In the nearly one year of operations from July 1946 to May 1947, the situation in the national battlefield of the Liberation War had been reversed, and the strategy and tactics of Liu Deng's army of "advancing thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain" successfully brought the front line closer to lao Chiang's ruling area, and the PLA changed from a previous strategic defense to a strategic offensive.
After more than a year of fighting, Chiang Kai-shek's army was annihilated by 255,000 people, and it had lost the ability to attack on a large scale, and after February 1948, with the reconquest of Siping in Dongye, the northeast Chiang army had to retreat into the three cities of Shenyang, Changchun and Jinzhou.
With the gradual stabilization of the war situation in the northeast, the central authorities also realized that the time had come to wage a strategic decisive battle against the enemy forces in the northeast; at that time, the northeast was China's heavy industrial base, and the arms production in the northeast liberated area ranked first in the liberated areas of the country, but because the connection between the northeast and north China had not yet been opened, the arms of the Northeast People's Liberation Army could not be transported to the liberated areas at all.
At the same time, it is precisely because the situation in the northeast is moving in a favorable direction for the PLA, and the central authorities attach great importance to the next move of Chiang Kai-shek's army, fearing that they will abandon the plan of the northeast and then withdraw their troops.
In February 1948, the central authorities sent a telegram to Dongye "the idea of sealing The Chiang Army in the Northeast to annihilate each one", and asked Dongye to close the gate of the Northeast as soon as possible, Jinzhou, in order to form a situation of closing the door and fighting dogs against the Jiang army in Dongye, and finally forming a strategy of annihilating the enemy in the northeast
In April 1948, the leaders of Dongye held a meeting in Harbin to study the action plan of the next step of the troops according to the situation in the northeast battlefield, and to cooperate with the central government's strategic plan of "annihilating the enemy in the northeast" in action.
In terms of the general direction, Dongye also strived to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's army in the northeast as much as possible, but on the point of attacking Changchun and attacking Jinzhou, Dongye initially held a different opinion with the central authorities, and the central government's opinion was to demand that Jinzhou be fought first and cut off the retreat route of the enemy in the northeast, while Dongye envisioned taking Changchun, then pushing it flat step by step, and finally completing the strategic concept of annihilating the enemy in the northeast.
Attacking Changchun first is obviously not in line with the central government's strategic concept at the beginning, and attacking Changchun may also frighten the birds of the bow, so that the enemies in Shenyang and Jinzhou will be alert, and after that they will desperately move closer to Jinzhou, and then they will break the original strategic concept.
However, just a few months before the Liaoshen Campaign was launched, the central government finally agreed to Dongye's plan to attack Changchun, and finally turned to Jinzhou because it failed to successfully take Changchun.
So why did the central government agree to attack Changchun first before the Liaoshen Campaign began?
It is convenient for the People's Liberation Army to support, and it is more advantageous to fight Changchun first
After 1948, Lao Jiang's army was shrunk in the three cities of Shenyang, Changchun and Jinzhou, and what was more fatal for Lao Jiang was that the passage between the three cities was cut off by Dongye, which meant that the Jiang army in the three cities was in the position of fighting alone.
However, at this moment, which first must be considered is the problem, among the three cities, the Strength of Jiang Jun in Shenyang City is the strongest, here is Wei Lihuang's 300,000 troops, of which one of the two main forces of Lao Jiang, the New Sixth Army and the New First Army, are also in Shenyang; the next point is Jinzhou, which is the passage between the Northeast Jiang Army and the North China Jiang Army, the geographical location is also quite important, here Old Jiang also deployed 150,000 troops; and the weakest is Changchun, when there were 100,000 people in Changchun City. However, among them, the regular army only has 60,000 people, the others are police, gendarmes and some militia, and the 60th Army in the regular army has been looked down upon by other Chiang Kai-shek troops because it is a miscellaneous army, and there are many contradictions with the New 7 Army, which is jointly defending Changchun. Therefore, in a comprehensive comparison, among the three at that time, Changchun's enemy was the weakest.
From a formal point of view, Shenyang's enemies are the strongest, and in between, once Shenyang is attacked, then the enemies in Changchun and Jinzhou will definitely come to the rescue, so they will be in an unfavorable situation of attacking on both sides, so Dongye decided at the beginning to start with a head and then a waist.
From the actual situation, in May 1948, the attack on Changchun was indeed a relatively safe plan:
At that time, our army had just captured the main cities in the northeast of Siping, the main force of the troops was mainly concentrated in the northern Manchurian area, close to Changchun, first attacking Changchun was convenient for the support of the liberated areas, and it was also convenient for our army to concentrate its troops; even if the enemy could not hold Changchun and wanted to retreat, our army could also give play to the advantages of mobile warfare and use the movement warfare to destroy the enemy, and once Changchun was captured, then after attacking Jinzhou or Shenyang, our army would have no worries and could safely go south to support the operation.
Moreover, at that time, because the enemy was trapped in isolated cities, the supply of troops was a problem, and the replenishment of food and ammunition could only be transported by aircraft; at that time, our army had occupied the main railway in the northeast, and the logistics and transportation were continuous, so whether it was a quick battle or a protracted war, it was on our side.
On April 22, 1948, the Central Committee sent a telegram to Dongye: "We agree that the reason why you fight Changchun first is that it is more advantageous to fight Changchun first than to fight elsewhere first." ”
In October 1948, the Central Military Commission also sent a telegram to Dongye, which mentioned the initial attack on Changchun:
"Five months ago, the enemy of Changchun was easy to fight, but you did not dare to fight, but two months ago, the enemy of Changchun fought well, and you did not dare to fight."
From this telegram, it can be seen that between April and July 1948, the People's Liberation Army was also very likely to capture Changchun, of course, it was precisely because the attack on Changchun was frustrated, and finally Dongye had to implement the second plan: attack Jinzhou.
Accumulate experience for our army in tackling tough battles
Secondly, the reason why the central government originally agreed to Dongye to attack Changchun first was also based on the situation of the national battlefield.
Since the defeat of the Great Revolution in 1927, our army has had to embark on the road of armed struggle, and because the gap between us and Chiang Kai-shek and later the Japanese and The Koso was so great that militarily we could only adopt the method of "guerrilla warfare" and "movement warfare" to maneuver with the enemy, strive to accumulate small victories into big victories, and destroy the enemy in the movement.
After the PLA shifted into a strategic offensive, the overall situation of the war situation also developed in a favorable direction for the PLA, but with the gradual expansion of the war, a new problem was exposed to our army: how to fight the offensive battle in the big cities.
In the past, due to the lack of heavy weapons, there was not much experience in how to fight tough battles, and with the expansion of the war, this problem has become a new operational topic for our army.
At that time, lao Chiang's three armies of soldiers and horses were all shrunk in the three major cities in the northeast, and the defense of these three cities was very strong, and the bloody battle of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army left a very heavy psychological shadow on our army in the battle of attacking and attacking, after which it took more than two months for our army to take this kind of city and the battle was also very hard.
Therefore, on this issue, the views of the central leaders are surprisingly unanimous; the People's Liberation Army's offensive battle against the big city has not yet passed, and the significance of attacking Changchun is to hope to accumulate experience for other units so that other fraternal units can learn from this battle.
The situation of Chiang Kai-shek's army in the northeast is unclear, and the plan to withdraw from the northeast is not yet obvious
In 1948, with the victory of the People's Liberation Army in the northeast, Chiang Kai-shek's army lost soldiers and generals, and finally only three cities were left, at this time, the problem of leaving in the northeast became a "big burden" for old Chiang.
At that time, many American advisers advocated that Lao Jiang quickly abandon the northeast and transfer the main force back to Guannei, and after the outbreak of the Liaoshen Campaign, Lao Jiang himself was also this kind of proposition, he only wanted to keep his own concubine troops, and these were all done to compete with Li Zongren and others.
However, from April to May 1948, on the issue of going to and from the northeast, lao Jiang was still an ambiguous attitude at this time, or at this time he was still inclined to hold the northeast.
In March 1948, Chiang's situation in the northeast became more and more difficult, but he still made an important speech:
"To ensure that the northeast is the foundation of the country, the government has the greatest determination, has increased the number of troops, strengthened military strength, and the situation will gradually improve."
On April 9, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek mentioned the northeast again in his "National Assembly Policy Address":
"The northeast must hold several important strongholds, such as Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou, to symbolize the existence of our national power."
Why was Old Jiang so obsessed with the northeast at that time?
On the one hand, the reason is that old Chiang Kai-shek had just become the president of the so-called Republic of China at that time, and politically he needed to create a momentum for himself, and if he had just become president and lost several big cities in succession, then whether his position as president could still be maintained is another matter; on the other hand, from the overall consideration of Old Chiang Kai-shek himself at that time, he also needed 550,000 troops in the northeast to continue to support him, although at that time, the northeast Chiang army was annihilated several divisions, but most of them were miscellaneous armies without combat effectiveness, which was not a loss for the entire northeast Chiang army.
On the other hand, the northeast is the gateway to north China, as long as lao Chiang's 550,000 troops are still there, then Dongye can not go south to support the North China Field Army at will, at that time, although our army was in a strategic offensive, but other directions were still relatively inferior, only the northeast occupied the advantage, so at that time Lao Jiang needed these 550,000 troops to contain Dongye's 700,000 troops.
It was precisely because in April 1948, chiang kai-shek did not have a plan to withdraw from the northeast, and the central authorities agreed to Dongye's plan to attack Changchun from the strategic overall consideration, which was not only the respect and autonomy given to the frontline commanders, but more importantly, it was also a choice after careful consideration.