【編者按：4月11日，美國總統拜登将和印度總理莫迪舉行線上會晤，這一度被認為是美國向印度直接施壓，以尋求在俄烏問題上印度能站在美國一邊。
近日，印度政策研究中心進階研究員、美國耶魯大學通路教授蘇桑特·辛格，邀請清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員、中國論壇特約專家周波訪談，雙方就國務委員兼外交部長王毅對印度的工作通路、中印關系應如何走出加勒萬河谷沖突低谷、兩國邊境實際控制線問題解決、中印在俄烏沖突上的立場之“同”與“不同”，以及中印在亞太和全球事務的合作等熱點暢言。訪談播客已在印度政策研究中心網站釋出，觀網和中國論壇全文翻譯，以飨讀者。】
蘇桑特·辛格：大家下午好！我是印度政策研究中心進階研究員蘇桑特·辛格。我們很少聽到來自中國的權威聲音。今天我們的節目有幸請來中國的周波大校（退休），他是清華大學戰略與安全中心研究員，中國論壇特約專家。
周波大校于1979年入伍，在軍隊中擔任過許多職務，包括中央軍委國際軍事合作辦公室安全合作中心主任。周波是空軍工程學院的大學生和劍橋大學聖愛德蒙學院的碩士研究所學生。他在各種西方出版物上撰寫了100多篇論文和文章，并作為解放軍代表在新加坡香格裡拉對話會和慕尼黑安全會議上發言。他是中國人民解放軍國防大學外軍碩士研究所學生導師。周波，歡迎您的到來。
周波：蘇桑特，感謝您的邀請。
蘇桑特·辛格：周波，我們現在這個對話正好是在中國國務委員兼外長王毅通路新德裡僅四天後。他在新德裡時會見了印度外長和印度國家安全顧問。你如何看待王毅對印度和整個南亞的通路？在你看來，他對印度進行特别通路的原因是什麼？
周波：王毅國務委員兼外長通路南亞的直接原因是參加在伊斯蘭堡舉行的伊斯蘭合作組織外長理事會第48次會議。我認為他為了充分利用這次機會，也順道通路了印度、尼泊爾和阿富汗。他對印度的通路時間并不長，但不言而喻的是，這種簡短、直接的交流是非常需要的，因為這是至少兩年來，中國外長第一次通路印度。是以，這種工作通路，特别是在2020年加勒萬河谷發生了不幸的沖突的背景下，是極為重要和有益的。
蘇桑特·辛格：除了雙方（很久）沒通路對方國家之外，還有任何其他原因嗎？王毅來印度，也許是在尋找（雙邊關系）突破口，也許是想赢得印度支援？他通路的主要動機是什麼？
周波：在雙方士兵之間發生最不愉快的沖突（2020年加勒萬河谷沖突）之後，雙邊關系肯定會冷一陣子。雙方都需要一些時間來療傷。是以我們可以了解這種沉默，但這種沉默不應該繼續下去。
中國，不僅對亞洲，而且對世界而言，都是重要的國家，而印度也是如此。中國是世界上第二大經濟體，而印度是世界上第六大經濟體。是以，對我們這兩個相鄰的大國來說，我們不能讓這種關系如此冷淡，如此疏遠。是以，接觸是符合雙方的利益的。當然，我知道雙方是有很多接觸，參加了各種線上會議，但這種個人（面對面的）交流是最重要的，它無法被任何線上會議所取代。
3月25日，王毅同印度外長蘇傑生舉行會談（圖檔來源：中華人民共和國外交部網站）
蘇桑特·辛格：如果你們希望他的通路取得突破，就好像你建議的那樣，與印度重歸于好，為什麼他卻選擇在巴基斯坦的伊斯蘭合作組織外長理事會上發表了那些涉及克什米爾的聲明，然後與巴基斯坦外長一起發表聲明，談到了巴基斯坦的領土完整。如你所知，新德裡站出來譴責了這些聲明。顯然，如果王毅想在印度尋求關系突破的話，這一舉動并沒有為實作突破創造一個很有利的環境。
周波：我認為這種言論對外交突破是否有益并不重要。我認為最重要的是他必須真誠地說出中國對巴基斯坦和印度所關注的事情的感受。克什米爾問題由來已久，這并不是印度和巴基斯坦之間的新問題，實際上中國在這方面的立場是盡量保持公正。
當然，中立對當事雙方來說總是一個問題，因為别人會認為你的平衡實際上是一種權宜之計。但是中國實際上在盡力一碗水端平，巴基斯坦與中國友好有其曆史原因，而中國與印度的關系，除了邊界問題，基本上也是好的。至少在克什米爾問題上，中國的立場并沒有改變。是以我不認為他說了許多對印度聽衆來說很新的東西。
蘇桑特·辛格：是的，我了解對印度聽衆來說，王毅沒說什麼新的東西，但要考慮他說這話的背景。顯然你知道，印度對中國和巴基斯坦之間的某種“合謀”有一種憂慮，這似乎加深了印度的很多恐懼和不安全感，即中國和巴基斯坦可能會在軍事上合作甚至“勾結”起來。如果中國決定，或者說王毅決定，在某些方面讓印度放心，或者讓印度政府放心，這難道不是一件好事嗎？
周波：我不會用“勾結”一詞來形容中國和巴基斯坦之間的關系。中國與巴基斯坦的關系不是一個秘密，實際上巴基斯坦的對華政策也不是一個秘密。我認為，巴基斯坦的外交政策是根植于與中國的良好關系。我在過去接待了許多巴基斯坦代表團，其中一位部長對我們說的一句話令我印象深刻，他說“除了與中國的友誼，巴基斯坦人基本上不能就任何事情達成一緻”。是以中巴友誼是一個事實。
但我們又不得不考慮，中國和巴基斯坦之間什麼樣的合作會讓印度如此擔憂。我想，中國對巴基斯坦的軍事援助可能是印度的主要關切。但如果我們更透徹地看待它們，這些算什麼問題？基本上就是軍事裝備的交易而已。的确，我們賣給他們飛機軍艦，但這些出口是完全合理的，因為它們隻是正常貿易。例如，從國際貿易來說，你不能出售大規模殺傷性武器，你不能出售超過一定射程、一定載荷的飛彈，因為這超出了飛彈技術控制制度（MTCR）規則。是以除了這些，你基本上可以出售任何你想賣的東西。
我再反問你一下。印度的軍事裝備主要來自俄羅斯，俄羅斯提供了印度60-70%的軍事裝備。有時印度與中國的關系并不那麼好,但中國有沒有向印度或俄羅斯抱怨過這種軍品貿易？從來沒有。是以，我同樣認為印度不應該抱怨中國與巴基斯坦的軍事關系，部分也是因為印度在軍事上比巴基斯坦強大得多。那麼，印度有什麼必要對中巴合作恐懼呢？
印度從俄羅斯購買的S-400防空系統（圖自澎湃影像）
蘇桑特·辛格：是的，我同意你說的關于恐懼的部分。我所說的某種不安全感、某種恐懼，是因為你也知道有很多關于印度面臨雙線作戰的軍事威脅的讨論，即中國和巴基斯坦一起行動來對付印度的威脅。這是唯一的原因。但我是能清楚地聽懂并了解你要表達的觀點。
周波：我想就這個問題多說幾句。在印度，有一些戰略家，他們關心的是所謂中國和巴基斯坦包圍印度的噩夢。這是完全錯誤的，這絕對是錯誤的。中國為什麼要這樣做？人類心理的弱點，就是人們總是仰望另一個更強大、更有力量的群體，以獲得靈感，進行效仿。例如，中國有時會将自己與美國比較，巴基斯坦會将自己與印度比較，而印度會認為自己可以與中國相比。
包圍印度确實不符合中國的利益。為什麼呢？我給你舉個例子。1998年，印度首先進行了核試驗，緊接着是巴基斯坦。而印度(核試驗)的借口是，中國是印度頭号潛在威脅。當時我是負責南亞地區的國防部參謀。大家聽了都很震驚，因為實際上我們的總參謀長（傅全有）剛剛通路了印度，在他通路期間一切都很好，大家談得也很好。他回來後不久，印度突然宣布中國是潛在的頭号威脅，這怎麼可能？當時中國的注意力完全集中在台灣，因為當時以陳水扁為首的台灣當局正在制造各種麻煩，要求進行“獨立公投”等。
但當我們聽說中國是潛在的頭号威脅時，每個人都很震驚。後來我想為什麼印度會把中國視為潛在的頭号威脅？印度無論如何都要發展核武器，是以它必須有一個非常、非常重大的理由來證明這一點，因為任何小的理由都不能證明它是合理的。是以國防部長喬治-費爾南德斯提出，中國是潛在的頭号威脅。這就是我對此事的看法。
蘇桑特·辛格：是的，回到1998年和（國防部長）費爾南德斯的聲明，當時印度政府對該聲明反悔了。你也會記得美國在洩露那封信方面所起的作用，當時的印度總理給克林頓總統寫了一封信，美國轉而向《紐約時報》透露了那封信，使印度非常尴尬，不知如何向中國解釋。
但這都是過去的事了。現在回到王毅最近對巴基斯坦的通路。正如你之前所說的，這次通路在某種意義上，在拉達克或錫亞琴冰川的這些邊境危機的背景下，我想問的是為什麼印度和中國這兩個國家，如你所說的兩個亞洲大國，在過去十年左右，邊境有這麼多的危機？是什麼因素驅動這個問題現在越來越頻繁地發生？
周波：我給你個非常簡短直接的答案：因為邊境實際控制線并沒有劃定，而中印對如何解決這個問題有不同的看法。這就是真正的問題所在。
讓我首先非常清楚地說明，這些最不幸的問題是殖民主義者遺留下來的，對嗎？是以，這不是我們制造的問題，但我們确實是以深受困擾。印度對邊境實際控制線的看法與中國的看法有本質的差別。基本上，印度的觀點是采取自下而上的方法，希望通過核定邊境實際控制線來解決這個問題。而中國則希望自上而下，表示首先讓我們做出一個政治決定，商議如何置換土地，以實作互諒互讓，而印度卻不同意。
印度的立場從表面上看是合理的，因為沖突發生是由邊境實際控制線（模糊）造成的，那我們為什麼不确定這條邊境實際控制線的位置？這樣我們就可以避免這種闖入對方國界的問題。但是印度的做法有一個危險，中國并沒有真正把實際控制線當作邊界，如果邊境實控線被核定後，印度可能會說：這就是事實上的邊界，讓它成為既成事實吧。
曆史上中國和印度就圍繞這個問題進行了很多會談，而我自己早期作為專家參加過這種雙邊軍事會談，是以我清楚地記得有哪些分歧。實際上，印度認為西部地區是有更多争議的地方。換句話說，中國不認為在西部地區有很多分歧，而印度認為那裡有更多問題。
但是，如果你看一下整個中印邊界，其實存在很多分歧，比如邊界的長度，中國認為它隻有2000公裡，而印度認為是3488公裡。但在中印邊界東段和中段，就沒有很多沖突事件發生。為什麼呢？因為印度在這兩段地區有實際的控制權，是以最終還是在西部出現更多的問題。
是以，讓我回到我所說的：實際控制線是我們的分歧、對峙和緻命沖突的根本原因，但我們不應該讓實際控制線控制兩國政府和兩國人民。
蘇桑特·辛格：這個問題我再挑戰你一下。正如你所說的那樣，實際控制線的問題從1947或1948年開始一直存在，但從1988年、1990年開始，在此後的幾乎20多年裡，邊界上沒有重大危機。我想問你的問題是，在過去十年左右的時間裡，是什麼發生改變了？盡管實際控制線沒有被劃定，但在邊境上出現了這麼多問題，無論是洞朗危機，還是你所說的2020年6月在加勒萬河谷發生的重大不幸事件。現在不斷地，幾乎每一或兩年，我們都會發生這樣的危機，還有在雙方部署部隊的邊界，危機繼續存在。那麼，在過去十年左右時間裡，這樣強烈的、重大的危機出現，是源于什麼變化？
周波：這是個好問題。當人們談論緻命的沖突時，往往被結果所限，而沒有回顧曆史，沒有看到危機中的機會。當我談到這一點時，讓我提醒你，自從拉吉夫-甘地1988年通路中國以來，我們實際上達成了大量包括政府層面和軍事層面的建立信任的措施。我相信你知道這些協定。如果你把這些信任建立措施與中國和外國之間的任何措施，例如與美國的相比較，我們會得出結論，中印的信任措施比中國與美國的信任措施要有内容的多。數量上，我們與美國有兩三個協定，但與印度的協定比中國與任何其他國家之間的協定都多。
這些信任建立措施非常好，因為它們富有内涵，充滿細節。例如，在邊境部隊協定中，它明确指出，當一方的部隊在巡邏時，另一方不應尾随。是以這是非常具體的規定。而且，在實際控制線附近，不應該舉行師級演習，也就是不超過15000人，如果要舉行旅級的演習，也就是5000人，應該事先通知對方，而且不應該在距離實際控制線10公裡的近距離内出現軍用飛機。是以，我相信這些規則，自從1993年我們有了第一個協定以來，确實是發揮了巨大的作用，大體上維持了邊境實際控制線的和平與安甯。
我們隻在過去幾年前發生過一次緻命的沖突，我們此前仍然有很多對峙，因為實際控制線并沒有劃定。唯一的差別是過去的對峙沒那麼緻命。
加勒萬河谷沖突
2020年6月15日的事件是非常不幸的。我們也能夠了解當這種緻命的沖突或事件發生時，人們難免互相指責。在這裡我就不長篇累牍地講事情的經過了。你有你一方的解釋，我也有我這邊的叙事。
但在這個事件中，好的一面是雙方都沒有試圖向對方開槍。是以他們實際上是以石器時代的方式，用石頭和棍棒鬥毆，這意味着在他們的意識中，他們清楚在任何情況下都不應向對方開槍。盡管後來印度軍隊确實向天空開槍了，但他們沒有向中國士兵開槍。是以，這說明中印建立信任的措施在很大程度上起到了作用。
但是信任措施并沒有阻止這種事故的發生。那麼，我們應該怎麼做？雙方坐下來探讨可能的信任措施的時刻肯定會到來。而其實我們不需要去其他地方尋找信任措施，我們隻需要看看我們已經達成的這些協定。它們細緻入微，非常具體。如果你執行了所有這些協定就不會有任何問題再出現。中印現在處于一個僵局中，大部分的部隊已經脫離接觸了，但我了解印度方面并不是非常滿意。
我的建議是，雙方部隊應該從最危險的地方脫離接觸。我們在班公湖一帶所做的就是脫離接觸，這種經驗應該在其他地方效仿，以使我們保持中印邊境實際控制線的和平安甯。
蘇桑特·辛格：我相信你所說的在某種程度上是真實的。但現在的問題是，雙方已經使用了棍棒，即使朝向空中，子彈也已經射出。死難發生後，雙方都不信任對方。雙方之間沒有信任，中印邊境實際控制線沒有被明确界定，而信任已經破裂。雙方都聲稱對方沒有遵守協定。印度外長公開表示，中國沒有遵守1993年和1996年的協定。中國方面則說是印度人沒有遵守這些協定。我們如何向前邁進？脫離接觸從理論上是可行的，但是你認為中印應該如何在這種環境中向前發展？
周波：好吧，讓我們來設想一下最壞的情況，即中國和印度彼此之間完全沒有信任了。這當然不是事實，但假設前景一片黑暗，讓我舉一個冷戰時期的例子加以說明。
在冷戰期間，美國和蘇聯根本不信任對方,他們是敵人，但是即便有這樣一種不信任存在，他們仍然能夠制定很多信任措施，這些措施主要是在核領域。有一些重要的協定可以反映這一點，如限制戰略武器條約（SALT）、削減戰略武器條約（START）、開放天空條約。他們甚至在兩個領域進行了合作，一個是在消除天花方面的努力，另一個是在外層空間上的合作。
中國與印度的關系，除了邊界問題外，我很難想象其他方面會有嚴重的問題。中國關切印度的擔憂，但印度的擔憂有時是無道理的，比如中國與巴基斯坦的密切關系。如果我提出印度與俄羅斯的密切關系，印度會怎麼說？中國與俄羅斯也是友好的，俄羅斯與印度有很好的友誼。是以，我的意思是，信任固然很重要，但對于有效的建立信任措施而言，互信并不是那麼要緊。中印之間在許多其他領域仍存在互信。我給你舉一個最新的例子，俄烏戰争中，你是否發現我們的立場有相似之處？當然有相似之處。
印度網友推特留言支援俄羅斯
我認為，這實際上表明在過去幾年裡，印度并沒有完全如實地表達自己的觀點。在過去幾年中，你會發現印度幾乎在以美國的口吻談論自由開放的印太。但讓我說，印度的立場實際上與中國的更像，而不是與美國的更像。因為印度同中國一樣對《聯合國海洋法公約》中的相同條款即第298條有保留。當有外國軍艦進入印度的專屬經濟區進行軍事演習時，如果涉及彈藥和爆炸物，印度政府會要求他們首先征得印度政府的同意。與中國的相關法律相比，印度的法律比中國的法律要更嚴苛。
我再舉一個例子，去年4月，美國約翰·保羅·瓊斯号驅逐艦駛入了印度西南部的專屬經濟區，美國海軍第七艦隊發表書面聲明稱這樣做是因為美國将挑戰印度的“過度海洋主張”。我發現，印度專屬經濟區占印度洋的三十分之一。換言之，美國挑戰印度的主張意味着，至少在美國人眼裡，1/30的印度洋是因為印度才不自由、不開放的。那麼，印度怎麼能用同美國一樣的口吻談論印太必須是自由開放的呢？這是不對的，因為海洋本身是天然互相聯系的，它們本來就一直是自由的、開放的。
如果一定要說印度洋中存在的問題，那就是海盜問題。從2008年開始一直到大約2013年，海盜很猖獗。在包括中國和印度海軍在内的共同努力下，我們已經解決了這個問題。印度海軍幫助救援中國商船“富城号”，在這個過程中印度海軍同一艘在北約指揮下的土耳其軍艦和一艘中國海軍軍艦進行了配合。我在幾年裡一直是中國軍隊反海盜的國際協調人。是以，我也在許多場合對印方表示過感謝，包括在巴林，因為各國海軍反海盜協調會會議總是在巴林舉行。
蘇桑特·辛格：我明白你想表達什麼，但有一點，關于你提出的印度和中國在俄烏争端中持相似立場，我想要反駁你。印度政府已經明确表示，雖然表面上看我們立場相似，但在這兩者之間，驅動它們的原因或驅動它們的原則是不同的。甚至在王毅通路之後，印度外交部長蘇傑生先生特意站出來，想澄清印度的立場與中國不同。這一點你也從西方國家那裡聽到了，大家立場是不一樣的。是以這是我想向聽衆澄清的唯一一點。但我明白你的論點，我不是在争論，僅僅是想把印度政府的立場說清楚。
你談到了印度對中國和中國對印度的擔憂。中國對印度的擔憂到底是什麼？地緣政治？意識形态？還是擔憂是由一些其他原因驅動的？中國對印度的擔憂是美國嗎？是印太戰略嗎？還是四國集團？中國真正關心的是什麼？關于對印度的擔憂還有什麼是中國沒有公開表達的？
周波：我知道印度政府試圖在對俄烏争端的立場上表現出同中國不同。但坦率地講，我研讀了你們的立場，我發現，印度與中國的立場沒有根本的不同。中國并不是想通過表達“好吧，我的立場跟你的立場很像”來接近印度，這樣沒有意義，也并不重要。中印一直以來談論的都是同一枚硬币的兩面，一面是一個主權國家的主權，另一面是俄羅斯對北約擴張的合理關切。我認為我們基本上談論的是同樣的事情，是以我不認為有什麼不同。坦言之，我認為，由于目前中印關系的氛圍，印度政府對中國采取了一些看似強硬的态度以試圖吸引公衆輿論，但是這其實隻是一種姿态。
蘇桑特·辛格：那麼中國對印度的擔憂呢？是美國嗎？是四國集團嗎？是印太戰略嗎？是意識形态、地緣政治嗎？中國對印度的擔憂，究竟是為何？
周波：實際上，我沒有這樣的擔憂。中國是為印度的所謂擔憂感到擔憂。讓我換個說法，中國擔憂隻是因為印度在為某些事情擔憂，雖然中國根本不知道印度為什麼要擔憂。很多人會說，中國擔心四國機制（QUAD）。确實有一些人甚至稱其為“亞洲的北約”。我不這麼認為。為什麼呢？因為我對印度的外交政策有信心。
如果我們看一下印度外交政策史，作為不結盟運動的創始國之一，作為一個自信的大國，印度當然會盡量不偏不倚，保持中立。在四國機制中，其他三個國家都已經是盟友，我也會說印度是最重要的。印度的态度對四國集團的生存和發展至關重要。
但是印度和其他國家一樣，會把自己的國家利益放在首位。印度不能與美國走得太近，因為印度和俄羅斯的關系也很好，印度大約70%的軍事裝備都來自俄羅斯，還在購買俄羅斯的S-400飛彈。是以，如果印度和美國走得太近，中國和俄羅斯會不高興，而這不符合印度自身的利益。
如果你觀察四國機制的最新發展，你會發現，它實際上正在朝向許多其他方向，而不是軍事方向發展。就其軍事内容而言，目前僅有一個名為“馬拉巴爾”的軍事演習，僅此而已。除此之外，四國機制正在各個領域發展，如基礎設施建設、氣候變化或向東南亞國家聯合分發疫苗等。
但我想說的是，它能有多成功呢？比如說，基礎設施，拜登推出的“重建更美好世界”倡議基本上已經泡湯了。據我所知，因為共和黨的強烈反對，它已被描述為一個雄心勃勃的回憶而已。而且，美國實際上能為該地區的基礎設施貢獻多少錢？它完全無法與中國的“一帶一路”倡議比拟。如果我們談論氣候變化或疫苗配置設定，這些計劃确實都很好。但這些并不是這四個國家的專屬問題，而是同每個國家息息相關。
是以，如果四國機制的發展不是針對中國的，它就沒什麼特别的。我不會說四國集團是針對中國的，我相信美英澳三邊安全合作協定（AUKUS）是針對中國的，而四國機制可以說是因為中國的。但是，如果讓四國集團勾結在一起的是一種“反華”的情緒，那麼四國機制将永遠不會壯大。它可以在我以上提到的那些領域存在，但不會蓬勃發展。
蘇桑特·辛格：但是，美國的印太戰略，以及由五角大樓提出的、被送到國會的最新的軍事檔案（被拒絕的版本），它當中明确提到中國是一個對手，它提到了印太戰略，表示歐洲（疑指俄羅斯）隻是第二個對手，美國主要的競争是與中國的競争。即使在這種情況下，你也不認為四國機制是針對中國的嗎？
周波：好吧，我認為，四國機制如果是針對中國的，它不會真正起很大作用。談到美國的印太戰略，我讀了這份報告，它是在2月發表的。我認為首先整個印太戰略的假設就是錯誤的，因為它假設中國想要在印太地區建立一種勢力範圍。這是完全錯誤的。為什麼呢？讓我這樣說吧，即使中國想，中國也無法建立勢力範圍。即使在中國影響力最強的東亞，中國也無法建立勢力範圍。東亞有北韓，北韓在核擴散問題上不聽中國，堅持發展核武器。東亞國家裡還有幾個美國的盟友。甚至在南海問題上，也存在一些聲索國持有自己的主張。是以，盡管中國的影響力在這個地區是最強的，但距離在這裡建立勢力範圍，我認為還有很大差距。
人們經常犯一個錯誤，他們混淆了兩個概念，一個是影響力，另一個是勢力範圍。如果你談論中國的影響力，中國的影響力現在絕對是全球性的。中國的影響範圍幾乎與美國的影響範圍重疊，隻是軍事影響力遜于美國，對不對？但中國沒有建立勢力範圍，這就是為什麼中國在海外的軍事活動都是人道主義性質的，無論是反海盜，還是維和，還是救災及撤僑。中國沒有全球軍事布陣的野心。在中國自己的領土和附近水域也就是中國的領海之外，我們隻是想幫助其他國家。這就是為什麼中國隻做人道主義的事情。我們有什麼必要建立代價高昂又難以維持的勢力範圍嗎？
是以這個假設從一開始就是錯誤的。此外，美國沒有足夠的能力來實作它在印太戰略中的諸多目的。印太戰略有這麼多目的，有多少國家會真正跟随美國，站在中國的對立面？我真的很懷疑。因為美國的盟友很多是中國的貿易夥伴，是以他們很難做出這樣的跟随美國，對抗中國的決定。
中國無緣無故地被卷入了這場大國競争之中。因為如果你看一下中國對美國的政策，中國對美國的政策是非常一緻和穩定的。我們自始至終一直談論同樣的事情。但實際上是美國不得不從根本上改變其對華政策，因為他們最終意識到他們無法改變中國的政治制度，中國正在變得越來越強大。是以他們很恐慌。自特朗普上台，他就引入了大國競争的概念。在中美關系中，中國犯了什麼錯誤嗎？我不能說我們事事都對，但是我們至少沒有給美國制造任何特殊的、非常困難的局面。是以中國對美國政策，相對美國的對華政策，要穩定得多。
蘇桑特·辛格：好的，周波，回到你之前說的一點，你說中國對印度的關切就是印度自己的擔憂，也就是說印度基本上沒有什麼讓中國關注或擔心的地方。這是因為中國比印度大得多嗎？無論是在經濟上、軍事上、地緣政治上，相關領域的差距是如此之大。換言之，這是否意味着印度對中國來說太小了？
周波：不，印度一點都不小，印度目前是第六大經濟體，到2030年你們将趕超日本成為亞洲第二大經濟體。是以，中國充分意識到了印度的份量，中國也充分尊重這一點。作為一個觀察者，我發現印度過去做的很多事同中國曾經做過的事情一樣。印度的改革比中國晚十年，但印度做的事幾乎同中國相同。是以，印度的發展也非常快，中國很高興看到這一點。因為事實是國際政治和經濟重心正在向亞洲移動，這是顯然的。中國當然将會位于中心位置，但是印度也十分重要。我不想談所謂的“亞洲世紀”，但我相信，我們兩國有充分理由進行良好的合作。
我個人的工作經曆中有十年都和南亞有關。我去過巴基斯坦，也去過印度，我相信我是極少數能報出一些印度菜名的中國人之一。那些菜名普通中國人聽起來會是一頭霧水。當我通路印度時，我認為印度的确是一個讓中國受益匪淺的國家。曆史上，佛教從印度傳入，我們還有絲綢之路的文化交流。現在我們卻僅因為殖民者留下的東西而不和，這太可悲了。我不知道如何解決這個問題，我覺得我們很難解決這個問題。但我相信，随着所有的這些措施到位，可能還會有一些新的想法，比如從所有危險的地方脫離接觸，我們能處理好兩國關系。也許你比我更有信心，因為你說在沖突發生之前，兩國很少發生意外事件。
是以，如果我們可以從20個印度士兵和4個中國士兵死亡中吸取教訓，在邊境沖突後維持和平與穩定，那麼我們可以再和平相處40年，避免這麼多傷亡。我相信這是可能的。因為這是一個血的教訓，我們都應該從中吸取教訓。如果這是我們付出的代價，我們就不應該在接下來的40年裡重蹈覆轍。
蘇桑特·辛格：說到你對印度菜的口味，我必須說你的品味很好。但說到更嚴肅的問題，你提到了印太戰略。印度是否有可能作為四國機制的一部分，即一個非安全、非軍事的聯盟的積極成員，同時仍與中國保持友好關系？
周波：我認為這首先取決于四國機制是什麼，以及它将如何演變。因為中國肯定會關注四國機制的演變，看其是否真的不會損害中國的利益。
坦率地說，我相信從現在開始，印度的态度會逐漸改變，會在過去的親美政策上再退回來一點。印度關于俄烏戰争的最新聲明就表明了這一點,這一點不出所料。但我相信這一次，因為印度被逼到了牆角，是以它必須展現自己的本色。是以，我們看到它在（聯合國）表決中投了棄權票，它所說的話或多或少類似于中國的立場。這是真實的印度，我相信這是“不裝”的印度。
在未來的日子裡，國際秩序變化将會是一幅宏大的圖景。我基本上相信歐洲在這場熱戰之後肯定會迎來另一場冷戰。但在亞洲，美國已經對中國發起了新冷戰，盡管在政府層面，他們不會稱之為新冷戰。但如果你仔細看一看，拜登的對華政策基本上就是極限競争。如果競争已經非常激烈了，不是新冷戰，還能是什麼呢？從理論上講，它離熱戰隻有幾步之遙，對吧?那麼它還能是什麼呢？是以，我們不再幻想中美關系将會大幅改善。當然，能有好的結果最好。
最根本的是，中國是現有國際秩序的一大受益者。是以，中國不像俄羅斯那樣以受害者心态怨恨目前的國際秩序。中國感謝目前的國際秩序，并從中受益。這就是為什麼中國堅定地要維護國際秩序。我們都在呼籲多極化，這與我們如何實作目标無關，而是因為，無論多麼緩慢，美國的實力都是在不斷下降的，這終将成為一個事實。
當我和美國人談話時，他們承認這一點。但他們會說這是相對下降。但相對衰落也是一種衰落，對吧？是以我相信美國人對印太的關注實際上反映了其實力的下降。是以，它必須收縮。它從阿富汗、從其他地方撤退到印太地區，實際上反映出它沒有以前那麼強大了。是以，它必須專注于與中國的競争。
是以，在這方面，印度将扮演什麼樣的角色至關重要。是以，中國有充分的理由希望自己與印度有着良好的關系。我們不希望你們站在美國一邊，曆史錯誤的一邊。
印度在烏克蘭問題上的立場，讓美國非常不滿（資料圖）
蘇桑特·辛格：我同意印度不希望陷入與中國沖突的局面。但是，正如我們今天看到的那樣，情況正在發生變化。是以我要問你的最後一個問題是，在你對形勢的客觀評估中，不是說希望或願望，你會怎樣評估中印關系和它的未來？是合作嗎？是競争嗎？還是沖突？還是三者的混合？
周波：我認為是三者的混合，但問題就在于三者混合的比例。由于加勒爾萬河谷發生的事情，我認為印度政府仍然處于一種怨恨、情緒化的狀态。他們像過去一樣說，除非邊界問題得到解決，否則不能指望雙邊關系得到極大改善。基本上就是這個意思。這很像印度政府在甘地通路前所說的話。但事實是，邊境問題不容易解決。即使印度政府想把雙邊關系的改善完全寄托在邊界問題的妥善處理上，也是不對的。因為從經濟角度來說，兩國仍将有巨大的經濟互動，而這種經濟規律将突破這種人為的障礙。
是以，中印關系肯定會越來越好。但由于已經發生的事情，可能會非常緩慢。我相信時間總會治愈創傷，畢竟中方也有傷亡。我認為我們必須面對現實。我相信，總體而言，盡管存在問題，兩國關系仍将繼續向前發展。
蘇桑特·辛格：實際上，印度的立場并不是邊界問題應該永久解決。印度的立場是，一旦邊界上的緊急危機——無論是班公湖附近、德普桑、碟穆綽克——得到解決,士兵們脫離接觸，雙邊關系就可以得以改善，然後恢複某種正常狀态。我認為正如你所說，脫離接觸是完全可能的。
周波：是的，如果這是印度政府的條件，我不認為有多難達成，因為中方也說過類似的話。肯定的是，其中還有很多細節問題，這就是為什麼我們到目前為止舉行了15輪軍長級别指揮官會晤。當然，為了使會談取得成功，雙方必須都得到來自首都的政治和戰略上的指導。我認為情況正在逐漸好轉。是以總的來說，我對中印關系持樂觀态度。因為除了這個邊界問題，我實在想不出雙邊關系中還有什麼其他重大問題。
蘇桑特·辛格：周波，你比我采訪的大多數印度人——印度評論員或印度官員都更樂觀。我願意相信你。我希望情況會有所改善，中印任何地方都不會再有沖突。非常感謝你抽出時間。非常高興可以和你交談，傾聽你的想法。我從中獲益匪淺。
周波：謝謝你，蘇桑特。
（訪談連結：https://india-speak-the-cpr-podcast.simplecast.com/episodes/episode-22-unpacking-the-chinese-perspective-of-sino-india-ties）
【翻譯：李澤西、程澤笠、張佳奕；核譯：韓桦 許馨勻】
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Good afternoon everyone. I am Sushant Singh, Senior Fellow of Centre for Policy Research India. We hardly hear any authentic voices from China. We have today on our show Senior Colonel Zhou Bo(retired), a senior fellow of Center of Strategy and Security of Tsinghua University and China forum expert. Senior Colonel Zhou Bo started his military service in 1979 and served in numerous appointments in the people's liberation army, including as director of the Center for Security Cooperation in the Office for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of national defense. Zhou Bo is an undergraduate of Air Force Engineering College and a postgraduate of St. Edmund College of Cambridge University. He has written more than 100 essays and articles in various western publications and speaks as a PLA delegate at Shangri- La Dialogue in Singapore and at Munich Security Conference. He's supervisor to foreign postgraduate office at PLA National Defense University. Zhou Bo, welcome to hear you speak.
Zhou Bo:
Thank you, Sushant, thank you for having me.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Zhou Bo, we are speaking only four days after Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi's visit to New Delhi. He met the Indian foreign minister and Indian national security advisor when he was in Delhi. What do you make of Wang’s Visit to India and to South Asia in general? And what were the reasons, to your mind, for his visit to India in particular?
Zhou Bo:
The direct reason for him to go to visit South Asia is to attend a meeting in Islamabad, that is 48th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and I think by making best use of this chance, he went to visit India, Nepal and Afghanistan as well. His visit to India was not very long, but it is self-evident that this kind of short, direct communication is badly needed because, I think, for at least two years this is the first time that a Chinese foreign minister visited India. Therefore, this kind of working visit, especially against the backdrop of the most unfortunate clash in Galwan valley in 2020, is extremely significant and useful.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
But were there any reasons, what were the motivations, that Wang had when he came to India, maybe looking for a breakthrough, maybe trying to win India? What were the reasons, what were the primary motivations for his visit?
Zhou Bo:
After the most unpleasant clash between the soldiers of the two sides, there must be a kind of cooling down of bilateral relationship, and it takes some time for both sides to heal the wounds. Therefore, we can understand this kind of silence. But it should not last because China is such an important country, and not only in Asia but in the world. And so is India. China is the second largest economy in the world, and you are the sixth largest economy in the world. Therefore, for us, the two great neighbors, we cannot afford to keep this kind of relationship so cold and so remoted. It is in the interests of both sides to come into contact. Of course, I know they have a lot of contacts, and they even attended some kind of visual meetings. But of course, this kind of personal exchanges would be most important. It cannot be replaced by any virtual meetings at all.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
If you want a breakthrough, as you seem to suggest, during his visit, and reestablish the warmth in ties with India, why did he give those statements in Pakistan in the organization of Islamic conference summit that you spoke of, which involved Kashmir, and then statements along with the Pakistani foreign minister, where he spoke about Pakistan’s territory integrity. As you know, India, New Delhi came out and condemned those statements. Clearly that was not creating a very conducive environment for kind of a breakthrough if Wang was looking from breakthrough in India.
Zhou Bo:
I think the most important is he has to be honest, to tell the truth, to tell how China feels about Pakistan’s concerns and also about India’s concerns. And these are not new issues between India and Pakistan. There is a longstanding issue of Kashmir. Actually China’s position on this is try to be as impartial as possible. Of course, neutrality is always a problem for people on the two sides, because they would consider your balance actually is a kind of expediency. But China is trying its best to strike a balance, because of course Pakistan is friendly with China, and this has certainly historical reasons. And China’s relationship with India basically is good apart from the border issue China’s position, at least on the Kashmir issue, has not changed. So, I don't think he has said a lot of things that are really new to Indian audience.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, I understand that Wang Yi said nothing new to the Indian audience, but the context in which it was said，and clearly, you know, there's an apprehension in India about a certain kind of collusion between China and Pakistan, which seems to drive a lot of Indian fears, Indian insecurities, that China and Pakistan can militarily collaborate and collude together. Would it not have been nice if China decided, or had Wang Yi decided to, in some ways reassure India or reassure the Indian government?
Zhou Bo:
Well I won't use this word collusion to describe the relationship between China and Pakistan. China's relationship with Pakistan is not a secret, and actually Pakistan’s policy toward China is not a secret neither, because I believe Pakistan’s foreign policy is, rooted in, above all, a good relationship with China. I received many Pakistan delegations in the past, and I was impressed when one of the ministers told us that Pakistani basically could not agree on anything except on friendship with China. So that is a fact.
But then I have to consider what kind of cooperation between China and Pakistan could be such a concern to India. I assume probably China’s military assistance to Pakistan might be a major concern. But if we just look at this issue more thoroughly, what are they? They're basically trading on military hardware. Yes we sell them aircraft, we sell them ships. But these exports are totally justifiable in that they are just normal trading. For example, internationally speaking, you're not allowed to sell weapons of mass destruction and you're not allowed to sell missiles whose ranges and payloads go beyond the MTCR rules. Apart from these, you basically can sell whatever you want.
Let me ask you another question. India's military hardwares are mainly from Russia, which provided from 60- 70% military hardwares to India. Sometimes India’s relationship with China is not so good. But has China ever complained either to India or to Russia about this kind of military sales? Never, yeah, never. So in the same fashion, I believe that India should not complain about China’s military relationship with Pakistan, in part because India is much stronger militarily than Pakistan. So what's the fear of India of this kind of cooperation?
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, I agree with you about the fear. I meant to say that certain insecurity, certain fear, because a lot of discussion in India, which you are aware of， is about a two front military threat, so to speak, which comes with both China and Pakistan acting together against India. That was the only reason. But I understand and hear you clearly to the argument that you're making.
Zhou Bo:
I want to say something more about this. In India, there are some strategies who are concerned with a kind of nightmare of China and Pakistan encircling India. This is totally wrong. This is absolutely wrong. Why should China do that? In human feelings, people always look up to another one more strong, more powerful for inspiration, for emulation. For example, China sometimes would compare itself with the United States, and Pakistan would compare itselff with India, and India would believeit is itself comparable to China.
It is really not in China’s interest to encircle India. Why? I give you an example. In 1998, India conducted nuclear tests first, followed by Pakistan. And India’s excuse is that China is a potential threat number one. I was staff officer in the Ministry of national defense at that time for South Asia. Everybody was shocked. Because we actually just had our chief of general staff visiting India. D uring his visit, everything was fine and all the sweet words were spoken. Not long after he came back, India suddenly announced China to be potential threat number one. how can that be? At that time, China’s attention was totally focused on Taiwan because at that time the Taiwanese authorities led by Chen Shuibian was making all the troubles, of calling for referendum and tose kind of things.
When we heard that we were potential threat number one, everybody was shocked. And later I thought about it. I thought, why was that? I thought that India wanted to develop nuclear weapons anyway, so it has to have a very, very big reason to justify it, because no small reasons could justify it. So defense minister George Fernandes raised China as potential threat number one. This is how I look at the issue.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, just going back to 1998 and the statement by George Fernandes. If you remember that, you would remember that the government of India had backtracked from the statement. And you would also remember the role of Washington DC, in leaking that letter, which then Indian prime minister had written to President Clinton and then released that letter to New York Times, putting India in a very embarrassing situation vis-à-vis Beijing. But that's all in the past. Now coming to the recent visit of Wang Yi’s Pakistan visit. So, as you rightly said, the visit was in a certain sense, in the backdrop of these border crises in Ladakh or in Siachen. The question I want to ask you is, why are the two countries, as you said two big Asian powers, why are they having so many crises at the borders in the past decade, the last ten years or so why are so many crises at the border between India and China? What are the drivers of this problem, which is happening more and more now?
Zhou Bo:
My answer to you is very brief and straight. That is because the line of actual control is not demarcated, but the problem is we have different views as to how this issue should be resolved. That is the genuine problem.
Let's me first make it very clear that these most unfortunate problem is a leftover by colonialists, right? And so it's not something that really we have created, but we are really troubled by this. India's approach to the line of actual control is fundamentally different from that of China. Basically, India’s argument is let's have a bottom-up approach. We verify the line of actual control and resolve this issue. China， preferring a top-down approach, would say that, okay, let's first of all make a political decision about how we might a kind of swap land, for mutual accommodation and mutual understanding. And India disagrees.
And so India’s position looks reasonable superficially. Because this is created by line of actual control, so why don't we just verify it and then determine where the line of actual control lies, so we can avoid this kind of a problem of trespassing to the other side. But there is a danger in India’s approach, that is, if this kind of line of actual control, which is not really taken by China as border, is verified, it could be taken by India to say, this is the de facto border, and let's make it as it is.
Historically speaking, both China and India had a lot of talks on this issue, and I myself was an expert at the earliest day of such bilateral military talks. So I remember clearly what the differences are. And in the western sector actually India has more places that they believe are controversial. So in other words, China doesn't believe that there are many differences in the western sector, while India believes there are more problems there. But if you look at the whole Indo-China border, then there are so many differences, including the length of the border. China believe it's just 2000 kilometers while India believes it's 3488 kilometers. In the eastern sector and the middle sector of the China-Indian border, there aren't many incidences happening. Why? Because India has actually de facto control in these two sections. So we end up having more problems in the western sector.
So let me come back to what I said. Line of actual control is the fundamental root cause of our disagreement, of the standoffs, of the deadly clashes, but we should not let the line of actual control hijack the two governments, the two peoples.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Just to push you a bit on this, the issues with the line of actual control had been there as you said, starting from 1947 or 1948. But almost for two and a half decades, there were no major crises on the border. The question I wanted to ask you was, what changed in the last ten years or so, that despite the line of actual control not being defined, there have been so many problems at the border, whether it was the Doklam crisis,or the major unfortunate incident in Galwan in June 2020 as you rightly said or others. Virtually every one or two years, we are having this crisis. And the crisis on the border from both sides, where the troops are deployed, continues to remain. So what has changed in the last 10 years that the crisis have emerged, such strong, big, major crisis have come up?
Zhou Bo:
Good question. When people talk about the deadly clashes, people actually are hooked with the results, without looking back into history, without looking at the opportunities actually in the crisis. When I talk about this, let me remind you that ever since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, we have actually established a number of confidence building measures, both at the governmental level and at the military levels. I'm sure you are aware of these agreements. And if you compare these confidence building measures with any of those between China and foreign countries, for example the United States, we would conclude that these confidence building measures are much more substantive than those we have with the United States, and they outnumber those. We just have a couple of agreements with the United States, but with India we have more than any other agreements between China and other countries. And these confidence building measures are so good in that they are so substantive. And in that they are full of details. For example, in the border troops agreement, it stated clearly that when the troops on one side are in patrol, the other side should not follow them. So this is very detailed. And, near the line of actual control you should not hold exercise at the division level, that is more than 15,000 people, and if you hold the exercise at the brigade level, that is 5000 people, you should notify the other side in advance, and you should not fly a military aircraft within close proximity of 10 kilometers from the LAC. So these rules have played a role, I believe they did, ever since 1993 when we have the first agreement. So they have played a huge, huge role, in maintaining, by and large, peace and tranquility along the borders of actual control.
We only had a deadly clash in a couple of years ago. We still had a lot of standoffs because the line of actual control is not demarcated. So the only difference is it’s not so deadly.
The incident on the 15th of June 2020 is most unfortunate. There are of course accusations against the other side, we understand that whensuch deadly clashes or incidents happened,people always pointed fingers at each other. So, here I do not give you a long story about how it happened. You have your interpretation and I have my own story.
But the good thing still, in this incident, is that neither side tried to shoot at the other side. So, they were actually fighting against each other in a stone age manner with stones and clubs. That means deep in their minds, they know that they should not shoot at each other at any circumstances, although later the Indian troops did shoot into the skythey didn’t shoot directly at the Chinese soldiers. So, it tells that these kinds of confidence building measures have really worked to a great extent.
Yes, they haven't stopped such a kind of accident from happening. So, what should we do? There definitely will come the time when both sides sit down and start to explore possible confidence building measures. And you don't need to look elsewhere. You just need to look into these agreements we have already made. They are so, so detailed. They areso tangible. So, if you carry out all of them, you don't have problems at all. And then, what makes the difference (is), because we were right now in a in a deadlock because the troops have very much disengaged, but not completely satisfactory to the Indian side, I understand that.
So, actually my suggestion is the troops from both sides should disengage at all most dangerous sectors. Yeah, so just disengage from each other. This is what we did along Pangong Tso lake and this type of experience should be followed elsewhere, for us to maintain the Line of Actual Control to be peaceful and tranquil.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
I believe what you are saying is to an extent true. But the problem is that neither side trust each other, not after deaths have occurred, after people have died and you said, you know, clubs have been used, rounds have been fired even though in the air. There is no trust between the two sides and the fact that the Line of Actual Control is not defined, the fact that trust has broken down, the fact that you know both sides say that the agreements are not being followed by the other side. The Indian foreign minister is on record saying China is not following these agreements of 1993 and 1996. The Chinese side is saying the Indians are not following the agreements. How do you move forward? How do you, you know in theory it's fine, we should disengage, but how do you move forward in this kind of environment?
Zhou Bo:
Okay, let's come to the worst scenarios, that China and India have no trust at all, with each other. This certainly is not the case, but let's assume, it's just an absolute black picture. Let me give an example of the cold war. During the cold war, the United States and Soviet Union did't trust each other at all, right? Because they were simply enemies, but out of such a kind of absolute mistrust of each other, they still were able to develop a lot of confidence building measures, primarily in nuclear fields. This is reflected in a number of important agreements, such as SALT, such as START, such as Open Skies Treaty. And they even had cooperation, for example, in two areas, one is joint efforts in eradicating smallpox, another is joint cooperation in outer space.
So, China’s relationship with India, apart from the border issue, I can hardly imagine there are serious problems elsewhere. Yes, you see, we in China are concerned with your concerns, but your concerns sometimes are not really justifiable, such as China’s close relationship with Pakistan. If I just raise your close relationship with Russia, what would you say? China is also friendly with Russia, which has great friendship with you. What I mean is that trust is of course important, but it's not that necessary for us to have effective confidence building measures. But between us, we still have trust in many other fields. I give you the latest example, the Russo-Ukrainain warDid you find the similarity in our positions? Yes, of course.
I believe this actually shows that India didn't say the right thing really wholeheartedly in the last few years. In the last few years, you would findIndia talking almost in an American tone about the free and open Indo-Pacific. But let me tell you, Indian position actually is more like that of China rather than that of the United States, because India has reservation for the same article in the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, that is article 298 for which China has reservation. When foreign military ships entered your exclusive economic zone to conduct military exercises, the Indian government would ask them for consent if it involves ammunitions and explosives. Well, if you compare your law on that with that of China, actually I would say that India’s is much more strict than that of China.
And let me give you another example, in April last year, the USS John Paul Jones sailed into the exclusive economic zone in the southwest of India, and the Seventh Fleet made a written declaration to say that in doing so, the United States would challenge India’s excessive maritime claim. India’s EEZ, I found, is actually one thirtieth of the whole Indian Ocean. That means if the United States challenged your claims, that means, at least in American’s eyes, 1/30 of the Indian Ocean is not free, not open because of India. So, how can India say, like the United States, that the Indo-Pacific has to be free and open ? This is wrong because the oceans themselves are interconnected naturally, so they are always free, they’re always open.
And if you look at the problems in the Indian Ocean, that is piracy. Piracy was rampant from 2008, basically to 2013. And thanks to joint efforts, including Chinese and Indian navy. We have solved this problem and the Indian navy has helped the Chinese merchant ships “Full City” in tandem with a Turkish ship under NATO’s command and a Chinese naval vessel. And I have been coordinator of the PLA on counter-piracy for quite a few years. I thank India on many occasions, including in Bahrain where international navy's efforts in counter-piracy were coordinated because the international military coordinations conferences about counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia Basin are always there in Bahrain.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yes, I'm hearing you. Bo the point I will push back on you, one point that you made about the Indian and Chinese position on the Russia-Ukraine war being similar. The Indian government has clearly come out saying, while the positions superficially look similar, the reasons driving them or the principles driving them are different in both cases. And even after Wang Yi’s visit, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Jaishankar actually came out and wanted to make it completely clear that India’s position is different from China’s. This is something which you heard from western capitals as well, and the position is not the same. So that's the only thing I would like to clarify to the listeners. But I get your argument, I'm not contesting your argument. I just wanted to make the Indian government's position clear.
But you spoke about concerns that India has from China and China has from India. What exactly are Chinese concerns with India? Are they geopolitical? Are the ideological? Are they driven by some other reasons? You know, I mean, is it the United States? Is it in the Indo-Pacific Strategy? Is it the Quad? What is it that the Chinese really are concerned with India about? What is something else about India, that is not publicly said? What exactly are those reasons?
Zhou Bo:
I'm fully aware that the Indian government try to make a difference in terms of its position towards the Russian-Ukrainian war. But to be honest with you, I read them and I haven't found them to be particularly different from that of China. Because you see China is not trying to get closer to India by saying, “Okay, my position is really like yours and your position really like mine”. It doesn't make sense. It doesn't matter. But you see, we have been talking about the two sides of the same coin, the sovereignty of a sovereign states and the legitimate concerns of Russia over NATO's expansion. I think we basically talk about the same things. So I don't know what are the differences. Frankly speaking, I believe because of the current atmosphere between China- India relationship, therefore, the Indian government is trying to appeal to the public opinion, to look somewhat hard, you know, on China. But, well, that is kind of gesture only.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
What about the concerns, about the Chinese concerns with India? Is it the United States? Is it the Quad? Is it the Indo-Pacific? Is it ideological? Is it geopolitical? What exactly are the reasons, all the areas that concern China when it looks at India?
Zhou Bo:
Actually, I do not have such worries. China is concerned with India’s so-called concerns. Let me put it in another way, we are only worried because you're worried for something and we don't know why you're worried at all. For example, a lot of people would say that China is worried about the Quad, and there are indeed some people even calling Quad “Asian’s NATO”. I don't think so. Why? Because I actually have confidence in India’s foreign policy. Because if I look at the history of Indian foreign policy, being one of the founders of the non-aligned movement and being a self-perceived great power, of course India will try its best to be impartial, to be neutral. And inQuad, I would say India is most important, because all the three other countries are already allies. India’s attitude really, really matters to the survival and development of Quad.
But India, like any other countries, would put its national interests as first priority. India cannot afford to even look too close to the United States， because of your good relation with Russia, because about 70% of your hardware comes from Russia, because you're still buying Russia’s S-400. So if you get too close to the United States, China and Russia won't be happy, and that is not in your interest.
If you look at the latest development of Quad, you would find that it is actually developing into many other directions rather than the military direction. In terms of its military content, that is only a military exercise called “Malabar” exercise, and that's it. And beside that, it is developing into a bit of everything, for example, like infrastructure building, climate change or joint distribution of vaccines to Southeast Asian countries. But I would argue that how successful can it be? For example, infrastructure. Joe Biden’s grandiose Build Back Better project basically is dead already. From what I read, it is described as a kind of ambitious memory, because of the strong opposition from the Republican parties. And then, how much money could actually United States contribute to this region in terms of infrastructure? It cannot be compared at all with China’s Belt & Road Initiative. And if we talk about climate change or joint distributional of vaccine, these are fine. But these are not exclusive issues for the four of you. It is for everybody. So, there's nothing particularly exclusive if it is not against China, well, I won't say it's against China. I believe AUKUS agreement is against China, and the Quad is because of China. But if the glue is, a kind of, anti-China sentiment, then Quad will never grow stronger. It can survive because of all the things I mentioned, but it won't thrive.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
But Bo the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States and even the latest military document, the rejected version that put out by the Pentagon, which was sent to the Congress. It clearly mentions China as an adversary, it mentions Indo-Pacific, it says, you know, Europe is the second resister, the primary contestation is with China. Even within that context, you don't think that Quad is directed towards China?
Zhou Bo:
Well, I don't believe that Quad would be very useful if it is against China. Let me talk about the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States. I read the report, which was published sometime in February. I believe that this is a, how can I say, first of all the assumption of the whole Indo-Pacific strategy is wrong because it's assumed that China wants to create a kind of a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific. This is totally wrong. Why? Let me put it this way, even if China wants, China cannot achieve it, even in East Asia, where its influence is the strongest. In East Asia, there is DPRK who won't listen to China on nuclear proliferation issue right? That is why they develop nuclear weapon. And there are quite a few American allies. And even in South China sea issues, there are a few claimant who have their own claims. So, in spite of the fact that China’s influence is strongest in this region, we still have a huge major difference for me to say that it is China’s sphere of influence.
The problem is, people often make a mistake, they confuse two things. One is the influence, another is sphere of influence. If you talk about China’s influence, absolutely, China’s influence is global now, it is already global. It's almost overlapping with that of the United States, short of military influence, right? But China is not creating a sphere of influence, and that is why China’s military activities overseas, be it counter-piracy, be it peacekeeping, be it evacuation of personals from disaster relief. They are all humanitarian in nature. So that tells China doesn’t have a global military ambition. So apart from its own territory and its adjacent waters which is Chinese territorial water, China just wants to help other countries. So that is why we are only doing things that are humanitarian. Why should we create our own spheres of influence that are so costly and so difficult to maintain?
So, this kind of assumption, from very beginning, is wrong. Besides, the United States does not have enough tools to realize it's too many purposes in the Indo-Pacific strategy, because you have so many purposes, and how many countries would really follow the United States in the antagonizing in China? I really doubt, because even its allies are the largest trading partners of China, so it would be very difficult for them to make such a decision.
And we simply were thrown into this kind of great power competition without reasons at all. If you look at China’s policy towards the United States, it is very much consistent and stable. Yeah, and then we will talk about the same thing. But it's the United States that actually have to change its policy fundamentally because they realize eventually that they could not change China’s political system, China is getting stronger. So, they were panicking. And since Trump, he ushered in this kind of great power competition. And what happened? What's wrong with China, on China’s part in this kind of relationship? Well, I won't say we did nothing wrong, but at least we haven't created any special, very difficult situation for the United States. Yeah, so China’s policy, comparatively speaking, is much more stable, right?
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Yeah, Bo, just getting back to something which you said earlier, you said that China’s concerns about India are India’s concerns, essentially saying that there is nothing about India which concerns or worries China. Is it because China is so much bigger than India? Economically, militarily, geopolitically, the gap is so much dilated, the difference in related part is so much. Is it another way of saying that you're too small for us?
Zhou Bo:
No, India is not small at all, and this economy is currently the sixth largest economy, and by 2030 you will become the second largest economy in Asia, overtaking Japan. So, we are fully aware of your magnitude, and we have full respect for that because, I, as an observer, found you were actually doing a lot of things that China did in the past. Basically, your way of reform started ten years behind that of China. But you are doing almost the same thing. So, you are also developing very fast. And we're happy to see that because the fact is the international political and economic shifts are just moving to Asia. That is for sure. China certainly is in the center, but India is also looming large. I won't talk about the so-called “Asian century”. But I believe there are really, really good reasons for our two countries to have good cooperation.
I myself in my working days, ten years of my working experiences are associated with South Asia. I went to Pakistan, I went to India, and I believe I'm among very few Chinese who at least know some Indian dishes by name. Those dishes make no sense to ordinary Chinese. When I was in India, I thought that this is a country which actually has benefited China a lot. Historically, the Buddhism, the exchange of cultures on The Silk Road... We are just not on a good term because of something left by the colonialists. Ah, it's very sad. I don't know how to resolve this, and I believe it's very difficult for us to resolve this. But I believe, yeah, with all those measures in place, and probably with some new ideas, such as a disengage each other from all the dangerous places. We can manage it. Probably you are more confident than me, because you talk about how very few accidental incidents happened before the clash.
So if we, with all this have maintained peace and stability with a cost of 20 Indian soldiers and 4 Chinese soldiers, probably with good lesson learned, we could make another 40 years peaceful and tranquil with even less casualty. I believe this is possible。 Because this is such a bloody and deadly lesson, both of us should have learned something from it. But if this is the price we paid, we should not pay it in the next 40 years.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Going back to your taste in Indian dishes, I must say you have good taste in Indian food. These are some of the nice dishes that India has. But to the more serious things, you mentioned the Indo-Pacific strategy. Is it possible for India to be a part of the Quad, to be an active member of the Quad, even though it's a non-security, non-military alliance and still be friendly with China?
Zhou Bo:
Well, I think it depends on, first of all, what Quad is and how it is going to evolve. Because China certainly would pay attention to the evolution of Quad to see if if this is not really harmful to China's interests.
Frankly speaking, I believe India's attitude from now on will change gradually because I believe it will just stay back a bit from its pro-American policy in the past. And the latest comments on the Ukraine and Russia war demonstrated that. I should have known that. But I believe this time because India was somehow pushed to the corner, therefore it has to show its true color. Therefore we see it abstained from the vote, and it said something more or less similar to that of China. And this is true India. This is not India in pretension, I believe.
So in the days to come, then there is a grand picture of how the international order would look like, right? So basically, I believe in Europe definitely we are going to have another cold war after this hot war. But in Asia, the United States has already initiated a new cold war against China, although at the governmental level they would not call it a new cold war. But if you look at it carefully, Biden’s policy toward China is basically extreme competition short of war. If competition is already extreme, what else can it be， if it is not like a new cold war? It is only a few steps away from hot war theoretically, right? W hat else can it be? So we do not have any fanciful wishes that China-American relationship will improve tremendously. But of course we still wish for the best.
The fundamental thing is, China is a large beneficiary from the existing international order. So China is not like Russia, which resents the current international order with victimhood. China is grateful to the international order and China has benefited from international order. So that is why China vows to safeguard the international order. And we all call for multipolarity. It's not about how we can actually achieve it. It's because it is a fact that the strength of the United States is on the wane, however slowly. When I talked to americans, they would admit that. But they will say this is relative decline. But relative decline is also kind of decline, right? So I believe Americans’ focus in the Indo-Pacific actually reflects its decline in strength. Therefore, it has to retrench. And its withdrawal from Afghanistan from elsewhere into the Indo-Pacific is actually a reflection that it's not as strong as it was. Therefore, it has to stay focused on competition with China.
In this regard, what kind of role would India play is critical. So China, for all good reasons, wish it has good relationship with India. We do not wish you take the American side. It’s on the wrong side of history.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
I agree that India would not want to be in a situation where it is in conflict with China. But the situation, as we see today happens to be something evolving. So my final question to you is, in your objective assessment of the situation, not a hope or a wish. In your assessment, how do you see the future of China-India, relationship, China-India ties? Is it collaboration? Is it competition? Is it conflict or is it a mixture of the three?
Zhou Bo:
Well, I think it's a mixture of three, but the only question is the proportion, right? Because of what had happened in the Galwan Valley, therefore I believe that the Indian government is still in a kind of resentmental， moody situation, because they say very much like in the old days that unless and until the border issue is resolved, we cannot expect the bilateral relationship to improve tremendously. Well, basically something like that. This is very much like how the Indian government before Karamchand Gandhi’s visit said. But the fact is the border issue cannot be resolved easily. And even if the Indian government wants to place this kind of relationship hostage to the border issue, they cannot. Because economically speaking, the two countries would still have tremendous, huge economic interactions, and these kinds of economic rules will break through such kind of man-made boundaries.
So the relationship definitely will get warmer and warmer, but slowly and slowly， because of what happened. I believe that time might just heal the wounds and the Chinese side also have casualties. I think we have to live with the reality. And I believe, generally speaking, the relationship will just move forward in despite of the problems.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
The question actually is in Indian position， it is not that the border issue should be resolved permanently. The Indian position is that the bilateral relationship can improve once the immediate crisis on the border, where the soldiers are facing each other whether at PP15 or Depsang or Demchok. Once that is resolved and disengagement happens, then some kind of normalcy can resume in the bilateral ties, which I think as you yourself said, a disengagement is definitely a possibility.
Zhou Bo:
Yes, so if that is the condition of the government, I don't believe it's difficult to meet because the Chinese side also said something similar. Of course, there lies many details. So that is why we have held so far 15 rounds of talks at corps-commander level. But of course for talks to become successful, we have to have political and strategic guidance from the two capitals. I think things are improving gradually. Generally speaking, I'm optimistic about this relationship. Because apart from this border issue, I can see no other major issues in the bilateral relationship. I really cannot figure it out.
Mr. Sushant Singh:
Bo, you are more optimistic than most Indians or most Indian commentators or most Indian officials that I talk to, who are less optimistic than you. I would like to believe you and I hope that things would improve and there are no more conflicts anywhere. Anyway, Bo, thank you so much for your time. It was wonderful talking to you and listening to your thoughts. I really enjoy speaking to you.
Zhou Bo:
Thank you Sushant for all this, thank you.
本文系觀察者網獨家稿件，文章内容純屬作者個人觀點，不代表平台觀點，未經授權，不得轉載，否則将追究法律責任。關注觀察者網微信guanchacn，每日閱讀趣味文章。