Auchinleck succeeded Wavell as Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East in June 1941. Large in stature, with broad eyebrows and deep vision, he was an outstanding strategist in the British Army, who personally organized and commanded the "Crusade Expedition" at the end of 1941, which repelled Rommel. But he was not a good tactician, lacked the organizational ability and will to carry out his own plans to the end, and did not understand the characteristics of mechanized warfare in the desert regions of North Africa. Killed by Rommel in early 1942, the two armies faced each other on the Jazara Line.
In February 1942, Auchinlake advocated remaining unmoved for four months in order to launch a second general war against Rommel. On Feb. 27, in a 1,500-word report, he listed the reasons why you can't rush into it:
In short, my intentions on the Western Front are as follows:
1. Continue to be in the forward theater of the 8th Army to establish the main offensive unit of the armored unit as soon as possible. 2. Consolidate as far as possible the positions occupied by Jazara, Tobruk and Salum and extend the railway line to the east. 3. Stock up on munitions in the forward areas in order to relaunch the offensive. Churchill was unhappy with Oginlake's report. The island of Malta was in crisis; Rommel was receiving a steady stream of supplies; the Soviets were engaged in a deadly struggle with the Germans; Stalin had strongly demanded that the British open a second front in Western Europe; and Churchill wanted to respond to Stalin's call with a British offensive in North Africa. Churchill asked Auchinleck to return to London to negotiate a plan for the North African war, but Oginlake refused an invitation to return to Cairo on the pretext that he urgently needed to travel to Cairo. Churchill had no choice but to have sir Stafford Krieps, the Chancellor of the Seal, pass through Cairo on his way to India, exert influence on Auchinleck, and quickly set up a plan of attack, but without satisfactory results. Churchill continued to put pressure on O'Kinglake. Finally he decided to issue a clear order to Oginlake that the order must be obeyed or he would be removed from office. On May 10, Churchill called Auchin laker:
"The chiefs of staff of the three services, the National Defence Council and the War Cabinet have once again considered the overall situation. We have resolved that we will not allow the island of Malta to fall without your whole army fighting for its preservation. The loss of this fortress would cause more than 30,000 of our army and air force to surrender and lose hundreds of artillery pieces. The occupation of the island by the enemy is like obtaining a truly reliable bridge to Africa and the favorable conditions that have been created from it. The fall of the island will cut off the air routes that you and India rely on for reinforcements. ”
"We therefore reiterate the opinion we have expressed, plus the following condition that the latest date on which we can approve a confrontation with the enemy is the date on which the enemy will be able to maneuver in time to assist the convoy in June when the moon is dim."
After receiving Churchill's telegram, Oakinglake's heart was heavy as lead. In his opinion, the training level and technical and tactical level of the British army were not yet suitable for desert warfare, and it was necessary to be fully prepared to attack an opponent like Rommel. However, the prime minister repeatedly ordered that if he continued to postpone the attack, his black gauze hat would be difficult to keep. Hanging on the crown is also clean and sharp, but it is not too cheap to hit Rommel hard. Moreover, the island of Malta is in danger, so how can we sit idly by and not save it? On 19 May, he crossed his heart and called Churchill, stating that he would launch a massive offensive against Rommel in June, not just a limited offensive to assist the convoy bound for the island of Malta. On May 22, he called Churchill again: "Now that I have fully recognized my responsibility, I will do everything I can to complete it to your satisfaction." ”
As Britain's Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, Auchinleck shouldered the heavy responsibility of safeguarding British security in the Middle East. He is good at thinking about all aspects of the situation and trying to find comprehensive and reliable solutions. But he seems to have forgotten that there is no absolute military, that to concentrate forces one risks miscalculation in the secondary direction; that time is an important winning factor, and that a quick determination to attack is sometimes more certain than a determination to win tomorrow. At the turn of the spring and summer of 1942, for the British, an attack on the Jazara Line was linked to ensuring that the island of Malta was interconnected, and to secure the British initiative in the Mediterranean in North Africa, a pre-emptive large-scale offensive on the Jazara Line was necessary.
Auchinleck finally made up his mind to attack, but it was too late. On May 26, Rommel had already taken the lead. There is a parable in the West: in order to make a bear swallow a packet of explosives, a man carefully mixes explosives, trying to make the composition of the explosives absolutely accurate and the contents of the explosive packs not worse than a fraction. But when he rolled the explosives in a paper tube and was about to ignite and throw it into the bear's throat, the bear pounced first.