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After the first campaign of the Chinese People's Volunteers, the US military and political authorities, especially the intelligence departments and research institutes at all levels, submitted reports one after another to assess and judge the scale, actions, and intentions of the Chinese army in the war.
The most influential of these was the report of MacArthur and General Willoughby, the head of intelligence at the Far East Command.
1. Quantitative analysis of Willoughby
On November 3, at the direction of President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff telegraphed MacArthur and asked him to provide "a concise and accurate estimate of the situation in Korea and to determine what it appears that the Chinese forces have openly invaded" as soon as possible.
The next day, MacArthur presented his report to Washington.
In the report, MacArthur writes that it is not yet possible to make an authoritative assessment of the exact goals of China's involvement in the war.
Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, first impression of this report was:
MacArthur "replied to us with 'don't worry,'" and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff was relieved.
So Bradley left Washington with ease, went to Connecticut for two days of hunting, and when he returned to Washington, he did not immediately go to work at the Pentagon, but buried himself at home writing his memoirs during World War II. Truman turned his attention to the congressional midterm elections and rushed to Missouri to canvass for votes.
During this period, Willoughby, the chief intelligence officer of the US Far East Command and "the only intelligence officer who can influence MacArthur", confirmed and supported MacArthur's "no worries" assurance with his "professional analysis."
Just two days before MacArthur's report to Washington, Willoughby wrote a "Daily Intelligence Roundup" in which he acknowledged that Chinese involvement was no longer an "abstract theoretical issue" but "an imminent and grave threat."
He believes that the Chinese government has given the troops sent to North Korea a "good name" - the Volunteer Army in order to achieve the best of both worlds:
First, it can avoid the notorious reputation of "invasion" by claiming that there are no regular Chinese troops in Korea, and second, it can gain a reputation for helping North Korea in times of crisis, and in the event of defeat, it will not damage the reputation of the Chinese military.
According to Willoughby's calculations, the total strength of the Chinese army in Korea may be 34,000, of which 16,500 have already engaged the "United Nations Army".
Here, Willoughby warned of China's ability to "launch a massive offensive," but he gave a far cry from the reality of the strength of the Chinese troops that have now entered Korea.
Later, Willoughby provided another set of numbers in his report to the Pentagon:
The strength of each division of the Chinese regular army is 10,000, and the actual combat strength is 7,000~8,500. The total strength of 29 divisions is about 230,000. At present, there are 315,000 regular troops and 274,000 irregular troops in Northeast China, and most of the regular army troops are concentrated near the Yalu River crossings.
This figure is relatively close to the actual situation if it refers to the total strength of the volunteer army that has entered the territory of Korea, but Willoughby believes that these forces are still concentrated in China, have not yet crossed the river, and the number of people who have entered the Korean battlefield is still the 34,000 he previously judged.
In this way, this so-called "professional quantitative analysis" is not very reliable.
According to the official U.S. war history, a battlefield commander questioned Willoughby in person, but Willoughby prevaricated.
On one occasion, when Willoughby came to the headquarters of the U.S. 10th Army in Wonsan, the chief of staff of the army disagreed with him to estimate the strength of China's participation in the war only in battalion units, saying that the Chinese army had been confirmed on the battlefield to have the numbers of several divisions.
Willoughby replied:
"The number of most divisions of the CCP army does not represent a complete division, but only a part of it. ”
Commander Almond asked him:
I heard that the Chinese army around Yunshan had 3 divisions, and you said that the actual strength was only 3 battalions, if this is the case, why did the 8th Cavalry Regiment lose so badly?
Willoughby's explanation was that "the regiment lacked vigilance, and after only one small raid, it was routed in the darkness of the night." ”
2. Why is the intelligence malfunctioning?
During this period, the focus of the thinking of the US military and political authorities was: What should the United States do if the Chinese army goes to war?
Neither MacArthur's Far East Command nor the CIA gave clear answers and operational solutions, and they did not even grasp the basic premise. Questions such as the scale of the Chinese military's involvement, motives, and military objectives are either vague and ambiguous, or they are digressive.
For a time, decision-makers in Washington were bewildered by these generalized, specious views and statements.
Bradley once sighed when he recalled the scene:
When the U.S. needs to be militarily cautious, we don't know exactly how many troops China is actually committing to North Korea or what their likely military goals are.
Of course, this state of affairs cannot be attributed to the fact that US intelligence means have lost their effectiveness.
As Ridgway pointed out in his analysis of the reasons for the strategic miscalculation at that time:
We didn't have a lot of information at the time. In retrospect, this intelligence is fairly close to the actual situation. Our mistake is still in the analysis of the situation rather than the collection of the situation.
To ascertain the strength and deployment of the Chinese military, MacArthur took two steps:
The first is to launch a tentative attack north of the Cheongchon River with ground forces, the so-called "power reconnaissance"; the second is to use aerial reconnaissance forces and spy networks scattered throughout northern Korea, Chinese mainland, and other parts of the world to use all means to gather intelligence about the Chinese army's participation in the war.
This two-pronged approach has not had the desired effect.
First of all, the "power reconnaissance" of the ground forces did not make any valuable discoveries.
In a series of exploratory attacks on the front line, the US and ROK forces not only failed to find out the details of the volunteer troops in front of them, but were held by the volunteers and led step by step into the areas preset by the volunteers to annihilate the enemy. The reconnaissance effect over the battlefield is also quite limited.
At that time, the US military's aerial reconnaissance mainly relied on visual observation and aerial photography. During World War II, aerial photography was hailed as the "king of tactical reconnaissance" of the U.S. military. An experienced aerial photo reader can tell the size of an enemy unit from a small shadow on an aerial photograph and the number of artillery pieces from a few inconspicuous white spots.
On one occasion, the interpreter even identified the pit from a photograph taken over the Gilbert Islands in the Pacific Ocean, and extrapolated the number of Japanese troops stationed on the island based on the number of pits in fact, with an error of less than 20 men.
However, this time on the Korean battlefield, the accuracy of the aerial film interpretation plummeted. Researchers of the history of the war in the US military complained: Only five years after the end of World War II, with a group of experienced professionals, the aerial photo interpreters of the US military who retired from the army have almost completely lost their former professional ability.
Radio-technical reconnaissance, which is also a source of pride for the US military, is lackluster.
The three-volume history of electronic warfare compiled by the US military records in detail the proud achievements of the US military in radio technology reconnaissance in previous wars, but the achievements of the Chinese army during the period when it entered the Korean war are blank. And a few years ago, the Pacific War was even called "victory in the crypto war" by the Americans. In the Korean battlefield, the US military's specialty was useless, and the reason for this is worth exploring.
According to the analysis of US war history researchers, this is due to the fact that the Chinese military hardly uses radio communication means in combat.
Actually, this is not the case. The most valuable information about China's entry into the Korean war is precisely the "communications intelligence" that comes from outside the Korean battlefield, that is, the technical interception of Chinese mainland's radio signals (including cipher and clear code signals).
According to declassified documents from the US National Security Agency, between November 9 and 22, 1950, the US technical reconnaissance department learned from the analysis of radio signals intercepted from inside China that an agency based in Shanghai sent 30,000 maps of North Korea to the border cities between China and North Korea. Army intelligence officers estimated that about 1,000 maps would be needed for one division, and judged that these maps would be enough for 30 divisions to operate. In fact, the troops of the Volunteer Army that were put into operation in the second campaign were exactly 30 divisions.
The declassified document states:
Although the Soviet Union suppressed U.S. radio-technical reconnaissance, the U.S. "maintained coverage of China's internal communications network" and "provided timely, detailed, and accurate intelligence before Chinese interference occurred."
3. Why don't you believe that the Chinese army has entered the DPRK after you have captured the prisoners?
The best source of intelligence is the interrogation of captured personnel on the battlefield compared to radio-technical reconnaissance methods.
According to the history of the U.S. military, on October 25, the day the first battle began, the ROK 6th Division captured a Chinese soldier near Unsan. This may be the first Chinese soldier to be captured on the battlefield in Korea.
Since then, Chinese military personnel have been taken prisoner, 10 on 29 October, 55 on 2 November, 84 on 20 November, and by 24 November, the day before the second campaign was launched, the total number of Chinese prisoners in the hands of the "United Nations Army" had reached 96, from units of the 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 50th, and 66th armies.
In other words, the six armies of the Volunteer Army that participated in the first battle all fell into the hands of the enemy.
Based on the interrogation of the captured personnel, the intelligence of the 8th Army, after a simple calculation, came up with a figure:
The Chinese army may have 6 corps, 18 divisions, and at least 180,000 men involved in the operation.
However, it is inconceivable that this figure, which is basically close to the real situation, was judged by the intelligence of the 8th Army to be "very implausible" on the grounds that it "defies common sense". And this so-called "common sense" is the "authoritative" conclusion made by MacArthur before: "China can only use North Korea's troops to 50,000-60,000 troops." ”
When the U.S. military war history describes the Chinese prisoners at that time, it often emphasizes the following episodes:
Some of the prisoners did not fire a single shot before being captured. The U.S. military intelligence department suspects that these people may have deliberately allowed themselves to fall into the hands of the U.S. military in order to send false information that can confuse the other party.
In addition, U.S. military commanders involved in the interrogation of Chinese prisoners generally had a perplexing question:
Most of these prisoners were ordinary soldiers who could not read a few words, but from their mouths they could hear information that was usually only grasped by commanders in higher positions.
This cannot but arouse suspicion in the minds of the interrogators. As a matter of fact, the Chinese armed forces practiced military democracy and extensive combat mobilization before the war, and ordinary soldiers were able to learn about some higher-level situations through these activities, which was unbelievable to the US military.
At that time, the US military intelligence department selected three captured personnel and sent them to Pyongyang by plane for polygraph tests.
The details of this polygraph process are unknown, but the conclusion is clearly recorded in the history of the US military:
"In assessing the results of the interrogation, the intelligence officers of the 8th Army remained skeptical of the claims that a large Chinese force had entered North Korea, as they believed that there was a lack of convincing evidence and that what the prisoners had said was not credible. ”
Until the outbreak of the battle at Yunshan, the spokesman of the 8th Army still declared in a statement on the relevant reports:
"The investigation showed that the report was based on the oral story of two prisoners of war, who each told six different stories, adding up to twelve stories, and the result was equal to zero. ”
It is worth mentioning that there was an unexpected situation on the battlefield at that time, which made the matter itself even more confusing.
On October 29, U.S. forces stormed Taecheon, which was defended by the Korean People's Army, and captured 89 prisoners in the city, three of whom were identified as Chinese soldiers.
This situation was reported, and it played a further role in reinforcing the misjudgment of the US military intelligence department:
Since the three Chinese soldiers were captured along with the North Koreans, it is confirmed that the Chinese soldiers were incorporated into the North Korean army as volunteers, and not as regular units.
In fact, these three people were stragglers of the Volunteer Army, and the reason why they were included in the KPA prisoners was purely accidental.
Although there were volunteers on both the Western and Eastern Fronts who were captured, the U.S. military still did not believe that there were large Chinese forces on the battlefield.
4, 70,000 or 40,000?
According to the history of the U.S. military, in the first stage of entering Korea, the Chinese military used code names to conceal their true identities, such as the 38th Army called "Unit 54", the 39th Army called "Unit 55", the 40th Army called "Unit 56", and so on.
As a result, U.S. military intelligence officers often misjudge a corps of the Chinese military as a regiment. By analogy, the Chinese army also uses "battalions" as divisions and "companies" as regiments, such as "the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Unit", which is actually the 334th Regiment of the 112th Division of the 38th Army, and the "1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 55th Unit" is actually the 345th Regiment of the 115th Division of the 39th Army.
This is a simple and effective approach, and it is often the result of errors in judgment by US military intelligence officers.
On November 4, after the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division of the US Army suffered heavy losses at Unsan, intelligence officers of the 8th Army admitted that there were two divisions of Chinese troops on the Western Front, and the next day, the number was increased to three divisions, and confirmed that they were "54th, 55th, and 56th units, totaling about 27,000 men."
On the Eastern Front, the U.S. 1st Marine Division captured two Chinese soldiers seven miles west of Hajayu-ri on November 23, and through interrogation, it was learned that the unit number of the unit was the 267th Regiment of the 89th Division of the 20th Army, which had entered Korea 10 days earlier.
It should be said:
This is a major situation, because the troops that fought on the Eastern Front have been confirmed to be the 42nd Army to which the 13th Corps belongs, and this time the number of the 20th Army has appeared, which means that there is not only a new Chinese division - the 89th Division, but also a new army - the 20th Army, and maybe even a new corps - the 9th Corps.
However, the results of the interrogation of the two captives were also not taken seriously. Until the day of the launch of the new offensive on the Eastern Front (November 27), the US 10th Army still believed: "There are at most two divisions of the Chinese army in front of them, which completely shows a defensive character." ”
Beginning with the capture of the first Chinese prisoner of war on October 25, many of the prisoners' interrogation records indicate that a considerable number of Chinese troops had entered Korea, numbering at least seven corps (six on the Western Front and one on the Eastern Front), but U.S. military intelligence officials remained deaf and stubbornly limited the number of Chinese troops to a small amount.
On November 7, the Far East Command's Daily Intelligence Summary raised "the number of Chinese troops in Korea to 34,500, including 27,000 in front of the 8th Army and 7,500 in front of the 10th Army."
On the 9th, the "Daily Intelligence Roundup" also said:
"The CCP army in Korea has 8 divisions, each of which is subordinate to 4 armies, the number of CCP troops who exchanged fire with the UN forces is about 51,000, and the other 2 divisions of 12,600 men are in the 10th Army's combat area, but there is no contact with the UN troops."
The report gives a total strength of 76,800 Chinese troops in North Korea.
On November 24, on the eve of a new offensive by the U.S. military, the Far East Command estimated the number of Chinese troops in Korea at "a maximum of 70,051 and a minimum of 44,851."
This is less than the 76,800 given by the Daily Intelligence Roundup half a month ago, because intelligence officers at the Far East headquarters believe that during this time, "the CCP army suffered about 5,500 casualties in the battle."
The U.S. War Department's estimate of the strength of the Chinese military in Korea is essentially the same as that of the Far East Command, at about 51,600 and at most 76,800 troops, belonging to 12 divisions of four armies (38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd armies), with 6,300 troops each.
For those who study the history of the Korean War today, it is really unbelievable to see the US military making mistakes in intelligence judgment at that time.
5. Why is the misjudgment so great?
Why did the Americans still think that the Chinese troops had already entered the war after fighting a campaign and had already pushed back the American, British, and South Korean troops from the Yalu River to the south of the Cheongchon River? Why did the Americans simply turn a blind eye to and turn a deaf ear to the vast amount of intelligence inside and outside the battlefield and still make such a wrong interpretation? What is the problem?
Obviously, this should not simply be blamed on problems in the intelligence gathering process, nor can it be blamed solely on the deviations in intelligence analysis, but there are other more important reasons.
At a deeper level, this has to do with Americans' ancestry-based approach to analysis, rigid mindsets, and deep-seated pride and prejudice.
One thing is certain: The United States, which ascended to the world hegemony after World War II, basically still viewed New China by the standard of "the sick man of East Asia."
They cannot understand or believe that such a weak Chinese can dare to make up their minds to enter the war in the face of the powerful offensive of the "United Nations Army" led by the United States; they cannot understand and believe that the Chinese army, which has an extremely inferior level of weaponry and equipment, and does not even have a single plane or tank, dares to drive to the DPRK and meet the US military, which has the highest level of modernization in the world today, and really clash on the battlefield.
One of MacArthur's biographers wrote that MacArthur "had in mind the Chinese army that Chiang Kai-shek's army had left behind for him, and he called that army 'the rabble of Asia.'"
This arrogant mentality and extreme contempt for the Chinese and the Chinese military have largely contributed to the collective ignorance and consensus bias of the US intelligence community and decision-making circles, causing serious problems in their observation, understanding, and judgment, and finally putting themselves in the situation of "a blind man riding a blind horse and a deep pool in the middle of the night."
The official war history compiled by the US Army History Center devotes considerable space to a more detailed analysis of MacArthur's psychology, pointing out:
MacArthur was not completely unaware of the presence of a sizable number of Chinese troops in Korea, nor was he unaware of the enormous potential for an immediate increase in Chinese troops, but he determined that "the build-up and aggressive posture of the Chinese were a bluff of intimidation." Since the Chinese cannot afford a war with the United States, they will not attack his troops."
In the United States at the time, this was a common mentality.
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