Editor's note: "Why has the Marcos administration repeatedly denied that it had negotiated with the Chinese side to reach an understanding and arrangement for the management and control of Ren'ai Jiao? Why did the Philippine Department of Defense refuse to properly handle maritime differences with the Chinese side through dialogue and consultation? If the 'gentlemen's agreement' was reached between the previous Philippine administration and the Chinese side, then the 'new model' was reached between the current Philippine administration and the Chinese side, and it has been proven in practice that it can manage differences and avoid conflicts, but why was it abandoned by the Philippine side again without reason after playing its role only once? Who made the decision to abandon the 'new model'? Is it against the interests of certain forces to manage differences and avoid conflicts?"
Recently, when asked by a reporter whether a number of senior Philippine officials had denied that they had reached a "gentlemen's agreement" with China, the spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines asked five questions, once again clarifying China's attitude on this issue.
How can the dispute between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea be resolved? Why does the "dangerous exercise" of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the mouth of the Western media make the Philippines and the United States so nervous? What is China's goal of speeding up military building?
On April 29, the South China Morning Post published a lengthy interview with Zhou Bo, former director of the Center for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defense and a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University. Zhou Bo answered questions raised by reporters on China's military development, China-US relations, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Gaza conflict and modern warfare, the use of nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence.
The Beijing Dialogue is translated and published by Guan.com, in both English and Chinese, as follows:
[Text/Zhou Bo, Translation/Jingwan Zhao Xin, Nuclear Translation/Han Hua]
South China Morning Post: China and the Philippines have been at loggerheads for a long time over disputed islands in the South China Sea. Do you think this will continue? What is China's strategy?
Zhou Bo: China has never used force against the Philippines. The Chinese Coast Guard has used water cannons to expel the Philippine Coast Guard, but this is a deterrent, not the use of force. Historically, the use of force has been the Philippine Coast Guard, which killed innocent Chinese fishermen from Chinese mainland and Taiwan in 2000, 2006 and 2013. Few people seem to remember this, but it's searchable on the internet.
In May 1999, the Philippines grounded a warship at Second Thomas Shoal under the pretext of "technical difficulties". In the face of Chinese protests, they promised to tow the ship away. But they didn't do it. Instead, the Philippines is trying to build it into a permanent facility.
The Philippines claims that China has threatened to use force to expel Filipino fishermen who have long fished in the waters of Scarborough Shoal. But it was the Philippines that first resorted to force. In April 2012, they sent a warship to the waters of Scarborough Shoal to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and fishermen.
China had to take the necessary measures to respond to such provocations. However, our response was restrained. For humanitarian reasons, we have not prevented the Philippines from providing water and food to its soldiers on beached warships. Otherwise, how could they have been there for 25 years?
South China Morning Post: What is the best and worst scenario for China in this situation, and is the Chinese government preparing for the worst? Is there a risk of ASEAN forming a NATO-like alliance?
Zhou Bo: The best-case scenario is for the Philippines to tow away the (beached) warship, as they promised. At least they shouldn't try to reinforce that warship. The best thing to do is to let nature solve the problem with her force majeure.
At worst, if they continue to be so provocative, the situation will definitely be even more tense. This is because the Philippines has broken its word and violated the commitments it made in 1999. China's demands are perfectly reasonable, and we have shown great patience over the past few decades.
Will ASEAN form an alliance like NATO? I don't think so. ASEAN is not a military alliance per cent. ASEAN has declared its neutrality, which must rely on impartiality. Although the Philippines is a member of ASEAN, the dispute between China and the Philippines does not mean that there is a problem between China and ASEAN.
Sierra Madre "beached" in the Philippines
The South China Sea issue cannot be interpreted as a dispute between China and ASEAN, which has disputes with only a handful of ASEAN claimants. In fact, many ASEAN countries also have disputed waters and overlapping claims.
South China Morning Post: How do you see the U.S. role in tensions in the South China Sea?
Zhou Bo: I don't think the US will jump to the fore and stand up to China on behalf of any ASEAN claimant. The Americans will not be so stupid, they have already had enough trouble in Europe and the Middle East.
China has never threatened to use force against ASEAN countries. China has always adhered to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which discourages the use of force in the region.
I hope the Philippines will not be stupid enough to get into the fire. There is a huge disparity in strength between China and the Philippines, and the Philippine side should clearly know that they do not have any chance. Even if the status quo persists for some time, it will be the Philippine government that will eventually die down.
South China Morning Post: Western commentators have described the activities of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the South China Sea as "dangerous exercises" or "reckless actions." What role do you think this dominant narrative or understanding plays in modern geopolitics?
Zhou Bo: I think portraying the PLA as "coercive" or reckless is a deliberate Western narrative. But so far, the Western media have failed to portray the PLA in a more negative way, because they simply cannot find an instance.
China's peaceful development is a miracle. Since 1979, China has not been at war with any other country, despite incidents such as the 2001 U.S.-China plane collision and the 2020 conflict between Chinese and Indian soldiers.
The PLA Naval Aviation Project 81192 J-8 fighter jet that crashed in 2001
It is remarkable that we have not fought a single war in the past 40 years and yet become the second largest economy in the world. It's not just luck, we endure and refrain for our goals and a better vision. I firmly believe that China's rise is peaceful, rare in human history.
South China Morning Post: Discussions about China in the West have inevitably been accompanied by criticism of the PLA's alleged "provocative behavior" and concerns about China's military growth. What do you think of the outside world's perception of the PLA?
Zhou Bo: Of course, the Chinese People's Liberation Army will bring many different reactions to different people – awe, fear or uncertainty. The PLA Navy is now the largest in the world. So, it's natural to ask what an increasingly powerful PLA means for China and the world. Some people believe that the PLA has not fought a war since 1979 and doubt that the PLA can fight.
For all armies of the world, there is one task that is common, and that is to defend territorial and sovereign integrity. But as a world power, China's military has two other responsibilities: to safeguard China's overseas interests and to assume China's international responsibilities.
For example, since 2009, the PLA has escorted ships in the Gulf of Aden, providing equal protection for Chinese and foreign vessels. This is a good example of how the mighty PLA perfectly combines China's national interests with its international responsibilities.
The 43rd escort group of the Chinese Navy
South China Morning Post: 2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and China has set a goal to build the PLA into a modern combat force. What does this goal mean concretely, and what kind of force does the PLA hope to become?
Zhou Bo: The ultimate goal of the PLA is not a secret. We have announced that we will build the people's army into a world-class army by 2049, and this goal was revised at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, stating that we should "accelerate" this goal. This means that we must become a world-class army by 2049, although there is no mention of how many years ahead we should achieve this goal.
The goal for 2027 is different, as it is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is a milestone. We need to strengthen the building of the armed forces and prepare for the early realization of the 2049 target.
At the same time, the biggest dilemma we face is how to prove that we are a world-class army without having to fight. China has always been committed to and benefited from peaceful development. It is a mistake to test the sharpness of one's own sword by chopping off someone's head.
Although we have not fought a war for more than 40 years, this does not mean that we cannot fight, otherwise the US military would not be so worried about the PLA.
South China Morning Post: Why is China speeding up its military buildup?
Zhou Bo: I think it has a lot to do with how you look at the overall situation, such as China-US relations, potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, etc. Taiwan should be the most important factor in this.
On Taiwan, you can see that Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan's former leader, Ma Ying-jeou, and the current leader, Tsai Ing-wen, is different. Tsai's successor, Lai Ching-tak, is likely to bring more uncertainty.
The United States is intensifying its competition with China, providing support to Taiwan despite its claims to pursue a "one-China" policy. All these are sufficient reasons for us to speed up the building of the armed forces and achieve the expected goals.
South China Morning Post: Some US officials say that China is stepping up its military buildup in order to take Taiwan by 2027. Do you think that the timetable of the PLA is related to Beijing's goal of reunifying Taiwan?
Zhou Bo: If you look closely at what China has said, China is still talking about peaceful reunification. At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, we mentioned that we will achieve peaceful reunification with the greatest patience and with the greatest efforts. I don't think that's changed now.
South China Morning Post: Do you think Lai Ching-te, the newly elected leader of the Taiwan region, will cross Beijing's "red line"? Beijing has labeled him a troublemaker and a "diehard Taiwan independence element."
Zhou Bo: To be honest, I don't know. I think there is some truth in saying that he is a "diehard Taiwan independence element," because he once declared himself a "pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence." The problem is that things can change when a person has a new position. So we'll just have to wait and see how he behaves. I'm sure the U.S. is also watching closely.
South China Morning Post: In August 2022, after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, the Chinese People's Liberation Army conducted multiple rounds of exercises, forming a new normal of frequent flights over the median line of the Taiwan Strait. What do you think about this, how dangerous is it?
Zhou Bo: We haven't flown over the middle line before, at least not often. The Pelosi affair changed that. Her visit to Taiwan is completely unacceptable to us, and such provocations have led to the status quo.
If it weren't for her visit to Taiwan, we wouldn't have conducted a four-day live-fire exercise around the island. Such a provocation would inevitably provoke a reaction, which in turn would create a new and irreversible status quo. You can see that now we cross the median line more often - this is in response to their provocative behavior. This is also a new state of affairs.
After Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, the Chinese side released a map of the scope of the exercise
South China Morning Post: Many U.S. officials and think tanks believe that the most likely military option for Taiwan is a blockade, but they believe that the blockade is likely to fail. What do you think?
ZHOU: Military planners rarely rely on one option. I think we have different options. Our choice depends on what actually happens.
South China Morning Post: What do you think about the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Zhou Bo: No conflict lasts forever, the question is how and when. I don't think Ukraine will be able to regain the lost territories. Ukraine would be lucky if Russia did not advance beyond the areas it had already occupied, because the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which had the full support of the West, had failed since last year.
The military balance is not in favor of Ukraine, and the West as a whole will not be able to provide enough ammunition without interruption. I don't think Ukraine will have the upper hand, especially if Trump returns to the White House. He may make significant adjustments to the US position on Ukraine, which is what European countries are most worried about. Since neither Russia nor Ukraine is willing to cease fire now, we really don't know when the war will end.
South China Morning Post: What is your view on China's position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Zhou Bo: This war has had a big impact on China, and it even reflects China's rising international status, because all of a sudden, everyone is asking which side China is on and what China thinks.
This war has nothing to do with China, and it is intriguing that people are asking about China's position. Why do you ask about China's position? Because China's position is too important to ignore.
How can things be so simple when the West thinks that China can simply order Russia to end the conflict? It is sad to see that a conflict that has nothing to do with China has actually affected China's relations with the EU.
Ukrainian troops on the Ukrainian Eastern Front
But I'm not pessimistic. I think that as long as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues, China-EU relations will not be very good, because the EU has extravagant expectations for China, and China cannot meet them, but as long as there is no war in the Taiwan Strait, China-EU relations will not be too bad, because they will not have to make a difficult choice between the United States and their largest trading partner.
South China Morning Post: What are your thoughts on the war in Gaza?
Zhou Bo: No one knows when the Russia-Ukraine conflict will end. And in the Middle East, even if a war ends, no one knows when it will break out again.
The war in Gaza has caused a large number of casualties and has been described as genocide. U.S. support for Israel has seriously undermined its moral authority and greatly damaged its image and credibility, especially among the countries of the Global South. The impact is long-lasting.
South China Morning Post: What do you think of Russia's resilience?
Zhou Bo: Russia's economy is actually doing quite well, with an economy of 3.6% last year. This surprised everyone, probably even the Russians themselves, while the economic situation in Ukraine is terrible.
Judging by the lessons learned, it is clear that Russia is making progress on the battlefield. But at the beginning, they didn't seem to be ready - there was no front-line command, there was not enough logistical supplies, there were no drones, there were no encrypted communications, there were no precision-guided bombs, but now the situation has changed.
Another lesson is that the pattern of warfare has changed a lot. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must keep pace with advanced technology, including drones and perhaps one day artificial intelligence, while retaining traditional equipment such as tanks and artillery.
In the past, we may have thought of UAVs as a means of supplementation, but now it turns out that it is a new means of warfare that can bring dramatic changes to the battlefield. This is evidenced by both the conflict in Ukraine and the Red Sea.
The "Sea Hawk" unmanned reconnaissance aircraft equipped by the Russian army
At the same time, we cannot rely entirely on new technologies, in the Ukrainian theater tanks and artillery are still in use, soldiers are still digging trenches, as they were during the First World War.
South China Morning Post: Speaking of advanced technology, how can China apply AI militarily? Can China cooperate with the United States in this regard?
Zhou Bo: On the first question, we have all kinds of state-of-the-art UAVs. We have not yet seen the direct application of AI in military warfare, and I think that even the United States has not yet demonstrated this.
President Xi Jinping and President Biden agreed in San Francisco last year to launch a dialogue between the Chinese and U.S. governments on artificial intelligence, but the press release did not specify whether the talks would involve the two militaries.
In my opinion, in the long run, this is not entirely impossible, because both countries understand the importance of ensuring human control of weapons systems. Advanced artificial intelligence has made this problem even more acute.
South China Morning Post: Can the US and China prioritize areas to prevent some of the dangerous applications of AI in nuclear weapons, for example?
Zhou Bo: I think it's very difficult for China and the United States to discuss this issue in the near future, because these are highly sensitive areas. So far, there have been no formal consultations or negotiations between China and the United States in the nuclear field. To do this, either China needs to significantly increase its nuclear arsenal, or the United States needs to drastically reduce its nuclear arsenal. Neither is realistic.
But I think both China and the United States need to work to ensure that this advanced AI is not applied to the most critical military domains, including nuclear weapons. Nothing is more important than ensuring human control of nuclear command and control systems.
South China Morning Post: What should we expect from the resumption of military dialogue between China and the United States last year, and now the dialogue is taking place again?
Zhou Bo: The resumption of dialogue is inevitable. What is new is that now there are channels of communication between the commanders of the theater of operations.
This is a new mechanism that needs to be explored in depth by both sides. For example, is the dialogue only between the commander of the PLA's Southern Theater and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander, or does it also include the PLA's Northern Theater Commander and Eastern Theater Commander?
The 17th U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Meeting, held in the United States in January
Because U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance along the coast of China covered these three Chinese theaters. Do the commanders talk on a regular basis, or do they only talk in times of crisis? I guess they're mainly a matter of communicating dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft. But what about the danger situations involving third parties? Questions like these could go on and on.
South China Morning Post: How big is the risk for Chinese and US warships?
Zhou Bo: There have been a number of dangerous close-up encounters between Chinese and US military aircraft. According to the Pentagon, in the two years since the fall of 2021, the Chinese People's Liberation Army intercepted more than 180 U.S. military aircraft. We must intercept it, because the United States is coming to our doorstep to provoke.
I don't think it's going to be easy to solve this problem, because it's hard for the United States to back down. They have been doing this for a long time, and if they stop, they fear that their image will be tarnished in the eyes of their allies. But I don't understand why the United States sends warships and planes to reconnoiter and monitor China with such intensity. Don't they have a lot of drones and military satellites that can provide real-time intelligence?
South China Morning Post: Is the risk of a military conflict between China and the United States overestimated? How high is the risk, and is there a solution?
Zhou Bo: When planes and ships are so close, of course, it is very dangerous. China and the United States have different understandings of "security", and both "safety" and "security" are translated as security in Chinese. Americans are talking about "safety", and we are talking about "security".
"Safety" means protecting your property, such as your ship and your personal safety. But "security" has more meanings, it is about sovereignty, rights and interests. The international law of the sea is not necessarily helpful.
In 2013, I led a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon to discuss the legal implications of freedom of navigation. The two sides have different interpretations of the international law of the sea. Therefore, there is no simple solution to reduce the risk of encounters.
South China Morning Post: How many aircraft carriers does China need? Why is it so important for China to have these aircraft carriers?
Zhou Bo: I won't speculate on how many aircraft carriers China needs, but I can tell you that aircraft carriers are not primarily used for offshore operations, they exist mainly for operations in the far seas.
China's second aircraft carrier, Shandong
One might say that one day, when China is forced to abandon peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue, we can use aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers are useful, of course, but aircraft carriers are more for our power projection into the Pacific, Indian or Atlantic oceans – anywhere far from our waters.
South China Morning Post: The United States has said that China will have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. What do you think are some of the considerations behind China's leaders in increasing their nuclear capabilities?
Zhou Bo: In China, no one will tell you how many nuclear warheads we have. That being said, it's no secret that we want to have an efficient, modern nuclear arsenal.
Since all sides are worried about the use of nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, why don't we discuss the issue of no first use of nuclear weapons? The Biden administration has said that nuclear weapons will only be used in extreme circumstances, which means that it is actually not far from China's "no first use" policy.
China's "no-first-use" policy has remained unchanged for decades. I think we should discuss the issue of no first use of nuclear weapons between China and the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. China and Russia have already agreed not to be the first to use. As a gesture of goodwill, and in order to alleviate the West's worst fears of Russia's possible use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, perhaps NATO could unilaterally declare that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against Russia.
NATO is capable of doing so, as its conventional forces are much stronger than Russia's, and such a commitment does not diminish its ability to strike back.
The following is the original English text:
SCMP: China and the Philippines have been in a row for some time over disputed islands in the South China Sea. Do you see the situation continuing and what is China’s strategy?
Zhou Bo: China has never used force against the Philippines. Yes the Chinese coastguard used water cannon to dispel the Philippine coastguard, but I think that is deterrence, not a use of force. Historically, it is the Philippine coastguard that has used force to kill innocent Chinese fishermen from the mainland and Taiwan in 2000, 2006 and 2013. Few people seem to remember that, but you can google it to find out.
The Philippines ran a naval ship aground in May 1999 at Renai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal) on the pretext of“technical difficulties”. In the face of Chinese protests, it made promises to tow away the vessel. But it has not done that. Instead, the Philippines has attempted to build it into a permanent installation.
The Philippines claims that China has threatened to use force to drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of Scarborough Shoal in spite of their long-standing fishing activities in those waters. But it was the Philippines that first resorted to the threat of force. In April 2012, they sent a naval vessel to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in the waters of Scarborough Shoal.
China has been forced to take necessary measures in response to such provocative conduct. However, our response is restraint. For humanitarian reasons, we haven’t stopped the Philippines from providing water and food to their soldiers on board the grounded ship. Otherwise how could they have stayed there for the past 25 years?
SCMP: What would be the best and worst-case scenarios for China in this situation and is Beijing preparing for the worst? And is there a risk of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forming a Nato-like alliance?
Zhou Bo: Well, the best-case scenario would be for the Philippines to tow the ship away as they have pledged. At least they shouldn’t try to reinforce the ship. The best way is to let Mother Nature solve the problem with her force majeure.
In the worst-case scenario, if they continue to be this provocative, we will definitely see more tension. It is the Philippines that violated its own promise in 1999. China’s demand is entirely reasonable and we have demonstrated immense patience over the past decades.
Will Asean form a Nato-like alliance? This is impossible. Asean itself is not a military alliance by nature. It has claimed its centrality and its centrality has to rely on impartiality. That China has disputes with the Philippines doesn’t mean it has issues with the entirety of Asean, regardless of the Philippines being a member.
The South China Sea issue cannot be interpreted as China having disputes with Asean. China only has disputes with a few Asean claimants. Actually, many of its member states have overlapping claims in disputed waters among themselves.
SCMP: What do you make of the role of the United States in the South China Sea tensions?
Zhou Bo:I don’t believe the US would necessarily come to the fore to confront China on behalf of any Asean claimants. They wouldn’t be so stupid. They already have enough trouble in Europe and the Middle East.
China has never threatened to use force against Asean countries. China has also honoured its commitments to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which discourages the use of force in the region.
I hope the Philippines would not be stupid to become more adventurous. They should know they don’t stand a chance vis-à-vis China. The strength of the Chinese side is way beyond that of the Philippines. Even if this situation may continue for a while, eventually the Philippine government will have to back down.
SCMP: Commenters in the West describe PLA activities in the South China Sea as“dangerous manoeuvres” or“reckless behaviour”. What role do you think a dominant narrative or understanding plays in modern geopolitics?
Zhou Bo: I think that portraying the PLA as coercive or reckless is a kind of deliberate Western narrative. But so far, the Western media has not described the PLA in a more negative way because they just can’t find examples.
China has been a miracle in terms of its development. Since 1979, China has not fought any war with any other country in spite of incidents like the collision of Chinese and US military aircraft in 2001 and a deadly brawl between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley border area in 2020.
Without a single war being fought over the past four decades, we reached the second position in the world. Isn’t that phenomenal? This is not just luck. We have endured and held back for our goals and for a bigger picture. I sincerely believe China’s rise is peaceful – and rare in human history.
SCMP: Western discussions of China inevitably come with criticisms of the PLA’s“provocative behaviour” and concerns about how the Chinese military has grown. What’s your take on external perceptions of the PLA?
Zhou Bo: The PLA certainly generates a lot of different reactions in different people – awe, fear or uncertainty. The PLA Navy is now the largest navy in the world. So it is natural for people to ask what an ever stronger PLA means for China and the world. But some argue that the PLA has not fought a war since 1979 and doubt whether the PLA can fight.
For all the militaries in the world, there is a common task: to defend territory and sovereignty. But since China is a major global power, its military has two more duties: to safeguard its overseas interests and shoulder its international responsibilities.
For example, the PLA has offered equal protection to Chinese and foreign vessels in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. This is a good example of how a strong PLA can best blend China’s national interests with its international responsibilities.
SCMP:China has set a goal to turn its vast military into a modern fighting force by 2027, the centenary of the PLA’s establishment. What does this goal specifically mean? What kind of force does the PLA want to become?
Zhou Bo: The PLA’s final goal is not a secret. We have declared that we want to become a world-class military by 2049. But the goal was actually modified at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022, which said we should“speed up” progress to advance the goal. This means we have to become a world-class military before 2049, though it didn’t say how many years in advance we should do it.
The 2027 goal is a different story, since it marks the 100th year since the PLA’s establishment, a landmark moment. We want to build up our military and be ready to advance to our 2049 goal.
At the same time, we are facing our biggest dilemma, that is, how to prove we are a world-class military without fighting and winning some difficult battles. China has reaped tremendous benefits from maintaining peace with other countries so it clearly cannot test whether the sword is sharp by chopping heads – that is the wrong thing to do.
While we haven’t been at war for 40 years and more, that does not mean that we cannot fight, otherwise the American military would not need to be so worried about the PLA.
SCMP: Why does China want to speed up the progress on building its military?
I think that has a lot to do with how you see the overall situation, meaning tensions in US-China ties or potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Taiwan should be the most important factor.
On the Taiwan issue, you can see Beijing’s attitude is different towards Taiwan’s former president Ma Ying-jeou and its current leader Tsai Ing-wen. Her successor, Lai Ching-te, may bring more uncertainty.
The US is intensifying competition with China and is providing support to Taiwan, despite saying it follows the one-China policy. Those are good reasons we should speed up achieving the PLA’s goal.
SCMP: Some US officials have said China aims to build up its military capacity to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027. Do you think the PLA timeline has anything to do with Beijing’s goal of unifying Taiwan?
Zhou Bo: If you study carefully what China has said, it is still about peaceful reunification. We mentioned at the Communist Party’s 20th national congress [in 2022] that we would have ultimate patience and make utmost efforts for a peaceful reunification. Right now, I think this very much remains the same.
SCMP: Do you think Taiwanese "president-elect" William Lai Ching-te may step across Beijing’s“red lines”? Beijing has already labelled him a troublemaker, as well as a“stubborn Taiwan independence activist”.
Zhou Bo:Honestly, I don’t know. I think there is some good reason for us to say he is a“stubborn Taiwan independence activist” because he once declared himself as a“pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence”. But the point is, when a man gets a new position, things may change. So we’ll have to wait and see what he’s going to do. I believe the US is also watching closely.
SCMP: After the then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August 2022, the PLA carried out rounds of exercises and appeared to create a new norm of frequently flying across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. What is your take on the situation and how dangerous is this?
Zhou Bo: Historically speaking, we didn’t fly across the median line, at least not as often as we are doing now. Things changed after the Pelosi business. Her trip to Taiwan was totally unacceptable to us. This kind of provocation resets the status quo.
If she hadn’t visited Taiwan, it would have been hard for us to conduct the live-fire exercise around the island which lasted for four days. Such provocations will definitely lead to reactions which in turn, will create irreversible new status quos. You see now we fly much more often across the median line – that’s a response to their provocation. That is also a new status quo.
SCMP: According to many officials and think tanks in the US, the most likely military option against Taiwan is a blockade, which they regard as likely to fail. What do you think?
Zhou Bo: Military planners seldom rely on one option. I think we have different options. Our choices depend on what actually happens.
SCMP: Moving away from Taiwan, what are your thoughts on the Ukraine war?
Zhou Bo: No war will last forever, the question is how and when it will end. I don’t believe the Ukrainians will be able to take back their lost territories. They will be lucky if Russia does not advance beyond the regions already taken, because Ukraine’s counteroffensive – which is fully supported by the West – has failed since it was launched last year.
The military balance is not in favour of the Ukrainians and the whole of the West doesn’t have enough ammunition to offer in an endless and seamless way. I don’t believe Ukraine will have the upper hand, especially if Donald Trump comes back. He may just make a U-turn on the US’ Ukraine stance. That is the worst fear of European countries. We just don’t know when it will end since both sides don’t have the wish for a ceasefire now.
SCMP: So what are your thoughts on China’s position on the war in Ukraine?
Zhou Bo: This war matters a lot for China and even reflects China’s ever-rising international position as, all of a sudden, everyone asks which side are you on and what is your thinking.
This is interesting because the war has nothing to do with China. Why would people ask about China? Because China’s approach is too important to ignore.
The West believes China can simply tell Russia to end the war. But how can things be that simple? It is really sad to see how a war that has nothing to do with China has actually soured ties between China and the European Union.
But I am not pessimistic. I think that as long as the Ukraine war continues, the relationship can’t be too good, because the EU has high expectations of China that Beijing cannot meet. But as long as there is no war in the Taiwan Strait, China-EU ties won’t be too bad because they don’t have to make a hard decision between the United States and their largest trading partner.
SCMP: What’s your take on the war in Gaza?
Zhou Bo: No one knows when the Ukraine war will come to an end. But in the Middle East, even if a war comes to an end, nobody knows when it will crop up again.
The war in the Gaza Strip has brought too many casualties, to the extent that it has been described as genocide. US support for Israel has delivered a heavy blow to its moral authority and really hurts its image and credibility, especially in the Global South. The impact will be long lasting.
SCMP: How do you regard Russia’s resilience? Could it hold on, despite the massive costs of the war?
Zhou Bo: Russia’s economy actually is doing quite well, with economic growth of 3.6 per cent last year. This has surprised everybody – probably even the Russians themselves – while Ukraine’s economy is in bad shape.
On lessons learned, apparently Russia is making progress on the battlefield. But in the beginning, they didn’t seem so prepared – no forward command, no adequate logistics supply, no drones, no encrypted communication and no precision-guided bombs. But that has changed.
Another lesson is that the pattern of war has changed a lot and the PLA must keep pace with advanced technologies, including drones and maybe artificial intelligence one day, while maintaining traditional things like tanks and artillery.
In the past, we might have considered drones to be supplementary, but it has proven to be a new combat platform that could bring massive changes to the battlefield. We saw this in both Ukraine and the Red Sea.
Meanwhile, we cannot totally rely on new technologies because you see that tanks and artillery are still being used and people are still digging trenches in the Ukraine war – like during the first world war.
SCMP: Speaking of advanced technology, how is China applying AI in the military and could China cooperate with the US in this area?
Zhou Bo: On the first question, we have state of the art drones of all sorts. I don’t think we have yet seen the application of AI directly in military warfare. I think even the US hasn’t demonstrated that.
President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden agreed in San Francisco last year to set up China-US government talks on AI, but it was not specified whether the dialogue would involve the militaries.
But I assume it is not entirely impossible in the long term because both countries understand the importance of ensuring human control of weapons systems. Advanced AI has made this issue more acute.
SCMP:Would there be some areas that the US and China could prioritise to prevent some dangerous applications of AI, such as in nuclear weapons?
Zhou Bo: I think it would be difficult in the near future for China and the US to talk about that because these are highly sensitive areas. So far, there are no official consultations or negotiations in the nuclear field between China and the US. For this to happen, either China needs to drastically increase its nuclear arsenal or the US massively reduces its nuclear arsenal. Neither is possible.
But I think both China and the US need to make an effort to make sure that this kind of advanced AI would not be applied in the most crucial military areas, including nuclear weapons. Nothing is more important than making sure of absolute human control of the nuclear command and control system.
SCMP:Last year, China and the US resumed military dialogue. Now that they are talking again, what should we expect？
Zhou Bo: The resumption of dialogue is inevitable. But something new is that there is now a communication channel between the heads of theatre commands.
This is a new mechanism that has to be thoroughly explored by the two sides. For example, is the conversation just between commanders of the PLA Southern Theatre Command and US Indo-Pacific Command, or could it also involve the PLA Northern Theatre Command and Eastern Theatre Command?
This is because American reconnaissance and surveillance along the Chinese coast cover areas of all these three Chinese military commands. Would the commanders talk regularly or just during a crisis? I assume they basically talk about dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft. But what about a dangerous situation that involves a third party? Questions like this could go on and on.
SCMP: What is the risk of an encounter between the Chinese and US ships and aircraft?
Zhou Bo: There have already been a number of dangerous close encounters between US and Chinese aircraft. According to the Pentagon, in the two years from the autumn of 2021, the PLA intercepted more than 180 American aircraft. We have to make those interceptions because you can’t just come so close to us to make provocations.
I do not see an easy solution to this because it is difficult for the US to back down. They have been doing this for a long time and if they stop, they would worry about their image in the eyes of their allies. But I don’t understand why the US has to scrutinise China at such a high frequency. Don’t they have a lot of drones and military satellites that provide real-time intelligence?
SCMP:Is the risk of US and China military encounters overestimated? How dangerous are they, and is there a way out of the situation?
Zhou Bo: They’re certainly very dangerous, when aircraft and ships get so close. Chinese and Americans have different takes on safety and security, which are the same word in Chinese. Americans talk about safety. We talk about security.
Safety refers to keeping your property, like your ships, and personnel safe but security connotes more meaning. It’s about sovereignty, rights and interests. International maritime law doesn’t necessarily help.
In 2013, I headed a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon to discuss the legal implications of freedom of navigation. Each side had different interpretations of international maritime law. So there are no easy solutions to mitigate the risk of encounters.
SCMP: How many aircraft carriers does China need and why is it important for China to have them?
Zhou Bo:I cannot speculate on how many carriers China will need. But I can tell you that aircraft carriers are primarily not for coastal fights. They are for a possible war far from home.
People may say that one day, when China has to retreat from peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue, we could use aircraft carriers. Of course they are useful, but they are more useful in our power projection in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, or Atlantic Ocean – anywhere far from our waters.
SCMP:The US has said China will have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. What do you think are some of the Chinese leadership’s considerations behind the advancement of its nuclear capabilities?
Zhou Bo: Nobody in China will tell you how many nuclear warheads we have because that is considered a secret. Having said that, it is not a secret that we want to have a nuclear arsenal that is effective and modernised.
Everybody worries about the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war. Then why don’t we discuss no first use of nuclear weapons? The Biden administration has talked about the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, which means it is actually not so far away from China’s no-first-use policy.
China’s no-first-use policy has remained the same for decades. I think we should discuss no first use of nuclear weapons between China and the US, France and Britain. China and Russia have agreed on no first use. As a goodwill gesture and to mitigate the worst fear of the West that Russia might use nuclear weapons in the battlefield, perhaps Nato can unilaterally announce not to use nuclear weapons against Russia first.
Nato can afford to do this because its conventional forces are much stronger than Russia’s and such a commitment won’t reduce its nuclear retaliation capacity.
This article is an exclusive manuscript of the observer.com, and the content of the article is purely the author's personal opinion, which does not represent the views of the platform, and shall not be reproduced without authorization, otherwise legal responsibility will be pursued. Pay attention to the WeChat guanchacn of the observer network and read interesting articles every day.