First, the domestic situation:
On January 7, 1941, chiang kai-shek's clique disregarded the overall situation of the anti-Japanese resistance and brazenly launched the "Anhui Southern Incident". After the incident occurred, the CPC Central Committee had a far-sighted vision, took the overall situation into consideration, and put forward the strategic principle of taking the offensive politically and the defensive position militarily. On the one hand, the New Fourth Army Headquarters was rebuilt, and Chen Yi was appointed as the acting commander of the New Fourth Army, Liu Shaoqi as the political commissar, Zhang Yunyi as the deputy commander, Lai Chuanzhu as the chief of staff, and Deng Zihui as the director of the Political Department. On 20 October, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee Mao Zedong, in the name of the spokesman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, delivered a speech denouncing the heinous crimes of the Kuomintang reactionary clique in creating the "Anhui Southern Incident," exposing the capitulation plot of the Kuomintang diehards and pro-Japanese factions, and proposing to the Kuomintang twelve ways to stop the provocations, punish the culprits of the "Anhui Southern Incident," restore Ye Ting's freedom, return all the guns of the New Fourth Army, abolish the one-party dictatorship, and arrest the leaders of the pro-Japanese faction. On the other hand, the Southern Bureau led by Zhou Enlai waged a resolute struggle against the Kuomintang diehards in Chongqing, fiercely counterattacked politically and propagandaly, and angrily rebuked He Yingqin: Your actions have caused pain to your relatives and quick enemies, and you have done what the Japanese wanted to do but could not do. He also inscribed in the Xinhua Daily: Thousands of ancient injustices, Jiangnan Yiye; the same room, why is it urgent to fry each other? Inscription. Through holding forums, individual forums, and distributing leaflets, he also announced the truth of the incident to people from all walks of life and exposed the anti-communist features of the diehard Kuomintang faction.
General Ye Ting
The Communist Party's stand of just self-defense has won the sympathy and support of people from all walks of life and democratic parties. Song Qingling, Liu Yazi, He Xiangning, Chen Youren, and others launched a protest in Hong Kong for the "Anhui Southern Incident." Various democratic parties have also expressed dissatisfaction and indignation at the Kuomintang's perverse behavior. Even within the Kuomintang, there were many people who disapproved of Chiang Kai-shek's initiation of a civil war. Overseas Chinese also expressed their opposition to separatism.
Marshal Chen Yi
II. International Bureau:
In June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, forcing it to join the fight against fascism. At this time, Britain, the United States and other Western countries began to ease relations with the Soviet Union in order to defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan, which intended to form alliances with them for hegemony.
Liu Shaoqi
In December, Yukimoto attacked Pearl Harbor and launched the Pacific War. The Interests of the United States and Britain in Asia and the Pacific suffered heavy losses and were forced to declare war on Japan. At the beginning of 1942, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and other countries signed the Declaration of the United Nations, marking the formal formation of the world anti-fascist united front. At this time, the Soviet Union and the United States, which had a deep impact on the situation in China, did not want the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to break down, but continued to maintain cooperation to jointly resist Japanese fascism and firmly tie the living forces of Japanese fascism to the Chinese battlefield, so as to reduce the pressure of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and other countries in other battlefields.
Zhang Yunyi
Upon learning of the news of the "Anhui Incident," the Soviet Foreign Ministry immediately telegraphed to the Nationalist Government, hoping that Chiang Kai-shek would "not do anything to please the enemy" and demanded that he immediately "properly handle it so as not to affect the purpose of the War of Resistance." Soviet military adviser in China, Trikov, hinted that if the Nationalist government insisted on turning the gun on the inside, it would definitely affect the Soviet side's military assistance to China.
Lai Chuanzhu
The US government sent a telegram to the Nationalist government, deciding to suspend the implementation of the 50 million US dollars of aid to China previously signed between the two countries, and asked curie, the incoming president's economic adviser to China, to earnestly investigate the specific situation of the conflict between the KMT and the CPC. President Roosevelt also entrusted people to tell Chiang Kai-shek that he hoped that China would not have a civil war within three years, and at the same time stressed that the arms provided by the United States to aid China should not be used for civil war. ：
Under the pressure of the domestic and international situation, Chiang Kai-shek said at the Second National Participation Conference: There will never be any military effort to suppress the Communists in the future, and he clearly pointed out: Use political methods to solve the Communist Party problem. In August 1942, he met with Zhou Enlai and expressed his desire to meet with the leader of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, in Xi'an.
Deng Zihui
With regard to Chiang Kai-shek's proposal, Mao Zedong expressed his willingness to meet with Chiang Kai-shek. After careful consideration, Zhou Enlai believed that Mao And Jiang would be out of date at present. To this end, he put forward two opinions to the Party Central Committee for decision-making: First, Mao claimed to be ill and sent Lin Biao instead; second, Zhou accompanied Jiang to Xi'an, then flew alone to Yan'an, and returned to Xi'an with one person (Lin Biao or other responsible persons) to see Jiang. After studying it, the Party Central Committee agreed to Lin Biao's suggestion to see Chiang Kai-shek.
Zhou Enlai called the Party Central Committee again on 5 September and expounded his judgment on the prospects for negotiations: First, although Chiang Kai-shek tends to a political settlement, his so-called politics is to make us submit and is by no means democratic cooperation; second, Chiang Kai-shek's concept of our party and our army is still non-merger, that is, the elimination of most of them; third, Chiang Kai-shek's concept of people still harbors evil intentions.
Zhou Enlai
According to this, Zhou Enlai analyzed that there may be two prospects for the Chiang-Mao meeting: First, on the surface, it was carried out harmoniously and promised to solve the problem and disperse; second, after Mao Came to Chongqing to hold a political meeting, he used the pretext of staying in Chongqing for a long time and not letting it be postponed (this cannot be prevented). If so, I would lose too much. Finally, he proposed that Lin be sent to see Jiang, and depending on Jiang's attitude, he would decide whether Mao would see Jiang or not.
Material Biao
In October 1942, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent Lin Biao to Chongqing to negotiate with the Kuomintang. During the negotiations, the Chinese Communists put forward specific conditions for improving the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and strengthening cooperation: First, on the issue of the Party. Recognize the legitimacy of the CCP. Under this premise, the Kuomintang may go to the border areas and behind enemy lines to run the party and newspapers. Second, on the issue of the army, including the New Fourth Army, it is required that the army under the leadership of the Chinese Communists be organized into four armies and twelve divisions. Third, on the issue of border areas, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been changed into an administrative region and the central decree has been implemented, but the personnel and geographical conditions have not changed. Fourth, with regard to the combat areas, they can be redivided after the war, and appropriate adjustments are made at present in accordance with the actual situation. It was determined that the troops south of the Yellow River would move north of the Yellow River after the war. However, because the objective conditions of wartime do not allow it, only preparations are made at present, and no movement can be carried out.
Song Qingling
In this negotiation, just as Zhou Enlai had predicted in advance, the Chiang Kai-shek clique had no sincerity, and the conditions they put forward were more stringent than in the past, insisting that the army under the leadership of the Chinese Communists could only be organized into eight divisions, and that the issue of the legitimate status of the Communist Party would be discussed after the army was reorganized. The border areas should be changed into administrative districts, and the combat areas should be moved northward. The negotiations dragged on for a long time and did not resolve any practical issues. In July 1943, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and others left Chongqing and returned to Yan'an.