Business management requires philosophy!
First, what is phenomenology
Phenomenology is the "apparent science" of the 20th century, which was founded by E. Husserl. Husserl,1859-1938) founded, M. Scheler), Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau Ponty, H Gadamer, Rico (P· Ri-coeur, R. Ingarden, and others have become a spectacular phenomenological movement that has dominated European philosophy for decades. It can be said that the history of the development of European philosophy in the 20th century is still a confused account without clarifying phenomenology, but what exactly is phenomenology is not an easy thing to figure out. There are all kinds of disputes and disagreements among phenomenologists about what phenomenology is, and even in Husserl himself, there is no ready-made answer to what phenomenology is. Several of his representative works appear as "Introductions": Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Presentology (1913), Descartes' Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1913), And The Crisis of European Science and A priori Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (1936). We cannot give a better introduction beyond Husserl's classical introduction, and our introduction can only be regarded as an introduction to his own introduction to phenomenology. Husserl was born in Moravia in 1859 to a Jewish family. He was a mathematician and had a Ph.D. in mathematics. Later, under the influence of F. Brentano, he became interested in philosophy. He first worked as a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Halle, and from 1900 to 1901 Husserl published a two-volume Study of Logic, whereby he was employed as an associate professor at the University of Göttingen, where he did not become a professor until he was 47 years old. By this time a group of like-minded students and friends had gathered around him, known as the "Göttingen School" Ingarton, Scheler, and Stein (E. Berger). Stein) is one of the best of them, they meet regularly, they are keen to expound Husserl's theory of objects, they adhere to the principle of "facing things themselves" in The Study of Logic, and give phenomenological descriptions of various objects.
There is a similar school in Munich, the Munich School, whose main members are: J. Berger. Daubert), Pfandel (A· Pfander), Reinach (A · Reinach), Geiger (M. Ｇｅｉｇｅｒ） 。 In 1913 Husserl, together with his followers, founded the Annals of Philosophical and Phenomenological Studies, and his Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology was published in the first issue of the Annals. In the view of his Göttingen and Munich followers, the work deviated seriously from the direction of The Study of Logic, sliding from neutral object descriptions to transcendental idealism. Many of his followers left him as a result. From 1916 until his retirement, Husserl was professor of philosophy at the University of Freiburg, where he died in 1938. In his later years, Husserl was unhappy, with one of his sons dying in the war and the other permanently disabled. His Jewish identity scared away many friends. Many of his works can only be published abroad. He was even forbidden to use the university's library. It is touching that he also wrote his research notes on the back of this ban. In his cold and sober funeral, only one person from the philosophy department of the University of Freiburg appeared in his private capacity. Heidegger, his most proud disciple in his lifetime, refused to even show his face. Husserl published few works during his lifetime, but after his death he left behind 45,000 pages of manuscripts, which were written by Van Vuitton. Van Breda used diplomatic channels to secretly transport it abroad to save it from nazi hands. In 1939 van Breda established the Husserl Archive at the University of Louven in Belgium, and in cooperation with the Husserl Archive of the University of Cologne, it began to publish the Complete Works of Husserl in 1950, which was published in volume 28 by 1992. So, what exactly is phenomenology? Shortly after the introduction of phenomenology to France in the 1920s, the French thinker Raymond Berger was born in France. Aaron (R · Aron pointed to a cocktail glass and said mysteriously to his friend Sartre, "My man, if you're a phenomenologist, you can talk about this glass, and that's philosophy." Let's start with the wine glass. We see a wine glass on the table, and maybe we glance at it in our hands because of its strange appearance, or maybe we don't pay attention to it as a vessel for cooking wine.
We indulged in heart-to-heart conversations with our friends. Of course we know that the cup is on the table, and of course there's something else on the table, the ashtray, the little vase, and so on. Actually, we know and don't know exactly, we pick up the glass and take a sip is not to do some cognitive activity first, look at the cup, point it with your hand, and then put it up. Serving the cup and sipping are carried out naturally, and all these activities are "daily use without detection". This straightforward attitude of acceptance is the "attitude of nature", and I am aware of a world that stretches endlessly in space and changes infinitely in time. I take it as something that has always existed, and I experience it directly in the present moment. Of course, we sometimes dream, and sometimes we have some hallucinations, but we will soon know that we are dreaming, and we can easily separate the illusion from reality. We live in an orderly, everyday world that is shared and taken for granted. As soon as we sat down at the café table and made a move of the hand, the café waiter would come over, and it was as if we had reached a tacit agreement. When we pay the bill, we unconsciously put our hands in our pockets and pull out our wallets, and we don't do this by first thinking about where the pockets are, where the wallets are. The world of natural attitudes is so real that no one pays attention to its reality. Of course we know that all this is not very precise, we know that the wine glass on the table can hold a certain amount of wine, but how much it can hold depends on the measurement of physics, we know that this wine is made of grapes, but the specific composition of this wine depends on chemical testing. Natural science does not negate our natural attitudes, it merely further refines our daily attitudes. In this regard, the attitude of the natural sciences is still the attitude of nature. However, when I see a wine glass, what exactly do I see? Did I see the bottom of its cup? When I saw the waiter coming toward me, did I see the back of the waiter? Of course I realized it was a wine glass, but how exactly was this wine glass realized? Is this wine glass presented in my consciousness like a table in a café? This abrupt questioning method is simply a slap in the face for people with natural attitudes: Which way is this? Doesn't the cup have a bottom? Isn't the waiter behind it? This question is a phenomenological question, a question that comes from an attitude of reflection.
The man with the attitude of nature plunges headlong into the object because of his natural interests, and the phenomenological attitude shelves all the interests of nature, and it looks backwards from the object to see how the object is presented to me. Thus the phenomenological attitude of reflection is no longer concerned with what the object is, but with how the object is, with how the object is presented as an object. Phenomenological attitude is a general breakaway from the attitude of nature, the phenomenologist does not doubt the existence of the natural world as Descartes did, no, he has no interest in the existence of the world set by this natural attitude, he encloses the daily habits of man and various theoretical knowledge systems in parentheses. The addition of parentheses does not mean that everyday habits and scientific knowledge are questionable, let alone deliberately incompatible with it, Husserl repeatedly stated that he admired and appreciated the human knowledge system. Bracketing simply means existing, and by bracketing all propositions that are subordinate to the essence of the natural point of view are all useless, so that what has been obscured by the natural point of view is exposed, which is the basic meaning of "phenomenological suspension". Thus the phenomenological suspension does not negate anything, but on the contrary makes the things that are not named in the attitude of nature shine brightly. By suspending, the cloak of ideas worn on facts is "stripped" and "disassembled", and in the end it is worth us facing the facts themselves, and "facing the facts themselves" becomes the first principle of phenomenological methodology. Facts themselves are what is given in evidentiary, in absolute giving. Thus phenomenology does not construct any theoretical system, does not carry out any abstract speculation, but is faithful to all the phenomena it sees, and describes the phenomena as they appear in themselves. I see a wine glass, whether it really exists or not, how heavy it is, how big it is, how chemical it is, and the habits of science and science are all preserved, and I only pay attention to how it appears in my consciousness. I look at it from different angles, I don't see the same things, and I can close my eyes and recall what the glass looked like just now, and in all the conscious activities about the cup, the cup emerges as an object.
In fact consciousness is always about the consciousness of something. Always think about something, look at something, love always have to love something, hate always hate something... Conscious activity always involves an object of consciousness, and this attribute of consciousness is "intentionality." Intentionality is derived from "intentio", originally associated with archery, the act of pointing an arrow at a target, and later became a term in medieval scholasticism. Husserl's teacher, Brentano, first introduced it into modern philosophy. He proposed the concept of intentionality to distinguish between physical phenomena and mental phenomena, physical phenomena such as a rock is a rock, no more and no less, it is itself; and mental phenomena such as "I feel", "I imagine", "I love", "I am afraid", etc. It always involves something that is not itself, this thing may not exist at all, "I am afraid of ghosts", although ghosts do not exist. Husserl used Brentano's concept of intentionality to refer to the characteristics of conscious behavior. He believes that there is still a non-intentional feeling and material in the intentional behavior. For example, when I see this milky white wine glass in front of me, in this intentional act, "milky white" is just a "real feeling and material", and what I actually see is the wine glass itself outside the feeling and material. This factor that makes the real non-intentional material act is called "intentional action", the object produced by the intentional activity is called the "intentional object", the non-intentional material and the intentional action is the real part of the conscious experience, the intentional object is the conceptual part of the conscious experience, it is not the actual object in nature, the apple tree in the orchard can be burned, but the perceived apple tree cannot be burned. Thus the existence of the whole intentional act is also clear: the material and the intention action are real, they really exist in the concrete conscious action; the intentional object is the ideal, it is intentionally present in the conscious action; the external object is actual, it actually exists in nature under the natural attitude, it has nothing to do with the intentional action, it has been shelved by the phenomenological suspension. What is revealed through the phenomenological suspension is this intentional realm, the stream of pure consciousness.
Since we have set aside common sense and the scientific system, this allows us to describe the phenomenon of consciousness as consciousness for the first time. We no longer have to pay attention to the physiological basis of consciousness, still less to reduce consciousness to natural things, but to suspend the actual integration of thinking, so that all impulses to naturalize consciousness are suppressed. Phenomenologists can describe and analyze intentionality in the field of primitive conscious phenomena in the direction of the object pole of intention and the pole of the subject. The object of intent is not something that exists in nature, the latter is something set by a natural attitude, which phenomenology is not interested in; the object of intent is not something real in mental activity, the attraction of the color of the wine glass to my eyes, the stimulation of the aroma of wine in the glass to my sense of smell, these are the real things of mental activity, but when I say "this is a wine glass", I am not reporting on the actual state of my gaze and smell, as I said 1 + 1 = 2 Nor is it reporting on the counting activity of my own inner mind, but the object of intent is a stream that transcends specific inner mental activity. The object of intent is not conditioned by concrete, individual conscious behavior, but rather all specific individual conscious behavior is governed by its corresponding object type. I see a wine glass, and the wine glass as an object type guides me to the unfolding of further conscious behavior, and although I only see one side, I expect how its back is, how its bottom is, and this "how how" safety is predetermined by the object type of the wine glass. The prescriptiveness of object types as essentials is directly grasped by the present intuitive. I don't start by seeing a bunch of pure perceptions and then comparing them to previous perceptions of cups and finding that they have some kind of similarity before saying, "I saw a glass." No, the essence is intuitive, and the essence of intuition is of course made with the help of individual examples, but it is not limited to it. Imagination plays a crucial role in the intrinsic intuition. We can imagine a cup, it doesn't have a handle, of course it's still a cup, we can also imagine a cup with a fairly wide mouth and its bottom surprisingly narrow, in my free imagination of the cup, the specific part of the cup can be constantly changed, the cup is still a cup. But there's an insurmountable boundary, and once that boundary is crossed, the cup is no longer a cup.
It is in this change of free imagination that this boundary is revealed, and this boundary is the essence of the cup. If a thing lacks this essence, it is not the thing. Thus the phenomenological description does not care about concrete empirical facts, and although phenomenology also describes specific intentional behaviors, this description is purely an "example" of the essential description. The transfer from empirical facts to essential fields is called "essential reduction". Or let's go back to the wine glass. When we see a wine glass, all we actually perceive is one side of it. Even if I see the whole cup, this view is perspective, for example, the bottom part of the inner wall of the cup is not actually seen. In order to see the whole cup, I had to circle it, or simply put it in my hand and play with it, and my perspective was constantly changing, and the other sides of the cup were constantly presented in my consciousness. So the cup as an object of intention has more things than the manifestations in any particular way of giving, yet "this more thing" is not a random imagination, it is governed by certain rules, it has a predetermined possibility, which is the "realm". I saw a waiter coming up to me, and all I actually saw was his front, and I didn't actually see his back. But in "Realm" his back and its front are pointed to by my intentional behavior, and I expect him to have such and such a back, and it will not be the back of the tree, nor the back of the wine glass. Of course, my expectations also disappointed, I saw the waiter coming towards me, but when he turned around, I found that there was a bunch of mechanical things behind him, and his movements were not as natural as people, it turned out that it was not a person at all, but a robot. At this point, the intention of the person in my original consciousness is frustrated, and a new intention, the intention of the robot, is created, and further conscious behavior will enrich this new intention. It can be seen that due to the spatial character, the giving of things is always carried out in the outline (adum-bration), it is always given in one direction. In addition to the actual giving of one side, there is also a "realm" of common giving that has not yet been fully determined, which makes new perceptions possible. The giving of things is "adeguate" and there is always a possibility that their predeuested existence will be altered by further experience or cancelled.
The object is only a presumptive, and the presentation of the object must be premised on the harmonious unity of conscious behavior. Since the giving of things is always temporary and inadequate, we can always imagine that future experience will cancel the previous experience, and we can even imagine that all the various conscious actions that present "things" are completely in conflict with each other and cannot live in harmony, and the experience "explodes", at which point things cannot be presented at all. The idea of the incomparable world is always possible, but the idea that consciousness does not exist is impossible, so it can be seen that the existence of things is relative and dependent on him, the existence of consciousness is absolute and self-disciplined, the presentation of the world is completely dependent on consciousness, and the world is composed of consciousness. This is a misleading proposition. To say that the world is made of consciousness is not to say that the wine glass is made of glass, but that what is said about the natural attitude is causal. Physical, the table is made of wood, which means that carpentry has made a table through the processing of wood. The phenomenological suspension has completely suppressed this natural attitude, so we must not speculate on Husserl's thought from the natural attitude. "Composition" is entirely in the phenomenological sense, and to say that things are composed of consciousness is nothing more than to say that things appear and appear in consciousness. Manifestation also does not mean that there is a ready-made thing behind the scenes, and then there is a ready-made stage of consciousness, and the appearance of things goes from behind the scenes to the stage. The object as a thing is precisely what appears as a thing in the process of manifesting itself in consciousness. In the process of the appearance of things as things, intentional acts have taken on various meaning-giving effects. Therefore, to say that things are presented in consciousness is not to say that things are constituted in consciousness, just as the pen is in a stationery box. Talking about the self outside of consciousness is as absurd as talking about the square of the circle. In the same way, "consciousness" must also be understood in a phenomenological sense, consciousness is completely stripped of the character of the world, it is no longer related to any worldly physical and spiritual reality, it is pure absolute transcendental consciousness. In order to attain this purely absolute transcendental consciousness it is necessary to implement a "phenomenological transcendental reduction". The word "reduction" derives from the Latin word "re-ducere" meaning "return to the source".
Phenomenological reduction is the phenomenon of returning from ready-made knowledge systems and daily habits to the original. Reduction is actually "deconstruction" and "stripping", which disassembles all the objects of consciousness in layers, through the "accumulation of meaning" caused by intentional behavior, and directly approaches the source of meaning - the encounter of the transcendental self and its predicate. So, what is the transcendental self? The transcendental self is the radiation source of all intentional behavior, it is the subject pole of intentional behavior. It is not the physical self, nor the experiential self, not even the mental self, the transcendental self has nothing to do with the worldly organism, the experience, the psychology, which is completely a thing in the world, a materialized thing. The transcendental self is not an object in the world, not a part of the world, but rather the world is its object, and the transcendental self is the subject of the world. In the first thing of the reduction, the thing turns to me, and after the reduction, it is I who transfer the thing. The transcendental self lives in an ever-changing stream of pure consciousness, which is not an empty homolog. Every intentional action of the ego leaves "traces" in the transcendental self, and I can make such and such a decision, but once this decision is made, I am the self that makes this determination, and I am the carrier of the accumulation of these actions, and these accumulated habits constitute a huge realm of my behavior. Therefore, the pure conscious life of the transcendental self is not chaotic, it has an intrinsic temporal structure, and the essence of the transcendental self is "temporality". "Temporality" (Tem-porality) is not the common sense of time. Common sense time is one-dimensional, phenomenological temporality is three-dimensional, and every present consciousness has a realm consciousness of the past and the future. For example, if I listen to a piece of music, if there is no three-dimensional sense of time, we can only hear isolated sounds, and the reason why we can listen to a piece of music with a perfect melody is entirely due to temporality: at the same time that I hear the sound of the present, the sound of the past is wrapped around my subconscious as a retenBtion, and this memory is primary, it is different from the secondary active memory (recollection); at the same time, my current consciousness is also open to the future. The future protention is also wrapped around me subconsciously, and this pre-storage is also different from the active expectation.
The presentation of reality also depends on the temporality of the transcendental self, and without temporality, we can only see discontinuous sensory impressions, and it is precisely because of temporality that although what I actually see in each present moment is only one side of the wine glass, the actual view of this present moment has a boundary between past memory and future pre-existence, which makes us say: I see a wine glass. Each of the intentional actions emanating from the transcendental self is not isolated, but is intertwined with other intentional acts in temporality to form a comprehensive stream of consciousness. Thus the transcendental self, in the fluid and uninhabited diversity of its intended life, forms a "monadhis" with the object of the meaning. The monad self encompasses my entire life of intention, the transcendental subjectivity is universal and absolutely concrete, the "universe of the possible sense", and all intentional actions and objects of intentional behavior are ultimately composed of the transcendental self. Thus every conceivable meaning, every conceivable existence, finally falls into the realm of a priori subjects. Any attempt to conceive of a real whole as external to conscious, possibly knowledge, possibly proving the whole is absurd. The transcendental self becomes the final foundation, the highest rationality imaginable, and any effort to restore it to the a priori self is futile and absurd. Phenomenology reaches the ultimate thoroughness, reaches the final source, phenomenology becomes a "self-study", a "first philosophy", a "transcendental idealism". One asks: Where is the other person when phenomenological reduction restores everything to the "realm of the self"? What is the objectivity of the world? Isn't this a kind of solipsism? We should understand that in the natural attitude that others exist, that the world is objective and public, that this is not a problem, and Husserl is not interested in this. The problem is how to present another transcendental consciousness in the transcendental consciousness, which is quite difficult. The giving of others is different from the giving of things, things are always given in the form of a one-sided straightness and appresented, and the attached side through the movement of my body will be transformed into the original straightness; the other person is undoubtedly presented to me with his body, and his conscious life is attached to me, but this attachment can never be transformed into my original straightness, because if then he is no different from me, he is not him. This has really become solipsism.
The other person gives is so special that on the one hand he must be constituted in my consciousness, and on the other hand, he must be constituted as someone else with a priori consciousness. For this reason, Husserl pointed out that a body that is neither mind nor matter nor mind nor matter solves this problem. The body is not a body, the body is a body full of heart, a body of will, and I can lift my hand at will, which is fundamentally different from the way I lift an object with my hand. When I see someone who is physically similar to me, through empathy, I immediately realize that he has a similar life of consciousness as I do. Energy is the ability of the body, and sense of the spirit is the sense of the spirit. It is precisely because of this kind of sensing that I can understand the words of others, not the pure vibration of sound waves, and I can see others smile and not the displacement of wrinkles on my face. The realm of "interactive subjectivity" thus opens up, and the objectivity of the world thus falls into place. The original goal of phenomenology was to "face the facts themselves", and facts are the evidence of the present moment in the intuitive. As he progressed in phenomenological intention analysis, Husserl discovered that many of the ego's manipulative behaviors are not directly present to me in the present, but may have a time distance from the intuition of the present, and this past time spacing itself has an accumulated boundary structure. Thus it seems that the earlier practice of directly reducing from the natural attitude to the self-Cartesian practice inevitably gave a sense of emptiness, and the constantly retrograde intentional interpretation of all the meanings contained in the constituent was thus eliminated. In his later years, Husserl began to write his last introduction to phenomenology, The Crisis of European Science and A priori Phenomenology, in which Husserl proposed the concept of the "living world". This work is considered to be a major turning point in the development of Husserl's thought, but in fact his own interest in transcendental phenomenology has not changed. To return to the "living world" is simply to return to the intermediate station of transcendental subjectivity. The living world is the pre-scientific perceptual world, the subjective relative world, the world of everyday life. The living world arose before science. The abstraction and conceptualization of the scientific world can only be carried out with the help of things in the living world, and the evidentibility of the living world makes all scientific observations and verifications possible.
But the objectivists in the scientific world are ungrateful, they forget all the benefits they receive from the living world, and they go so far as to equate their conceptual methods with actual existence itself, resulting in a crisis of meaning in science. In order to discover the dimension of true meaning obscured by scientism, it is necessary to impose a phenomenological suspension on the scientific world and return to the world of life. Returning to the world of life is not a good thing, and the work of true phenomenological analysis has only just begun. Through the "inner thinking" of the living world, it is found that the "root" that was once masked, the original transcendental self is the "operator of all validity", and the world, science, and natural life are all obtained through the "conscious life" of the "transcendental subject". The ego has become the carrier of "teleology" and "absolute reason" that runs through the entire historical development, so he must compose his life according to internal teleology and absolute reason, overcome the relativity of the living world, and achieve the universal rationality of the world of universal reason. It seems that Husserl is still obsessed with his transcendental self and his conscious life. The world of science, the world of life, is, in the final analysis, made up of the transcendental self. Those who have no affinity for a priori philosophy will long ask: How can one component of the world make up the whole world? Doesn't this mean that the main part of the world swallows up the whole world and itself? Isn't that ridiculous? This is not "absurdity" but "paradox", and Husserl says that not resolving this paradox means that "actual universality and complete suspension are simply unattainable". Husserl's solution is simple and straightforward: the empirical self is originally a transcendental self, but it is only unaware. It is only through the revelation of the transcendental dimension that I discover that as a transcendental self, I am also the same self as the worldly individual self. Violation is sentient beings, enlightenment is Buddha. The problem is: under the natural attitude, the transcendental self is hidden, people do not even know that they are in the natural attitude, only through suspension can recognize the transcendental self, that is to say, to break through the natural attitude must have a priori self to reflect, and to recognize the transcendental self must be suspended in the natural attitude, the result is a logical strange circle - the premise of restoration is that there must be an awakening of the transcendental self, and the premise of the awakening of the transcendental self must be restored first. Reason finally hits its limits, and where reason is powerless, irrationality emerges: phenomenological reduction is like a "conversion", and the transition from the empirical self to the transcendental self is a "leap" of faith. This jump is not far from existentialism.