This is a literary misleading, the harsh winter in Russia is only to kill Napoleon and Hitler,perhaps even just one of the elements, and the real reason for their failure is the too long front, the mistakes of strategic decision-making, and the logistical difficulties that come with it.
A little look at history reveals that weather was never the main factor in defeating Napoleon and Hitler, but they were themselves. As military commanders with decision-making power, they still have a fluke mentality and a gambler mentality when they know that the climate will affect the strategy, and the result is a big loss.
In 1810, Napoleon basically killed the whole of Europe, leaving Tsarist Russia and Britain, because there were many troubles in cross-sea warfare, so Napoleon first aimed the spearhead at Russia, in 1812, Napoleon pulled up a group of servants and formed a large army of 570,000 people to attack Russia.
In the beginning, fortunately, Napoleon's army won successive battles and even took Moscow, but at this time the problem came, according to Napoleon's plan, as long as the army was pressed, it could eliminate the main force of the Russian army like a lion and a rabbit.
However, the Russians did not choose to engage in a deadly head-on confrontation with the French army, Kutuzov issued the order to clear the field, and the Russian army avoided the French army that was advancing like a fool, and even gave up Moscow. The French could not find the target decisive battle, and were exhausted by the continuous skirmish, and Napoleon had to admit it.
Logistics was the most important factor in the war, the French army rolled up 570,000 troops to fight the Russian army, but it is not easy to feed these 570,000 people in any era, let alone the early 19th century. At that time, there was no accessible railway network, no mechanized traffic, no airdrops, and everything had to be done by horse-drawn carriages. When Napoleon's supply lines were stretched to Moscow, the French army had to consume a huge number of people to maintain such a large logistics. Although Napoleon came up with the strategy of feeding the war with war, trying to seize supplies from Russia to link his own situation, he ignored the productivity of Russia at that time, and the Russian side's tearing tactics like a wolf pack.
Kutuzov's strategy was very similar to the ancient Mongol tactics of the Russians, when the Mongols encountered an immovable opponent, they would induce them to continue to attack, then cut off the grain road, and then chase the army's uncertain enemy all the way.
Napoleon was not a fool, after all, he was a great warrior of a generation, in fact, in order to invade Russia he spent a lot of money, such as he established a supply force with 200,000 heads of livestock, a large army composed of 5400 horse-drawn carriages, 2400 ox carts, and 9 large supply stations, storing a considerable amount of grain and grass and red wine for safe drinking water.
But the supply was not smooth, Russia's poor road traffic made it difficult for any heavy vehicle to move forward, the rain near winter filled the roads with mud, the turtle-like speed made it impossible for logistics to connect smoothly with the combat troops; and many combat troops forcibly requisitioned heavy horses because of the death of cavalry and horses pulling cannons, which quickly made the Logistics of the French army incapacitated.
In the final analysis, Napoleon miscalculated the strategy, mistakenly pulled the army to a battlefield that exceeded its supply carrying capacity, coupled with the failure of the plunder policy and the inability to achieve the decisive battle strategy, he could only bear the bitter fruit of defeat in the cold wind.
Hitler's problem was even greater, because his advantage was actually higher than Napoleon's, but because of his eager gambler mentality, he forgot Napoleon's previous lesson.
During the Battle of Moscow, the Germans behaved in the same way as the French, and Hitler insisted on a major armageddon in the direction of Moscow to resolve the situation on the Eastern Front as soon as possible. Because of the new mechanized combat method, the German army was very confident in the "blitzkrieg" theory to break through the Soviet defense line, Hitler personally approved the "Typhoon Action Plan", and strived to break through the front line of the Soviet army group with a pincer offensive, divide and then annihilate the Soviet army, and the result triggered the Soviet army's defense of Moscow.
Originally, the Soviet army did not react to the rapid blitzkrieg of the German army, but under Hitler's orders, Army Group Center lost the strategic opportunity to attack Leningrad and Ukraine, resulting in the Soviet army being able to redeploy and deploy troops in Moscow, which made the German "blitzkrieg" quickly disintegrate and become a war of attrition under the city.
Later, as Napoleon experienced, the German elongated supply line could not carry the 1 million mechanized army, even with mechanized transportation assistance, but the Soviet Union's harsh field roads were difficult for mules and horses to walk, and trucks were even more choked.
Especially in the autumn of 1941, the temperature problem, so that the rain in the area ahead of schedule, the amount of rain has also increased, so many roads have become mud, the German trucks can not go such a road, relying on animal power can be slightly topped, but with the drop of temperature, the mules in the mud were blown by the cold wind, a large area of illness died, the German army almost lost all effective logistics transportation methods.
Of course, robbery is also a way out, the German army relies on the stolen Soviet tractors, mules and horses, and even forced the Soviet coolie cart to desperately solve logistical problems, coupled with the airdrop of the air force, to a certain extent to alleviate the pressure on the front line. They also gathered a number of Soviet garment factories and fiber processing factories, desperately making winter clothes for the front. Logistics was always a problem, however, and the daily amount of fuel and shells that the German mechanized troops needed to burn were astronomical, and the supply of raw transportation was simply in short supply, such as winter clothes, medicine and even food were arranged behind weapons and ammunition.
In this way, the logistics line of the German army, which could not be efficiently supplied, led to the tragedy of the winter in the Battle of Moscow, coupled with the defeat of the battle, a large number of German officers and soldiers were frozen to death in the wilderness.