History of the Origins of World Philosophy, Seventeenth Century Western Philosophy No. 6: Leibniz 5

Seventeenth Century Western Philosophy No. 6: Leibniz 5

　　From a historical point of view, Leibniz's monad theory first overcomes the dualistic flaws of Cartesian philosophy. In Descartes, the mind and the body, the spirit and matter coexist, and matter is only an object with a broad attribute. This idea of duality, understood from the macroscopic perspective of historical development, has the effect of breaking through the old theory and has a typical transitional nature. Leibniz's theory, on the other hand, takes the monad as the starting point of the problem, and takes God as the complete embodiment of its ultimate process, and the monad connects the inside and the outside, and the spirit and matter eventually become one, which obviously has a more complete and rigorous way of thinking than Descartes' dualism. And perhaps we can be inspired even more by it if we do not simply consider his various definitions of the list, but as a hypothesis of knowledge of the material world. This is one of them.

　　At the same time, he believes that the monad itself is dynamic, and that this agency is not from external forces, but from its own characteristics. Accordingly, Feuerbach commented: "In Leibniz's view, the object entity is no longer, as Descartes believed, merely expansive, rigid, driven by external forces, but an entity that is active in itself, with the principle of never-static activity. In Descartes, matter is dead; in Leibniz, matter is vivid and full of vitality. Although the basis of his argument is still problematic, this dynamic expression of objects is clearly more valuable than Descartes' view of matter. That's the second.

　　Moreover, although he believed that God was the Creator of the List, he also believed that God should appear as a legislator. In other words, God should not abuse His power excessively. God is only the ultimate cause and effect, not the process. He said: "God as an architect satisfies God as legislator in every respect. Thus sin necessarily brings its punishment by the natural order, and even by the mechanical structure of things; likewise, good deeds are rewarded by mechanical means of the physical, though this cannot and should not always be attained immediately. God is certainly the most full incarnation, but it is best not to be nosy. Since God has arranged everything in a "predetermined harmony, he should let people deal with their own affairs according to this a priori reason for existence." Although Leibniz did not express his meaning in such language, his words clearly implied such thoughts. This is the third.

　　Moreover, although Leibniz gave all the power of the birth and destruction of the monad to God, his monotheism did not conform to the concept of scripture, nor to the concept of scholastic philosophy, let alone to the concept of traditional theology. His painstaking monologue is actually a rational way of thinking for God, which is somewhat similar to Descartes' philosophy. Only then did the church organizations distrust him and have all kinds of doubts about him; but only then did they be willing to draw him in the hope that he would be converted to God's bosom as soon as possible—to invite him to the Church. But perhaps out of reason, or perhaps for other reasons, he politely and resolutely declined the kindness of those who suggested him to join the religion. In this way, although his doctrine is often suspected of being at both ends of the rat, its theological value is almost equal to zero, and its philosophical connotation is profound.

　　Moreover, in the process of arguing the list, he also provided a more philosophical method of understanding, mainly by using the law of sufficient reason that he had created.

　　(2) On the law of sufficient reasons

　　Leibniz's law of sufficient reason is both a major development of his traditional logic and a fundamental method representing his epistemology. In the former, he is one of four logical theorems that juxtapose the law of sufficient reason with the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of exclusion. And this fourth law is his new creation. From an epistemological level, the law of sufficient reason has more epistemological value than the laws of general logic.

　　Leibniz said: "Our reasoning is based on two great principles, namely: <1 > the principle of contradiction, by virtue of which we judge the contradictor as false and the opposite or contradictory from false as true. "and <2 > the law of sufficient reasons, by virtue of which we hold that if anything is true or real, if any statement is true, there must be a sufficient reason why it is so and not so, although these reasons are often always unknown to us." These words, which become Leibniz, may be somewhat puzzling to readers who do not know much about logic and Leigh's philosophical terms. But to explain these ideas of his in layman's terms, it is best to first analyze his two views of truth.

　　Leibniz believed that there were originally two truths in the world, one, the truth of reasoning, and the other, the truth of facts. And he further argues that two different truths should apply to different principles.

　　Reasoning truths apply the law of contradiction, and factual truths apply the law of sufficient reason.

　　Why?

　　For in his view, the truth of reasoning belongs to the necessary truth, which "can be found analytically to find its reasons, to reduce it to more pure ideas and truths, all the way to the original truth" . Obviously, this truth can be proved by deduction, by the law of contradiction. If its truth itself is correct, it is true, e.g. 2 + 2 = 4; conversely, if its truth itself is false, it is false, e.g. 2 + 2 = 5. But it cannot be both true and false, e.g. 2 plus 2 equals both 4 and 5. And the opposite or contradictory to false is true, which is the basis for his reasoning truth as the necessary truth. Generally speaking, the truth of reasoning can only have one conclusion, and the scope of application of reasoning truth, that is, the law of contradiction, is mainly in the field of mathematics or formal logic.

　　The law of sufficiency is different. The scope of application of the law firm of sufficient reason belongs to factual truth. According to Leibniz, factual truth is not necessary truth, but accidental truth. The so-called accidental truth cannot be accomplished by deductive reasoning. It may be said that the study of reasoning truth, as long as the false is excluded, the rest is true. For example, if there are 15 answers to the proposition 2 + 2 = 4, then 14 answers must be false. Factual truth is different. Because it is contingent, separable, and complex, it cannot be solved by the law of contradiction, such as 2 plus 2 is absolutely equal to 4. For example, for the proposition that the sky is blue, it is far from easy to find an accurate answer to it. In other words, why is the sky blue? Reasoning the truth alone will not answer this question. Therefore, the law of contradiction is not enough, and the law of sufficient reasons must be applied to find out the various causes that cause this result of the sky being blue.

　　For example, pregnancy can give birth to children is also a factual truth. Pregnancy can give birth to children, but the result is to give birth to a boy, or a girl, whether to have a handsome child or an ugly child, to give birth to a genius or an idiot, and even whether there will be a freak, these are uncertain, because it is uncertain, the law of contradiction is not applied, and the law of sufficient reason must not be applied.

　　Although Leibniz classified factual truths as contingent truths because of their uncertainty, they were not without laws to follow. That is, although you cannot determine what kind of child is born after pregnancy, there is a definite causal relationship between pregnancy and childbirth, and although we do not know the final result, there are sufficient causes for the result. In this sense, the so-called accidental truth is actually governed by the necessary truth. That is why Leibniz said: "These contingencies can obtain their last reason or sufficient reason only in the necessary entity, and the necessary entity has its reason for existence from itself." The so-called sufficient reason refers to the knowledge of the causal relationship of things and the connection of their necessity." In other words, in the entity of necessity, what is possible is sufficient to become a reality. That is to say, Leibniz, then, divides the object of study of philosophy into two distinct fields.

　　One field is speculative philosophy, or science that can be proved by deductive reasoning; the other is empirical philosophy, i.e., science that cannot be proved by deductive reasoning, and to understand and know them is to find sufficient reasons, that is, to find out why they are so.

　　Leibniz applied his law of sufficient reason to the knowledge of the monad, i.e., as a special entity with a process of necessity. And his ideological value of the law of sufficient reason is of great historical significance for understanding the agency of the world and for finding out the laws of cognition and the law of cause and effect of the development of the objective world.

　　The view of the world of monads as dynamic, and as regular, governed by the law of sufficient reason, is a great historical contribution of Leibniz's philosophy. This idea of his, before him, had not been expounded so systematically; after him, it was finally made more theoretical and systematic at a higher level by Kant, Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel.

　　(3) Criticism of the "whiteboard" and others

　　Some of Leibniz's important philosophical insights, although very concentrated in his "monolithic theory", his full interpretation of these views is revealed through the criticism and refutation of the English empiricist philosopher Locke.

　　Locke was a great figure who occupied a special place in the history of Western philosophy. In terms of his direct influence on modern Western philosophy, only Descartes can compete with him. But Leibniz, with both his penchant and courage to confront the great men, thought he had "good reason" to argue with Locke, and at the same time the two of them did have major differences in some basic epistemology.

　　These differences began with the fact that Locke was an empiricist who disagreed with the idea of gifts, while Leibniz was a transcendental theorist who not only believed that the idea of gifts necessarily existed, but also created a complete doctrine for its existence.

　　Leibniz criticized Locke, one was to criticize his "whiteboard theory", and the other was to criticize his theory of the origin of knowledge. These two points are actually two sides of the same coin.

　　The so-called whiteboard theory is a major point of Locke's philosophy. "Whiteboard" means that the human mind is like a whiteboard. Whiteboarders, there is no point in any handwriting. It is only through experience that the symbols of knowledge can be written down on this "whiteboard".

　　The so-called origin of knowledge theory, that is, Locke believes: "All our knowledge is based on experience; knowledge is ultimately derived from experience." And these ideas Leibniz did not agree with at all. Not only has he "always been, and still is, in favour of the idea of the gift of God which Monsieur Descartes once advocated, but he also believes that there are other ideas of gift that cannot come from the senses." Moreover, he even believed that all thoughts and actions of the human soul came from within itself, and could not be given to it by feeling. It should be said that Leibniz's conception of talent seems undoubtedly absurd to many modern people, and indeed has a considerable sense of historical gap than Locke's thought. As a philosophy, however, his thoughts were by no means of a theological nature; and in the course of his speculations, they showed some very useful revelations. In fact, he is not opposed to the role of experience under any conditions, and he therefore thinks that in a certain sense it is also possible to say that external sensations are partly the cause of our thoughts.

　　What makes him superior to the empirical philosophers is that he thinks that whatever can be summarized under his law of sufficient reason is themselves varied. And these changes are not generalized by simple experience. Experience is dead, while factual truth is contingent. One can find the causal law of these changes only through the law of sufficient reason, that is, through the analysis of contingency, to achieve a sufficient understanding of their inevitability. For example, in his rebuttal to Locke, he also wrote a sharp criticism: "The beast guides itself purely by experience, only by example, because as far as we can judge, the beast can never come up with an inevitable proposition, and man can have proven scientific knowledge."

　　It is also because of this that the function of association that the beast possesses is something lower than the rationality possessed by man. The associations of the beasts are purely the same as those of the mere empiricists; they think that everything that has happened before will happen later on an occasion that makes them feel similar, and they cannot judge whether the same reason still exists. This is the reason why man is so easy to catch beasts, and why simple empiricists are so prone to making mistakes. Thus those who have become shrewd by reason of their age and experience are bound to make mistakes when they believe too much in their past experience, which is not uncommon in both civilian and military terms, because they do not take fully into account the world changing, and people have discovered a thousand new techniques and become more shrewd, while the roe deer or hare have not become more cunning than in the past. Although the language is harsh, it is not unreasonable. And how many facts in human life can prove that what he says is not false. In ancient China, there was such a parable as "keeping the plant and waiting for the rabbit", and modern times are harmful to people's dogmatism and formalism. Leibniz's philosophy, whose theoretical framework is dead, is often alive in its content. In this regard, Leibniz can be called Kant and Hegel of the 17th century. As far as the cause and effect of the development of Western philosophical thought is concerned, he also has every reason to prove that he is their precursor — but unfortunately all this has nothing to do with God.

　　Unfortunately, although Locke was 14 years older than Leibniz, the young Leibniz belonged to the old category of 17th-century philosophy, while the older Locke represented a new hope for the Enlightenment. After all, Leibniz's argument with Locke, he is not the winner of the times.

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