Xu Guangda (1908.11.19~1969.6.3), a native of Changsha, Hunan. In 1925, he joined the Communist Youth League of China and transferred to the Communist Party of China in the same year. In 1926, he entered the Whampoa Military Academy. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, he served as chief of staff of the 6th Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, political commissar and division commander of the 17th Division of the Red 2nd Army. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he served as the director of training, the chief of education and the president of the 3rd Branch school of the Chinese Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, the director of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission and the commander of the Yan'an Traffic, the commander of the Air Defense, and the commander of the garrison, and the commander of the Independent 2nd Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army and the commander of the Second Sub-district of the Jinsui Military Region.
During the Liberation War, he served as the commander of the column, the commander of the 3rd Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and the commander of the 2nd Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he was appointed to form the armored corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, served as the commander, and successively served as the president of the chariot school and the president of the armored corps academy. In September 1959, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense. He was awarded the rank of Grand General in 1955.
The main contents of General Xu Guangda's military thinking are:
I. The organizational principles of the people's army
The army is a product of class society. The factors that determine the organizational principles and forms of the army are, first of all, the social system and economic conditions, and secondly, the political nature of the war and the basic tasks of the army at that time. In addition, the geographical conditions of the battlefield, the strategic principles, and the characteristics of weapons and equipment also have an important impact on the organization of the army. The organizational principle of the people's army in the War of Resistance Against Japan should be: Mobilize the people of the whole country to form an army of a large number and excellent quality, and the relationship between officers and soldiers should be based on political equality and vigorous political education should be carried out. As a reserve army, the masses of the people militarized and carried out anti-war education. Extensive organization of guerrilla groups, fighting in coordination with the regular army, and constantly enriching the regular army. Establish a modern corps equipped with new technologies. The organizational structure of the troops should meet the requirements of highly mobile operations, be conducive to dealing with the Superiorly Equipped Japanese Army, and facilitate the training and replenishment of the contingent of cadres. In the armed forces under the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of China, it is its aim to implement the party's policies and tasks. Commanders at all levels must understand the Party's principles, policies, and Mao Zedong's military thought; otherwise, they are by no means good commanders; this is the most important issue in the army's organizational line. The people's army fights for the interests of the people, and it is an important content of the thinking of army building to be responsible to the people in everything, to believe in the strength of the masses, to rely on the masses, and to mobilize the consciousness and initiative of the masses to accomplish various tasks.
In 1941, Xu Guangda was in Yan'an
2. Tactics of revolutionary war
Tactics are methods of fighting from squad to division. The "cooperation" of people, technology, terrain, climate, time and other factors determines the specific tactical content. People and technology are the basic factors that determine tactics. The nature of the army, the political mood, the degree of fatigue, and the political factors of the conditions of the masses are inextricably linked to the use of tactics. It would be wrong to apply new tactics to defeat the enemy in accordance with the nature and conditions of the military struggle at that time, and to copy the tactics of the Western European or Soviet armies. Implement a war of annihilation against a purely defensive war. The most advantageous method of warfare is to mobilize the enemy to annihilate it in motion, or to pretend to attack with a small number of troops, while concentrating the main force on attacking the enemy's flank. The success of the operation depended on careful reconnaissance, careful planning and adequate preparation, and control of a strong reserve. Emphasis is placed on the combination of coordination and maneuvering, and the combination of firepower and assault. Troops should have strong melee combat capabilities. Commanders should exercise uninterrupted command over the troops, resolutely implement the intentions of their superiors, resolutely handle the situation, and not let go of favorable fighters. The enemy is not feared as a whole, but each specific enemy must not be taken lightly. The fighting style must be resolute and brave, not afraid of sacrifice, not afraid of difficulties. Fear of difficulties and crying bitterness are manifestations of the revolution's instability. The troops must act clearly, quickly, and alertly, and everything must precede the enemy in order to defeat the enemy.
Third, the construction and combat application of armored troops
Armored forces should be established and developed in light of China's specific conditions.
1. Mechanization is an inevitable trend in the development of the Army. Mechanization is the task of the entire army, and the armored corps is a mechanized composite army, which should include independent tank units and subordinate tank units in the organizational structure. Commanders of synthetic armies must be familiar with the theoretical knowledge of armored troops in order to complete the task.
2. Armored forces are an important assault force of the Army. As the army's mechanized share grows, tank troops and mechanized infantry will become the army's basic assault forces. There must be an appropriate number of strategic reserve tank troops to ensure the implementation of the strategic principle.
3. Technology is the basis of the combat effectiveness of armored troops. Without technology, there would be no armored forces. It is necessary to establish a complete set of armored corps technical support institutions and management systems. Cadres at all levels must have the knowledge and technology to manage and maintain vehicles, and strictly implement the management system of orders, models, and depots. The occupants should take care of the tank as much as they love their own eyes. Advocate the spirit of studying and improving technology, and attach importance to the development of tank technology experts and technological innovation activities. Technical support should meet the needs of combat. We must unswervingly strive to overcome bureaucracy and lax discipline in technical work and to avoid vehicle accidents. The development of armored forces should implement the policy of focusing on self-reliance and actively introducing advanced foreign technologies.
4. Pay attention to the effectiveness and quality of education training. All the work of the troops is aimed at improving their combat effectiveness. Troops should take training as the center, learn from the advanced experience of foreign armies on the basis of maintaining fine traditions, and in light of the actual conditions of the troops. In training, it is necessary to follow the law of first technology and then tactics, first foundation and then application, and proceed from difficulties and strictness to the needs of actual combat. The improvement of the quality of cadres is a decisive factor in the improvement of the quality of training. Cadres must be trained in colleges and universities. Advocate the system of appointing cadres, and establish and adhere to the crew training system of "training first and making up for it later". In peacetime, tactical training should focus on attacking the enemy defending the position, and the defensive topic should focus on the defense of pre-preparedness. It is necessary to attach importance to popularizing and popularizing the advanced experience of tactical training in detachments. In battle, tank soldiers must be good at using terrain, timely discovery and elimination of enemy anti-tank weapons, overcoming anti-tank obstacles, actively supporting the troops and annihilating enemy tanks, and taking this as the basic standard for detachment training.
5. Carry out political work with an eye on the characteristics of armored forces. Political work must be integrated with technical work, so that every commander and fighter has a high degree of political consciousness and integrates it with modern technology, which is the basic task of political work. Political cadres should actively study military technology and become insiders. Cadres should go deep into the depots, workshops, and various training grounds to ensure the completion of the military training plan. Political cadres of armored corps companies should be selected from cadres at the squad (vehicle) and platoon levels who have skills.
6. Armored troops are the most ideal units that can give full play to the characteristics of mobile warfare. In campaigns and battles, tasks can be carried out individually, and tasks can be carried out within the formation of a composite army. Armored forces should be concentrated in the main direction and mainly used in offensive battles. In the offensive, it can be used for the first echelon to carry out breakthroughs, and it can also serve as the second echelon and reserve team to develop victories, and it can also form rapid groups to widely encircle, detour and intersperse, and pursue and annihilate the retreating enemy. In defense, it is mainly used to implement counter-impact and counter-assault, annihilate enemy airborne troops and close breakthroughs. Infantry divisions are organized into tank units within the tank unit, which can partially strengthen the first echelon to directly support the infantry attack, or as a fire point to enhance the stability of the defense. Combat on special terrain should focus on specific characteristics.
Fourth, master military dialectics to improve the art of command
Mastering military dialectics is of extreme significance to improving the art of command. Defense and offense in the people's war are used alternately, with defense in the offensive and offense in the defense, infiltrating and transforming each other. Offense is the main thing, defense is the preparation or initiation of the offense, is the means to reach the offense. There must be no negative defensive thoughts in command. The strength and weakness of the forces of war are not absolutely static, but relatively variable. Strong is weak, weak is strong, and strength and weakness can be transformed. In combat, the weak part of the enemy is destroyed, and the strong one loses its support, and it is weaker than before, which is the internal reason for "fighting the weak first and then fighting the strong." In combat, commanders must find out the real strength and weakness from the comparison of the enemy and us and the various parts of the forces of one side. Quantity and quality have a dialectical relationship. Commanders on the battlefield should focus on the question of the quantitative boundaries that determine the quality of things. The best advantage in the comparison of troop strength should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and it should constitute an "absolute superiority in content" in terms of efficiency, economy, and duration of sustained combat of troops. There are not too many basic principles of combat, and there are only a few of them in ancient and modern China and abroad, while there is no eternal and unchangeable law in the method of warfare, and the problem lies in how to flexibly apply the basic principles of operation according to specific conditions.
General Xu Guangda's military thinking played a certain role in the formation and development of Mao Zedong's military thought, in winning victory in China's revolutionary war, in guiding the people's army and national defense construction, and in guiding the building and development of the troops mainly under his leadership and in the victory in combat, especially in the building and development of the armored troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army after the founding of the People's Republic of China.