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Adorno: A Reflection on Heidegger's "Jargon as Fantasy"

Written by | Luo Songtao (Professor, School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University)

Adorno: A Reflection on Heidegger's "Jargon as Fantasy"

Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969), also translated as Theodor Ador, was a German philosopher and sociologist.

1

No more "more"

Adorno's critical focus on Heidegger's ideas continued throughout his academic career. In his inaugural address , " The Reality of Philosophy " , which is regarded as the germ of his ideas , Adorno focused on Heidegger 's philosophical reflections on the problems of existence. Adorno argues that the "problem of existence itself" is in fact "the least complete problem" because it is "no different from the empty formal principle", and the premise of the questioning of "existence" is that "the mind is absolutely adapted to existence and associated with it". (See Wang Fengcai's translation of "Philosophical Reality", Foreign Social Sciences, No. 1, 2013) This idea of existence, which is absolutely compatible with "existence", became the "jargon of authenticity" in the book "The Jargon of Authenticity".

The term "Jargon," which usually refers to the vocabulary used in a particular context by a social class or occupation, often imply "more" (Mehr) beyond its own meaning. In The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno focuses on a series of "jargons" about "being" in Heidegger's philosophy of existence, such as "here and now", "authenticity", "fear", "death in", "being", etc., including of course "existence". In Adorno's view, Heidegger sought to use these "jargon" alone to reveal the meaning of the existence of real people and even to make "existence" itself appear as it is. However, this "more" beyond the jargon itself, "the everyday language speaks in the here and now as if it were divine language." In other words, the everyday vocabulary of the "halo cloak" is transformed into "painting the philosophical universal concepts and ideas (such as the ideas that exist".

In the philosophical vision of non-identity between subject and object, conceptual and non-conceptual (i.e., "conceptual surplus") that cannot be taken by concepts, Adorno insisted on the priority of the object (non-conceptual). We know that Marx and Engels, in the German Ideology, and especially in the first chapter of the first volume, "Feuerbach", repeatedly emphasized the starting point of historical materialism: "The premises which we begin to talk about are not arbitrarily formulated, not dogmas, but certain practical premises which can only be set aside in the imagination." These are the actual individuals, their activities and their material conditions of life, including those they already have and created by their own activities. (The Collected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 1, People's Publishing House, 1995 edition, pp. 66-67) It should be said that this view of thinking about the relationship between man and history and between man and social reality from the perspective of "real man" is also the starting point of Adorno's criticism of Heidegger's survival and existential ideas.

If the young Hegelians, which Marx and Engels criticized, regarded theoretical criticism as a force for changing society, thus carrying an intrinsic element of avoidance (and even escape) from reality, then the fundamental problem of the modern German ideology represented by Heidegger's survival and existentialism criticized by Adorno was that in the reflection and questioning of "existence", thought was completely equated with existence. That is, the material conditions of life on which man's existence and practical activity depend are regarded as "so exist", abstracted as an "empty formal principle", and ultimately reduced to a "devotion to existence". Adorno argues that "in this jargon the fragrance of flesh-and-blood, non-metaphorical things is quietly spiritualized." In essence, the philosophy of existence, which is supposed to reflect on and transcend the dilemma of human existence, is nothing more than an authentic jargon that "deliberately sacralizes its everyday life." The "more" it contains is nothing more than an empty fantasy that is no different from the actual living conditions.

Adorno: A Reflection on Heidegger's "Jargon as Fantasy"

"The Black Words of Authenticity", translated by Xia Fan, Qi Zhenguan, Zhejiang University Press, August 2021.

2

Disagreement about what constitutes "death"

In Existence and Time, Heidegger intends to suspend the abstract definitions of man in traditional metaphysics, so that the existence of "existing beings" is to comprehend its own existence and to make its own existence manifest through its existential activities: "The existence of this being is always my existence. This being makes a difference in his own existence. As the being of such a being, it has been entrusted to its own existence. For such beings, the key is all about being. In Heidegger's view, this presence, unlike other beings, can exist in the sense of survivalism, existentialism, possessing the existential qualities of "zu sein" and "Jemeinigkeit": "The 'essence' of this being lies in its existence", and "the existence to which this being does something in its existence is always my existence".

However, in Adorno's view, Heidegger's existential and existential analysis has become an ideological myth ("authenticity jargon") that confirms the legitimacy of the social status quo, which is epitomized in Heidegger's analysis of this "dying".

Heidegger saw death as the most fundamental possibility here, and "this most intrinsic, unrelated possibility is insurmountable." To the existence of this possibility makes this person realize that what hangs before it as the most extreme possibility of existence is the renunciation of itself. But this precedence is not like dodging this insurmountable realm like the unrealistic existence of death, but giving freedom to itself for this insurmountable realm." This "fear" in the face of this "insurmountable" possibility makes this authentic choice and determination about many possibilities of existence while existing in the world.

Adorno, who pondered after the specific historical situation of Auschwitz, argued: "Since Auschwitz, fear of death has meant that fear of death is worse than death. Heidegger painstakingly distinguished between the non-authenticity of ordinary people," the "fear of death," and the "fear of death" of this being, arguing that the "death" of ordinary people's "fear" is nothing more than the "death of others" that understands death as an object (event) at the level of being, and only the "death" of this "fear" of the true earth can put this place in a state of freedom that fully demonstrates the possibility of its existence.

Adorno, who spares no effort to "disenchant" the above-mentioned authenticity jargon, believes that Heidegger's rendering of this is a set of words that obtain the true survival understanding through "dying and then making authentic choices" and finally "giving freedom to oneself", on the one hand, the reality of human existence (and death) is completely withdrawn, and on the other hand, the sense of powerlessness and fear of real people in the face of death is transcended into human survival characteristics, "as this jargon says, pain, calamity and death should be accepted." Ironically, this presence, which is bravely "dying" in existential and existential philosophies, is "incapable of confronting the fact that man is relegated to a functional set."

In Adorno's view, the modern German ideology represented by Heidegger's theory of survival and existentialism is essentially engaged in a kind of "desocialized" thinking. The prisoners in the Auschwitz incinerator, forced to give up their lives, lose any meaning of existence, while the survivors can only prove their existence in the concentration camps by number, and the "tragic consolation" offered by Heidegger ("I" became the real "self" because of the death of "me") can at best indulge one in the illusion of "the most extreme abstraction", but in the end it cannot compete with a wisp of green smoke or a number.

Adorno: A Reflection on Heidegger's "Jargon as Fantasy"

"The Jargon of Authenticity", translated by Xie Yongkang, Shanghai People's Publishing House, August 2021.

3

The "excessive abstraction" that becomes problematic

Coincidentally, the Austrian philosopher jean Emery, a survivor of Auschwitz, in The Philosophy of Aging: Resistance and Abandonment, also makes a powerful rebuttal to the abstract formal principle of "equality before death":

A poor wretched ghost who dies alone in the hospital, unappreciated by an indifferent nurse, is very different from a rich man leaving in a higher ward: for the latter, flowers on the table, cordial greetings and thoughtfulness of doctors to fulfill the obligations of high-paying positions, and frequent visits by relatives may not help him, but they can make some pain-free moments more peaceful. There is a good life in the days of death, and it is this good life that so starkly distinguishes his life from the miserable life of the poor.

One must repeat that we are equal before death, as it is not said, or that it excludes the demand for equality into the shameful, unconstrained metaphysical sphere, where we are not equal when we die.

——Refer to the philosophy of aging, Chinese edition, page 155, translated by Yang Xiaogang, Lujiang Publishing House, 2018.

Obviously, "equality before death" is only formal equality in the metaphysical speculative sense, and in fact "death" here, like "equality", is only an empty abstract concept; since it does not have any historical and practical "binding" nature, its propagation is "shameful". In contrast, the social, family, and individual situations faced by each individual "at the time of death" are complex and diverse and cannot be uniform. In my opinion, Emery's distinction between "before death" and "at death" also applies to Adorno's criticism of Heidegger's survival and existentialism.

In fact, in the 14th lecture series entitled Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems in 1965, Adorno recommended Emory's work to his students, with particular emphasis: "It is a lie to say that death has not changed in all ages; death is also a rather abstract entity." (Cf. Adorno, Metaphysic: Concepts and Problems, Polity, 2000) In heidegger's jargon of authenticity, death is desocialized as a "rather abstract entity." The philosophy of existence tries to rebel against the "oblivion of existence" and to give meaning to the survival of modern man, but because of this jargon "transcendence made of bad experience", it degenerates into a fantasy that merely tries to grasp the reality as a whole in the mind, an empty fantasy, a "grinding sound" of authenticity: "The extreme abstract self, which is nothing more than the incessant talking about me, me, my teeth grinding, is so nothing, just like the 'self' becomes in death."

It can be seen from this that Adorno's reflection and criticism of Heidegger's existential theory of survival in "The Jargon of Authenticity" aims to break through the fetishistic fantasy of the concept of "existence" and gain insight into the ideological mythological attributes of the jargon of the authenticity of life and death, so that the real person can break free from the shackles of abstract concepts and become himself and change the world in the concrete practice of life.

Heidegger's view, which is not attributed in the text, is quoted from Existence and Time, translated by Chen Jiaying and Wang Qingjie, life, reading, and Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore, 2000; Adorno's view is quoted from "The Jargon of Authenticity", translated by Xie Yongkang, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2021 edition.

Written by | Luo Songtao

Edit | Liu Yaguang

Proofreading | Xue Jingning

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