. [In Lacan's case], the limits of thinking (the realm of reality) are the empty "scarcity" at the center of the collection (symbolic realm) of objects of thought. This scarcity is guaranteed by Gödel's theorem.[10] The totality of beings must never be enclosed under a level. There is a crack [point], which Heidegger calls "here and now" and "Phyllis" [Lacan calls it], both in an attempt to define a structural phenomenon of mathematical impossibility. It's just that Philus simply exhibits a dualistic property and has no substance, which is slightly different from this.
The thinking of logical positivism (Russell) regards the boundaries of the world as the basis of static, continuous meta-levels. But Heidegger's (Gödel's) thinking sees the boundary-foundation as something produced (in the phenomenological sense) through the movement of specific points (here and now) in the world. Although one cannot think directly about the boundary-the foundation, it is always possible to think about the boundary-the basic production process itself. This kind of thinking is actually what is called existential analysis. In the view of logic, Heidegger's attempt is impossible; but after such a change of train of thought, his attempt is possible. Our discovery of this acrobatic approach to logic should be given a higher evaluation – Haydn gives a new way of thinking about boundaries/foundations, i.e., a holistic approach to thinking about the motion of "meta, trans, über, hyper, plus".
【Reference】
[1] i.e. "Clearing Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language"
[2] [Quotation from Heidegger's What is Metaphysics]
[3] [Actually, Heidegger's thinking is not so simple], here Carnap's "noun" means to think about the object, or the object of propositional calculation. There is no strict reference to linguistic lexical classification here, because lexical problems are not discussed in predicate logic. When discussed later in Heidegger's "nounization" problem, "noun" is not a linguistic "noun", but the meaning of "name" in philosophical naming problems. It is well known that late Heidegger examined in detail the noun and verb of the word "being", and in view of this, we cannot simply say that Heidegger regarded existence as a noun. (Hays's claim is that on has a dual participle property, being both a noun and a verb.) But for the sake of discussion, let's follow For the moment Carnap's binary opposites: nouns (propositional variables) and verbs (propositional forms).
[4] Allan Janik and Stephen Edelston Toulmin, starting from the synchronicity of The Philosophy of Logic and vienna in the early twentieth century, unearthed the positive meaning of Wittgenstein's "silence.". According to their research, Wittgenstein (and other Viennese intellectuals) in the 1910s and 1920s pondered the subject of "preventing the intrusion of speculative fields into everyday life." Therefore, the silence in the field of ethics in the Treatise on the Philosophy of Logic should be read as an active means of ensuring "ethical subjectivity". See janik A, Toulmin S. Wittgenstein's Vienna[M]. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973.What logical positivism and analytic philosophy after the 1940s did not inherit is precisely the positive meaning of Wittgenstein's silence. They simply erase the existential problem and ignore the existential problem. For example, in his 1948 paper On What Exists, Quine proposed that "only the values of the arguments exist" (i.e., repeating the karnap-Russell theoretical posture) and proposed that Wittgenstein's "mysterious" realm be cut off with an Occam razor. See Quine W V. From a logical point of view: Nine logico-philosophical essays[M]. Harvard University Press, 1980. This completely reduces the problem of existentialism to that of logic, completely erasing the differences between the two in interpreting propositions such as "x Pegasus(x)".
[5] Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Kawahara Eiko, Kawahara Eiho, 1994, pp. 50-51. According to the original German text of Wissenschaft, "learning" was changed to "science".
[6] The Complete Works of Wittgenstein, Vol. V, Overhaul Hall Bookstore, pp. 97-98.
[7] Wegmarken, Vittorio Klostermann, 3 ed., 1996, p.107.
[8] 参见Was hei t Denken?, S.134ff.
[9] Was ist das — die Philosophie?, Verlag Günther Neske, 10 ed., 1992, p.15.
[10] The use of Gödel's ideas to organize Lacan psychoanalysis is a paradigm established in the 1960s. See Badio's famous paper Alain Badiou, "Marque et Manque: à propos du zéro", in Les cahiers pour l'analyse, no.10, Seuil, 1969.