The great Russian writer Julian. Semyonovich. Semenov wrote the immortal masterpiece "Seventeen Moments of Spring" in the world spy novel, shaping a brilliant Soviet intelligence officer Stillitz, and the protagonist and the novel together became the pinnacle of spy literature. It has to be said that Mr. Semenov wrote so brilliantly that many people later regarded Stirlitz as a real spy during the war years, and quite a few espionage enthusiasts spent their energy searching for the prototype of this protagonist.
And Semenov himself has said that one of the prototypes he created for Stilitz was the famous intelligence officer Norman. Borozin. His father's name was Mikhail. Markovich. Borodin, the name, has an extraordinary meaning for modern China. He was once a Soviet adviser to Sun Yat-sen, known as the "Father of the Nation" of China, and in the 1920s, he set off the wave of the Great Revolution in China.
Veteran qualified KGB General Sergey. Aleksandrovich. Kondrasov (Lieutenant General, Vice-Chancellor of Perm State Gorky University) believes that the founder of the secret intelligence apparatus (referring to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Cheka) Alexander K. Kondrasov (Vice-Chancellor of the Perm State Gorky University) believes that the secret intelligence apparatus (referring to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Cheka) is the founder of the Secret Intelligence Service. Mikhailovich. Korotkov is also the prototype.
So, is there really a person like Stilitz?
Rather, does the protagonist in the literary work and the protagonist in the film have their own archetypes?
In fact, the opinion given by the experts of the secret service is unanimous: there will be no such person as Stilitz, and there can be no one. Of course, a Russian or Russified German could try to impersonate a native German, but only for a short period of time before the initial review, because the German's mechanized, high-standard procedural, and accurate personnel review department was probably of the highest standard at the time.
During World War II, Soviet hero Nikolai. Ivanovich. Kuznetsov was quite successful in his activities in the German rear, but he was mainly engaged in not intelligence work, but sabotage. He wandered all over Germany, deceived the Germans, and was always able to disappear without a trace before he was suspected. But he never spent a long time in one place, in a German institution, or in a senior core institution for a long time.
An intelligence agent who was a citizen of the Soviet Union could not have held a prominent position in Nazi Germany, because he would inevitably be exposed. The intelligence services were actually focused on "recruiting Germans willing to serve the Soviet Union."
In fact, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Soviet intelligence did establish a large intelligence station in Germany with many spies.
But beginning in 1936, the worst "Great Purge" in Soviet history began, and Soviet intelligence was not spared a large-scale purge. Quite a few intelligence officers working abroad were recalled to Moscow. After they were arrested, some were shot and some were sent to labor camps.
In December 1938, the head of the Army Intelligence Department reported to the People's Commissar of National Defense: "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has in fact lost its intelligence apparatus. The secret spy network that was the basis of the intelligence apparatus was almost completely eliminated. ”
Vitali, who served in the Intelligence Department of the Red Army on the eve of the war. Major General Nikolisky has many accounts in his recollection: the repression that followed the Tukhachevsky case dealt a heavy blow to the army and prevented it from recovering until 1941. The central branch of the military intelligence service did not have a single experienced staff member left by 1940. All were executed. Some of the newly promoted people who were hastily transferred became our superiors, but they were also replaced frequently. When an officer of the central apparatus is arrested in Moscow, the overt and covert intelligence officers who contact him are naturally suspected. At first, they no longer believed their intelligence, and then they were recalled to Moscow and executed.
It can be seen that it is not the enemy's counter-espionage organs that have caused serious damage to the intelligence organs, but the xiao wall that has caused serious damage.
Nikolisky recalls: "We know better about the plans of European leaders than the intentions of our own governments. The treaty with Germany and the advance of Soviet troops into Poland surprised the military intelligence apparatus. We did not have time to transfer all our intelligence personnel from the eastern Polish states to the west, because all our important intelligence personnel became Prisoners of the Soviet Union during the Rapid Advance of the Red Army towards the Bug River. On the eve of a terrible war, this was a heavy loss for the intelligence agencies. When war broke out, our technical equipment was very poor. Radio stations are fixed and heavy, and only spies who have been working in a certain area for a long time can use them. Mobile intelligence personnel, on the other hand, do not have radio equipment to keep in touch in a timely manner. However, this will allow them to avoid defeat that is difficult to escape. After the outbreak of war, we demanded a lot of intelligence from long-dormant spies, which forced them to sit in front of the radio for hours on end. As a result, the direction finder determined their position, so they became the prey of the counter-espionage agency...
In February 1941, the Intelligence Department of the Red Army held a large conference in Moscow. Officers from the military districts said frankly at the meeting that the country was on the brink of war and that the intelligence services were completely unprepared for war. There are neither radio stations nor parachutes, nor automatic weapons suitable for use by sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
During the first months of the Soviet-German war, sabotage and reconnaissance teams sent to the rear of the enemy were armed only with pistols, as there were no automatic weapons. The retreat in the summer of the first year of the war was fatal to intelligence. All intelligence stations, intelligence officers and operators were lost. In short, everything starts from scratch: find the right people, train the operators.
Nikolisky recalls that we did not even know how to find people with such expertise at first, because there was no registration for this before the war. It takes 4 months to train the operators, but we need to send teams to the rear of the Germans every day. Before the war, there were no registration materials for people who knew German. We are looking for amateur radio operators, graduates of the Language Department and the Department of Education who have studied German.
The intelligence services also did not have their own aircraft suitable for airdrop reconnaissance and sabotage groups. It was not until 1943 that the 105th Aviation Group was established, and the teams were airdropped with whatever aircraft they had previously caught. This has led to many failures and tragedies. Some teams were reimbursed in the air.
Nikolisky recalls: "We accomplished our mission because we took advantage of the chaos in the Germans. The Occupation Command has not yet had time to register the population and establish local police stations. And we are, after all, operating on our own land. Our spies were assisted by locals on 9 of the 10 occasions in the occupied territories. A piece of bread would always be given, of course, if they had to live. After the arrival of the German field gendarmerie and the Gestapo in the occupied territories, the work became difficult after the emergence of police stations established by the Germans and the beginning of the suppression of those who helped the partisans.
The losses of the reconnaissance team were so great that one could not help but wonder: Were these losses cost-effective? Is this intelligence from the military intelligence services worth the almost mortal risk of being taken for them?
worth. Otherwise we can't fight. Sometimes the means to an end are terrible, but without intelligence it is impossible to win a battle... Nikolisky also had his own firm assessment of this.
During these crucial years, Stalin continued to change the structure of the secret service. The NKVD was sometimes divided into two organs, one of which was the independent NKVD, which was sometimes merged into one body. The army's counter-espionage organs are sometimes subordinate to the People's Commissariat of National Defense, sometimes to the People's Commissariat of the Interior, and sometimes to the People's Commissariat of National Defense. Military intelligence has also not escaped the fate of accepting the restructuring.
Nikolisky recalls that Stalin issued an order at the end of 1942 to 'disband the spy intelligence apparatus in the 'army-front' link, which was full of "double espionage" and spies, and whose leaders were uncultured commanders. All intelligence personnel were transferred to the organs of the NKVD and lower-ranking officers were sent to replenish the troops. I received this order in Stalingrad. A new front has been established here, and we have gone to great lengths to set up an intelligence apparatus for it, but this order has in vain all our work. Some commanders of the army groups and fronts wrote to Stalin requesting the restoration of the intelligence apparatus. Later, the order was finally issued to restore the intelligence organs of the army and establish the intelligence department of the General Staff ...
However, the consequences of the strikes on the intelligence services at the end of 1942 could be felt for a long time. The professional intelligence officers sent to the troops were killed in battle. As new officers gain experience, spies keep dying and the army does not receive very important information.
Stalin's affection for the intelligence apparatus may have been nothing more than the butcher's knowledge of the butcher's knife on his side, which he used to purge all dissidents, even those who were not accustomed to his vision. By the hand of Yezhov (the former leader of internal affairs and national security), he almost completely destroyed the intelligence agencies.
The Intelligence Station in Berlin had only 3 staff members by 1938. One of them doesn't speak German yet.
It was not until 1939, after Merkulov's leadership of the General Directorate of State Security, that the Berlin intelligence station began to resume, but it was impossible for a new generation of intelligence agents to achieve the same feats as they had in the past.
A large spy network has been established, but the level of espionage personnel is not high. Such a spy only knows what is happening in the department he works for, and has no ability to see through the thoughts and intentions of the government leaders, and this is what is most important.
Soviet espionage agencies did not have access to first-hand intelligence from Hitler's side. Moscow did not know what the German leaders were actually thinking and saying, so it often made all kinds of speculations, and often made mistakes.
Merkulov
Nevertheless, Merkulov was appointed deputy of the People's Commissariat of State Security, Bogdan. Kobrov's younger brother, Amayak, who had no intelligence experience. Zakharovich. Kobrov served as the head of the Berlin intelligence station. Kobrov knew neither German nor the situation in Germany.
The German counter-espionage agencies discovered this and successfully installed several Russian-speaking double agents at his side. These spies actually worked for the Imperial General Security Service. Kobrov was easily hooked.
Hitler was also involved in this very important game. He personally examined the information intended to be provided to Kobgangv.
Through him, the Germans provided Stalin with reassuring information: Germany had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union. Merkulov reported this to Stalin. The experienced Merkulov did not believe this, but out of fear and life, he could only report to the moody commander what he wanted to hear, and these were completely false information.
Many of the spies were left-wing and anti-fascist figures who saw the Soviet Union as an ally in the fight against Hitler. Other spies demanded money to buy intelligence. The work was carried out as agreed, and the more information was sent, the more money was received. As a result, more money is spent on disinformation.
There is also the problem that Moscow has not been able to properly analyze the information obtained. Stalin did not believe in the analytical abilities of his own intelligence officers and preferred to draw his own conclusions. He asked Merkulov to put the original spy's report on his desk. Therefore, Merkulov did not need to establish an intelligence analysis office in the intelligence apparatus.
The movie "Seventeen Moments of Spring" features multiple unprofessional scenes: intelligence agents tell politicians what to do. In fact, the atmosphere in the Soviet Union was the opposite: politicians made decisions, and intelligence agents sought a basis for those decisions.
Until June 22, 1941, Stalin and his confidants believed in long-term cooperation with Hitler. Thus, in the special report of the intelligence apparatus brought by Merkulov, Stalin looked only at what he wanted to see.
A few years ago, the Russian Federal Security Service had such a rumor that the real prototype of Stilitz was a man named Willy. Germans in Lyman. He was a member of the Gestapo and had been working for Soviet intelligence since 1929 under the name Breitenberg. Breitenberg's personnel file by Julian. Semyonov was secretly in charge, and he changed the Germans to Russians.
When the KGB's World War II archives were partially declassified, it was found that Breitenbach's personnel file had not been modified.
But this pseudonym is Breitenbach, and his real name is Willy. Lyman's Gestapo official was indeed the highest-ranking Soviet spy, but his fate was tragic.
In 1938, after Stalin destroyed soviet intelligence stations in Germany, contact with Brytenbach was broken. He simply could not help the Soviet Union for two years, because there was no one to connect with him. In early 1941, relations were finally reconnected, but they were interrupted by the German attack on the Soviet Union.
In 1942, I don't know if it was because of despair or stupidity that Brytenbach was destroyed. The intelligence services parachuted a spy who had not completed his training on the other side of the battle line and told him the code word of the connection with Breitenberg. The Gestapo immediately caught him. This man confessed that he was not Brytenbach of Stilitz.
Before the outbreak of the war, the Soviet Union had rebuilt a huge intelligence network in Germany. It had spies in the Luftwaffe, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Gestapo, and the defense enterprise. The People's Commissariat of State Security had a powerful secret organization in Berlin, led by the later very famous anti-fascist figures Harrow Schulzer-Boyson and Alvid Harnak. They were widely communicated and provided Merkulov with valuable information that made me proud, but in fact, today's history looks back and is mostly fruitless.
Soviet military intelligence had secret operations groups in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, but most of them were mainly engaged in sabotage.
Soviet spies provided a lot of intelligence, especially in the first months of the war. However, they soon began to be arrested. This is often due to moscow's mistakes, which the Gestapo took advantage of.
Like the Red Army Intelligence Department, the People's Commissariat of National Security demanded up-to-date information in a timely manner, but liaison was the weakest link. The operators often worked for hours at a time, so the radio stations were positioned by the Germans, and the intelligence officers were arrested one by one.
The most precious information of the Soviet Union during the war was probably the intelligence of the famous "Ramza Group" Sorge, as well as the sharing of intelligence provided by the Allies, of which intelligence from China was indispensable.
The head of the Gestapo was Heinrich. Miller. Soviet actor Leonid. Bronievoy played this character brilliantly in the film Seventeen Moments of Spring. Miller in life is not such a flaunted person. But he was a well-versed policeman, and he was both methodical and serious in his work.
The Berlin street seems to be the one where Stilitz once worked. There is nothing left of the Reich Security Directorate building in the German capital, leaving only the porters used by the SS officers in charge of the guards, which have become ruined. The building has been completely demolished, and a museum dedicated to the victims of the Gestapo has been built on the site. The museum has underground exhibition rooms and a large number of stunning photographs.
It's hard to imagine that it was once the seat of a German counterintelligence agency. Although the German secret police are small in number, especially in comparison with the large NKVD, NKNS and SPL military counter-espionage apparatus, it is highly efficient. The real Gestapo was actually not many, with 32,000 in 1944, even fewer before the war. For example, in 1937 in Düsseldorf, a city of 4 million people, the local branch of the Gestapo had 291 people. In the city of Essen, which has a population of about 1 million, there are only 43 Gestapo elements.
The Gestapo's intelligence officers were not very numerous, and there were usually dozens of people in a big city. Of course, quite a few people volunteer to do fine work and eyeliner. They took revenge on their enemies by informing the Gestapo and satisfying their self-esteem.
The power of the Gestapo is not in how many people wear black uniforms or black leather trench coats, but in the frightening feeling that these people are omnipotent and omnipresent. The Germans believed that no one and nothing could avoid the eyes of the Gestapo.
Like the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany had military intelligence (Reich Military Intelligence), counterintelligence (Gestapo), and a political intelligence bureau subordinate to the Reich General Security Directorate. The head of the Imperial Military Intelligence Service was William. Admiral Kanaris, director of the Political Intelligence Bureau was the young SS General Walter. Schulenberg, Oleg. Tabakov played him in the film Seventeen Moments of Spring. The two of them even look alike.
Germany's military and political intelligence apparatus was much smaller than its Soviet counterpart. Neither in the pre-war years nor during the war did german intelligence achieve particularly boastful results. The Germans had almost no espionage organization on Soviet territory. The Germans had tried to compensate for this by airdropping spies, but without success, as the men were caught almost immediately.
The Soviet counterintelligence apparatus was stronger than the intelligence apparatus in the war, and it was not until the end of the war that the two sides were tied. The Gestapo tracked down all the secret intelligence posts of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, thus losing the entire spy network in Germany. However, Soviet intelligence continued to provide valuable information. Merkulov's men obtained this information not from their enemies, but from their allies.
Julian Semenov, when writing the novel Seventeen Moments of Spring and later the screenplay for the film of the same name, did not know much about the work of Soviet intelligence in Nazi Germany. He was not given access to secret documents, which he did not need. What he came up with was better than what was real in life.
Julian. Semyonov was a great writer. Filmed the film by Tatyana. Leoznova is a director who is no less impressive. People believe that there is this person in Stilitz. The impartiality of spy personnel in war is indisputably elevated to an unparalleled level.
This is art's portrayal of life, but it is not the essence of life.
In any case, pay tribute to the people in the cruel years, in the anti-fascist "spring moment".