Author: Zhao Xiaoguang
Source: "Deng Xiaoping's Three Ups and Three Downs"
I was the most nervous at this time in my life.
Our task is to draw the enemy from both ends into the middle, and our strategic counter-offensive has fulfilled the strategic intentions of the Central Military Commission and Chairman Mao. First of all, we crossed the Yellow River, destroyed four divisions and nine and a half brigades of the enemy at once, and won the victory. Crossing the Yellow River is actually the beginning of a counter-offensive.
——Deng Xiaoping's conversation on November 20, 1989, when he met with the old comrades who wrote the history of the Second Field Army
I was the most nervous at this time in my life. Hearing that the water of the Yellow River was coming, I could hear my heart beating! Only me and (your) Uncle Liu read the telegram and burned it immediately after reading it. At that time, we were really in trouble, but we didn't say a word, and immediately called the central authorities, saying that we would act in half a month. Ten days to prepare for a thousand-mile leap into Dabie Mountain is already very short, but we have begun to act in less than ten days. At that time, the real thing was that I didn't say a word, and I couldn't take care of any difficulties!
Deng Xiaoping's conversation with his children
In March 1947, Chiang Kai-shek changed the strategy of attacking the Liberated Areas in an all-round way to the strategy of attacking the Liberated Areas of Northern Shaanxi and Shandong, during which Time Hu Zongnan led his troops to capture Yan'an. Although it was an empty city deliberately left behind by Mao Zedong and others, Chiang Kai-shek was also full of joy and flew to the ground in Yan'an to stand on the ground. He felt that by occupying the place where the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong had lived for 10 years, this in itself could mentally boost the morale of his troops, and the morale of the People's Liberation Army, together with the situation of the attack on Shandong, Chiang Kai-shek thought that he was victorious.
However, Mao Zedong would not let Chiang Kai-shek capture Yan'an in vain, and he would also send troops to take a look near Nanjing. He was determined not to completely crush the Kuomintang's key offensive and immediately enter the strategic counter-offensive, that is, to fight the main force to the outside line and lead the war to the Kuomintang-ruled areas, so he chose Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping to lead his troops to take up this great historical task.
On the night of June 30, 1947, Liu and Deng led four main columns of 120,000 people to cross the Yellow River from 8 crossings and 150 kilometers under the cover of strong artillery fire. Although this scene is smaller than the scale of the river crossing campaign led by Deng Xiaoping and others two years later, the momentum is also "remarkable." In an instant, the "Yellow River Strategy" on which the Kuomintang relied for defense was shattered. Chiang Kai-shek hurried to Zhengzhou, on the south bank of the Yellow River, and dispatched troops in an attempt to force Liu and Deng to fight on horseback on the Yellow River. And Liu Bocheng said: "If you don't fight at this time, when will you stay?" Deng Xiaoping borrowed the ancient metaphor: "We will never learn from Han Xin." We can only have one choice when it comes to life and death. For the sake of the people's interests, we must survive and let the enemy jump the Yellow River! Therefore, Liu and Deng commanded the troops to launch the Southwest Lu Campaign at the right time.
The Battle of Southwest Lu was a prelude to the People's Liberation Army's transition into a strategic offensive. Although the Kuomintang army mobilized 10 reorganized divisions, 25 and a half brigades, more than 180,000 people, and dispatched more than 1,500 fighters and bombers, our army, with 15 brigades, after 28 days of continuous combat, annihilated the enemy's 4 reorganized division headquarters and 9 and a half brigades of more than 60,000 people, forcing the enemy to mobilize 7 integrated divisions and 17 semi-brigades from the northwest, Shandong, and the central plains to rush to the aid of southwest Lu. Thus effectively cooperating with our army in the northwest and Shandong in crushing the enemy's key offensive operations.
It is said that before leaving China, General Wei Demai, a member of the US army's advisory group, said to Chiang Kai-shek: I have seen the communist army break through the "Maginot Line" in the east, which is enough to reach the "400,000 troops." They fought for 28 consecutive days and wiped out 9 and a half brigades of the "National Army". Saying that they are "sneaking west", in fact they are marching south, saying that they are "missing", in fact they are counterattacking! This can be said to be a "summary" for Liu Deng's army.
Before his death, although Deng Xiaoping did not write a special article reviewing the years of revolutionary struggle in Dabie Mountain like Liu Bocheng, he talked about Dabie Mountain many times. It can be seen how impressed he is, he said:
"Dabie Mountain is a strategically good base for forward. It is close to the Yangtze River, and in the east it goes all the way to Nanjing, Shanghai, and southwest to Force Hankou, which is an important springboard for crossing the Yangtze River, and the enemy is constantly threatened by our crossing of the river. It is truly remarkable to make this determination to go a thousand miles to the south, and from this we can also see the brilliance of Chairman Mao's strategic thinking. And this burden fell on Erye, and the most difficult thing in the whole liberation war was to pick up this burden, a heavy burden. It is not to say that the annihilation of the enemy's nine and a half brigades is to shoulder a heavy burden, but the main thing is to set aside all difficulties and persistently advance a thousand miles, and it is this heavy burden that is picked up. ”
Strategizing, the words of the "History of Gao Zu Benji": "In the midst of the planning and planning of the husband, the victory is thousands of miles away." The old saying refers to the commander-in-chief's comprehensive planning of the military in the military tent, and now refers to the planning of the secret. In 1947, in accordance with the instructions of the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping made the decision to lead their troops to leap thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain and put it into practice, which vividly embodied the amazing courage of Mao Zedong, Liu and Deng to strategize and win a decisive victory over thousands of miles, and showed their superb military strategy and skillful military command art.
Judging the hour and sizing up the situation, the strategic plan of the Central Plains began to brew between the Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Chen Geng as early as May 1947.
Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping clearly remembered: On 8 May, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram of instructions for the Central Military Commission and sent to himself, proposing: In order to break the enemy who is focusing on attacking the Liberated Areas of Shandong, Liu and Deng led their troops to cross the Yellow River before June 10, the first step was to attack the enemies in the Jiluyu And YuwanSu districts, and the second step was to attack the Central Plains. At the same time, in order to "gain a foothold in the Central Plains for a long time," the whole army should make full political mobilization, "make everyone understand political tasks, advocate bearing hardships and standing hard work, and not being afraid of difficulties," and make full preparations for cadres, funds, and other items. Chen and Su's troops were ready to cooperate with Liu and Deng's forces in launching a major attack after June 10. In the instruction telegram on July 19, it was decided that the direction of use of Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi and other columns would be changed from going north to aiding Shaanxi to crossing the river to the south. Strategically, it coordinated with the Northwest Field Army to break through the enemy who focused on attacking northern Shaanxi, and at the same time assisted Liu and Deng Jingluo in the Central Plains. At this time, the local armed forces that were firmly adhering to the revolutionary struggle in the Dabie Mountains sent cadres to southwest Lu to brief them on various situations in the Dabie Mountains area. The diary of an old comrade recorded: "On July 7, Zhengjiazhuang. Political Commissar Deng said: Comrade Chu Yi came from Dabie Mountain, and you should talk to Chen Heqiao to him. Due to the tight time, I will talk about it for a while. ”
Liu and Deng still clearly remember that on June 30, the main force of Liu and Deng's field army successfully crossed the Yellow River and immediately launched the Southwest Lu Campaign. Before it was over, the Instructions Telegram from the Central Military Commission arrived again. It is pointed out that if there is a rapid certainty of annihilation of the enemy at yangshan ji and Jining, it will be annihilated. Otherwise, we should immediately concentrate the whole army on rest for about ten days; except for sweeping away the small enemies and militia groups passing through the road, we will not fight the Longhai Sea, the east of the New Yellow River, nor the Pingliu Road; we will make up our minds not to go to the rear, and we will go straight out of the Dabie Mountains in half a month's journey, occupy dozens of counties centered on the Dabie Mountains, eliminate the militia groups, mobilize the masses, establish base areas, and attract the enemy to attack and fight a campaign war against us. A few days later, the enemy at two points was annihilated. In accordance with the instructions of the Central Military Commission, Liu and Deng Sui prepared for the whole army to rest for half a month, and then rely on Yuwan Su to maintain the rear to receive assistance and strive to annihilate the enemy in large numbers, in accordance with the fact that the enemy in Shandong was not advancing westward and that his troops were fighting continuously, and they were very tired and in urgent need of supplies. After two months, depending on the situation, it may be gradually developed to the south, or straight out of the Dabie Mountains.
However, at that time, the enemy situation was very serious, especially the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong led a small number of troops to fight in northern Shaanxi, and the situation was even more difficult. Therefore, the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong sent a telegram on 29 July to Liu, Deng, and others: "The current situation in northern Shaanxi is very difficult (Chen Geng has been told in person), and if Chen, Xie, Liu, and Deng cannot mobilize a part of the Hu army with their own effective actions within two months to help northern Shaanxi open up the situation, so that northern Shaanxi cannot support it, then in two months the main force of the Hu army may be transferred eastward, and your difficulties will increase." ”
The next day, Liu and Deng received this top-secret cable with a large number of words indicating that "4A" was extremely hot and urgent, and their hearts were very anxious. They thought of the policy put forward in the Telegram of the Party Central Committee of July 23 and thought that it was "indeed good." After several days of "repeated consideration," he "resolved to go out after a half-month break to meet the needs of the overall situation." Liu and Deng immediately telephoned the Central Military Commission and proposed: Go straight to Dabie Mountain, first form a corner with the Chen and Xie cliques, practice lenient maneuvers, and prepare for a battle without rear. In this way, the determination to go straight out of Dabie Mountain in advance was initially determined. More than 40 years later, Deng Xiaoping also clearly recalled: "At that time, we did not say a word, immediately returned the power, and after half a month took action, jumped into the rear of the enemy, and went straight out of the Dabie Mountain." When he told his children about the situation, he also repeated: "The real thing is that there are two words, and no matter what difficulties can be ignored!" Deng Xiaoping, who had never shown much affection, said this with a slight choking in his voice.
The diary of an old comrade left interesting details about the decision to go south: "July 24, Tang Guantun. Next to the pomegranate tree in the courtyard of a landlord, Liu and Deng surrounded a map, sitting, standing, and walking outside the village, standing in the west of the village and looking south, looking east, looking west, as if they did not know where the earth was turning (one)? On July 26, the Zhao Family Building was moved by Tang Guantun. It was in this village that chairman Mao of the Central Military Commission informed him every day that he was determined to go straight out of Dabie Mountain until the 30th. ”
On July 30, liu bocheng and Deng Xiaoping held a meeting of the heads of various columns at the headquarters of the Zhaojialou Field Army south of Yuncheng, Shandong, and at this time, the Central Military Commission's instructions on July 30 also arrived. The telegram pointed out: If you are determined to go straight out of dabie Mountain, if you are determined not to go to the rear, you must hold a meeting of cadres at and above the regimental commander level, in addition to informing them of various favorable conditions, and envisioning all kinds of difficult conditions and establishing the will to go on an expedition. It is best to send a map of the three provinces of Eyu and Anhui to each company, so that all cadres can understand the geographical environment. Only by determining the method of collecting grain taxes can we solve the problem of feeding the army, and so on. At the same time, Chen and Xie should also be enabled to establish such determination. The meeting was very warm. Chief of Staff Li Da used a wooden stick to point out the enemy's situation map to introduce the current military situation. Commander Liu Bocheng stared at the map with a magnifying glass, And Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping raised some questions from time to time to deepen the discussion, and Liu and Deng talked to each other from time to time.
August 1 is the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, and it is the day when Liu and Deng set the specific operational deployment to go straight to Dabie Mountain. On this day, Liu Bocheng conveyed the Instructions of the Central Military Commission on 23 July, saying: Comrade Xiaoping and I agree that our army's leap into Dabie Mountain is a strategic task entrusted to us by the PARTY Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, and it is the starting point and foothold for us to consider everything. Subsequently, specific operational deployments were made. Deng Went on to talk about three futures that Mao had estimated for the strategic move. The first is to pay the price and be untenable and ready to come back; the second is to pay the price and stand firm, and persist in the struggle around them; and the third is to pay the price and stand firm. Deng Xiaoping urged everyone to think of the most difficult aspects, resolutely and bravely overcome all difficulties, and strive for the best future. Our army must bravely forge ahead, not look backwards, and resolutely and courageously accomplish this glorious and arduous strategic task. After the meeting, the principal commanders of the various columns hurried back to their garrisons and convened a meeting to convey the spirit of the field army meeting and the instructions of Chiefs Liu and Deng. Immediately afterward, the columns held a meeting of the principal responsible cadres of the division and regiment to study the tasks of each unit and prepare for a large-scale attack in mid-August.
However, the military situation was urgent, the water situation was serious, and due to the torrential rain pouring down for several days, the water level of the Yellow River soared sharply, especially Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to repeat the old drama of bombing the Yellow River levee and flooding our army. At this time of danger, Liu Bocheng used the four words of "worry is like burning" to express his anxious mood. And Deng Xiaoping also felt that this was the most tense moment of his life. "When I heard that the water of the Yellow River was coming, I could hear my heart beating!"
August 6 was an unforgettable day for the comrades working around Liu and Deng, and the day when Liu and Deng finally made up their minds to advance south to Dabie Mountain. After breakfast on this day, Liu, Deng, and other chiefs of the field army convened a meeting in the war room with cadres of relevant departments and sections of the headquarters to study the strategic actions of the next step of the troops. The Intelligence Service reported on the enemy's situation, and the Operations Department reported on the rest of the troops over the past few days, and proposed that the sharp rise in the water level of the Yellow River was a greater threat to our army, and suggested that we make up our minds early. Deng Xiaoping attached great importance to this and immediately issued a clear instruction: We must grasp the changes in the water level of the Yellow River at any time, and report and report in a timely manner.
The atmosphere of the meeting was tense and warm, and the participants looked calm and spoke enthusiastically. Many advocate a strategic offensive after one or several battles on the inside. It was suggested that the rest would be held until 15 August, as originally planned, and then as the case may be. However, everyone carefully observed the every move of Liu and Deng, every word and deed, and eagerly hoped that they would make up their minds and make decisions quickly. After lunch, Liu Bocheng came to the war room, and when he heard that Deng Xiaoping went to the third column and the sixth column to talk to Chen Xilian and others, and by the way, he nodded thoughtfully, and then carefully inspected the map as he had done in the morning, inquiring about the situation in all aspects. When the break continued and the chaos was reversed, Liu Bocheng judged the situation and immediately sent someone to inform Deng Xiaoping and others to come to the meeting again, after which Liu Bocheng solemnly announced in the war room: The army must act immediately as it advances southward. The opportunity must not be missed, the time is not waiting, we must make a decision on the spot, and the sooner and sooner we act, the better. Subsequently, he stated the basis and rationale for his determination and made a military deployment.
During this time, Deng Xiaoping nodded from time to time. After Liu Bocheng finished speaking, he immediately stood up and said: "Commander Liu's opinion and deployment are very correct, and I completely agree. We made up our minds not to go to the rear, to pound the heart of Chiang Kai-shek, the Dabie Mountains, to approach the Yangtze River, to threaten the three towns of Wuhan and Chiang Kai-shek's old lair, Nanjing, and to push the front from the Yellow River to the south to the Yangtze River. The ancients said, 'On the side of the bed, you will not allow others to sleep soundly.' The strategic actions of our army will certainly force Chiang Kai-shek to send troops back to reinforcements. In this way, we will be able to cooperate with the fraternal units in various battlefields throughout the country to thoroughly smash Chiang Kai-shek's key offensives and completely turn the tide of the war throughout the country. In order to accomplish this strategic task, he stressed three points: First, all work must be subordinated to the requirements of the strategic offensive task, and the vast number of commanders and fighters must be prepared to pay the price and make contributions to the realization of this decision. Second, it is necessary to try our best to avoid entanglement and fighting with the enemy's main forces, do everything possible to go straight to the hinterland of Dabie Mountain, and walking to Dabie Mountain is victory; third, we must enter the new area to fight, and we must strictly abide by the party's policy and the three major disciplines and eight points of attention. Finally, Deng Xiaoping set his sights on Li Da, drafted a telegram, reported our determination and deployment to the Party Central Committee, and issued advance orders to the ministries.
At this time, the Central Military Commission made continuous calls, pointing out that the southward advance needed to pay a relatively large cost of casualties and attrition, and that no matter what role it played, it was necessary to be prepared to pay, but if it could achieve the role of changing the overall situation, it would be more worth paying such a price. Liu and Deng repeatedly studied the central military commission's telegram, and in accordance with the established strategic intentions of the party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, especially in light of the enemy's and water conditions at that time, they decided not to change their determination to move ahead of time, to act decisively according to local conditions, and to march south according to the established arrangements. In response, the Central Military Commission replied: "Liu and Deng are determined to be completely correct," "Liu and Deng are well deployed," and "All policy decisions are handled on the spot, and do not ask for instructions." We help you as much as we can." The feat of leaping forward in a thousand miles, the miracle in the history of war, and its strategy came into being in the cave dwellings of northern Shaanxi and the farmhouses of northern China.
The 19th-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz said that "secrecy and swiftness are two factors of surprise", and both are premised on the commander-in-chief's "great boldness and the seriousness of the army's ability to carry out the task". Liu and Deng were well aware that the thousand-mile march into the Dabie Mountains was long and long, and the enemy's transportation was convenient and easy to maneuver, so they should create the enemy's illusion and carelessness, so as to keep the action hidden and sudden, and to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of our strategic intentions as early as possible. On the contrary, they believe that our army has been fighting continuously, is tired, suffers heavy casualties, is difficult to fight again, and may have to cross the Yellow River north to "escape." Liu and Deng made a plan, and with the eleventh column and the troops of the Jiluyu Military Region, they pretended to move at the yellow river crossing, causing our army to cross to the north, and using a small number of troops of the 5 columns of the Huaye Line Corps, which was temporarily under the command of Liu and Deng, to suppress the enemy and cover the southward advance of Liu and Deng's main forces. And with one of them, it broke the stratosphere road, and after one of the roads was broken, it entered the Dabie Mountain from the west side of the stratosphere road. To disperse and confuse the enemy. The mobilization of troops is also kept strictly confidential and does not reveal strategic intent.
Just when the enemy army was confused, Liu and Deng led the main force of the field army to divide into three routes, break through the enemy's unfinished encirclement, and march toward Dabie Mountain without hesitation. In order to keep things extremely secret, the troops constantly changed their numbers, and some disguised themselves as local troops; as a result, the troops operated for more than 10 days, and Chiang Kai-shek still did not discover our army's strategic intentions, but on the contrary, he believed that he could neither cross the north nor dare to fight, so he had to "flee" to the south. It was not until our army broke through the Shahe River that Chiang Kai-shek woke up like a dream, and at this time, it was too late to organize a large-scale interception and blockade in a planned way, so he had to hastily deploy defenses. The US military advisory group was very disappointed that Chiang Kai-shek misjudged our military's strategic attempts.
Unexpected, unexpected. In the history of foreign warfare, Napoleon suddenly attacked Brücher from Dresden twice in 1813, but the results did not receive the expected results, which not only wasted time and troops, but also put Dresden almost in danger. It can be seen that even if it is fully unexpected, it is not always possible to achieve the expected results. In clausewitz's view: "In order to achieve great results by taking advantage of the enemy's surprise in the course of war, it is necessary to actively act, quickly resolve and carry out forced marches." ”
Narrow roads meet, and they are the first soldiers. On the evening of August 7, Liu and Deng led more than 100,000 men and horses to the enemy's vast and empty strategic depth in a situation of overwhelming the mountains and the sea, and the commanders and fighters crossed the Longhai Railway, crossed the Yellow Pan area, and broke through the Shahe River. This sudden strategic move was like a steel knife that came out of its sheath and plunged straight into the strategic hinterland of the enemy, Dabie Mountain. On the 23rd, when Liu, Deng, and the Sixth Column entered the north bank of the Ru River, they found that the enemy had reached the south bank of the Ru River before us, occupied the ferry, and cut off our army's way with the cooperation of aircraft. At this time, the rearguard of the rear was only 30 kilometers away from our rearguard.
Liu Bocheng changed his previous Confucian style and said in a loud voice: "Since ancient times, when the narrow road meets the brave and wins, we must open a bloody road from the enemy's position and rush through!" Deng Xiaoping then said, "A thousand shots! Now there is no other way out but to fight resolutely. The bridge is broken, and then repaired! If the enemy does not give way, fight! If we can't go over or turn back, we won't be able to accomplish the strategic tasks entrusted to us by the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao! Therefore, we must resolutely fight at all costs and sacrifices! Encouraged by Liu and Deng's personal command, the commanders and fighters fought bloodily, and finally broke through the Ru River before dawn and killed a passage from the enemy's defensive positions. At this time, Liu Bocheng judged: The enemy will definitely block our army between Ru and Huai, in an attempt to make me lose everything. Therefore, the troops should not be in love with war, but should cross the Huai River first. Deng Xiaoping proposed that he command the enemy who was blocking the tail pursuit, Li Da, chief of staff, commanded the crossing of the river, and Liu Bocheng crossed the Huai River first, commanding the troops entering the Dabie Mountains. Liu Bocheng said: "What the political commissar said is a decision, and it will be implemented immediately. As a result, the crossing of the Huai River was successful, and on August 27, Liu and Deng led their troops into the Dabie Mountains.
The successful move of Liu and Deng to leap thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains shows: "The causes and effects of matter are only the handle of the sword, and the causes and effects of the spirit are precious metals and the real sharp blades." "The shining sword of Liu Deng's army has been hanging high above the head of the kuomintang reactionary ruler ever since!" Here, there are several small things that also reflect the hardships and hardships of the thousand-mile leap into the Dabie Mountains. First, after Liu and Deng received an urgent telegram from the PARTY Central Committee and Mao Zedong and made up their determination to leap thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain, they blew up heavy artillery and captured American jeeps in order to be lightly loaded. Second, when crossing the RuHe River, Deng Xiaoping had been standing on the Ruhe River and commanding the troops to cross the river as soon as possible, and the planes in the sky were constantly bombing, and the head of the column repeatedly urged him to cross the river first, but he still insisted on waiting for the large troops to pass before leaving. When crossing the river, the guards accidentally dropped Deng Xiaoping's luggage into the water due to panic, and when they fished it out, the coarse cloth quilt had been dyed to a mess. Deng Xiaoping comforted the guards and said: Just right, in the future, it can be covered as a flower quilt.
Third, when crossing the Huai River, Liu Deng's army ventured across the Huai River, and just after walking out of the 5-mile road, the pursuing soldiers rushed to the north bank. Unexpectedly, the river had already soared, and hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang officers and soldiers could not imagine how Liu Deng's army would cross the river, so they had to look at the river and sigh. It turned out that when Liu and Deng crossed the Huai River, it happened to be between two flood peaks, and the empty time was about 20 hours, and they seized on this gap to pass. Liu and Deng were the first to cross the river when Hongfeng was about to arrive. And the pursuit of the soldiers arrived, it happened to be the arrival of The peak of the flood, perhaps it was made in heaven and earth, Deng Xiaoping said wittily, this is "The heavenly lord helped a big favor."
When it comes to crossing the Yellow River and marching into Dabie Mountain, many albums often use these two pictures: First, the boatmen are propping boats on the banks of the Yellow River, and the commanders and fighters who cross the river sit on the boats. The second is that the soldiers rode on horses and waded through the yellow pan area of cement, shallow to knee-deep, and deep to navel. Both photos are taken at night, and the images are still very clear, but they can still make people feel the tense, secret atmosphere.
Deng Xiaoping, who had just entered the Dabie Mountains, immediately put forward such a loud slogan:
"The task ahead is to wholeheartedly and wholeheartedly create a consolidated Base Area of Dabie Mountain, and to cooperate with friendly and neighboring regiments to fully control the Central Plains."
The author once got acquainted with an old man named Guo Rugui, when Liu Deng's army advanced into Dabie Mountain, he served as the director of the Department of Operations of the Ministry of National Defense of the Kuomintang government, with the rank of lieutenant general, and when Liu Deng's army marched into the southwest, he led an uprising in Yibin, Sichuan, and later served as the president of the Sichuan Huangpu Alumni Association. and joined the Communist Party of China. When he came to Beijing to attend the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, I visited him and met another senior Kuomintang general, Song Xilian, through whom he met Song Xilian, another senior general of the Kuomintang army.
The large-scale documentary "Deng Xiaoping" interviewed Guo Rujie to understand the reaction of the Kuomintang side to our army's advance into dabie Mountain and some of the situation in the Huaihai Campaign. Therefore, he told the crew: "Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping marched into the Dabie Mountains, that is, the well to save people, jumping into the dry well to save people, they are very dangerous things, so Liu and Deng are the most dangerous." Going in, he himself was a dangerous thing, he dared to do it, as soon as he entered the Dabie Mountains, he changed the whole situation. All the horses, the Dabie Mountains were part of it, and the Kuomintang troops were scattered. ”
Liu Deng's army quickly advanced into the Dabie Mountains, directly threatening the center of Kuomintang rule. Chiang Kai-shek hastily mobilized 33 brigades to carry out comprehensive "encirclement and suppression," and the situation in the Dabie Mountains suddenly became tense.
On August 27, 1947, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping jointly issued instructions, indicating that the future task was to create a consolidated Dabie Mountain base area and control the Central Plains. Deng Xiaoping firmly said: "We will never go again." Our slogan is to coexist and die with the people of Eyuwan, liberate the Central Plains, and liberate the people of Eyuwan. On August 31, he made a report on the current situation and tasks to the cadres at and above the company level directly under the field army in Guangshan County, Henan Province.
On this day, the weather was hot. Deng Xiaoping stood at a square table with no speeches, not even an outline, only a kettle, a water bowl, and a coat and hat draped over it. However, Deng Xiaoping's in-depth and simple report and easy-to-understand explanation made the cadres sitting on the floor around them smile. In his words: We have reached Dabie Mountain, completed the first step of our strategic task, and forced Chiang Kai-shek to retreat in a line. This was Chiang Kai-shek's strategic defeat. He then succinctly analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of persisting in the struggle in the Dabie Mountains and proposed specific tasks at present.
Deng Xiaoping preached passionately: The task of rebuilding the Eyu-Anhui Liberated Area is very glorious and an important page in China's modern history! Our determination is strong! The Liberated Areas must be established! Difficulties must be overcome! The Communist Party is characterized by the more difficult it is, the more vigorous it is, and the more united it is! We must have the confidence to overcome difficulties!
"We must stand firm and take root!" Deng Xiaoping finally concluded the report with a forceful gesture, and the commanders and fighters applauded warmly. A reporter snapped a photo, leaving behind this precious historical moment.
In September, Liu Deng's army fought three consecutive battles in Shangcheng and Guangshan counties, attracting the mobile troops of the Kuomintang southern front to the northern foothills of Dabie Mountain, and in view of the enemy's division and combined attack, they carried out encirclement, and in October, Liu and Deng used two brigades to disguise the main force to stay in the northern foothills to negotiate with the enemy, and took the opportunity to go out of eastern Hubei with the main force of 7 brigades. The heroic actions of Liu and Deng led their troops in the Dabie Mountains not only shocked the three towns of Wuhan in one day, but also threatened Jiujiang in Jiangxi. The Kuomintang command judged that Liu and Deng "had the tendency to attack jiujiang across the river, cut off the Yangtze River, and rebuild the earlier red area." The "Jiujiang Headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense," which was concurrently headed by Bai Chongxi, minister of national defense, was set up to "command troops to garrison along the river to consolidate the defense of the river, and it was later discovered that Erye had no such attempt, which was a false alarm." However, in order to consolidate the Pinghan Road and ensure the main artery of the Yangtze River, the enemy still concentrated the superior strength of 33 brigades, and with the purpose of eliminating our army, began a comprehensive siege of Dabie Mountain on November 27.
For a time, the battle clouds rolled over the Dabie Mountains, and a great war between "cleansing and suppressing" and opposing "cleansing and suppressing" was about to erupt. Mao Zedong, who was thousands of miles away, and Liu and Deng, who were on the front line, were keenly aware that whether the Dabie Mountain base area could be established and consolidated had a great relationship. Therefore, Liu and Deng decided to divide the troops! Deng Xiaoping led the field army's forward command post, commanded three columns and combined with the armed forces of the military region, to carry out small-scale battles and guerrilla warfare on the inner line of the Dabie Mountains, and continued to effectively contain the enemy army; Liu Bocheng led the Central Plains Bureau and the rear organs of the field army and commanded the first, tenth, and twelfth columns to expand the base areas in Huaixi, Tongbai, and Jianghan respectively, expand the base areas, and cooperate with the Chen and Su field armies and the Chen and Xie corps to annihilate the enemy on the outer front. Liu commanded the overall situation in Huaixi.
Liu and Deng once had an argument over who led their troops to hold dabie Mountain. Obviously, staying behind in Dabie Mountain under the conditions of heavy enemy siege and very difficult terrain and supply is a heavy burden, which can be described as the most important task. Therefore, both people insisted on staying on their own, and as a result, they were still snatched by Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, on the night of December 10, 1947, Liu and Deng were temporarily separated. Deng Xiaoping said to Liu Bocheng with concern: "I am younger than you. I stayed in Dabie Mountain to command, and you went to Huaixi to direct the overall situation. Liu's attitude was resolute: "The guard regiments are all left for you, I only need to take one platoon." Deng Xiaoping once stated to the Central Military Commission: I and Xiannian led the command north of the Huai River, and commanded the columns. Li Xiannian met Liu and Deng on November 27, where he grew up in the Dabie Mountains and led the revolutionary struggle. Yang Guoyu once said happily: "Li Xiannian is most familiar with the situation of Dabie Mountain, and we can not need a map." When the troops were divided, Li Da's chief of staff told the relevant personnel with a serious look: "Liu and Deng act separately, and they must keep it secret!" secrecy! Obviously, Li Xiannian and Li Da were Deng Xiaoping's right-hand men in leading the revolutionary struggle at Dabie Mountain.
"The main reason for this struggle in Dabie Mountain is that our policies are opposed, including military policies." When the troops first entered the Dabie Mountains, they were not familiar with the terrain, did not understand the language, lacked experience in mountain warfare, and had no logistical supply. The local bandits spread rumors to confuse the masses, saying something: "Liu Bocheng has one eye, and now both of them are blind, they cannot command us, and they will fail"; "Liu and Deng want to return to Sichuan, we will send them, how will they return to the north in the future"; "Liu and Deng are in Jiluyu in the future, using radio to direct", and so on. The above situation has caused some commanders and fighters to doubt the possibility and necessity of creating the Dabie Mountain base area, and there has been a right-leaning sentiment with insufficient confidence and the phenomenon of violating the law and discipline. From September 27 to 29, Liu and Deng held a meeting of cadres at and above the brigade level at the WenShi Ancestral Hall in Brick Bridge Township, Guangshan County, for three consecutive days, known in history as the "Wang Dawan Conference." It is also humorously called the "Ann Egg Conference".
After analyzing the situation in the whole country at the meeting, Deng Xiaoping said: "The Party Central Committee has fully estimated the significance of our action. At present, we have not only preserved and further consolidated the basic areas of the original Liberated Areas, but also directed the war to the Chiang Kai-shek areas and forced Chiang Kai-shek to move the front from the Yellow River to the Yangtze River. Comrades can see how wisely and far-sighted the Central Committee has played this move. He turned the topic around: "However, some of us only see our own hardships, but we cannot see the new changes in the whole battlefield..." Subsequently, Liu Bocheng made a long speech, in which he called on cadres to "stand up and stand in line." To this day, an old man who brought water and washed clothes to the meeting still clearly remembers the situation of the meeting at that time, when the meeting was held, the chiefs were squatting on the ground, and Deng Xiaoping waved his hands when he spoke, very excited. The meeting went very well.
On the issue of the location of the "Wang Dawan Conference," some people have heard such a statement from the local party history department, but in fact, Guangshan County does not have the place name Wang Dawan, and the place where the Wen Clan Ancestral Hall is located is not called Wang Dawan. At that time, it was said that Wang Dawan's meeting was a way to make the meeting smoothly under extreme secrecy. This meeting enabled everyone to clarify the close relationship between upholding the Dabie Mountain struggle and the national war situation. The determination to overcome difficulties has been strengthened. Thus it became a turning point in the arduous struggle to uphold the Dabie Mountains. Later, Deng Xiaoping said: "Especially in difficult times, we should especially encourage the troops to fight resolutely and suppress the enemy's morale in order to consolidate their own morale." Dabie Mountain has this experience in September. Soon, the main force won the battle of Gaoshanpu and other battles at the southern foot of Dabie Mountain.
Soon, in the process of the gradual northward movement of the main force, there was a rush to fight in the troops. "I always want to fight a war of annihilation." Deng Xiaoping recalled: "We had a meeting, and what I said proposed to avoid war. Because at that time, the battle could not be lost, and once defeated, it could not be controlled." In his view, the victory of the struggle against Dabie Mountain did not depend on the destruction of many enemies, but on whether or not the strategic decision of the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong could be realized: to pay the price to stand firm, to stand firm, to stand is to win. "Everything is to get a foothold". In this way, Liu Deng's army arrived at the Yangtze River, expanded the liberated areas, faced Wuhan and other large cities where the enemy was heavily entrenched, and threatened the rule of the Kuomintang.
An old comrade wrote down Deng Xiaoping in his diary that year: "August 30. Political Commissar Deng reported: We have reached Dabie Mountain; September 12 and 13. In Huangjiawan, after the chiefs stayed, they went out for a walk, and as they walked, they seemed to be thinking that the troops had arrived in a new place, the terrain was unfamiliar, the enemy situation was unknown, and they were worried about suffering losses. Commissar Deng looked at those mules, do you want to tell us to reduce them again? October 21. From washing the horse to get up, climbing the triangular tip, the horse is not easy to ride, Commander Liu used a bamboo pole as a cane, step by step upwards, Commissar Deng did not use a cane, grabbed the small tree and rushed straight forward. ...... Liu and Deng liked to ask these old monks about the east and west; November 10. At the meeting, Commissar Deng made a report first, followed by Commander Liu; November 27. Today, liu bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Xiannian met with Li Xiannian; on December 10, Chief of Staff Li Da came to me and said: Today, according to the previous day, I will go according to the previous day. secrecy. I went south with Commissar Deng and Deputy Commander Li, and Commander Liu went north, how to go, Commander Liu knew; December 11. To The Choi Ka-sa sa, northwest of the Sujia River. Since then, tacitly, they have been systematically separated according to the list. ”