Among the ten founding marshals of New China, Marshal Chen Yi was called "Marshal of Poets" by everyone because of his bold personality, open-mindedness, completeness of literature and martial arts, and rich poetic temperament; in the Liberation War, although many famous battles of the Third Field Army were commanded by Su Yu, Chen Yi, as commander of the Three Fields, was also indispensable, and many orders might have been a different picture if Chen Yi had not made a decision.
In 1947, the Central China Field Army and the Shandong Field Army merged to form the East China Field Army, which successively carried out the Battle of Lunan, the Battle of Laiwu, and the Battle of Taimeng, and the three battles attacked and annihilated 133,000 Kuomintang troops, completely annihilated 5 reorganized divisions (armies) of the Kuomintang, and achieved brilliant victories.
Because the Kuomintang troops on the Shandong battlefield were defeated and completely annihilated by Huaye many times, Chiang Kai-shek was very angry and decided to shrink his strength and concentrate his forces and seek a decisive battle with the main force of Huaye with the tactics of steady and steady fighting, so the Kuomintang invested 24 divisions, 60 brigades, and 450,000 men and horses, and attacked under the leadership of Gu Zhutong, Tang Enbo and others.
Because the Kuomintang army had suffered scattered losses in the past, the East China Field Army led by Chen Yi and Su Yu gradually found flaws in the movement war, and the various units of the Kuomintang army were closely connected and cooperated with each other, especially the seams between the various units, and the enemy army never ventured forward, but gradually promoted the compression of Huaye's range of activities.
Under these circumstances, it was very difficult for the main force of Huaye to find a suitable opportunity to annihilate the enemy, and if he was not careful, he would be dragged by the enemy and fall into the encirclement of hundreds of thousands of people, in order to crush the enemy's attack and break the stalemate on the Battlefield in Shandong, Su Yu decided to first attack the reorganized 74th Division of the Kuomintang ace army.
Although the target was confirmed, Su Yu was not very sure of this battle, and on the eve of the battle, Su Yu reported his plan and ideas to Commander Chen Yi.
After hearing this, Chen Yi not only did not raise objections, but on the contrary vigorously supported it, believing that it was necessary to have the atmosphere of taking the first rank of the enemy in a million troops, and to make Chiang Kai-shek feel pain thoroughly by a fierce tiger.
Since then, Huaye's main offensive target has been confirmed, because the integrated 74th Division is relatively close to the 25th Division and the 83rd Division, and the nearest point is only a dozen kilometers, while the other units are only two days away from the 74th Division, so this battle can only be won quickly and cannot be delayed for a long time, which is a great test of the combat effectiveness of the main attacking troops.
After receiving the order, Huaye's various units quickly threw themselves into battle, zhang Lingfu was forced to throw away his heavy weapons on Meng Lianggu, hoping that other Kuomintang troops could put down their prejudices to rescue him, if he could drag Huaye's main force, then this battle alone could cause Huaye Yuanqi to be seriously injured or even destroyed, but Zhang Lingfu so imagined that other Kuomintang troops would not cooperate with him, especially Huang Baitao's 25th Division and Li Tianxia's 83rd Division, although the two units were closest to Zhang Lingfu, but the rescue was not active.
In order to annihilate the 74th Division as soon as possible and rush to withdraw from the battle after the Kuomintang army was encircled, Chen Yi called the Ye Fei Column and Xu Shiyou Column, which were the main attackers, and issued a death order that the 74th Division must be taken, and after two days of arduous fighting, Zhang Lingfu was finally wiped out above Meng Lianggu.
Since then, Huaye has successively launched the Battle of Sand Andiji and the Battle of Laiyang, all of which have achieved brilliant victories.
At the end of 1947, the East China Field Army held a summary meeting of the whole army to report on the achievements made by HuaYe in the past year and discuss the next development strategy.
Because most of the Kuomintang troops occupy large cities and have high walls, it is inevitable that they will have to attack fortifications in the future, while our army has rich experience in field battles, but its experience in attacking tough problems is basically zero.
Although Chen Yi's proposal was unanimously approved by the leaders of the field army such as Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, the commanders of the various columns under them were somewhat dissatisfied with this, because all the battles that Huaye's units had gone through in the past year had been victorious, and even Chiang Kai-shek's "Yulin Army" integrated 74th Division had been wiped out, and coupled with the weak will to fight among the rest of the Kuomintang troops, it was not at all too difficult for our army to build, so the commanders of all columns believed that the combat effectiveness of the Kuomintang army was like that, and it was not worth paying too much attention to at all. Even relying on cities and pools could not stop the attack of the People's Liberation Army.
In fact, this suggestion put forward by Chen Yi occurred more than a year ago, but at that time our army was still mainly defensive, so it did not care, at that time, the Shandong Field Army gathered the 8th Division, the 9th Column and 6 regiments and other troops to attack Sixian County, and the Sixian defenders only had one division of the Kuomintang 7th Army.
It was precisely because Chen Yi anticipated that the next battlefield would definitely be dominated by the battle of big cities and did not want to repeat the mistakes of Sixian County, so he reminded the commanders of all units at the summary meeting to let them learn from experience in advance and not to cause unnecessary casualties on the battlefield.
However, huaye units have always been immersed in the joy of victory and have not studied the experience of attacking tough problems in a targeted manner; in the Battle of Huaihai, the Battle of Nianzhuang, the Battle of Shuangduiji, the Battle of Chen Guanzhuang, and other Battles, the Kuomintang did not have too many permanent fortifications, and they collapsed under the devastating and decadent attack of the Liberation Army, and crossing the Yangtze River made the Kuomintang army flee in a hurry.
The joy of victory in successive battles made the major field armies relax their vigilance and believe that the Kuomintang army was vulnerable, but one of the battles in the Shanghai Campaign gave the vast number of officers and men in Sanye a blow, and also made them understand that it was not that the Kuomintang army was too weak, but that the people who commanded them were too weak, and the combat effectiveness of the Kuomintang army should not be underestimated.
On the eve of the Shanghai Campaign, Chen Yi stipulated that once the troops entered the urban area to fight, they were not allowed to use heavy weapons such as artillery, because this was done so that the lives and property of the residents of Shanghai and the buildings in various places would suffer less loss and damage, and in order to take over Shanghai in its entirety, hard battles, and vicious battles must be fought on the outskirts of Shanghai.
Commander Chen Yi said humorously:
Entering Shanghai is to catch rats in the porcelain shop, not only to catch the rats, but also not to damage the porcelain in the store, in a word, to achieve a comprehensive victory in both military and political aspects!
In order to ensure the integrity of Shanghai, Sanye gave up frontal combat, but instead led the enemy out and fought by clamping down on both wings, and Ye Fei's 28th and 29th armies of the 10th Corps fought fiercely with the Kuomintang army in the area of Yuepu, Liu Xing, and Yang Xing.
The main offensive task in the Battle of Yuepu was the 260th Regiment of the 87th Division of the 29th Army, the 253rd Regiment of the 85th Division was temporarily under the command of the 87th Division, serving as the assist of The 260th Regiment, and the commander of the 260th Regiment went to Jiangyin Fortress for another task, so the actual command was taken care of by the political commissar Xiao Ka.
Before the battle, Xiao Ka held a pre-war mobilization meeting to convey to the officers and men of the regiment the importance that the superior leaders attached to them; moreover, the liberation war was nearing its end, and there were not many opportunities for a big battle in the future, and this liberation of Shanghai was their last chance to make meritorious contributions.
After mobilization, the morale of the whole regiment was high, but since the troops crossed the river, there was a general sentiment, that is, they thought that the Kuomintang army was fleeing from the wind and vulnerable to a blow, and this kind of light enemy sentiment from top to bottom made Xiao Ka a little worried, plus they were not familiar with the enemy situation, terrain, and fortifications around Yuepu, Baoshan, and Wusong, and Xiao Ka was still a little uneasy before launching the attack.
At that time, most of the tactics adopted by the units in Sanye were onslaught tactics, and the 260 regiment was naturally no exception, but as the main offensive regiment, they only received the assistance of 3 mountain cannons of the 29th Army Artillery Regiment, and it was reasonable to say that such a configuration of this kind of offensive battle was absolutely rare, but the spread of light enemy sentiment at that time was too serious, and Xiao Ka himself and other regiment leaders believed that the mountain artillery equipped to them by the superiors was enough, and even without cannons they could defeat the Kuomintang army.
On the evening of May 12, the 260th Regiment set out from southeast Changshu and eliminated a mobile sentry of the Kuomintang in the process of approaching Yuepu, capturing a platoon leader, in the mouth of this platoon leader, Xiao Ka and others learned that it was the 25th Division of the Nationalist 52nd Army guarding Yuepu, and there was a regimental strength in the forward position.
The Kuomintang in the Baoshan and Wusong areas arranged hundreds of cannons from 12 artillery regiments, plus more than 30 warships on the Yangtze River could fire guns on the shore at any time, in addition to aircraft from Jiangwan and Longhua airports, and a large number of reinforced concrete pillboxes were also built in the more than 20-mile area from Yuepu to Wusong, forming a crossfire network, waiting for the PLA to take the bait.
After Xiao Ka and the others received the news, they immediately decided to adapt the tactic of rushing and thrusting, changing it to the technique of attacking and attacking, and immediately reported the situation to the division headquarters, but due to lack of experience and tight time, the fortification trenches had already been bright before they had time to dig deep, and at this time the Kuomintang army had also discovered the People's Liberation Army, and half of the fortifications dug under the attack of enemy artillery were continuously destroyed, and even the three mountain cannons equipped with the 260 regiment were destroyed.
Although the 260th Regiment was the main attack, but because of the timely discovery or took a part of the means, the casualties were not too large, and the 253rd Regiment that served as an assist was not so lucky, the whole regiment rushed forward, taking advantage of the night to rush forward, on the night of the 12th, in the misty drizzle, the 253rd Regiment entered a "cemetery" next to Yuepu Street.
The leaders of the 253rd Regiment saw the nearby "grave bags" one after another, and there was no doubt at all, but instead ordered the troops to stand on standby, and the regimental command post was set up in the "graveyard", and when it was dawn, everyone found that this was the "grave bag", all of which were kuomintang reinforced concrete bunkers, and this unexpected situation surprised the regiment leaders and quickly ordered a retreat, but it was too late.
These "grave bags" were all turned into demons, each of which spewed out evil flames, and the commanders and fighters of the 253rd Regiment launched 2 surprise attacks one after another, all of which were beaten back by the Kuomintang army, and the troops suffered heavy casualties.
On the morning of the 13th,
The main attack of the 260 regiment except for the 3rd battalion of the other two battalions were shrouded in Nationalist artillery fire, and the situation of the 253 regiment was more serious than that of the 253 regiment before the attack was launched.
Because the roads leading to Yuepu Street were blocked by fire, the attack of the 260th regiment and the 253rd regiment was seriously blocked, and the soldiers on the charging road fell in pieces, although some commanders and fighters shouted to stop the attack, but the roaring artillery fire drowned out all these orders, and the attacking troops could not do anything in front of the powerful cross-fire network of the Kuomintang, and all of them were blocked outside Yuepu Street.
Due to the improper application of tactics, the 260th Regiment was unable to move in the rain of bullets and bullets, although the soldiers went forward and followed, it was difficult to break through the blockade for a while, and finally occupied the bunkers and trenches of the front position of Yuepu under the continuous "sea of people" tactics, and the Nationalist defenders then retreated into the Yuepu block.
The 260th Regiment then approached the town of Yuepu, and in the process of advancing, encountered a small river, and the soldiers opened fire in a group of bunkers hidden in the grass and woods as they crossed the river, and due to the lack of heavy weapons such as artillery fire, the 260th Regiment suffered heavy casualties, plus the 260th Regiment was on the plain without any shelter, all of which became a living target for the Nationalist army.
Hu Bingyun, commander of the 29th Army, called to ask if the 260th Regiment could continue to attack, Xiao Ka replied loudly that it was okay, but the casualties were too large and needed support, Hu Bingyun said that he would deploy two battalions of the 259th Regiment to him, and then under the reunion of commanders and fighters at all levels who were not afraid of death, they finally attacked the Yuepu block on the evening of the 14th.
That night, Ye Fei, commander of the 10th Corps, sent a telegram to Su Yu and Zhang Zhen, reporting on the difficulties faced by our army in the Battle of Yuepu and suggesting that tactics be changed and adopted the technique of attacking the enemy in a forced operation.
Subsequently, the 260th Regiment took the lead in summing up the lessons of this campaign in a timely manner, and they believed that to deal with the offensive battle of the Kuomintang's dense bunker group, it was necessary to attack the enemy bunker group with small units, small group actions, and multiple attacks.
Each road is divided into three groups, fire groups block enemy bunker gun holes, demolition teams specialize in blowing up bunker doors or using bamboo poles to stuff explosives and grenades into them, and assault groups charge up to sweep the enemy and shout, so that they can lay down their weapons and surrender.
With the experience and lessons learned by the 260th Regiment, the operations since then have been quite smooth, and the attacking troops will capture some bunkers every night, and the attacking troops will basically have no casualties; in addition, the 28th Army also summarized the lessons learned from the Battle of Yuepu and reported them, and then the Third Field Army issued them to the units under its command
"Notice on the Tactical Characteristics of enemy garrisons"
, so that the successful experience of the 28th Army can be promoted throughout the army.
In order not to let Shanghai be destroyed, Sanye abandoned frontal combat, and the 28th and 29th armies fought fiercely with the Kuomintang at Yuepu, Liu Xing, and Yang Xing, with more than 8,000 casualties.
Taking the 260 regiment as an example, the whole regiment suffered more than 1,200 casualties, the cadres suffered heavy casualties, the regimental chief of staff was wounded, 12 battalion-level cadres were wounded, 11 were wounded, the deputy instructors of the 3 battalions were killed, and the remaining company-level cadres suffered 1/3 casualties.
As for the defeat in the Battle of Yuepu, Sanye held in his summary that there were two main reasons: First, the troops' offensive since the Huaihai Campaign was too smooth, resulting in the serious spread of the enemy's mood among the troops from top to bottom; second, the troops' lack of experience in attacking the strongholds, and they were simple and rude in the attack, but only adopted the tactic of rushing and slaming, which seriously hindered the attack at the beginning of the campaign.
At the post-war meeting, Zhang Zhen, chief of staff of Sanye, also said that the units did not attach enough importance to the matter mentioned by General Manager Chen at the summary meeting at the end of 1947 on the study of experience in tackling tough problems, and that the thinking of the troops lightly attacking the enemy was serious, which led to the defeat in the Battle of Yuepu, and suggested that the whole army should strengthen the study of the experience of attacking tough problems.
Marshal Chen Yi was far-sighted and had made suggestions more than a year ago, but in the later stages of the Liberation War, the Kuomintang army was defeated too quickly, causing the commanders and fighters of the troops to think that the Kuomintang army was not worth mentioning, which was the only reason for planting a heel in the Shanghai campaign.
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