編者按：“為什麼馬科斯政府一再否認曾同中方商談達成仁愛礁管控諒解和安排？為什麼菲國防部拒絕與中方通過對話協商妥處涉海分歧？如果說‘君子協定’系菲上屆政府與中方達成的，那麼‘新模式’系菲現政府與中方達成的，而且已被實踐證明是可以管控分歧、避免沖突的，為什麼卻僅在發揮一次作用後就被菲方再次無故抛棄？到底是誰作出了背棄‘新模式’的決定？難道管控分歧、避免沖突違背了某些勢力的利益？”
近日，在面對記者提問菲律賓多位高官否認曾與中方達成“君子協定”時，我駐菲律賓大使館發言人五連問，再次闡明了中國在此問題上的态度。
中國和菲律賓在南海問題上的争議如何解決？西方媒體口中解放軍的“危險演習”，為什麼讓菲律賓和美國如此緊張？中國加快軍隊建設的目标是什麼？
4月29日，《South China Morning Post》（香港南華早報）刊登了對國防部國際軍事合作辦公室前安全中心主任、清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員周波進行的長篇專訪。周波就中國軍力發展、中美關系、俄烏沖突、加沙沖突及現代戰争、核武器運用與人工智能等回答了記者提出的問題。
北京對話受權翻譯并由觀網釋出，中英文如下：
【文/周波，翻譯/晶婉 趙欣，核譯/韓桦】
南華早報：中國和菲律賓在南海争議島嶼問題上争執已久。您認為這種情況會持續下去嗎？中國的政策是什麼？
周波：中國從未對菲律賓使用過武力。中國海警是用過水炮驅逐菲律賓海警，但這是威懾，而不是使用武力。從曆史上看，使用武力的是菲律賓海警，他們在2000年、2006年和2013年，殺害過來自中國大陸和台灣的無辜中國漁民。似乎很少有人記得這一點，但網際網路上能搜到。
1999年5月，菲律賓以“技術困難”為借口，在仁愛礁擱淺了一艘軍艦。面對中方的抗議，他們承諾會拖走該艦。但是他們并沒有這樣做。相反，菲律賓試圖将其建成一個永久性的設施。
菲律賓聲稱，中國威脅要使用武力驅逐長期以來一直在黃岩島水域捕魚的菲律賓漁民。但首先訴諸武力的是菲律賓。2012年4月，他們派出一艘軍艦前往黃岩島水域，扣留并逮捕了中國漁船和漁民。
中國不得不采取必要措施回應這種挑釁行為。然而，我們的回應是克制的。出于人道主義原因，我們沒有阻止菲律賓為其在坐灘軍艦上的士兵提供水和食物。否則，他們怎麼可能在25年裡一直待在那裡？
南華早報：在這種情況下，對中國來說最好和最壞的情況是什麼，中國政府是否在做最壞的打算？東盟是否有形成類似“北約”聯盟的風險？
周波：最好的情況是菲律賓像他們承諾的那樣，拖走那艘（坐灘）軍艦。至少他們不應該試圖加強那艘軍艦。最好的辦法是讓大自然用她的不可抗力來解決問題。
最壞情況是，如果他們繼續如此挑釁，局勢肯定更加緊張。因為是菲律賓自食其言，違反其在1999年做出的承諾。中國的要求完全合理，我們在過去幾十年中表現出了極大的耐心。
東盟是否會像北約那樣結盟？我認為不可能。東盟本質上就不是一個軍事聯盟。東盟宣布要保持中立，而中立必須依賴公正。盡管菲律賓是東盟成員國，中國與菲律賓的争議，并不意味着中國與東盟存在問題。
菲律賓“坐灘”的“馬德雷山号”
南海問題不能被解讀為中國與東盟有争端，中國隻與少數東盟聲索國存在争議。實際上，許多東盟國家之間也存在争議水域，也有互相重疊的主權聲索。
南華早報：您如何看待美國在中國南海緊張局勢中的作用？
周波：我不認為美國會跳到前台，替任何東盟聲索國對抗中國。美國人不會這麼愚蠢，他們在歐洲和中東已經麻煩夠多了。
中國從未威脅要對東盟國家使用武力。中國一直遵守2002年《南海各方行為宣言》，該宣言不鼓勵在該地區使用武力。
我希望菲律賓不會愚蠢到火中取栗。中菲實力懸殊，菲方應該清楚地知道他們沒有任何機會。即使現狀會持續一段時間，最終偃旗息鼓的一定是菲律賓政府。
南華早報：西方評論員将中國人民解放軍在南海的活動描述為“危險的演習”或“魯莽的行動”。您認為這一主導叙事或了解在現代地緣政治中扮演了什麼角色？
周波：我認為将解放軍描繪成“脅迫”或魯莽是一種故意的西方叙事。但到目前為止，西方媒體未能以更負面的方式描述解放軍，因為他們根本找不到執行個體。
中國的和平發展是個奇迹。自1979年以來，盡管發生了2001年中美撞機、2020年中印士兵沖突等事件，但中國沒有與任何其他國家發生過任何戰争。
2001年墜毀的解放軍海軍航空兵81192号殲-8戰鬥機
在過去四十多年裡，我們沒有打過一場戰争，卻躍升為世界第二大經濟體，這是非常了不起的。這不僅僅是運氣，我們為了我們的目标和更美好的願景忍耐并克制。我堅信中國的崛起是和平的，在人類曆史上是罕見的。
南華早報；西方對中國的讨論不可避免地伴随着對解放軍所謂的“挑釁行為”的批評，以及對中國軍力增長的擔憂。您如何看待外界對解放軍的看法？
周波：中國人民解放軍當然會給不同的人帶來許多不同的反應——敬畏、恐懼或不确定。解放軍海軍現在是世界上規模最大的海軍。是以，人們很自然地會問，一支日益強大的解放軍對中國和世界意味着什麼。有些人認為解放軍自1979年以來沒有打過戰争，懷疑解放軍是否能打仗。
對于世界上的所有軍隊來說，有一個任務是共同的，即保衛領土和主權完整。但作為世界大國，中國軍隊還有兩項職責：維護中國的海外利益，承擔中國的國際責任。
例如，自2009年以來，解放軍在亞丁灣護航，為中國和外國船隻提供了同等保護。這是一個很好的例子，說明強大的解放軍如何将中國的國家利益與其國際責任完美地結合在一起。
中國海軍第43批護航編隊
南華早報：2027年是中國人民解放軍建軍100周年，中國設定了一個目标，希望将解放軍隊建成一支現代化的作戰力量。這個目标具體意味着什麼？解放軍希望成為什麼樣的力量？
周波：解放軍的最終目标不是秘密。我們已經宣布将在2049年把人民軍隊建設成為世界一流軍隊，這個目标在2022年中國共産黨第二十次全國代表大會上進行了修改，提出我們應該“加快”推進這個目标。這意味着我們必須在2049年之前成為世界一流軍隊，雖然沒有提到我們應該提前多少年實作這一目标。
2027年的目标則不同，因為這是解放軍建軍100周年，具有裡程碑意義。我們要加強軍隊建設，為提前實作2049年目标做準備。
與此同時，我們面臨的最大困境是，如何在不用打仗的情況下，還能證明我們是世界一流軍隊。中國一直緻力于和平發展，也從和平發展中受益。通過砍别人的頭來測試自己的劍刃是否鋒利的做法是錯誤的。
雖然我們40多年沒有打過仗，但這并不意味着我們不能打，否則美軍就不會如此擔心解放軍。
南華早報：中國為什麼要加快軍隊建設？
周波：我認為這與如何看待整體局勢有很大關系，比如中美關系、台海和南海潛在沖突等。台灣應該是其中最重要的因素。
在台灣問題上，你可以看到北京對台灣地區前上司人馬英九和現上司人蔡英文的态度有所不同。蔡的繼任者賴清德可能會帶來更多不确定性。
美國正加劇與中國的競争，盡管它聲稱奉行“一個中國”政策，但仍然向台灣提供支援。這些都是我們加快軍隊建設，實作預期目标的充分理由。
南華早報：一些美方官員說，中國加強軍力建設，是為了在2027年之前拿下台灣。您認為解放軍的時間表與北京統一台灣的目标有關嗎？
周波：如果你仔細研究中國所說的，中國仍然在談和平統一。我們在2022年共産黨第二十次全國代表大會上提到，我們将以最大的耐心，盡最大的努力實作和平統一。我認為這點現在沒有改變。
南華早報：您認為台灣地區新當選上司人賴清德會不會跨越北京的“紅線”？北京已經給他貼上了麻煩制造者和“頑固台獨分子”的标簽。
周波：實話說，我不知道。說他是“頑固的台獨分子”，我認為确有一定道理，因為他曾宣稱自己是“台獨務實工作者”。問題是，當一個人有了新職位時，情況可能會發生變化。是以，我們隻能拭目以待，看他如何行事。我相信美國也在密切觀察。
南華早報：2022年8月，時任美國衆議院議長佩洛西竄訪台灣後，中國人民解放軍進行了多輪演習，形成了經常飛越台灣海峽中線的新常态。您對此怎麼看，這有多危險？
周波：之前我們沒有飛越過中間線，起碼不是經常飛越。佩洛西事件改變了這一态勢。她竄訪台灣對我們來說是完全不能接受的，這樣的挑釁導緻了現狀。
如果不是她竄訪台灣，我們就不會在台島周圍進行為期四天的實彈演習。這樣的挑釁必然引起反應，反過來就會造成不可逆轉的新現狀。你可以看到現在我們越過中線的次數更多了——這是對他們挑釁行為的回應。這也是一種新的現狀。
佩洛西竄訪台灣後，中方公布的演習範圍地圖
南華早報：許多美國官員和智庫認為，對台灣最可能的軍事選擇是封鎖，但他們認為封鎖很可能失敗。您怎麼看？
周波：軍事規劃者很少依賴一種選擇。我認為我們有不同的選擇。我們的選擇取決于實際發生的情況。
南華早報：您對俄烏沖突怎麼看？
周波：沒有沖突會永遠持續下去，問題是如何結束以及何時結束。我不認為烏克蘭能重新奪回失去的領土。如果俄羅斯沒有推進到已經占領的地區之外，烏克蘭就算是幸運的了，因為自從去年以來，得到西方全力支援的烏克蘭反攻已經失敗。
軍事平衡不利于烏克蘭，整個西方也無法不間斷地提供足夠的彈藥。我不認為烏克蘭會占上風，尤其是如果特朗普重返白宮的話。他可能會對美國在烏克蘭問題上的立場做出重大調整，這是歐洲國家最擔心的事情。由于俄烏雙方現在都不願意停火，我們真不知道戰争何時結束。
南華早報：您對中國在俄烏沖突中的立場有何看法？
周波：這場戰争對中國影響重大，甚至折射出中國不斷上升的國際地位；因為突然之間，大家都在問，中國站在哪一邊，中國是怎麼想的。
這場戰争與中國毫無關系，人們都在問中國的立場就耐人尋味了。為什麼會問起中國的立場？因為中國的立場太重要了，不容忽視。
西方認為中國可以簡單地指令俄羅斯結束沖突，事情怎麼可能會這麼簡單？看到一場與中國毫無關系的沖突實際上已經影響了中國與歐盟的關系，真是令人悲哀。
烏東前線的烏軍
但我并不悲觀。我認為，隻要俄烏沖突還在繼續，中歐關系就不會太好，因為歐盟對中國有奢望，中國無法滿足；但隻要台海沒有戰争，中歐關系也不至于太糟，因為他們不必在美國和他們最大的貿易夥伴之間做出艱難的抉擇。
南華早報：您對加沙戰争有什麼看法？
周波：沒有人知道俄烏沖突何時結束。而在中東，即使一場戰争結束了，卻沒有人知道它何時會再次爆發。
加沙戰争造成了大量人員傷亡，被描述為種族滅絕。美國對以色列的支援嚴重損害了其道德權威，極大地傷害了美國的形象和信譽，特别是在全球南方國家當中。其影響是長遠的。
南華早報：您如何看待俄羅斯的韌性？戰争造成了巨大的損失，它還能堅持下去嗎？
周波：俄羅斯的經濟表現其實相當不錯，去年經濟增長了3.6% 。這令所有人都感到驚訝，可能連俄羅斯人自己也感到吃驚，而烏克蘭的經濟狀況卻很糟糕。
從經驗教訓來看，俄羅斯顯然在戰場上取得了進展。但是一開始，他們似乎并沒有準備好——沒有前線指揮，沒有足夠的後勤補給，沒有無人機，沒有加密通訊，沒有精确制導炸彈，但現在情況變了。
另一個教訓是，戰争模式已經發生了很大變化。中國人民解放軍必須跟上先進技術的步伐，包括無人機，也許有一天還要用上人工智能技術，同時要保留坦克和大炮等傳統裝備。
過去，我們可能認為無人機是一種補充手段，但現在事實證明，它是一種新的作戰手段，可以給戰場帶來巨大的變化。烏克蘭和紅海的沖突都證明了這一點。
俄羅斯軍隊裝備的“海鷹”無人偵察機
與此同時，我們不能完全依賴新技術，在烏克蘭戰場，坦克和大炮仍在使用，士兵仍在挖戰壕，就像第一次世界大戰期間那樣。
南華早報：說到先進技術，中國如何在軍事上應用人工智能? 中國能否在這方面與美國合作？
周波：關于第一個問題，我們有各種最先進的無人機。我們還沒有看到人工智能在軍事戰争中的直接應用，我認為即使美國也還沒有證明這一點。
習近平主席和拜登總統去年在舊金山達成共識，将啟動中美兩國政府關于人工智能的對話，但新聞公告沒有具體說明對話是否将涉及兩軍。
我認為，從長遠來看，這并非完全不可能，因為兩國都明白確定人類控制武器系統的重要性。先進的人工智能使這個問題變得更加尖銳。
南華早報：為了防止人工智能在比如核武器上的某些危險應用，美國和中國是否可以優先考慮一些領域？
周波：我認為，中國和美國近期還很難讨論這個問題，因為這些都是高度敏感的領域。到目前為止，中美兩國在核領域沒有進行任何正式磋商或談判。要做到這一點，要麼中國需要大幅增加其核武庫，或者美國大幅削減其核武庫。兩者都不現實。
但我想，中國和美國都需要努力確定這種先進的人工智能不會應用于最關鍵的軍事領域，包括核武器。沒有什麼比確定人類控制核指揮和控制系統更重要了。
南華早報：去年中美兩國恢複了軍事對話，現在又在進行對話，我們應該期待什麼？
周波：恢複對話是必然的。新的情況是，現在戰區司令之間有了溝通管道。
這是一個需要雙方深入探讨的新機制。例如，對話僅僅是解放軍南部戰區司令和美國印太司令之間的對話，還是也包括解放軍北部戰區司令和東部戰區司令？
1月在美舉行的第17屆中美防務政策協調會談
因為美國在中國沿海的偵察和監視覆寫了這三個中國戰區。指揮官們是定期通話，還是僅僅在發生危機時通話？我猜他們主要是交流艦機之間危險相遇的問題。但涉及第三方的危險情況呢？諸如此類的問題可以一直問下去。
南華早報：中美艦機遭遇的風險有多大？
周波：中美軍機已經發生了多起危險的近距離遭遇。根據五角大樓的說法，自2021年秋季之後的兩年裡，中國人民解放軍攔截了180多架次美國軍機。我們必須進行攔截，因為美國是到我們家門口來挑釁。
我認為解決這個問題并不容易，因為美國很難退縮。他們這樣做由來已久，如果停止，他們會擔心自己在盟友眼中的形象受損。但我不明白為什麼美國要如此高強度地派艦機偵察監視中國。他們不是有很多無人機和軍事衛星可以提供實時情報嗎？
南華早報：中美軍事沖突的風險被高估了嗎？風險有多高，有沒有解決的辦法？
周波：當飛機和艦艇如此接近時，當然是非常危險的。中國和美國對“安全”有不同的了解，在中文中“safety”和“security”都翻譯為安全。美國人談論的是“safety”，而我們談論的是“security”。
“Safety”意味着保護你的财産，比如你的艦艇和你的個人安全。但是“security”有更多的含義，它關乎主權，權利和利益。國際海洋法并不一定有幫助。
2013年，我率領一個中國代表團通路五角大樓，讨論航行自由的法律含義。雙方對國際海洋法有不同的解釋。是以,要降低遭遇風險，沒有簡單的解決方案。
南華早報：中國需要多少航空母艦? 為什麼擁有這些航空母艦對中國如此重要？
周波：我不會推測中國需要多少航母，但我可以告訴你，航母主要不是用來進行近海作戰的，它們的存在主要是為遠海作戰。
中國第二艘航母山東号
人們可能會說，有朝一日，當中國被迫放棄和平方式解決台灣問題時，我們可以使用航母。航母當然有用，但航母更多是用于我們向太平洋、印度洋或大西洋——任何遠離我們水域的地方——進行力量投射。
南華早報：美國曾表示，到2030年，中國将擁有1000枚核彈頭。您認為中國上司人在提高核能力背後的一些考量是什麼？
周波：在中國，沒有人會告訴你我們有多少核彈頭。話雖如此，我們希望擁有一個高效、現代化的核武庫，這并不是什麼秘密。
既然各方都擔心俄烏沖突中會使用核武器，那我們為什麼不讨論一下不首先使用核武器的問題呢？拜登政府已經表示,隻有在極端情況下才會使用核武器，這意味着它實際上與中國的“不首先使用核武器”政策相去不遠。
中國“不首先使用”政策幾十年來一直沒有改變。我認為我們應該讨論中國和美國、法國、英國之間不首先使用核武器的問題。中國和俄羅斯已經同意不首先使用。作為一種善意的姿态，為了緩解西方最擔心的俄羅斯可能在戰場上使用核武器的情況，也許北約可以單方面宣布不首先對俄羅斯使用核武器。
北約有能力這樣做，因為它的正常力量比俄羅斯強大得多，這樣的承諾并不會削弱其核反擊的能力。
以下為英文原文：
SCMP: China and the Philippines have been in a row for some time over disputed islands in the South China Sea. Do you see the situation continuing and what is China’s strategy?
Zhou Bo: China has never used force against the Philippines. Yes the Chinese coastguard used water cannon to dispel the Philippine coastguard, but I think that is deterrence, not a use of force. Historically, it is the Philippine coastguard that has used force to kill innocent Chinese fishermen from the mainland and Taiwan in 2000, 2006 and 2013. Few people seem to remember that, but you can google it to find out.
The Philippines ran a naval ship aground in May 1999 at Renai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal) on the pretext of“technical difficulties”. In the face of Chinese protests, it made promises to tow away the vessel. But it has not done that. Instead, the Philippines has attempted to build it into a permanent installation.
The Philippines claims that China has threatened to use force to drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of Scarborough Shoal in spite of their long-standing fishing activities in those waters. But it was the Philippines that first resorted to the threat of force. In April 2012, they sent a naval vessel to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in the waters of Scarborough Shoal.
China has been forced to take necessary measures in response to such provocative conduct. However, our response is restraint. For humanitarian reasons, we haven’t stopped the Philippines from providing water and food to their soldiers on board the grounded ship. Otherwise how could they have stayed there for the past 25 years?
SCMP: What would be the best and worst-case scenarios for China in this situation and is Beijing preparing for the worst? And is there a risk of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forming a Nato-like alliance?
Zhou Bo: Well, the best-case scenario would be for the Philippines to tow the ship away as they have pledged. At least they shouldn’t try to reinforce the ship. The best way is to let Mother Nature solve the problem with her force majeure.
In the worst-case scenario, if they continue to be this provocative, we will definitely see more tension. It is the Philippines that violated its own promise in 1999. China’s demand is entirely reasonable and we have demonstrated immense patience over the past decades.
Will Asean form a Nato-like alliance? This is impossible. Asean itself is not a military alliance by nature. It has claimed its centrality and its centrality has to rely on impartiality. That China has disputes with the Philippines doesn’t mean it has issues with the entirety of Asean, regardless of the Philippines being a member.
The South China Sea issue cannot be interpreted as China having disputes with Asean. China only has disputes with a few Asean claimants. Actually, many of its member states have overlapping claims in disputed waters among themselves.
SCMP: What do you make of the role of the United States in the South China Sea tensions?
Zhou Bo:I don’t believe the US would necessarily come to the fore to confront China on behalf of any Asean claimants. They wouldn’t be so stupid. They already have enough trouble in Europe and the Middle East.
China has never threatened to use force against Asean countries. China has also honoured its commitments to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which discourages the use of force in the region.
I hope the Philippines would not be stupid to become more adventurous. They should know they don’t stand a chance vis-à-vis China. The strength of the Chinese side is way beyond that of the Philippines. Even if this situation may continue for a while, eventually the Philippine government will have to back down.
SCMP: Commenters in the West describe PLA activities in the South China Sea as“dangerous manoeuvres” or“reckless behaviour”. What role do you think a dominant narrative or understanding plays in modern geopolitics?
Zhou Bo: I think that portraying the PLA as coercive or reckless is a kind of deliberate Western narrative. But so far, the Western media has not described the PLA in a more negative way because they just can’t find examples.
China has been a miracle in terms of its development. Since 1979, China has not fought any war with any other country in spite of incidents like the collision of Chinese and US military aircraft in 2001 and a deadly brawl between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley border area in 2020.
Without a single war being fought over the past four decades, we reached the second position in the world. Isn’t that phenomenal? This is not just luck. We have endured and held back for our goals and for a bigger picture. I sincerely believe China’s rise is peaceful – and rare in human history.
SCMP: Western discussions of China inevitably come with criticisms of the PLA’s“provocative behaviour” and concerns about how the Chinese military has grown. What’s your take on external perceptions of the PLA?
Zhou Bo: The PLA certainly generates a lot of different reactions in different people – awe, fear or uncertainty. The PLA Navy is now the largest navy in the world. So it is natural for people to ask what an ever stronger PLA means for China and the world. But some argue that the PLA has not fought a war since 1979 and doubt whether the PLA can fight.
For all the militaries in the world, there is a common task: to defend territory and sovereignty. But since China is a major global power, its military has two more duties: to safeguard its overseas interests and shoulder its international responsibilities.
For example, the PLA has offered equal protection to Chinese and foreign vessels in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. This is a good example of how a strong PLA can best blend China’s national interests with its international responsibilities.
SCMP:China has set a goal to turn its vast military into a modern fighting force by 2027, the centenary of the PLA’s establishment. What does this goal specifically mean? What kind of force does the PLA want to become?
Zhou Bo: The PLA’s final goal is not a secret. We have declared that we want to become a world-class military by 2049. But the goal was actually modified at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022, which said we should“speed up” progress to advance the goal. This means we have to become a world-class military before 2049, though it didn’t say how many years in advance we should do it.
The 2027 goal is a different story, since it marks the 100th year since the PLA’s establishment, a landmark moment. We want to build up our military and be ready to advance to our 2049 goal.
At the same time, we are facing our biggest dilemma, that is, how to prove we are a world-class military without fighting and winning some difficult battles. China has reaped tremendous benefits from maintaining peace with other countries so it clearly cannot test whether the sword is sharp by chopping heads – that is the wrong thing to do.
While we haven’t been at war for 40 years and more, that does not mean that we cannot fight, otherwise the American military would not need to be so worried about the PLA.
SCMP: Why does China want to speed up the progress on building its military?
I think that has a lot to do with how you see the overall situation, meaning tensions in US-China ties or potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Taiwan should be the most important factor.
On the Taiwan issue, you can see Beijing’s attitude is different towards Taiwan’s former president Ma Ying-jeou and its current leader Tsai Ing-wen. Her successor, Lai Ching-te, may bring more uncertainty.
The US is intensifying competition with China and is providing support to Taiwan, despite saying it follows the one-China policy. Those are good reasons we should speed up achieving the PLA’s goal.
SCMP: Some US officials have said China aims to build up its military capacity to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027. Do you think the PLA timeline has anything to do with Beijing’s goal of unifying Taiwan?
Zhou Bo: If you study carefully what China has said, it is still about peaceful reunification. We mentioned at the Communist Party’s 20th national congress [in 2022] that we would have ultimate patience and make utmost efforts for a peaceful reunification. Right now, I think this very much remains the same.
SCMP: Do you think Taiwanese "president-elect" William Lai Ching-te may step across Beijing’s“red lines”? Beijing has already labelled him a troublemaker, as well as a“stubborn Taiwan independence activist”.
Zhou Bo:Honestly, I don’t know. I think there is some good reason for us to say he is a“stubborn Taiwan independence activist” because he once declared himself as a“pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence”. But the point is, when a man gets a new position, things may change. So we’ll have to wait and see what he’s going to do. I believe the US is also watching closely.
SCMP: After the then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August 2022, the PLA carried out rounds of exercises and appeared to create a new norm of frequently flying across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. What is your take on the situation and how dangerous is this?
Zhou Bo: Historically speaking, we didn’t fly across the median line, at least not as often as we are doing now. Things changed after the Pelosi business. Her trip to Taiwan was totally unacceptable to us. This kind of provocation resets the status quo.
If she hadn’t visited Taiwan, it would have been hard for us to conduct the live-fire exercise around the island which lasted for four days. Such provocations will definitely lead to reactions which in turn, will create irreversible new status quos. You see now we fly much more often across the median line – that’s a response to their provocation. That is also a new status quo.
SCMP: According to many officials and think tanks in the US, the most likely military option against Taiwan is a blockade, which they regard as likely to fail. What do you think?
Zhou Bo: Military planners seldom rely on one option. I think we have different options. Our choices depend on what actually happens.
SCMP: Moving away from Taiwan, what are your thoughts on the Ukraine war?
Zhou Bo: No war will last forever, the question is how and when it will end. I don’t believe the Ukrainians will be able to take back their lost territories. They will be lucky if Russia does not advance beyond the regions already taken, because Ukraine’s counteroffensive – which is fully supported by the West – has failed since it was launched last year.
The military balance is not in favour of the Ukrainians and the whole of the West doesn’t have enough ammunition to offer in an endless and seamless way. I don’t believe Ukraine will have the upper hand, especially if Donald Trump comes back. He may just make a U-turn on the US’ Ukraine stance. That is the worst fear of European countries. We just don’t know when it will end since both sides don’t have the wish for a ceasefire now.
SCMP: So what are your thoughts on China’s position on the war in Ukraine?
Zhou Bo: This war matters a lot for China and even reflects China’s ever-rising international position as, all of a sudden, everyone asks which side are you on and what is your thinking.
This is interesting because the war has nothing to do with China. Why would people ask about China? Because China’s approach is too important to ignore.
The West believes China can simply tell Russia to end the war. But how can things be that simple? It is really sad to see how a war that has nothing to do with China has actually soured ties between China and the European Union.
But I am not pessimistic. I think that as long as the Ukraine war continues, the relationship can’t be too good, because the EU has high expectations of China that Beijing cannot meet. But as long as there is no war in the Taiwan Strait, China-EU ties won’t be too bad because they don’t have to make a hard decision between the United States and their largest trading partner.
SCMP: What’s your take on the war in Gaza?
Zhou Bo: No one knows when the Ukraine war will come to an end. But in the Middle East, even if a war comes to an end, nobody knows when it will crop up again.
The war in the Gaza Strip has brought too many casualties, to the extent that it has been described as genocide. US support for Israel has delivered a heavy blow to its moral authority and really hurts its image and credibility, especially in the Global South. The impact will be long lasting.
SCMP: How do you regard Russia’s resilience? Could it hold on, despite the massive costs of the war?
Zhou Bo: Russia’s economy actually is doing quite well, with economic growth of 3.6 per cent last year. This has surprised everybody – probably even the Russians themselves – while Ukraine’s economy is in bad shape.
On lessons learned, apparently Russia is making progress on the battlefield. But in the beginning, they didn’t seem so prepared – no forward command, no adequate logistics supply, no drones, no encrypted communication and no precision-guided bombs. But that has changed.
Another lesson is that the pattern of war has changed a lot and the PLA must keep pace with advanced technologies, including drones and maybe artificial intelligence one day, while maintaining traditional things like tanks and artillery.
In the past, we might have considered drones to be supplementary, but it has proven to be a new combat platform that could bring massive changes to the battlefield. We saw this in both Ukraine and the Red Sea.
Meanwhile, we cannot totally rely on new technologies because you see that tanks and artillery are still being used and people are still digging trenches in the Ukraine war – like during the first world war.
SCMP: Speaking of advanced technology, how is China applying AI in the military and could China cooperate with the US in this area?
Zhou Bo: On the first question, we have state of the art drones of all sorts. I don’t think we have yet seen the application of AI directly in military warfare. I think even the US hasn’t demonstrated that.
President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden agreed in San Francisco last year to set up China-US government talks on AI, but it was not specified whether the dialogue would involve the militaries.
But I assume it is not entirely impossible in the long term because both countries understand the importance of ensuring human control of weapons systems. Advanced AI has made this issue more acute.
SCMP:Would there be some areas that the US and China could prioritise to prevent some dangerous applications of AI, such as in nuclear weapons?
Zhou Bo: I think it would be difficult in the near future for China and the US to talk about that because these are highly sensitive areas. So far, there are no official consultations or negotiations in the nuclear field between China and the US. For this to happen, either China needs to drastically increase its nuclear arsenal or the US massively reduces its nuclear arsenal. Neither is possible.
But I think both China and the US need to make an effort to make sure that this kind of advanced AI would not be applied in the most crucial military areas, including nuclear weapons. Nothing is more important than making sure of absolute human control of the nuclear command and control system.
SCMP:Last year, China and the US resumed military dialogue. Now that they are talking again, what should we expect？
Zhou Bo: The resumption of dialogue is inevitable. But something new is that there is now a communication channel between the heads of theatre commands.
This is a new mechanism that has to be thoroughly explored by the two sides. For example, is the conversation just between commanders of the PLA Southern Theatre Command and US Indo-Pacific Command, or could it also involve the PLA Northern Theatre Command and Eastern Theatre Command?
This is because American reconnaissance and surveillance along the Chinese coast cover areas of all these three Chinese military commands. Would the commanders talk regularly or just during a crisis? I assume they basically talk about dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft. But what about a dangerous situation that involves a third party? Questions like this could go on and on.
SCMP: What is the risk of an encounter between the Chinese and US ships and aircraft?
Zhou Bo: There have already been a number of dangerous close encounters between US and Chinese aircraft. According to the Pentagon, in the two years from the autumn of 2021, the PLA intercepted more than 180 American aircraft. We have to make those interceptions because you can’t just come so close to us to make provocations.
I do not see an easy solution to this because it is difficult for the US to back down. They have been doing this for a long time and if they stop, they would worry about their image in the eyes of their allies. But I don’t understand why the US has to scrutinise China at such a high frequency. Don’t they have a lot of drones and military satellites that provide real-time intelligence?
SCMP:Is the risk of US and China military encounters overestimated? How dangerous are they, and is there a way out of the situation?
Zhou Bo: They’re certainly very dangerous, when aircraft and ships get so close. Chinese and Americans have different takes on safety and security, which are the same word in Chinese. Americans talk about safety. We talk about security.
Safety refers to keeping your property, like your ships, and personnel safe but security connotes more meaning. It’s about sovereignty, rights and interests. International maritime law doesn’t necessarily help.
In 2013, I headed a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon to discuss the legal implications of freedom of navigation. Each side had different interpretations of international maritime law. So there are no easy solutions to mitigate the risk of encounters.
SCMP: How many aircraft carriers does China need and why is it important for China to have them?
Zhou Bo:I cannot speculate on how many carriers China will need. But I can tell you that aircraft carriers are primarily not for coastal fights. They are for a possible war far from home.
People may say that one day, when China has to retreat from peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue, we could use aircraft carriers. Of course they are useful, but they are more useful in our power projection in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, or Atlantic Ocean – anywhere far from our waters.
SCMP:The US has said China will have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. What do you think are some of the Chinese leadership’s considerations behind the advancement of its nuclear capabilities?
Zhou Bo: Nobody in China will tell you how many nuclear warheads we have because that is considered a secret. Having said that, it is not a secret that we want to have a nuclear arsenal that is effective and modernised.
Everybody worries about the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war. Then why don’t we discuss no first use of nuclear weapons? The Biden administration has talked about the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, which means it is actually not so far away from China’s no-first-use policy.
China’s no-first-use policy has remained the same for decades. I think we should discuss no first use of nuclear weapons between China and the US, France and Britain. China and Russia have agreed on no first use. As a goodwill gesture and to mitigate the worst fear of the West that Russia might use nuclear weapons in the battlefield, perhaps Nato can unilaterally announce not to use nuclear weapons against Russia first.
Nato can afford to do this because its conventional forces are much stronger than Russia’s and such a commitment won’t reduce its nuclear retaliation capacity.
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