Stephen Walter Article: Will Europe really engage in confrontation with China?

Stephen Walter, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, wrote an article in the bimonthly us "Foreign Policy" on the 15th analyzing whether Europe will really engage in confrontation with China. The full text is excerpted below:

The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to win the support of many U.S. allies in its "strategic competition" with China. Without broad cooperation from Japan, Australia, South Korea, India, and other countries, the United States cannot compete with China.

But U.S. President Joe Biden also wants European partners to be part of the effort, which is another matter entirely. I am not referring to the recent defence agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Anglo-American Alliance, which has little to do with European efforts to balance China, but with Britain's desire to maintain a so-called special relationship with the United States and Australia's interest in deepening its relationship with Washington.

Moreover, the Anglo-American alliance has annoyed France and undermined efforts to bring the continent into a broadly balanced coalition against China, which could have been an uphill battle. This is no small problem: most European countries are relatively wealthy, democratic, economically significant within the EU framework and capable of producing advanced weapons. Europe also includes two nuclear-armed MEMBERS of the Un Security Council with a population of more than 500 million. For these and other reasons, how European countries take sides will have a significant impact on the overall balance of global power.

So, will Europe balance China?

I think the best way to think about this is the threat balance theory. The theory holds that countries often ally to balance the greatest threats they face. In turn, the degree of threat consists of four components: comprehensive strength, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intent.

Many European governments have taken a more cautious view of China's growing role on the world stage. Looking ahead, there is a shared desire not to allow China to exert maximum influence on the core principles of the world order, and this shared desire is likely to encourage most European countries, especially America's closest allies in Europe, to stand with Washington, at least on issues such as trade or basic human rights.

But On the other hand, Europe is far from China, and Beijing poses no threat to the territorial integrity of European countries or other essential elements of their national security. China will not invade Europe, will not attack Europe with nuclear weapons, and will not sponsor large-scale terrorist attacks there. Even the very powerful Chinese navy would not go around half the world in an attempt to impose a blockade. Nor does China intend to send millions of refugees to European borders. So, is it still necessary for Europe to check and balance?

In fact, to some extent, the divisions within Europe hinder Europe's "strategic autonomy" because there is no hegemonic threat in Europe, which is well known. For the foreseeable future, China's prospects for European hegemony are nearly impossible.

If this is true, then why is it in Europe's interest to take sides in the military competition with China? Look at what Bruno Le Maire, France's economy and finance minister, said this week: "The United States wants to confront China. The EU wants to engage with China. The key issue for Europe, he added, is to be "independent of the United States and able to defend its own interests, both economic and strategic." Even now, it is understandable that most European countries are reluctant to damage their economic relations with China, further hampering their military balances on China.

The Biden administration seems to believe that shared democratic values can unite Europe and the United States in a vast anti-China coalition. Hopes such as these may disappoint: why should Europe make a major military effort to defend or promote democracy on the other side of the world, given that the EU cannot even address the erosion of democracy in Hungary and Poland and the vigorous repression of democracy in Belarus?

So what are the prospects for meaningful transatlantic cooperation to counterbalance China? I'm not sure. My best guess is that the United States and Europe will continue to align on many issues of soft power – human rights, public health, non-proliferation, some efforts to reform the global economic order, and so on. We may occasionally see joint freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and there is some ongoing discussion about what European countries might do in the event of a real crisis involving China. Both sides of the Atlantic are willing from time to time to impose symbolic sanctions on the obvious troublemakers. I am confident that the United States will continue to insist that Europe work to deny Beijing access to sensitive technologies for military applications.

Other than that, I don't see anything more. According to the threat balance theory, Europeans will be primarily concerned with dangers that arise closer to their doorsteps, and most European countries will be extremely reluctant to risk their lives or prosperity in order to maintain a regional balance of power in Asia.

Source: Reference News Network