In February 1945, when World War II was about to be won, the heads of state of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom held a meeting in Yalta, on the Crimean Peninsula. It should be said that this meeting was the common "arrangement" of the three giants for major post-war international affairs, and the influence of the Yalta system on the world pattern that was formed still exists today.
Yalta winner
After a battle of wits and courage, during the February 11 talks, Stalin finally spat out that the Soviet Union would join the war against Japan within three months of the end of the war against Germany. However, "in order to give the Soviet people a reason to send troops", Stalin laid out a series of conditions: Outer Mongolia needed to maintain the "status quo", the medium-long railway "co-operated", "leased" the port of Lushun, "reclaimed" The Southern Sakhalin Islands and the Kuril Islands, and so on.
The United States, which opened its mouth to the Lion of the Soviet Union and has always flaunted the maintenance of world peace and opposed colonial aggression, actually agreed to it in its entirety. I have to say that roosevelt of the wise one is really late in the day, and he is confused at the last moment when he is about to enter history. Later, when he learned of the Yalta conspiracy, Chiang Kai-shek also scolded Roosevelt in his diary for "fainting and decaying."
Now it seems that the "compromise" made by the Americans in the situation at that time is also understandable. After all, where there are so many benevolent friendships between countries, the decisive factor is ultimately their own interests. After more than three years of two-front combat between Europe and Asia, the Americans have paid a great price, especially in the brutal Pacific War, and the Japanese let American soldiers "go to the ghost gate" from time to time.
At that time, although the overall situation of defeating Germany had been decided, how much price it would eventually cost to surrender Japan, a small hegemon in the Pacific, the Americans had no bottom in their hearts, not to mention that the atomic bomb had not yet been successfully developed. Of course, the Americans, who were particularly "sparing their lives," wanted the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan, but as everyone knows, Stalin would not have won the imperialist fire without a rich return.
Stalin naturally had a set of remarks about these conditions for sending troops, that is, the Soviet Union recovered the rights and interests lost in the Russo-Japanese War, including the "rights and interests" in northeast China. In this way, the host Soviet Union benefited the most at the Yalta Conference, and Stalin was indeed superior in the game of the big three.
As soon as the meeting ended, the Soviet High Command ordered the beginning of the plan for the war against Japan. In the plan, the Soviet army will carry out the "Manchuria Offensive Operation" in northeast China to eliminate the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed here, and then launch the "Southern Sakhalin Offensive Operation" on The South Sakhalin Islands and launch a landing operation in the Kuril Islands.
Plans to leave the cage
The Soviet High Command disagreed on whether to land in Hokkaido on the Japanese mainland. The generals who advocated the landing believed that the occupation of Hokkaido would guarantee control of the Soya Strait and the Kuril Islands, and Khrushchev at the time supported this view. Foreign Minister Molotov and Marshal Zhukov, then deputy commander of the Soviet armed forces, opposed it, believing that it would invite a countermeasure from the US military.
Molotov, a diplomatic veteran, pointed out that the seizure of Hokkaido would give the Allies the excuse to accuse the Soviet Union of serious violations of the "Yalta Treaty", while Zhukov called the landing in Hokkaido "a very risky thing". In the end, Stalin only inquired about the need for at least 4 divisions to attack Hokkaido, and did not make a decision, and the plan to land in Hokkaido was unresolved.
On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it was not prepared to renew the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty signed on April 13, 1941. The five-year treaty stipulates that if it is not renewed, the other party must be informed one year before the expiration of the treaty. From this point of view, the Soviets still abided by the treaty. At the same time, Stalin tried to convince the Japanese that the Soviet Union would not attack Japan within the year of the expiration of the treaty.
After Germany's surrender on May 8, Japan's situation was naturally more difficult, and in order to strive for the maximum "conditional surrender", Japan sent representatives to Moscow and invited the Soviet Union to mediate an armistice with the United States and Britain. To the "intermediary" who mediated, Stalin fully agreed. In this way, the Soviet Union, while circling with the Japanese, was intensively transporting troops to the Far East.
Before the war on Japan, Vasilevsky, commander-in-chief of the Far East Command, received instructions from Stalin to "not only recover the southern Islands of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which border Manchuria, but also occupy the northern half of Hokkaido."
At 00:00 on August 9, the Soviet army of 1.57 million troops rushed to northeast China in three ways, and the August storm struck. The Japanese, who had just suffered the atomic bomb, were confused again, and how did the japanese-Soviet neutrality that they said turn into a War between Japan and the Soviet Union? Hundreds of thousands of Japanese Kwantung Army, once known as the Flower of the Imperial Army, were already vulnerable at this time, and the "Manchuria Offensive Operation" was proceeding exceptionally smoothly.
Implemented
Only two days later, on the 11th, on the Japanese-Soviet border on Sakhalin Island at 50 degrees north latitude, the Soviet Far East 2nd Front launched a huge "Southern Sakhalin Offensive Operation". Following Stalin's instructions, Vasilevsky ordered the Soviets to take South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands within half a month in preparation for the next landing in Hokkaido.
On August 13, Truman appointed MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, granting him full authority over matters relating to Japan. On the 15th, Japan announced its unconditional surrender. The next day, Stalin made two demands on Truman:
1. The Japanese forces of the entire Kuril Islands shall surrender to the Soviets, who shall occupy them in accordance with the Treaty of Yalta;
2. The area north of Hokkaido's Rumon-Kushiro Road should be occupied by the Soviet Union alone.
In response to the second demand, Stalin particularly emphasized: "Japan sent troops to occupy the Soviet Far East in 1919, and if the Soviet army did not occupy the japanese mainland, we would not be able to give an account to the people." ”
Seeing Stalin's old trick repeated, Truman did not eat this set. On August 18, Truman sent a telegram back to Stalin: he agreed to the "secret treaty" he and Roosevelt had reached at the Yalta Conference, and the United States categorically refused the Soviet Union's demand for Hokkaido. Not only that, Truman also requested an additional US military naval and air base on the Kuril Islands.
The scheming Truman kicked the ball to his men: MacArthur was solely responsible for the Allied occupation of Japan, and other Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, could symbolically occupy Japan under his command. Stalin had no choice but to send Soviet representatives to Japan to visit MacArthur in the Philippines. Following Stalin's tone, the Soviets said that whether the United States agreed or not, Soviet troops would be stationed in the Hokkaido area north of the Rumon-Kushiro Road and a Soviet-occupied zone would be established in Tokyo.
Mai Shuai was not frightened, and said to the Soviet representative word by word: If the Soviet army dares to land on the Japanese mainland, I will destroy them one by one, including your excellency! After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a document in the Moscow Archives shows that, despite strong opposition from the United States, Stalin gave orders to the Soviet commanders on the front line to land in Hokkaido.
The plan to land in Hokkaido was formulated by Yumashev, commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, on August 19, Vasilevsky ordered the 87th Infantry Corps of the Far Eastern 1st Front as the main force, its two infantry divisions were used to capture northern Hokkaido, the Air Force provided 1 fighter aviation division and 1 bomber division to support, the Pacific Fleet's 1st Submarine Fleet also received orders to land in the early morning of the 24th hokkaido Liumeng Harbor, two submarines will carry more than a hundred landing soldiers, Several anti-tank guns and food for 10 days set out from Vladivostok to make a tentative landing at the port of Rumon in order to contain the Japanese rear garrison.
Forced to give up
Vasilevsky particularly stressed that the Hokkaido landing operation must be ordered by him personally to begin. In fact, the Japanese are also very clear about the intention of the Soviet army to land in Hokkaido, on the 24th, the Japanese base camp sent an urgent message to MacArthur in Manila: "The Soviet Union will send airborne troops to land in Hokkaido."
The Americans immediately put into action, and two B-24 bombers of the US 11th Air Force appeared over the South Kuril Islands and Hokkaido on the same day, reconnaissance of the terrain and showing the Soviet Union its determination to "defend the Japanese mainland". After receiving Truman's call back, Stalin had also been weighing the pros and cons of landing in Hokkaido, and after nearly a week, Stalin finally decided to abandon the plan to land in Hokkaido.
Why did the Soviet Union, which was almost obsessed with territory, abandon its long-planned plan to land in Hokkaido? The reasons were, of course, manifold, such as pressure from the United States, the announcement of Japan's surrender, the difficulties encountered by the Soviet forces in fighting on The Southern Sakhalin Islands and the Kuril Islands, and the difficulty of the relatively weak Soviet Air Force in guaranteeing support for the Landing Forces in Hokkaido.
Among them, the tough attitude of the United States should be an important factor, after all, the United States monopolized the atomic bomb at that time. In order to make up for the near-rupture of U.S.-Soviet relations, Stalin had to compromise on this. Moreover, Germany in Europe had become the center of the confrontation between the two camps, and the Soviet Union, which had experienced the trauma of war, really did not have the energy to confront the United States in the Far East.
The Soviet Union, which had never suffered a loss, had lost money this time, and Stalin had always been grumpy about not being able to occupy Hokkaido. After the war, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to violate the Potsdam Proclamation's statement not to enslave Japanese prisoners of war and the people, and sent about 640,000 Japanese prisoners of war to Siberia for forced labor. In a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Harriman in October of that year, Stalin complained that the Soviet Union did not want to play the symbolic role of "furniture" only in Japan.