This article is "An inch of mountains and rivers and an inch of blood, 22 large-scale battles of the War of Resistance" 12: The Battle of Southern Henan
Nishio Decided that the Future Combat Method of the Japanese Army should be "short-range truncated operations." That is, in order to save troops and reduce attrition, instead of fighting with the Chinese army at a long distance and in depth, it took the form of a short surprise attack, "the limit of the division and regiment entering is between ten and fifteen miles (the position from the enemy's division headquarters)."
01 Short-range truncation operations
In 1941, the top brass of the Japanese army was deeply troubled.
Prior to this, every year the Base Camp of the Japanese Army would stipulate in the "Operational Guidance Plan against China" that this year it would "solve the China Incident." But until 1941, a large number of Japanese troops were still trapped in the Battlefield of China. The changes in the international situation stimulated the Japanese army to quickly invade Southeast Asia and obtain the required strategic materials such as rice, rubber, and oil. The Japanese base camp has been considering reducing its strength in China and putting more troops into the Southeast Asian battlefield
The Invading Japanese Army was also very impatient, and had to fight, and only in combat could it plunder more materials and end the war as soon as possible; but once the operation could not be carried out on a large scale, the existing strength of the Japanese army made it impossible to have enough troops to ensure the occupation of the region after the large-scale operation. Moreover, most of the time, the Chinese army did not consider the gains and losses of one city and one place with the Japanese army, and the rapid retreat made it impossible for the Japanese army to capture the main force and fight a decisive battle.
Under such contradictions, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese dispatch army at the time, Nishio Shouzo, proposed the method of "short-range truncated operations"
That is, instead of engaging in long-distance and large-depth operations with the Chinese army, it was mainly based on rapid assault, and even stipulated that "the limit for the entry of the division is between ten and fifteen miles (the position from the enemy division headquarters)"
02 The target is still Tombaugh
It was in this context that the commanders of the Japanese 11th Army, Lieutenant General Yuanbu and Ichiro, planned the Battle of Southern Henan.
For some reason, Kazuichiro Andichiro and his staff had a obsessive attachment to Tombaugh's troops. This time, their main goal was to eliminate the Tombaugh Group.
After the Battle of Zaoyi, Tang Enbo's army was the closest Chinese army to the Japanese army— but soon Tang Enbo's army moved to the area of Suiping and Xiangcheng in Henan.
The 11th Army drew up a battle plan for this purpose: first pretend to attack Xiangyang, so that the Chinese army thought that the Japanese army was going to attack the 5th Theater on a large scale. According to the custom of the Chinese army retreating in a battle, Tang Enbo's troops would inevitably retreat to the northwest, and at that time they would be surrounded and annihilated halfway through. According to the principle of "short distance", the Japanese limited the attack to Gwangju, Xincai and Xiping, eighty kilometers northeast of Xinyang, Henan, where they believed Thatnber could only run.
The southern Henan region is a large plain, through which the Pinghan Railway runs through it, and road traffic is also very developed. The Japanese army will attack north along the Pinghan Road, with bingfeng pointing directly at Tang Enbo's 31st Group Army, while the Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan will also respond to the offensive of Pinghan Road.
The Japanese army gathered troops, and the Chinese army quickly grasped and judged that the target of the Japanese army was Tang Enbo's troops. Chang Kaishen called Tang Enbo directly and asked
"It is imperative that all ministries be strictly ordered to make active preparations and not to be controlled by the enemy"
In response to the Japanese invasion, the 5th Theater of Operations planned to
Small troops blocked the Japanese troops in front of them and slowed down their advance; another force was sent to the back of the Japanese army to detour, harassing and even cutting off the rear road of the Japanese army; the main force quickly retreated to the two wings of the Japanese attack direction, and when the time was ripe, it attacked the besieging Japanese army on both sides.
Careful readers will find that this set of tactics is what we used in the Battle of Changsha zaoyi, and the Japanese army has suffered some hardships - but the Japanese army did not pay too much attention to it, they think that this is only because the Chinese army's combat effectiveness is low and they dare not fight head-on.
03 Pinch attack of the Chinese army
On January 20, 1941, the Japanese independent mixed 18th Brigade Regiment and one each of the 4th and 39th Divisions launched an attack on our 33rd and 29th Group Armies at Zhongxiang, Dangyang, and Jingmen in Hubei. However, the Japanese attack in this direction was a feint attack, in fact, in order to cover up its true intention to attack in the direction of southern Henan, and at the same time to contain the 5th Theater troops. Although the Japanese army was feinted in the Hubei battlefield, it was still repelled by the defenders in person, and the main force of our 5th Theater of Operations did not move; then, on January 24, the Japanese 3rd Division attacked our positions on the north side of Xinyang in an attempt to cut off our army's retreat, which also failed.
The Japanese plan didn't work in the first place.
Nevertheless, the Japanese launched a formal offensive on 25 January, attacking north along the Pinghan Road in three separate routes under the cover of aviation.
According to the established plan, our army left only a small force to block the frontal attack, and the main force gradually moved to the flank rear of the Japanese army, waiting for the arrival of the pinch attack.
The Japanese advanced quickly, starting from the 26th, the Japanese left wing and the central forces advanced nearly 100 kilometers in two days.
On 27 January, the Chinese army began a pinch attack on the Japanese. Tang Enbo's 31st Army appeared in the flank rear of the Japanese army, and its 13th Army attacked the 3rd Division, and the 85th Army attacked the 40th Division; on the other hand, the 86th Army also bit the 3rd Division, and the 55th army and the 59th Army also quickly approached the Japanese army.
The left and right flanks of the Japanese army were caught in a bitter battle, and the Japanese army changed its strategy at the sight of the situation, and the central corps of the Japanese army quickly divided its troops to the two wings, trying to encircle the Chinese army with the Japanese troops on the left and right flanks.
However, the Chinese army quickly retreated, leaving a small number of troops entangled with the Japanese army - the Japanese army's change of position did not have much effect.
After the Japanese army broke into the Wuyang and Shangcai areas, it found that it had pounced, not only did not capture the main force of the Chinese army, but found that it was blocked and attacked by the Chinese army everywhere, and it was impossible to concentrate superior forces in any direction to control the situation.
On February 2, 1941, the Japanese made the decision to withdraw completely.
During the Japanese retreat, the Chinese army laid a fierce siege on the Japanese at the rear and on both sides. The Japanese army had just fought fiercely with this Chinese army, and had to deal with the attack of another Chinese army. The Japanese army had to fall into a repetitive cycle of bitter battles, and the Japanese army had no intention of fighting and had to retreat desperately.
For example, the Japanese 17th Division. In order to meet the retreat of the 3rd Division, the main force of the Japanese 17th Division set out from Xiangheguan to the 13th Division, and as a result, when it came out of Xiangheguan, it was fiercely blocked by our army; during the retreat, it was beaten hard by our 29th Army, and the 17th Division had to abandon a large number of heavy weights, vehicles and corpses.
In this way, the Japanese army was driven all the way back to the starting point by the Chinese army.
The Battle of Southern Henan ended here, and the Japanese army's
History of war
Claiming to have suffered only minor losses,
However, the Chinese army believed that the Japanese army suffered more than 9,000 casualties in this battle, and our army captured countless enemy supplies near Nanyang, which was a great victory.
Compared with other battles in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Battle of Henan was indeed small in scale, and the enemy and we did not invest much troops. Nishio Shouzo's "short-range truncation operation" made the Japanese army dare not pull the battle line too large, and at the same time, the retreat was relatively rapid, objectively limiting the Japanese army. On the other hand, under the anxiety and arrogance of the Japanese army, there are many loopholes in campaign planning and mutual coordination on the battlefield.
These loopholes were successfully seized by our army, and the victory in the Battle of Southern Henan also enhanced the confidence and courage of our anti-Japanese soldiers and civilians and the Japanese and Koso to continue the War of Resistance.