[Editor's note: On April 11, US President Joe Biden will hold an online meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which was once considered to be direct pressure from the United States to seek to side with the United States on the Russian-Ukrainian issue.
Recently, Susant Singh, a senior researcher at the India Policy Research Center and a visiting professor at Yale University in the United States, invited Zhou Bo, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies of Tsinghua University and a special expert of the China Forum, to conduct an interview with the two sides on the work visit of State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India, how Sino-Indian relations should get out of the galvan Valley conflict trough, the settlement of the line of actual control issue on the border between the two countries, the "sameness" and "difference" of The Sino-Indian position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and Sino-Indian cooperation in Asia-Pacific and global affairs. The interview podcast has been published on the India Policy Research Centre website, with full text translations from Guanwang and China Forum for the benefit of readers. 】
Susant Singh: Good afternoon, everyone! I am Susant Singh, Senior Research Fellow, India Policy Research Centre. We rarely hear authoritative voices from China. Today's program has the honor to invite Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) from China, who is a researcher at the Center for Strategy and Security of Tsinghua University and a special expert of the China Forum.
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo joined the army in 1979 and has held many positions in the military, including director of the Security Cooperation Center of the Office of International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission. Bo Zhou is an undergraduate at the Air Force Engineering College and a master's student at St Edmond's College, Cambridge. He has authored more than 100 papers and articles in various Western publications and spoken as a representative of the People's Liberation Army at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the Munich Security Conference. He is the tutor of foreign military master's degree students at the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army of Chinese. Zhou Bo, welcome to your arrival.
Zhou Bo: Susante, thank you for the invitation.
Susant Singh: Zhou Bo, our current dialogue is just four days after Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi. While in New Delhi, he met with the Indian Foreign Minister and India's National Security Adviser. What do you think of Wang Yi's visit to India and south Asia as a whole? In your opinion, what is the reason for his special visit to India?
Zhou Bo: The direct reason for State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to South Asia was his participation in the 48th meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Islamabad. I think he also made the most of this opportunity by visiting India, Nepal and Afghanistan. His visit to India was not long, but it goes without saying that this brief, direct exchange was very much needed, because this was the first time that a Chinese foreign minister had visited India in at least two years. Such working visits, therefore, are extremely important and useful, especially in the context of the unfortunate conflict in the Galwan Valley in 2020.
Susant Singh: Is there any other reason than for both sides not visiting each other's country (for a long time)? Wang Yi came to India, perhaps looking for a breakthrough (in bilateral relations), or perhaps to win India's support? What was the main motivation for his visit?
Zhou Bo: After the most unpleasant clashes between soldiers on both sides (the 2020 Galwan Valley conflict), the bilateral relationship will definitely be cold for a while. Both sides need some time to heal. So we can understand this silence, but it should not continue.
China, not only for Asia, but also for the world, is an important country, and so is India. China is the second largest economy in the world, while India is the sixth largest economy in the world. Therefore, for our two neighboring powers, we cannot allow this relationship to be so cold and so distant. Therefore, it is in the interests of both sides to make contact. Of course, I know that there is a lot of contact between the two sides and participation in various online meetings, but this kind of personal (face-to-face) communication is the most important, and it cannot be replaced by any online meeting.
Wang Yi holds talks with Indian Foreign Minister Jaisen Sojacien on March 25 (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website)
Susant Singh: If you want a breakthrough in his visit, as you suggested, to reconcile with India, why did he choose to make those statements about Kashmir at the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Pakistan, and then with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to make statements about the territorial integrity of Pakistan. As you know, New Delhi has stood up and condemned these statements. Obviously, if Wang Yi wants to seek a breakthrough in relations in India, this move does not create a very favorable environment for achieving a breakthrough.
Zhou Bo: I don't think it matters whether such remarks are beneficial to diplomatic breakthroughs. I think the most important thing is that he has to be honest about how China feels about what Pakistan and India are concerned about. The Kashmir issue has a long history, and this is not a new issue between India and Pakistan, in fact, China's position in this regard is to be as fair as possible.
Of course, neutrality is always an issue for both parties, because others will think that your balance is actually a stopgap measure. But China is actually trying its best to level the bowl of water, Pakistan has its historical reasons for friendship with China, and China's relations with India, in addition to the border issue, are basically good. On Kashmir, at least, China's position has not changed. So I don't think he said a lot of things that are new to the Indian audience.
Susant Singh: Yes, I understand that for the Indian audience, Wang Yi didn't say anything new, but consider the context in which he said it. Obviously, you know, India has some kind of "collusion" between China and Pakistan, which seems to deepen a lot of India's fear and insecurity that China and Pakistan may cooperate militarily or even "collude." Wouldn't it be a good thing if China decided, or Wang Yi, to reassure India in some respects, or the Indian government?
Zhou Bo: I wouldn't use the word "collusion" to describe the relationship between China and Pakistan. China's relations with Pakistan are not a secret, and in fact, Pakistan's China policy is not a secret. I believe that Pakistan's foreign policy is rooted in good relations with China. I have received many Pakistani delegations in the past, and one of the ministers impressed me with a sentence that he said that "apart from friendship with China, Pakistanis basically cannot agree on anything". So the friendship between China and Pakistan is a fact.
But we also have to consider what kind of cooperation between China and Pakistan will make India so worried. I think China's military assistance to Pakistan is probably India's main concern. But if we look at them more thoroughly, what are these problems? It's basically a deal in military equipment. It is true that we sell them aircraft and warships, but these exports are perfectly reasonable, because they are just normal trade. For example, in terms of international trade, you can't sell weapons of mass destruction, you can't sell missiles that exceed a certain range and a certain payload, because that's beyond the rules of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). So apart from that, you can basically sell anything you want.
I'll ask you again. India's military equipment mainly comes from Russia, which provides 60-70% of India's military equipment. Sometimes India's relations with China are not so good, but has China ever complained to India or Russia about this trade in arms? Never. So, I also think India shouldn't complain about China's military ties with Pakistan, in part because India is much stronger militarily than Pakistan. So, what is the need for India to be afraid of China-Pakistan cooperation?
India's purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia (From The Paper)
Susant Singh: Yeah, I agree with the part you said about fear. I'm talking about a certain insecurity, a certain fear, because you also know that there's a lot of talk about the military threat that India faces in a two-front operation, where China and Pakistan are acting together to deal with the Indian threat. That's the only reason. But I can clearly understand and understand the point you are trying to make.
Zhou Bo: I would like to say a few more words on this issue. In India, there are strategists who are concerned about the so-called nightmare of China and Pakistan encircling India. This is completely wrong, it is absolutely wrong. Why is China doing this? The weakness of the human psyche is that people always look up to another, stronger, more powerful group to get inspiration and follow suit. For example, China will sometimes compare itself to the United States, Pakistan will compare itself to India, and India will think it can compare itself to China.
It is indeed not in China's interest to encircle India. Why? Let me give you an example. In 1998, India conducted the first nuclear test, followed by Pakistan. And the excuse for India (nuclear testing) is that China is the number one potential threat to India. At that time, I was a staff officer of the Ministry of Defense in charge of the South Asian region. Everyone was shocked to hear this, because in fact our Chief of the General Staff (Fu Quanyou) had just visited India, and during his visit everything was fine and everyone talked very well. Shortly after his return, India suddenly declared that China was the potential number one threat, how could this be? At that time, China's attention was completely focused on Taiwan, because the Taiwan authorities headed by Chen Shui-bian were creating all kinds of troubles and demanding an "independence referendum."
But everyone was shocked when we heard that China was the potential number one threat. Then I wondered why India would see China as a potential number one threat. India is going to develop nuclear weapons anyway, so it has to have a very, very significant reason to justify that, because no small reason can justify it. That's why Defense Secretary George Fernandez argued that China is the potential number one threat. That's how I think about it.
Susant Singh: Yeah, back to the statement made in 1998 and [Defence Minister] Fernandez, which the Indian government reproached. You will also remember the role of the United States in leaking that letter, when the Indian prime minister wrote a letter to President Clinton, and the United States in turn revealed the letter to the New York Times, which made India very embarrassed and did not know how to explain it to China.
But that's all in the past. Now back to Wang Yi's recent visit to Pakistan. As you said before, this visit is in a sense, in the context of these border crises in Ladakh or the Siachen glaciers, what I want to ask is why are there so many crises on the borders of these two countries, India and China, as you said, the two Asian powers, over the past decade or so? What is driving this problem to happen more and more frequently now?
Zhou Bo: I will give you a very short and straightforward answer: because the line of actual control on the border has not been demarcated, and China and India have different views on how to solve this problem. That's the real problem.
Let me begin by making it very clear that these most unfortunate problems are the legacy of the colonialists, right? So it's not a problem we've created, but we're really bothered by it. India's view of the Line of Actual Control on the border is fundamentally different from China's view. Basically, India's view is to take a bottom-up approach, hoping to address this issue by approving the Line of Actual Control on the border. China, on the other hand, wants to go from the top down, saying it will first let us make a political decision on how to replace the land to achieve mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, while India does not agree.
India's position is plausible on the surface, because the conflict is caused by the line of actual control (blurred) of the border, so why don't we determine the location of this line of actual control on the border? That way we can avoid this problem of breaking into each other's borders. But there is a danger in India's approach, China does not really use the Line of Actual Control as a border, and if the Line of Actual Control is approved, India may say: This is the de facto border, let it become a fait accompli.
There have been many talks between China and India over this issue historically, and I myself have participated in these bilateral military talks as an expert in the early days, so I clearly remember the differences. In fact, India sees the western region as having more controversy. In other words, China doesn't think there are a lot of divisions in the west, while India thinks there are more problems there.
But if you look at the entire China-India border, there are actually a lot of differences, such as the length of the border, China thinks it is only 2,000 kilometers, while India thinks it is 3488 kilometers. But in the eastern and central sections of the China-India border, there have not been many clashes. Why? Because India has de facto control over both regions, it ends up with more problems in the west.
So let me return to what I said: the Line of Actual Control is the root cause of our differences, confrontations and deadly conflicts, but we should not allow the Line of Actual Control to control the two Governments and two peoples.
Susant Singh: I'll challenge you again. As you said, the question of the Line of Actual Control has been around since 1947 or 1948, but from 1988 to 1990, and for almost 20 years since then, there have been no major crises on the border. The question I want to ask you is, what has changed in the last decade or so? Although the Line of Actual Control has not been demarcated, there have been so many problems along the border, whether it is the Doklam crisis or what you call the major unfortunate events in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. Now continuously, almost every year or two, we have such crises, as well as on the borders where troops are deployed on both sides, and crises continue. So, in the past decade or so, what is the result of such a strong and significant crisis?
Zhou Bo: That's a good question. When people talk about deadly conflicts, they are often limited by the outcome without looking back at history and without seeing opportunities in crises. As I touch on this, let me remind you that since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, we have actually reached a large number of confidence-building measures, both at the governmental and military levels. I'm sure you know these protocols. If you compare these confidence-building measures with any measures between China and foreign countries, such as those of the United States, we will conclude that the confidence measures between China and India are much more content than those between China and the United States. Quantitatively, we have two or three agreements with the United States, but we have more agreements with India than those with China and any other country.
These confidence-building measures are very good because they are rich in content and full of detail. In the Border Force agreement, for example, it makes it clear that while troops on one side are on patrol, the other should not trail. So this is a very specific provision. Moreover, near the Line of Actual Control, there should be no division-level exercises, that is, no more than 15,000 people, and if a brigade-level exercise, that is, 5,000 people, should be notified in advance, and military aircraft should not appear within a close distance of 10 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control. So I believe that these rules, since we had the first agreement in 1993, have indeed played a huge role in general maintaining peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control on the border.
We have had only one deadly clash a few years ago, and we still have a lot of confrontations before because the line of actual control has not been drawn. The only difference is that past confrontations have been less deadly.
Conflict in the Galwan Valley
The events of June 15, 2020 were very unfortunate. We can also understand that when such a deadly conflict or event occurs, it is inevitable that people will blame each other. I will not dwell on the course of events here. You have your side of the explanation, I have my side of the narrative.
But the good side of this incident is that neither side tried to shoot at the other. So they were actually fighting with stones and sticks in a Stone Age way, which meant that in their consciousness they knew that they should not shoot at each other under any circumstances. Although the Indian army did fire into the sky later, they did not shoot at the Chinese soldiers. Therefore, this shows that the confidence-building measures between China and India have played a large role.
But confidence-building measures have not prevented such accidents from occurring. So, what should we do? The time will surely come for both sides to sit down and discuss possible confidence-building measures. We don't need to look elsewhere for confidence-building measures, we just need to look at the agreements we've reached. They are nuanced and very specific. If you implement all these agreements you won't have any problems coming back. China and India are now in a stalemate, most of the troops have disengaged, but I understand that the Indian side is not very satisfied.
My suggestion is that forces on both sides should disengage from the most dangerous places. What we have done around Pangong Lake is disengagement, an experience that should be emulated elsewhere so that we can maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control on the China-India border.
Susant Singh: I believe what you said is true in a way. But the problem now is that both sides have used sticks, and even when they are facing the air, the bullets have been fired. After the death, neither side trusted the other. There is no trust between the two sides, the Line of Actual Control on the China-India border is not clearly defined, and trust has broken down. Both sides claimed that the other had not complied with the agreement. India's foreign minister has publicly stated that China has not abided by the 1993 and 1996 agreements. The Chinese say the Indians have not complied with the agreements. How do we move forward? Disengagement is theoretically possible, but how do you think China and India should move forward in this environment?
Zhou Bo: Well, let's imagine the worst-case scenario, where China and India have no trust in each other at all. This is certainly not true, but assuming that the outlook is dark, let me illustrate it with an example from the Cold War.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union did not trust each other at all, they were enemies, but even if such a mistrust existed, they were still able to develop many confidence-building measures, mainly in the nuclear field. There are important agreements that reflect this, such as the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT), the Start of Strategic Arms Treaty (START), and the Open Skies Treaty. They have even cooperated in two areas, one in efforts to eliminate smallpox and the other in outer space.
In addition to the border issue, I can hardly imagine serious problems in China's relations with India. China is concerned about India's concerns, but India's concerns are sometimes unjustifiable, such as China's close relationship with Pakistan. What would India say if I raised India's close relationship with Russia? China and Russia are also friendly, and Russia has a good friendship with India. So, I mean, trust is important, but it's not so important for effective confidence-building measures. Mutual trust between China and India still exists in many other areas. Let me give you the latest example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, did you find that there were similarities in our positions? There are certainly similarities.
Indian netizens tweeted messages in support of Russia
I think this actually shows that in the last few years, India has not fully and truthfully expressed its views. Over the past few years, you've found that India is talking about a free and open Indo-Pacific almost in an American tone. But let me say that India's position is actually more similar to China's than to that of the United States. This is because India, like China, has reservations about the same provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 298. When foreign warships enter India's exclusive economic zone for military exercises, if ammunition and explosives are involved, the Indian government will ask them to first obtain the consent of the Indian government. Compared with the relevant laws in China, the laws in India are more stringent than those in China.
As another example, last April, the USS John Paul Jones sailed into India's exclusive economic zone in southwestErn India, and the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet issued a written statement saying it was doing so because the United States would challenge India's "excessive maritime claims." I found that India's exclusive economic zone accounts for one-thirtieth of the Indian Ocean. In other words, the U.S. challenge to India means that, at least in the eyes of Americans, 1/30 of the Indian Ocean is unfree and unopened because of India. So how can India talk in the same tone as the United States about the indo-Pacific must be free and open? This is not true, because the oceans themselves are naturally interconnected, and they have always been free and open.
If there is one problem in the Indian Ocean, it is the problem of piracy. From 2008 until about 2013, piracy was rampant. With the combined efforts of the Chinese and Indian navies, we have solved this problem. The Indian Navy helped rescue the Chinese merchant ship A fortune, and in the process the Indian Navy cooperated with a Turkish warship under NATO command and a Chinese naval warship. For several years, I have been the international coordinator of the Chinese military's anti-piracy campaign. Therefore, I have also expressed my gratitude to the Indian side on many occasions, including in Bahrain, because the meetings of the Naval Anti-Piracy Coordination Committee are always held in Bahrain.
Susant Singh: I understand what you want to say, but one thing, with regard to your claim that India and China have similar positions in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute, I would like to refute you. The Indian government has made it clear that while on the surface we have similar positions, the reasons that drive them or the principles that drive them are different. Even after Wang Yi's visit, Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Jaisen Su has come out to clarify India's position, which is different from China's. You have also heard this from Western countries, and everyone's position is different. So that's the only point I want to clarify to the audience. But I understand your argument, I'm not arguing, I'm just trying to make the position of the Indian government clear.
You talked about India's concerns about China and China about India. What exactly are China's concerns about India? Geopolitics? ideology? Or are the concerns driven by some other reason? Is China's concern for India the United States? Is it the Indo-Pacific strategy? Or the Group of Four? What is China really concerned about? What about concerns about India that China has not publicly expressed?
Zhou Bo: I know that the Indian government is trying to show a different position from China in its position on the Dispute between Russia and Ukraine. But frankly, as I have studied your position, I have found that there is no fundamental difference between the positions of India and China. China is not trying to approach India by saying, "Well, my position is very similar to yours," which makes no sense and doesn't matter. China and India have been talking about two sides of the same coin, on the one hand, the sovereignty of a sovereign state, and on the other side, Russia's legitimate concerns about NATO expansion. I think we're basically talking about the same thing, so I don't think there's any difference. Frankly, I think that because of the current atmosphere of Sino-Indian relations, the Indian government has taken some seemingly tough attitudes towards China in an attempt to attract public opinion, but this is really just a gesture.
Susant Singh: What about China's concerns about India? Is it the United States? Is it the Group of Four? Is it the Indo-Pacific strategy? Is it ideology, geopolitics? What are China's concerns about India?
Zhou Bo: Actually, I don't have such concerns. China is worried about India's so-called concerns. Let me put it another way, China is only worried because India is worried about something, although China has no idea why India is worried. Many would argue that China is worried about the Quad. It is true that some even call it "Asia's NATO." I don't think so. Why? Because I have confidence in India's foreign policy.
If we look at the history of India's foreign policy, as one of the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement, as a confident power, India will certainly try to be impartial and neutral. Of the four-nation mechanism, the other three are already allies, and I would say That India is the most important. India's attitude is crucial to the survival and development of the group of four.
But India, like other countries, will put its own national interests first. India can't get too close to the United States because it also has good relations with Russia, which comes from Russia about 70 percent of its military equipment and is still buying Russian S-400 missiles. So if India and the United States get too close, China and Russia will be unhappy, and that's not in India's own interest.
If you look at the latest developments in the four-power mechanism, you will see that it is actually moving in many other directions, not in the military direction. As far as its military content is concerned, there is currently only one military exercise called "Malabar", and that is all. In addition, the quadrilateral mechanism is being developed in various areas, such as infrastructure development, climate change or joint distribution of vaccines to Southeast Asian countries.
But what I want to say is, how successful can it be? Infrastructure, for example, Biden's "Rebuild a Better World" initiative has largely failed. As far as I know, because of the strong opposition of the Republican Party, it has been described as an ambitious memory. And, how much can the U.S. actually contribute to the region's infrastructure? It is completely incomparable to China's Belt and Road Initiative. If we talk about climate change or vaccine distribution, these plans are really good. But these are not the exclusive problems of these four countries, but are closely related to each country.
Therefore, if the development of the four-power mechanism is not directed at China, it is nothing special. I wouldn't say that the G4 is aimed at China, I believe that the US-Uk-Australia Trilateral Security Cooperation Agreement (AUKUS) is aimed at China, and the quadrilateral mechanism can be said to be because of China. However, if what makes the four-power group collude is an "anti-China" sentiment, then the four-country mechanism will never grow. It can exist in those areas I mentioned above, but it won't flourish.
Susant Singh: But the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and the latest military document (rejected version) that was presented by the Pentagon and sent to Congress, explicitly mentions China as an adversary, it mentions the Indo-Pacific strategy, saying that Europe (suspected to be Russia) is only the second adversary, and the main competition of the United States is competition with China. Even in this case, don't you think the four-nation mechanism is aimed at China?
Zhou Bo: Well, I don't think the four-nation mechanism will really play a big role if it is aimed at China. When it comes to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, I read the report, which was published in February. I think the assumption of the entire Indo-Pacific strategy is wrong first, because it assumes that China wants to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region. This is completely wrong. Why? Let me put it this way, even if China wants to, China cannot establish a sphere of influence. Even in East Asia, where China's influence is strongest, China has not been able to establish a sphere of influence. There is North Korea in East Asia, and the DPRK does not listen to China on the issue of nuclear proliferation and insists on developing nuclear weapons. There are also several U.S. allies in East Asia. Even on the South China Sea issue, there are some claimants who hold their own claims. So while China's influence is strongest in the region, I think there's still a big gap between and the establishment of a sphere of influence here.
People often make the mistake of confusing two concepts, one is influence and the other is sphere of influence. If you talk about China's influence, China's influence is absolutely global right now. China's sphere of influence almost overlaps with that of the United States, but its military influence is inferior to that of the United States, right? But China has not established a sphere of influence, which is why its military activities abroad are humanitarian in nature, whether anti-piracy, peacekeeping, disaster relief and evacuation. China has no ambitions for a global military presence. Outside of China's own territory and nearby waters, which is China's territorial waters, we just want to help other countries. That's why China only does humanitarian things. Is there any need for us to build costly and unsustainable spheres of influence?
So this assumption was wrong from the start. Moreover, the United States does not have sufficient capacity to achieve many of its purposes in the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indo-Pacific strategy has so many purposes, how many countries will really follow the United States and stand against China? I really doubt it. Because many of America's allies are China's trading partners, it is difficult for them to make such a decision to follow the United States and confront China.
China has been embroiled in this great power competition for no reason. Because if you look at China's policy toward the United States, China's policy toward the United States is very consistent and stable. We talk about the same thing all the time. But in reality, the United States had to fundamentally change its China policy because they finally realized that they could not change China's political system, and China was getting stronger and stronger. So they panicked. Since Trump took office, he has introduced the concept of great power competition. Has China made any mistakes in the U.S.-China relationship? I can't say that we are right in everything, but at least we have not created any special, very difficult situation for the United States. Therefore, China's policy toward the United States is much more stable than the United States' china policy.
Susant Singh: Okay, Zhou Bo, back to what you said earlier, you said that China's concern about India is India's own concern, which means that India basically has nothing for China to pay attention to or worry about. Is this because China is much bigger than India? Whether economically, militarily, or geopolitically, the gaps in the relevant areas are so large. In other words, does this mean that India is too small for China?
Zhou Bo: No, India is not small at all, India is currently the sixth largest economy, and by 2030 you will catch up with Japan to become the second largest economy in Asia. Therefore, China is fully aware of India's weight, and China fully respects this. As an observer, I have found that india has done many of the same things in the past as China has done. India's reforms are a decade later than China's, but India is doing almost the same thing as China. Therefore, India's development is also very fast, and China is very happy to see this. Because the fact is that the international political and economic center of gravity is moving towards Asia is clear. China will of course be at the center, but India will also be very important. I do not want to talk about the so-called "Asian century", but I believe that our two countries have every reason to cooperate well.
Ten years of my personal work experience have been related to South Asia. I've been to Pakistan and I've been to India, and I'm sure I'm one of the very few Chinese who can name some Indian dishes. Those dishes are commonly named Chinese sound confusing. When I visited India, I thought that India is indeed a country that has benefited China a lot. Historically, Buddhism was introduced from India, and we also had cultural exchanges along the Silk Roads. It is sad that we are now at odds only because of what the colonizers left behind. I don't know how to solve this problem, and I think it's hard for us to solve this problem. But I believe that with all these measures in place, there may be some new ideas, such as disengagement from all dangerous places, and we can manage the relationship between the two countries. Maybe you're more confident than I am, because you said that before the conflict, there were very few accidents between the two countries.
So if we can learn from the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and 4 Chinese soldiers to maintain peace and stability after border conflicts, then we can live in peace for another 40 years and avoid so many casualties. I believe it is possible. Because this is a bloody lesson, we should all learn from it. If that's the price we pay, we shouldn't repeat the same mistakes over the next 40 years.
Susant Singh: Speaking of your taste for Indian food, I must say that your taste is good. But on a more serious issue, you mentioned the Indo-Pacific strategy. Is it possible for India to remain an active member of a non-secure, non-military coalition as part of a four-state mechanism while still maintaining friendly relations with China?
Zhou Bo: I think it depends first and foremost on what the four-nation mechanism is and how it will evolve. Because China will certainly pay attention to the evolution of the four-state mechanism to see if it really does not harm China's interests.
Frankly, I believe that from now on, India's attitude will gradually change, and it will retreat a little more from the pro-US policies of the past. India's latest statement on the Russo-Ukrainian war makes this clear, and it is not surprising. But I believe this time, because India is cornered, it has to show its true colors. So we saw that it abstained in the voting, and what it said was more or less similar to China's position. This is the real India, and I believe this is the "unpretentious" India.
In the days to come, changes in the international order will be a grand picture. I basically believe that Europe will surely have another Cold War after this hot war. But in Asia, the United States has launched a new Cold War against China, although at the government level they will not call it a new Cold War. But if you look closely, Biden's China policy is basically extreme competition. If the competition is already fierce, not a new Cold War, what else can it be? Theoretically, it's only a few steps away from a hot war, right? So what else could it be? Therefore, we no longer have any illusions that Sino-US relations will improve significantly. Of course, it is best to have good results.
Most fundamentally, China is a major beneficiary of the existing international order. As a result, China does not resent the current international order with a victim mentality, as Russia does. China appreciates and benefits from the current international order. That is why China is determined to uphold the international order. We're all calling for multipolarity, and that has nothing to do with how we achieve our goals, but because, no matter how slowly, America's power is declining, and that will eventually become a fact.
When I talk to Americans, they admit it. But they would say it was a relative decline. But relative decline is also a kind of decline, right? So I believe that Americans' focus on the Indo-Pacific actually reflects a decline in its power. Therefore, it must shrink. Its retreat from Afghanistan, from elsewhere, to the Indo-Pacific, actually reflects that it is not as strong as it once was. Therefore, it must focus on competing with China.
Therefore, what role India will play in this regard is crucial. Therefore, China has good reason to want to have good relations with India. We don't want you to be on america's side, the wrong side of history.
India's position on Ukraine makes the United States very dissatisfied (data map)
Susant Singh: I agree that India does not want to be in conflict with China. But, as we see today, things are changing. So my last question to ask you is, in your objective assessment of the situation, not hope or desire, how would you assess Sino-Indian relations and its future? Is it cooperation? Is it competition? Or a conflict? Or a mixture of the three?
Zhou Bo: I think it's a mixture of the three, but the problem is the proportion of the three. Because of what happened in the Galwan Valley, I think the Indian government is still in a state of resentment and emotion. As they have said in the past, bilateral relations cannot be expected to improve significantly unless the border issue is resolved. That's basically what it means. This is much like what the Government of India said before Gandhi's visit. But the truth is that border issues are not easy to resolve. Even if the Indian government wants to pin the improvement of bilateral relations solely on the proper handling of the border issue, it is not right. Because from an economic point of view, the two countries will still have a huge economic interaction, and this economic law will break through this artificial obstacle.
Therefore, Sino-Indian relations will certainly get better and better. But because of what has already happened, it can be very slow. I believe that time will always heal the wounds, after all, there are casualties on the Chinese side. I think we have to face reality. I am confident that, overall, despite the problems, the relations between the two countries will continue to move forward.
Susant Singh: Actually, India's position is not that the border issue should be resolved permanently. India's position is that once the emergency crisis on the border – whether near Pangong Lake, Depsang or Domuq – is resolved and the soldiers disengage, bilateral relations can improve and then return to some normalcy. I think, as you said, disengagement is entirely possible.
Zhou Bo: Yes, if this is a condition of the Indian government, I don't think it will be very difficult to achieve, because the Chinese side has said something similar. Sure, there are a lot of details in it, which is why we've had 15 rounds of commander-level commanders meetings so far. Of course, for the talks to be successful, both sides must receive political and strategic guidance from the capital. I think things are getting better. So in general, I am optimistic about China-India relations. Because apart from this border issue, I really can't think of any other major issues in the bilateral relationship.
Susant Singh: Zhou Bo, you are more optimistic than most of the Indians I interviewed — Indian commentators or Indian officials. I'm willing to believe you. I hope that the situation will improve and that there will be no more conflicts anywhere in China and India. Thank you very much for taking the time. It's great to be able to talk to you and listen to your ideas. I've learned a lot from it.
Zhou Bo: Thank you, Susante.
(Interview link: https://india-speak-the-cpr-podcast.simplecast.com/episodes/episode-22-unpacking-the-chinese-perspective-of-sino-india-ties)
[Translators: Li Zexi, Cheng Zeka, Zhang Jiayi; Core Translators: Han Hua, Xu Xinyun]
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Good afternoon everyone. I am Sushant Singh, Senior Fellow of Centre for Policy Research India. We hardly hear any authentic voices from China. We have today on our show Senior Colonel Zhou Bo(retired), a senior fellow of Center of Strategy and Security of Tsinghua University and China forum expert. Senior Colonel Zhou Bo started his military service in 1979 and served in numerous appointments in the people's liberation army, including as director of the Center for Security Cooperation in the Office for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of national defense. Zhou Bo is an undergraduate of Air Force Engineering College and a postgraduate of St. Edmund College of Cambridge University. He has written more than 100 essays and articles in various western publications and speaks as a PLA delegate at Shangri- La Dialogue in Singapore and at Munich Security Conference. He's supervisor to foreign postgraduate office at PLA National Defense University. Zhou Bo, welcome to hear you speak.
Zhou Bo:
Thank you, Sushant, thank you for having me.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Zhou Bo, we are speaking only four days after Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi's visit to New Delhi. He met the Indian foreign minister and Indian national security advisor when he was in Delhi. What do you make of Wang’s Visit to India and to South Asia in general? And what were the reasons, to your mind, for his visit to India in particular?
Zhou Bo:
The direct reason for him to go to visit South Asia is to attend a meeting in Islamabad, that is 48th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and I think by making best use of this chance, he went to visit India, Nepal and Afghanistan as well. His visit to India was not very long, but it is self-evident that this kind of short, direct communication is badly needed because, I think, for at least two years this is the first time that a Chinese foreign minister visited India. Therefore, this kind of working visit, especially against the backdrop of the most unfortunate clash in Galwan valley in 2020, is extremely significant and useful.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
But were there any reasons, what were the motivations, that Wang had when he came to India, maybe looking for a breakthrough, maybe trying to win India? What were the reasons, what were the primary motivations for his visit?
Zhou Bo:
After the most unpleasant clash between the soldiers of the two sides, there must be a kind of cooling down of bilateral relationship, and it takes some time for both sides to heal the wounds. Therefore, we can understand this kind of silence. But it should not last because China is such an important country, and not only in Asia but in the world. And so is India. China is the second largest economy in the world, and you are the sixth largest economy in the world. Therefore, for us, the two great neighbors, we cannot afford to keep this kind of relationship so cold and so remoted. It is in the interests of both sides to come into contact. Of course, I know they have a lot of contacts, and they even attended some kind of visual meetings. But of course, this kind of personal exchanges would be most important. It cannot be replaced by any virtual meetings at all.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
If you want a breakthrough, as you seem to suggest, during his visit, and reestablish the warmth in ties with India, why did he give those statements in Pakistan in the organization of Islamic conference summit that you spoke of, which involved Kashmir, and then statements along with the Pakistani foreign minister, where he spoke about Pakistan’s territory integrity. As you know, India, New Delhi came out and condemned those statements. Clearly that was not creating a very conducive environment for kind of a breakthrough if Wang was looking from breakthrough in India.
Zhou Bo:
I think the most important is he has to be honest, to tell the truth, to tell how China feels about Pakistan’s concerns and also about India’s concerns. And these are not new issues between India and Pakistan. There is a longstanding issue of Kashmir. Actually China’s position on this is try to be as impartial as possible. Of course, neutrality is always a problem for people on the two sides, because they would consider your balance actually is a kind of expediency. But China is trying its best to strike a balance, because of course Pakistan is friendly with China, and this has certainly historical reasons. And China’s relationship with India basically is good apart from the border issue China’s position, at least on the Kashmir issue, has not changed. So, I don't think he has said a lot of things that are really new to Indian audience.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, I understand that Wang Yi said nothing new to the Indian audience, but the context in which it was said，and clearly, you know, there's an apprehension in India about a certain kind of collusion between China and Pakistan, which seems to drive a lot of Indian fears, Indian insecurities, that China and Pakistan can militarily collaborate and collude together. Would it not have been nice if China decided, or had Wang Yi decided to, in some ways reassure India or reassure the Indian government?
Zhou Bo:
Well I won't use this word collusion to describe the relationship between China and Pakistan. China's relationship with Pakistan is not a secret, and actually Pakistan’s policy toward China is not a secret neither, because I believe Pakistan’s foreign policy is, rooted in, above all, a good relationship with China. I received many Pakistan delegations in the past, and I was impressed when one of the ministers told us that Pakistani basically could not agree on anything except on friendship with China. So that is a fact.
But then I have to consider what kind of cooperation between China and Pakistan could be such a concern to India. I assume probably China’s military assistance to Pakistan might be a major concern. But if we just look at this issue more thoroughly, what are they? They're basically trading on military hardware. Yes we sell them aircraft, we sell them ships. But these exports are totally justifiable in that they are just normal trading. For example, internationally speaking, you're not allowed to sell weapons of mass destruction and you're not allowed to sell missiles whose ranges and payloads go beyond the MTCR rules. Apart from these, you basically can sell whatever you want.
Let me ask you another question. India's military hardwares are mainly from Russia, which provided from 60- 70% military hardwares to India. Sometimes India’s relationship with China is not so good. But has China ever complained either to India or to Russia about this kind of military sales? Never, yeah, never. So in the same fashion, I believe that India should not complain about China’s military relationship with Pakistan, in part because India is much stronger militarily than Pakistan. So what's the fear of India of this kind of cooperation?
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, I agree with you about the fear. I meant to say that certain insecurity, certain fear, because a lot of discussion in India, which you are aware of， is about a two front military threat, so to speak, which comes with both China and Pakistan acting together against India. That was the only reason. But I understand and hear you clearly to the argument that you're making.
Zhou Bo:
I want to say something more about this. In India, there are some strategies who are concerned with a kind of nightmare of China and Pakistan encircling India. This is totally wrong. This is absolutely wrong. Why should China do that? In human feelings, people always look up to another one more strong, more powerful for inspiration, for emulation. For example, China sometimes would compare itself with the United States, and Pakistan would compare itselff with India, and India would believeit is itself comparable to China.
It is really not in China’s interest to encircle India. Why? I give you an example. In 1998, India conducted nuclear tests first, followed by Pakistan. And India’s excuse is that China is a potential threat number one. I was staff officer in the Ministry of national defense at that time for South Asia. Everybody was shocked. Because we actually just had our chief of general staff visiting India. D uring his visit, everything was fine and all the sweet words were spoken. Not long after he came back, India suddenly announced China to be potential threat number one. how can that be? At that time, China’s attention was totally focused on Taiwan because at that time the Taiwanese authorities led by Chen Shuibian was making all the troubles, of calling for referendum and tose kind of things.
When we heard that we were potential threat number one, everybody was shocked. And later I thought about it. I thought, why was that? I thought that India wanted to develop nuclear weapons anyway, so it has to have a very, very big reason to justify it, because no small reasons could justify it. So defense minister George Fernandes raised China as potential threat number one. This is how I look at the issue.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, just going back to 1998 and the statement by George Fernandes. If you remember that, you would remember that the government of India had backtracked from the statement. And you would also remember the role of Washington DC, in leaking that letter, which then Indian prime minister had written to President Clinton and then released that letter to New York Times, putting India in a very embarrassing situation vis-à-vis Beijing. But that's all in the past. Now coming to the recent visit of Wang Yi’s Pakistan visit. So, as you rightly said, the visit was in a certain sense, in the backdrop of these border crises in Ladakh or in Siachen. The question I want to ask you is, why are the two countries, as you said two big Asian powers, why are they having so many crises at the borders in the past decade, the last ten years or so why are so many crises at the border between India and China? What are the drivers of this problem, which is happening more and more now?
Zhou Bo:
My answer to you is very brief and straight. That is because the line of actual control is not demarcated, but the problem is we have different views as to how this issue should be resolved. That is the genuine problem.
Let's me first make it very clear that these most unfortunate problem is a leftover by colonialists, right? And so it's not something that really we have created, but we are really troubled by this. India's approach to the line of actual control is fundamentally different from that of China. Basically, India’s argument is let's have a bottom-up approach. We verify the line of actual control and resolve this issue. China， preferring a top-down approach, would say that, okay, let's first of all make a political decision about how we might a kind of swap land, for mutual accommodation and mutual understanding. And India disagrees.
And so India’s position looks reasonable superficially. Because this is created by line of actual control, so why don't we just verify it and then determine where the line of actual control lies, so we can avoid this kind of a problem of trespassing to the other side. But there is a danger in India’s approach, that is, if this kind of line of actual control, which is not really taken by China as border, is verified, it could be taken by India to say, this is the de facto border, and let's make it as it is.
Historically speaking, both China and India had a lot of talks on this issue, and I myself was an expert at the earliest day of such bilateral military talks. So I remember clearly what the differences are. And in the western sector actually India has more places that they believe are controversial. So in other words, China doesn't believe that there are many differences in the western sector, while India believes there are more problems there. But if you look at the whole Indo-China border, then there are so many differences, including the length of the border. China believe it's just 2000 kilometers while India believes it's 3488 kilometers. In the eastern sector and the middle sector of the China-Indian border, there aren't many incidences happening. Why? Because India has actually de facto control in these two sections. So we end up having more problems in the western sector.
So let me come back to what I said. Line of actual control is the fundamental root cause of our disagreement, of the standoffs, of the deadly clashes, but we should not let the line of actual control hijack the two governments, the two peoples.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Just to push you a bit on this, the issues with the line of actual control had been there as you said, starting from 1947 or 1948. But almost for two and a half decades, there were no major crises on the border. The question I wanted to ask you was, what changed in the last ten years or so, that despite the line of actual control not being defined, there have been so many problems at the border, whether it was the Doklam crisis,or the major unfortunate incident in Galwan in June 2020 as you rightly said or others. Virtually every one or two years, we are having this crisis. And the crisis on the border from both sides, where the troops are deployed, continues to remain. So what has changed in the last 10 years that the crisis have emerged, such strong, big, major crisis have come up?
Zhou Bo:
Good question. When people talk about the deadly clashes, people actually are hooked with the results, without looking back into history, without looking at the opportunities actually in the crisis. When I talk about this, let me remind you that ever since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, we have actually established a number of confidence building measures, both at the governmental level and at the military levels. I'm sure you are aware of these agreements. And if you compare these confidence building measures with any of those between China and foreign countries, for example the United States, we would conclude that these confidence building measures are much more substantive than those we have with the United States, and they outnumber those. We just have a couple of agreements with the United States, but with India we have more than any other agreements between China and other countries. And these confidence building measures are so good in that they are so substantive. And in that they are full of details. For example, in the border troops agreement, it stated clearly that when the troops on one side are in patrol, the other side should not follow them. So this is very detailed. And, near the line of actual control you should not hold exercise at the division level, that is more than 15,000 people, and if you hold the exercise at the brigade level, that is 5000 people, you should notify the other side in advance, and you should not fly a military aircraft within close proximity of 10 kilometers from the LAC. So these rules have played a role, I believe they did, ever since 1993 when we have the first agreement. So they have played a huge, huge role, in maintaining, by and large, peace and tranquility along the borders of actual control.
We only had a deadly clash in a couple of years ago. We still had a lot of standoffs because the line of actual control is not demarcated. So the only difference is it’s not so deadly.
The incident on the 15th of June 2020 is most unfortunate. There are of course accusations against the other side, we understand that whensuch deadly clashes or incidents happened,people always pointed fingers at each other. So, here I do not give you a long story about how it happened. You have your interpretation and I have my own story.
But the good thing still, in this incident, is that neither side tried to shoot at the other side. So, they were actually fighting against each other in a stone age manner with stones and clubs. That means deep in their minds, they know that they should not shoot at each other at any circumstances, although later the Indian troops did shoot into the skythey didn’t shoot directly at the Chinese soldiers. So, it tells that these kinds of confidence building measures have really worked to a great extent.
Yes, they haven't stopped such a kind of accident from happening. So, what should we do? There definitely will come the time when both sides sit down and start to explore possible confidence building measures. And you don't need to look elsewhere. You just need to look into these agreements we have already made. They are so, so detailed. They areso tangible. So, if you carry out all of them, you don't have problems at all. And then, what makes the difference (is), because we were right now in a in a deadlock because the troops have very much disengaged, but not completely satisfactory to the Indian side, I understand that.
So, actually my suggestion is the troops from both sides should disengage at all most dangerous sectors. Yeah, so just disengage from each other. This is what we did along Pangong Tso lake and this type of experience should be followed elsewhere, for us to maintain the Line of Actual Control to be peaceful and tranquil.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
I believe what you are saying is to an extent true. But the problem is that neither side trust each other, not after deaths have occurred, after people have died and you said, you know, clubs have been used, rounds have been fired even though in the air. There is no trust between the two sides and the fact that the Line of Actual Control is not defined, the fact that trust has broken down, the fact that you know both sides say that the agreements are not being followed by the other side. The Indian foreign minister is on record saying China is not following these agreements of 1993 and 1996. The Chinese side is saying the Indians are not following the agreements. How do you move forward? How do you, you know in theory it's fine, we should disengage, but how do you move forward in this kind of environment?
Zhou Bo:
Okay, let's come to the worst scenarios, that China and India have no trust at all, with each other. This certainly is not the case, but let's assume, it's just an absolute black picture. Let me give an example of the cold war. During the cold war, the United States and Soviet Union did't trust each other at all, right? Because they were simply enemies, but out of such a kind of absolute mistrust of each other, they still were able to develop a lot of confidence building measures, primarily in nuclear fields. This is reflected in a number of important agreements, such as SALT, such as START, such as Open Skies Treaty. And they even had cooperation, for example, in two areas, one is joint efforts in eradicating smallpox, another is joint cooperation in outer space.
So, China’s relationship with India, apart from the border issue, I can hardly imagine there are serious problems elsewhere. Yes, you see, we in China are concerned with your concerns, but your concerns sometimes are not really justifiable, such as China’s close relationship with Pakistan. If I just raise your close relationship with Russia, what would you say? China is also friendly with Russia, which has great friendship with you. What I mean is that trust is of course important, but it's not that necessary for us to have effective confidence building measures. But between us, we still have trust in many other fields. I give you the latest example, the Russo-Ukrainain warDid you find the similarity in our positions? Yes, of course.
I believe this actually shows that India didn't say the right thing really wholeheartedly in the last few years. In the last few years, you would findIndia talking almost in an American tone about the free and open Indo-Pacific. But let me tell you, Indian position actually is more like that of China rather than that of the United States, because India has reservation for the same article in the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, that is article 298 for which China has reservation. When foreign military ships entered your exclusive economic zone to conduct military exercises, the Indian government would ask them for consent if it involves ammunitions and explosives. Well, if you compare your law on that with that of China, actually I would say that India’s is much more strict than that of China.
And let me give you another example, in April last year, the USS John Paul Jones sailed into the exclusive economic zone in the southwest of India, and the Seventh Fleet made a written declaration to say that in doing so, the United States would challenge India’s excessive maritime claim. India’s EEZ, I found, is actually one thirtieth of the whole Indian Ocean. That means if the United States challenged your claims, that means, at least in American’s eyes, 1/30 of the Indian Ocean is not free, not open because of India. So, how can India say, like the United States, that the Indo-Pacific has to be free and open ? This is wrong because the oceans themselves are interconnected naturally, so they are always free, they’re always open.
And if you look at the problems in the Indian Ocean, that is piracy. Piracy was rampant from 2008, basically to 2013. And thanks to joint efforts, including Chinese and Indian navy. We have solved this problem and the Indian navy has helped the Chinese merchant ships “Full City” in tandem with a Turkish ship under NATO’s command and a Chinese naval vessel. And I have been coordinator of the PLA on counter-piracy for quite a few years. I thank India on many occasions, including in Bahrain where international navy's efforts in counter-piracy were coordinated because the international military coordinations conferences about counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia Basin are always there in Bahrain.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yes, I'm hearing you. Bo the point I will push back on you, one point that you made about the Indian and Chinese position on the Russia-Ukraine war being similar. The Indian government has clearly come out saying, while the positions superficially look similar, the reasons driving them or the principles driving them are different in both cases. And even after Wang Yi’s visit, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Jaishankar actually came out and wanted to make it completely clear that India’s position is different from China’s. This is something which you heard from western capitals as well, and the position is not the same. So that's the only thing I would like to clarify to the listeners. But I get your argument, I'm not contesting your argument. I just wanted to make the Indian government's position clear.
But you spoke about concerns that India has from China and China has from India. What exactly are Chinese concerns with India? Are they geopolitical? Are the ideological? Are they driven by some other reasons? You know, I mean, is it the United States? Is it in the Indo-Pacific Strategy? Is it the Quad? What is it that the Chinese really are concerned with India about? What is something else about India, that is not publicly said? What exactly are those reasons?
Zhou Bo:
I'm fully aware that the Indian government try to make a difference in terms of its position towards the Russian-Ukrainian war. But to be honest with you, I read them and I haven't found them to be particularly different from that of China. Because you see China is not trying to get closer to India by saying, “Okay, my position is really like yours and your position really like mine”. It doesn't make sense. It doesn't matter. But you see, we have been talking about the two sides of the same coin, the sovereignty of a sovereign states and the legitimate concerns of Russia over NATO's expansion. I think we basically talk about the same things. So I don't know what are the differences. Frankly speaking, I believe because of the current atmosphere between China- India relationship, therefore, the Indian government is trying to appeal to the public opinion, to look somewhat hard, you know, on China. But, well, that is kind of gesture only.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
What about the concerns, about the Chinese concerns with India? Is it the United States? Is it the Quad? Is it the Indo-Pacific? Is it ideological? Is it geopolitical? What exactly are the reasons, all the areas that concern China when it looks at India?
Zhou Bo:
Actually, I do not have such worries. China is concerned with India’s so-called concerns. Let me put it in another way, we are only worried because you're worried for something and we don't know why you're worried at all. For example, a lot of people would say that China is worried about the Quad, and there are indeed some people even calling Quad “Asian’s NATO”. I don't think so. Why? Because I actually have confidence in India’s foreign policy. Because if I look at the history of Indian foreign policy, being one of the founders of the non-aligned movement and being a self-perceived great power, of course India will try its best to be impartial, to be neutral. And inQuad, I would say India is most important, because all the three other countries are already allies. India’s attitude really, really matters to the survival and development of Quad.
But India, like any other countries, would put its national interests as first priority. India cannot afford to even look too close to the United States， because of your good relation with Russia, because about 70% of your hardware comes from Russia, because you're still buying Russia’s S-400. So if you get too close to the United States, China and Russia won't be happy, and that is not in your interest.
If you look at the latest development of Quad, you would find that it is actually developing into many other directions rather than the military direction. In terms of its military content, that is only a military exercise called “Malabar” exercise, and that's it. And beside that, it is developing into a bit of everything, for example, like infrastructure building, climate change or joint distribution of vaccines to Southeast Asian countries. But I would argue that how successful can it be? For example, infrastructure. Joe Biden’s grandiose Build Back Better project basically is dead already. From what I read, it is described as a kind of ambitious memory, because of the strong opposition from the Republican parties. And then, how much money could actually United States contribute to this region in terms of infrastructure? It cannot be compared at all with China’s Belt & Road Initiative. And if we talk about climate change or joint distributional of vaccine, these are fine. But these are not exclusive issues for the four of you. It is for everybody. So, there's nothing particularly exclusive if it is not against China, well, I won't say it's against China. I believe AUKUS agreement is against China, and the Quad is because of China. But if the glue is, a kind of, anti-China sentiment, then Quad will never grow stronger. It can survive because of all the things I mentioned, but it won't thrive.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
But Bo the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States and even the latest military document, the rejected version that put out by the Pentagon, which was sent to the Congress. It clearly mentions China as an adversary, it mentions Indo-Pacific, it says, you know, Europe is the second resister, the primary contestation is with China. Even within that context, you don't think that Quad is directed towards China?
Zhou Bo:
Well, I don't believe that Quad would be very useful if it is against China. Let me talk about the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States. I read the report, which was published sometime in February. I believe that this is a, how can I say, first of all the assumption of the whole Indo-Pacific strategy is wrong because it's assumed that China wants to create a kind of a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific. This is totally wrong. Why? Let me put it this way, even if China wants, China cannot achieve it, even in East Asia, where its influence is the strongest. In East Asia, there is DPRK who won't listen to China on nuclear proliferation issue right? That is why they develop nuclear weapon. And there are quite a few American allies. And even in South China sea issues, there are a few claimant who have their own claims. So, in spite of the fact that China’s influence is strongest in this region, we still have a huge major difference for me to say that it is China’s sphere of influence.
The problem is, people often make a mistake, they confuse two things. One is the influence, another is sphere of influence. If you talk about China’s influence, absolutely, China’s influence is global now, it is already global. It's almost overlapping with that of the United States, short of military influence, right? But China is not creating a sphere of influence, and that is why China’s military activities overseas, be it counter-piracy, be it peacekeeping, be it evacuation of personals from disaster relief. They are all humanitarian in nature. So that tells China doesn’t have a global military ambition. So apart from its own territory and its adjacent waters which is Chinese territorial water, China just wants to help other countries. So that is why we are only doing things that are humanitarian. Why should we create our own spheres of influence that are so costly and so difficult to maintain?
So, this kind of assumption, from very beginning, is wrong. Besides, the United States does not have enough tools to realize it's too many purposes in the Indo-Pacific strategy, because you have so many purposes, and how many countries would really follow the United States in the antagonizing in China? I really doubt, because even its allies are the largest trading partners of China, so it would be very difficult for them to make such a decision.
And we simply were thrown into this kind of great power competition without reasons at all. If you look at China’s policy towards the United States, it is very much consistent and stable. Yeah, and then we will talk about the same thing. But it's the United States that actually have to change its policy fundamentally because they realize eventually that they could not change China’s political system, China is getting stronger. So, they were panicking. And since Trump, he ushered in this kind of great power competition. And what happened? What's wrong with China, on China’s part in this kind of relationship? Well, I won't say we did nothing wrong, but at least we haven't created any special, very difficult situation for the United States. Yeah, so China’s policy, comparatively speaking, is much more stable, right?
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, Bo, just getting back to something which you said earlier, you said that China’s concerns about India are India’s concerns, essentially saying that there is nothing about India which concerns or worries China. Is it because China is so much bigger than India? Economically, militarily, geopolitically, the gap is so much dilated, the difference in related part is so much. Is it another way of saying that you're too small for us?
Zhou Bo:
No, India is not small at all, and this economy is currently the sixth largest economy, and by 2030 you will become the second largest economy in Asia, overtaking Japan. So, we are fully aware of your magnitude, and we have full respect for that because, I, as an observer, found you were actually doing a lot of things that China did in the past. Basically, your way of reform started ten years behind that of China. But you are doing almost the same thing. So, you are also developing very fast. And we're happy to see that because the fact is the international political and economic shifts are just moving to Asia. That is for sure. China certainly is in the center, but India is also looming large. I won't talk about the so-called “Asian century”. But I believe there are really, really good reasons for our two countries to have good cooperation.
I myself in my working days, ten years of my working experiences are associated with South Asia. I went to Pakistan, I went to India, and I believe I'm among very few Chinese who at least know some Indian dishes by name. Those dishes make no sense to ordinary Chinese. When I was in India, I thought that this is a country which actually has benefited China a lot. Historically, the Buddhism, the exchange of cultures on The Silk Road... We are just not on a good term because of something left by the colonialists. Ah, it's very sad. I don't know how to resolve this, and I believe it's very difficult for us to resolve this. But I believe, yeah, with all those measures in place, and probably with some new ideas, such as a disengage each other from all the dangerous places. We can manage it. Probably you are more confident than me, because you talk about how very few accidental incidents happened before the clash.
So if we, with all this have maintained peace and stability with a cost of 20 Indian soldiers and 4 Chinese soldiers, probably with good lesson learned, we could make another 40 years peaceful and tranquil with even less casualty. I believe this is possible。 Because this is such a bloody and deadly lesson, both of us should have learned something from it. But if this is the price we paid, we should not pay it in the next 40 years.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Going back to your taste in Indian dishes, I must say you have good taste in Indian food. These are some of the nice dishes that India has. But to the more serious things, you mentioned the Indo-Pacific strategy. Is it possible for India to be a part of the Quad, to be an active member of the Quad, even though it's a non-security, non-military alliance and still be friendly with China?
Zhou Bo:
Well, I think it depends on, first of all, what Quad is and how it is going to evolve. Because China certainly would pay attention to the evolution of Quad to see if if this is not really harmful to China's interests.
Frankly speaking, I believe India's attitude from now on will change gradually because I believe it will just stay back a bit from its pro-American policy in the past. And the latest comments on the Ukraine and Russia war demonstrated that. I should have known that. But I believe this time because India was somehow pushed to the corner, therefore it has to show its true color. Therefore we see it abstained from the vote, and it said something more or less similar to that of China. And this is true India. This is not India in pretension, I believe.
So in the days to come, then there is a grand picture of how the international order would look like, right? So basically, I believe in Europe definitely we are going to have another cold war after this hot war. But in Asia, the United States has already initiated a new cold war against China, although at the governmental level they would not call it a new cold war. But if you look at it carefully, Biden’s policy toward China is basically extreme competition short of war. If competition is already extreme, what else can it be， if it is not like a new cold war? It is only a few steps away from hot war theoretically, right? W hat else can it be? So we do not have any fanciful wishes that China-American relationship will improve tremendously. But of course we still wish for the best.
The fundamental thing is, China is a large beneficiary from the existing international order. So China is not like Russia, which resents the current international order with victimhood. China is grateful to the international order and China has benefited from international order. So that is why China vows to safeguard the international order. And we all call for multipolarity. It's not about how we can actually achieve it. It's because it is a fact that the strength of the United States is on the wane, however slowly. When I talked to americans, they would admit that. But they will say this is relative decline. But relative decline is also kind of decline, right? So I believe Americans’ focus in the Indo-Pacific actually reflects its decline in strength. Therefore, it has to retrench. And its withdrawal from Afghanistan from elsewhere into the Indo-Pacific is actually a reflection that it's not as strong as it was. Therefore, it has to stay focused on competition with China.
In this regard, what kind of role would India play is critical. So China, for all good reasons, wish it has good relationship with India. We do not wish you take the American side. It’s on the wrong side of history.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
I agree that India would not want to be in a situation where it is in conflict with China. But the situation, as we see today happens to be something evolving. So my final question to you is, in your objective assessment of the situation, not a hope or a wish. In your assessment, how do you see the future of China-India, relationship, China-India ties? Is it collaboration? Is it competition? Is it conflict or is it a mixture of the three?
Zhou Bo:
Well, I think it's a mixture of three, but the only question is the proportion, right? Because of what had happened in the Galwan Valley, therefore I believe that the Indian government is still in a kind of resentmental， moody situation, because they say very much like in the old days that unless and until the border issue is resolved, we cannot expect the bilateral relationship to improve tremendously. Well, basically something like that. This is very much like how the Indian government before Karamchand Gandhi’s visit said. But the fact is the border issue cannot be resolved easily. And even if the Indian government wants to place this kind of relationship hostage to the border issue, they cannot. Because economically speaking, the two countries would still have tremendous, huge economic interactions, and these kinds of economic rules will break through such kind of man-made boundaries.
So the relationship definitely will get warmer and warmer, but slowly and slowly， because of what happened. I believe that time might just heal the wounds and the Chinese side also have casualties. I think we have to live with the reality. And I believe, generally speaking, the relationship will just move forward in despite of the problems.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
The question actually is in Indian position， it is not that the border issue should be resolved permanently. The Indian position is that the bilateral relationship can improve once the immediate crisis on the border, where the soldiers are facing each other whether at PP15 or Depsang or Demchok. Once that is resolved and disengagement happens, then some kind of normalcy can resume in the bilateral ties, which I think as you yourself said, a disengagement is definitely a possibility.
Zhou Bo:
Yes, so if that is the condition of the government, I don't believe it's difficult to meet because the Chinese side also said something similar. Of course, there lies many details. So that is why we have held so far 15 rounds of talks at corps-commander level. But of course for talks to become successful, we have to have political and strategic guidance from the two capitals. I think things are improving gradually. Generally speaking, I'm optimistic about this relationship. Because apart from this border issue, I can see no other major issues in the bilateral relationship. I really cannot figure it out.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Bo, you are more optimistic than most Indians or most Indian commentators or most Indian officials that I talk to, who are less optimistic than you. I would like to believe you and I hope that things would improve and there are no more conflicts anywhere. Anyway, Bo, thank you so much for your time. It was wonderful talking to you and listening to your thoughts. I really enjoy speaking to you.
Zhou Bo:
Thank you Sushant for all this, thank you.
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