American religious expert Louis: Analysis of the media strategy of "Falungong".

Falun Gong was so annoyed by this that one Falun Gong practitioner sent many e-mails to harass Ms. Helen and her university, and even Mr. James was not spared. After trying to communicate with the Falun Gong practitioner and remind him that he could not use this method to interfere with academic freedom, Mr. James contacted the Falun Gong media, but Falun Gong responded that the harassment was the work of "Chinese spies". In desperation, Mr. James wrote an article entitled "Falun Gong Wants to Absorb 'Virtue' from Me -- How Li Hongzhi's Mysterious Doctrine of Persecution and Martyrdom Encouraged Falun Gong to Threaten Academic Freedom," in which he sorted out and analyzed Falungong's interference with academic freedom and harassment of scholars and media reporters.

On November 30, 2015 and May 21, 2016, a Falun Gong practitioner named "Wu Jianguo" published articles in the Falun Gong media and the Australian media Newsweek (Newsweekly.com.au) respectively, openly admitting that he had caused nuisance to Ms. Helen and Mr. James, and publicly insulting the personalities of Ms. Helen and Mr. James while defending Falun Gong unreasonably. In July 2016, Mr. James wrote this article, which was published on the website of the Center for the Study of Emerging Religions (Cesnur.org). Through extensive research on Falun Gong's media strategy, Mr. James's new work focuses on Falun Gong's strategy of dominating media outside China, the reasons why Falun Gong attacks and excludes others, and finally borrows the concept of social movement theory to partially interpret Falun Gong's media strategy, so as to conclude that Falun Gong manipulates the media. It is worth pointing out that Mr. James was very sympathetic to Falun Gong in the past, and after the Chinese government banned Falun Gong, he provided Falun Gong practitioners with opportunities to introduce Falun Gong and screen documentaries produced by Falun Gong in his own classes. After the Falungong nuisance incident, he felt bitterly that he had been deceived by Falungong and was ashamed of his students. Kaifeng contacted Mr. James and obtained authorization, and the full text of the article is now translated and reprinted.

Professor of Religion at the University of Tromsø, Norway, James Brown, R. Lewis

This article was written by James M. James R. Lewis, collaborator: Nicole Nicole S. Ruskell

Original author's statement: This article is the first draft. Do not reprint or quote without the author's permission.

This article is not yet finalized, and I am currently refining the sources of information as a basis for expressing my opinion. First, let me tell you a story that confirms my conclusion:

As I write this, I have a large glass of red wine next to me, hoping to calm my emotions. This is all to blame on Falungong, a combative, extreme, and stubborn organization that once again tried to participate in the Christmas parade in Auckland uninvited, and did not allow others to say "no."

For years, this quasi-political pseudo-spiritual organization has wanted to mix up the Christmas parades. When asked to leave with the shoddy crayon posters, they immediately yelled (unreasonable) and threatened to appeal to the High Court...... We discussed this in "Zhengming" (a hotline program), and within minutes, Falun Gong (also known as Falun Dafa) loyal practitioners burst the hotline, wanting to tell me how noble they are, how peace-loving, how gentle they are, and how they just want to spread love and light.

I don't have a prejudice about spreading some "light" and "love", just don't do it at the Christmas parade...... If they think that by taking the march organizers to court, they will win over friends and sway the public, and this is undoubtedly a cultural fault line that needs to be corrected. For God's sake, this is a Christmas parade!

Shouldn't the organizations participating in such marches be more gentle and kind?

After a few phone calls, I quickly got tired of the Falun Gong lobbyists and stopped answering their calls on the show.

But that doesn't stop them from constantly calling in and threatening to go to court...... Curse us with all kinds of retribution. My attitude towards these people gradually changed from resignation to disgust from the bottom of my heart. They belong to the type of passive-aggressive (wilting) villains who don't deserve to be part of the Christmas parade. [Note 1]

Falun Gong did sue the Auckland Children's Christmas Parade Trust (which ultimately lost). They surrounded the office of Foundation President Michael Barnett and harassed him, forcing him to hire personal bodyguards. Falun Gong's applications to participate in various Chinese cultural parades and festivals, not only in the United States, but also in the world, have been repeatedly rejected because of their insistence on spreading a strong political message.

To get back to business, I will discuss the background information of Falun Gong in the following aspects:

(1) Falun Gong's strategy of dominating media outside China;

(2) the reasons for Falun Gong's attacks and exclusion of others;

(3) Finally, some concepts from social movement theory are borrowed to partially interpret Falun Gong's media strategy.

Part I: Factors for Falun Gong's Media Success

First, more than a decade ago, Heather Kavan (at Massey University in New Zealand) read all the reports on Falun Gong published in Australian and New Zealand newspapers (even if they were just a few words), from the first mention of Falun Gong in May 1999 to the end of June 2005 (excluding the Chinese-language media and Falun Gong's own newspaper, The Epoch Times). Her findings at the time, even now, and in the English-language media community as a whole, are broadly represented.

A study of the Australian media found that while news reports generally tended to question emerging religious movements and exaggerate their aberrant behavior (Richardson, 1996, Selway, 1992), journalists seemed to be highly receptive to Falun Gong and tried to downplay the group's aberrant beliefs and equate them to mainstream (religious) activities...... I found that journalists supported Falun Gong (overall): 61 percent of the coverage was favorable to it, 33 percent was neutral, and only 6 percent were negative.

19.5% of the articles described Falun Gong extremely positively. This kind of article is impassioned, and the content seems to copy the statements of Falun Gong disciples word for word, and many of them also have strong anti-China sentiments. They include: (1) miraculous stories or illustrations of seriously ill practitioners (all women) being healed, spiritually benefited, and even rejuvenated, (2) harrowing stories of atrocities in which members (mostly women) are abused or abducted by the Chinese government, and (3) propaganda (Falun Gong) articles.

31.1% of the articles are completely positive about Falun Gong, but not to the extent that they publish articles written by Falun Gong disciples themselves or exaggerate too much. These reports include numerous reports of protests against human rights abuses, as well as interviews with people who have achieved success in their lives as a result of practicing Falun Gong (all men).

10.4% of the articles gave a different perspective (e.g., quoting the Chinese embassy, Air New Zealand's ban on Falun Gong at airports, etc.), but they still gave Falun Gong a positive image. I also classify these as positive, because the comments given by these authors also meet such criteria, such as "leaving aside the rationality of Falun Gong as a religious movement and other reasons...... (Fitzgerald, 2005)

13.2% of the articles gave an alternative perspective, but did not indicate the author's position. Examples include controversial reports of Falun Gong's refusal to participate in the Christmas parade and comments banning Falun Gong practitioners from using loudspeakers outside the Chinese embassy.

19.8% of the articles were neutral factual reports, and neither side would have a dispute about it, such as the protests [of Falun Gong]. Most of these articles are short summaries of international news.

2.6% of the articles have different angles, but Falun Gong presents a negative image. Most of these articles report on negative events, and the author will add that Falun Gong members deny any involvement. For example, Falun Gong followers allegedly set themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square, and hackers attacked the websites of Hong Kong newspapers to redirect visitors to a page with information about Falun Gong.

3.4% of the articles had a negative view of Falun Gong. The articles reported negative events, such as allegedly cutting their wrists at the Villawood detention centre in Sydney, or quoting merely condemnation of Falun Gong members, such as Chinese embassy personnel or Rupert Murdoch.

No article is completely negative, including articles from anti-Falun Gong or anti-cult sources. [Note 2]

Given these remarkable statistics, and the stark contrast between the media's treatment of Falun Gong and other emerging religious movements, we can't help but ask: Why is Falun Gong treated differently? I think this is due to various factors.

First, Falun Gong's founder, Li Hongzhi, explicitly forbade his followers to talk about the organization's core (i.e., high-level) teachings, making some of them unfamiliar to the outside world, not to mention the racist, sexist, and homophobic parts of Li Hongzhi's teachings. [note 3]

He instructed believers to show the public that Falun Gong is an innocent spiritual movement persecuted by the Chinese government. For example, he said:

...... When you tell the truth, you must not speak highly. What you know is what God ought to know, and I have told you, not to the world, so those things cannot be told to ordinary people. You can only say that we are persecuted, our real situation, we are good people who are innocently persecuted, freedom of belief has been trampled on, human rights have been trampled on, and they can accept this, and they will immediately support you and sympathize with you...... Knowing this, the world will say that Falun Gong is persecuted, and the persecutor is so evil, he will say, isn't that enough? [Note 4]

The second important factor in Falun Gong's media success is that it has shifted the discussion of Falun Gong's internal teachings to the discussion of human rights issues. Falun Gong is able to situate itself within a popular interpretive framework (a narrative framework commonly used in journalism, which generally includes a news narrator and a narrative perspective) that looks at China through the lens of political oppression. In an article published in 1999, James Mann argued that the coverage of China in the American media (and by extension, Western media) "tends to apply a single story, image, or concept to a specific time." [note 5]

In the fifties and sixties of the last century, this "frame" was the Chinese blue ants and robots Chinese. In the seventies, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States during the Nixon era, the framework was that of kind (or funny, lovable) Chinese, even under communist control, still showing their virtues not to be inferior by the passage of time. In the eighties, this framework was that China was "moving towards capitalism". For most of the '90s, that framework was "authoritarian China" – because the American framework of the '90s said that China was an authoritarian regime, almost every story about China had to mention the subject of political repression to a greater or lesser extent. (Ibid.)

In other words, Li Hongzhi encourages his followers to show the storyline to the outside world in a narrative that is very much in line with Western tastes, and this technique reinforces the West's preconceived view of China.

In addition to this narrative framework, there is the objective fact of China's suppression of Falun Gong (a factor analytically different from the grand analytical framework adopted by observers of media coverage of China). However, this factor is not as simple as it appears to be. As I and others have pointed out, "through their provocative actions," Falun Gong followers are clearly "deliberately seeking" and provoking the authorities to brutally suppress them. [6] At the beginning of the ban on Falun Gong, individual practitioners were exempted from prison by signing a declaration abandoning Falun Gong practice. However, Li Hongzhi advocated that persecution is beneficial to spiritual cultivation,[note 7] and that those who make the ultimate sacrifice can even reach the state of "consummation" (Falun Gong is similar to a term for "enlightenment")[note 8]. I don't usually attribute similar facts to Falun Gong's grand media strategy. However, in such incidents, Li Hongzhi encourages demonstrations and resistance, and his hidden intention seems to be to provoke the anger of the international community through the lens of the media, using the brutal treatment of Falun Gong disciples by the police, so as to pressure the Chinese government to lift the ban on Falun Gong (I will explore this further in the final part of the paper).

Another factor is that Falun Gong has set up various media groups and made fancy use of the Internet.

Even before it was banned, Falun Gong had already effectively used e-mail to organize demonstrations in China (e.g., the Zhongnanhai demonstration). [9] Four years later, the disciples maintained "hundreds of websites around the world." [10] This number has multiplied over the past decade,[11] in part because "most of the overseas members are Chinese students and scholars, have easy access to the Internet, and have the necessary level of education and technical ability."

At the global level, [this] ensures that Falun Gong's interpretation of events overshadows the Chinese government's interpretation." Western media coverage overwhelmingly supports Falun Gong and condemns the Chinese authorities, and negative reviews of the organization are rare outside of China. There is no doubt that the sheer amount of information posted on the website by Falun Gong disciples provides a readily available resource for compassionate journalists, not to mention the tight deadlines they face. [note 12]

In addition, in May 2000, shortly after Falun Gong was banned, they published their own newspaper outside the country, and in August of the same year, they launched their website. In 2001, they established New Tang Dynasty Television (originally based in New York) – a television channel dedicated to Chinese immigrants. In 2003, the "Voice of Hope" radio station began broadcasting. Beginning in 1999, Western media, which themselves lacked journalists in China, received "a flood of international information about Falun Gong from the Raclin Media Group." But what has never been told to us is that the group is essentially a public relations agency for Falun Gong, run by Gail Rachlin, one of Li Hongzhi's most ardent followers, who is also the spokesperson for the Falun Dafa Information Center." [note 13]

As a result, Falun Gong spreads all over the Internet, using its direct press releases and its own media to influence other media. Falun Gong also indirectly disseminates its own views through other illegal Lun Gong sources, creating the impression that multiple sources speak in unison. For example, "Amnesty International's report is often quoted in the news, but its report has not been independently verified, and its main source is Falun Gong." [14] Also, Falun Gong adherents and their sympathizers actually control the relevant pages on Wikipedia. [15] Such control is crucial.

When searching for something on the Internet, Wikipedia articles tend to be the first or second in the search results, which shows the impact of Wikipedia content. Wikipedia's entry criteria (what can and can't be recorded) affect the work of journalists, who often consult Wikipedia and use Wikipedia content as "background information" without attribution. [note 16]

Journalists often have strict deadlines,[17] which makes Wikipedia, a seemingly independent, neutral source of information, a compelling choice. However, like Amnesty International's report, Wikipedia turned out to be nothing more than a mouthpiece for spreading Falun Gong views.

But another factor that has contributed to Falun Gong's media dominance is that China seems to have abandoned much of its overseas public opinion. China's views on Falun Gong are sometimes published overseas through publications such as the People's Daily or through the websites of Chinese embassies in various countries. But the only one from China who can persist in opposing Falun Gong is Kaifeng (http://www.facts.org.cn).

Part II: The Development of Falun Gong's Attack Strategy

The decisive and most significant aspect of Falun Gong's overall media strategy was its attack on the critical media, which later went so far as to require the media to open a special column for Falun Gong to convey Falun Gong's message. This was a core strategy in the years leading up to the banning of Falun Gong. Specifically, after Falun Gong grew large enough to attract media attention in China, "Falun Gong's consistent response to all negative media coverage has been to (relentlessly) fight back against the news media in question, ranging from practicing demonstrations in front of news agency buildings to directly harassing the editorial staff and reporters involved." [note 18]

Between 1996 and mid-1999, Falun Gong disciples staged more than 300 protests over negative media coverage of them, forcing the news media to fire reporters and publicly apologize. In China, the media must not hinder social stability, so if the Falun Gong protests trigger social instability, media management will quickly give in to their demands. For example, after more than 2,000 protesters surrounded Beijing TV in the case of a Ph.D. student who became mentally ill from practicing Falun Gong, the station fired the reporter, immediately broadcast sympathetic reports, and distributed more than 2,000 boxed lunches to protesters as a gesture of goodwill. After tasting the sweetness of the protests, Falun Gong members became out of control. In order to prevent social unrest, the Beijing authorities have stipulated that no negative publicity should be made about Falun Gong. [note 19]

It is worth pointing out that Falun Gong's demands are not simply "the right to respond to media criticism, but also the right to censor the voices of opponents in the first place...... [In fact,] this movement is actually asking the Chinese government to use its censorship power to silence opponents of Falun Gong." [note 20]

In terms of aggressive attacks on opponents, Falun Gong seems unique among qigong organizations (both criticized in the late '90s). It is entirely fair to say that Falun Gong followers received the attack order from Li Hongzhi himself, although Li Hongzhi lied that these acts were of his own will. For example, a year before Falun Gong was banned, Li Hongzhi published an article entitled "Digging the Roots," in which he mentioned the need to protect "Dafa" (a mixed term roughly equivalent to "Buddhism" in Buddhism and "Tao" in Taoism):

In the recent period, due to the fact that those few ruffians, scientific ruffians, and qigong ruffians who have always wanted to use opposition to qigong to achieve their famous goals have been constantly making trouble, I am afraid that the world will not be chaotic. There are some newspapers, radio stations, and television stations throughout the country that have directly used these propaganda machines to sabotage our Dafa and have caused an extremely bad impact among the masses. Under such extremely special circumstances, Beijing Dafa disciples adopted a special method to tell those people to stop destroying Dafa, and it was actually right. This is only done at the limit. However, it cannot be said that it is wrong for the masses of students to spontaneously explain our actual situation to these irresponsible propaganda organizations who do not understand the facts. [note 21]

At the time, Li Hongzhi insisted that Falun Gong was not a political movement because such identification would likely provoke government repression. In the same article, he tried to describe this kind of political behavior as non-political: "I said that Dafa absolutely does not participate in politics, but this incident itself is aimed at giving it an understanding of our real situation, understanding us from a positive perspective, and not pulling us into politics. [note 22]

After Falun Gong was banned by China, it still actively silenced its critics. To give an example of Falun Gong's suppression of dissenting voices, the 2001 Overseas Chinese Times (Chinese-language media) [note 23] was convicted of defamation for publishing a critical article about the testimony of former Falun Gong members. Four years later, the Supreme Court of Quebec ruled against the plaintiff (Falun Gong). The verdict reads: "Falun Gong is a controversial movement. This kind of movement does not accept critical speech. Similarly, in response to a statement of condemnation by the Australian Chinese Daily, Falun Gong again filed a defamation lawsuit. Two years later, the Supreme Court of New South Wales ruled in favor of the Chinese Daily. [note 24]

There are many more similar lawsuits. However, while Falun Gong has made the implicit threat of litigation part of its overall strategy, for the most part, Falun Gong adherents have relied on other means as well. For example, in 2005, Falun Gong members staged protests outside the Associated Press headquarters to demand the retraction of the report after the Associated Press published an article titled "Chinese Publicly Confess to Join Falun Gong"[Note 25]. In addition, in 2008, the New York Times published an article entitled "A Chinese Cultural Performance That Some People Cannot Watch"[Note 26], which condemned a performance promoted by Falun Gong as a major Chinese cultural event, but in fact it was an attack on China by Falun Gong and had strong political overtones. As a result, Falun Gong's website made a lot of offensive remarks about the New York Times and the authors of the articles.

According to incomplete statistics, since 2001, Falun Gong practitioners have filed more than 100 lawsuits in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Spain, South Korea, Greece, Australia, Bolivia, and the Netherlands, but few have won the lawsuits. Perhaps, like Scientology (also known as Scientology), Falun Gong sees lawsuits more as a means of harassment and does not care whether it can really win. In recent years, in an effort to regain international media attention, the Falun Gong media have reported on the alleged resignation of a large number of Chinese Communist Party members (a claim that other media found uncredible) and the mass removal of human organs from Falun Gong members (which the international media has reacted to).

Conclusion: A theoretical analysis of Falun Gong's media strategy

From Junpeng Li's application of the conflict amplification model [note 27] to my and Nicole S. Ruskell's partial application of the moral panic methodology [note 28], there have been a variety of theories that have been used to try to analyze and interpret the conflict between Falun Gong and the Chinese government. To focus more specifically on Falun Gong's media strategy, Andrew Junker contrasts Falun Gong's methods of protesting against the Chinese authorities with those of the Chinese pro-democracy movement, using the concept of "tactical skills" proposed by social movement theorists (e.g., Tilly 1995, Taylor 2004). His analysis, which is particularly similar to my paper, is that "there is a similarity in the behavioral traits that the participants are trying to achieve." Juncker argues that the propaganda strategies of the two movements abroad are based on the strategic model that had previously developed in China. For example, both movements use petition writing or open letter tactics in China, as well as overseas. In China, Falun Gong uses public practice to attract attention, and overseas as well (which is not seen in the pro-democracy movement). The Chinese-style democracy movement, on the other hand, collects donations both at home and abroad (unlike Falun Gong).

However, Juncker's reliance on a "toolbox" approach has led him to focus more on specific, basic tactics and ignore more macro strategies, such as Falun Gong's attacks on media outlets that have unfavorable statements against them. As I have already pointed out, in the late 90s of the last century, Falun Gong's counter-attacks in China were so successful that they tried and tested themselves to silence the media overseas by using the same tactics, without taking into account the hostility that this method might provoke (as in the case of Kerr Woodham, as we mentioned earlier).

In the case of Supreme Master Ching Hai, Zhonggong, and Falun Gong (Falun Dafa), overseas protests can be counterproductive to protest groups, as discussed in the chapter of Patricia M. Thornton in Kevin J. O'Brien's ed., Popular Protest in China (2008). Thornton's analysis is based on what Keck and Sikkink call the "boomerang" model of transnational support – an attempt to force a change in the direction of public opinion in the home country by mobilizing international networks and international public opinion. [29] She noted, however, that the "boomerang" effect has been cultivated "yes and not very little, but at the cost of the efforts of these banned sects to support them across borders, with the result that they have increased domestic and international scrutiny of their internal affairs and PR tactics, and from time to time negative media attention on the network and its supporters." In contrast to the counterproductive effect of repression, which can produce an 'instantaneous' effect in mass mobilization, it undermines the credibility of movement organizers and their ability to influence established media, politicians, and the population at large. ”

On the Falun Gong section, she believes that the group's media, particularly The Epoch Times, "created dissent" by falsely reporting on the alleged mass resignation of senior Chinese officials. While quitting the party may seem "ridiculous" to other news outlets, The Epoch Times and its affiliates continue to dynamically display counts of those who quit the party on their websites. At the same time, she also spoke about Falun Gong's attack on Harry Wu. Wu Hongda has disputed Falun Gong's remarks that China harvests the organs of Falun Gong followers in prison and sells them to the international market. Falun Gong has viciously attacked him with numerous accusations, including allegations that he received money from the Chinese government — something that is completely impossible just by looking at Wu's experience in China.

In short, the use of high-pressure tactics to silence critical voices is arguably the clumsiest of all the strategies that directly affect the media. This approach (and even threatening) is, in Thornton's words, "a disservice" – a PR strategy that corrupts its PR strategy of presenting itself as an innocent spiritual movement group. Falun Gong could have taken the initiative to save its own image. However, Li Hongzhi seems to be increasingly hostile to the international media and does not intend to get his followers to stop all kinds of provocations and belligerent behavior. In the near future, the international media will finally wake up and re-realize that Falun Gong is a bad organization like the "Chinese version of Scientology." With the passage of time, especially when Li Hongzhi finally retires, the number and influence of Falun Gong followers will slowly weaken until it disappears.

Notes (translated from English and Chinese):

[注1] The New Zealand Herald, Kerre Woodham (McIvor), “Booze and Bullies,” 23 Nov 2008.

Kerr Woodham (McKeever).Drinking and Villains[N].New Zealand Herald, 2008-11-23

[注2] Heather Kavan (2005), “Print Media Coverage of Falun Gong in Australia and New Zealand.” In: Peter Horsfield, ed.: Papers from the Trans-Tasman Research Symposium, ‘Emerging Research in Media, Religion and Culture’.

Heather Kavan.Falun Gong Print Media Coverage in Australia and New Zealand.Pete Housefield, Editor-in-Chief.Proceedings of the Trans-Tasman Symposium: A Study on the Integration of Media, Religion and Culture[C].(2005)

Melbourne: RMIT Publishing, pp. 74-85. The articles to which Kavan refers are: James T. Richardson (1996). “Journalistic bias towards new religious movements in Australia.” Journal of Contemporary Religion. 11(3), pp. 289-302 and D. Selway (1992). “Religion in the mainstream press: The challenge for the future.” Australian Religious Studies Review, 5(2), pp. 18-24.

Melbourne: RMIT University Press.74-85. The article that Kavan is referring to is: James M. T. Richardson, Journalists Hold Prejudices Against Australia's Emerging Religious Movements, Journal of Contemporary Religion (1996): 11(3): pp. 289-302; and D. Selvey, Religion in the Eyes of the Mainstream Media: Challenges to the Future, Australian Religion Review, (1992), 5(2): 18-24.

[注3] I have briefly discussed this aspect of LHZ’s teachings in, “Sucking the ‘De’ Out of Me: How an Esoteric Theory of Persecution and Martyrdom Fuels Falun Gong’s Assault on Intellectual Freedom.” Alternative Spirituality and Religion Review 7:1 (2016), pp. 101-102. I also discuss the aspect of LHZ’s teachings that prompts followers to seek martyrdom. The most detailed treatment of FLG’s teachings in English is Benjamin Penny’s excellent, The Religion of Falun Gong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012)

I briefly discussed this aspect of Li Hongzhi's teachings in my article "Falun Gong Wants to Absorb "Virtue" from Me: How Li Hongzhi's Mysterious Doctrine of Persecution and Martyrdom Encouraged Falun Gong to Threaten Academic Freedom. 7:1 (2016).pp. 101-201. Benjamin Penny. The Religion of Falun Gong.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.2012.This is the best article written in English on the teachings of Falun Gong.

[注4] Li Hongzhi, “Explaining the Fa During the 2003 Lantern Festival at the U.S. West Fa Conference.” (15 February 2003. Los Angeles). LHZ’s rhetorical question practically begs the further question, Enough for what? If Li’s purpose is convert more individuals to FLG and thus save them from the suffering during imminent apocalypse, then, according to his own teachings, this is nowhere near enough to save them. Rather, this minimal amount of information is just enough to evoke public sympathy for FLG’s campaign to overturn the ban against the group in China. This goal – not saving souls – appears to be the overriding focus of LHZ’s concern.

Quoted from Li Hongzhi, "2003 Lantern Festival Western American Festival Dharma Lectures" (Los Angeles, February 15, 2003). Li Hongzhi's rhetorical question actually leads to further questions: What is "enough"? If Li Hongzhi's goal is to convert more people to practice Falungong so that they will be saved from the coming suffering, then according to his teachings, this is far from enough to save everyone. However, this small message was enough to arouse public sympathy for Falun Gong's rebellion against the Chinese government and its overturning of the ban. This purpose seems to be Li Hongzhi's primary concern, not to save souls.

[注5] James Mann (1999) “Framing China." Media Studies Journal: Covering China 13:1.

James Mann.Framed China.Journal of Media Studies: Panorama China 13:1 (1999)

[注6] David A. Palmer (2001). “Falun Gong: Between Sectarianism and Universal Salvation.” China Perspectives 35, p. 17.

Falun Gong: Sectarianism or Universal Salvation of the World.China Perspectives 35,17.(2001)

[注7] Lewis (2016) “Sucking the ‘De’ Out of Me.”

Louis Falun Gong wants to take "virtue" from me (2016).

[注8] Susan J. Palmer (2003). “Healing to Protest: Conversion Patterns Among the Practitioners of Falun Gong.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6:2, 348-364.

Susan S. J. Palmer. Healing Protest: A Conversion Model among Falun Gong Practitioners[J].Emerging Religions: Non-Traditional Religions and Emerging ReligionsJournal 6:2(2003).348-364

[注9] Mark R. Bell and Taylor C. Boas (2003). "Falun Gong and the Internet: Evangelism, community, and struggle for survival." Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6.2, p. 283.

Mark S. R. Bell and Taylor S. C. Boas, Falun Gong and the Internet: Evangelism, Community, and the Struggle for Survival[J]. Emerging Religions: Non-Traditional Religions and Emerging Religions, Journal.6:2.283

[注10] Ibid., p. 278.

Ibid., 278

[注11] Yuezhi Zhao (2003) “Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China.” In Nick Couldry and James Curran, eds., Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World (Rowman & Littlefield), p.214.

Zhao Yuezhi (Yuezhi Zhao). Falun Gong: Identity and the Significance of Struggle in China and Abroad . Edited by Nick Couldry and James Collen. The Power of Media Competition: Alternative Media in the Online World Roman and Littlefield Publishing Group Inc., 214 (2003)

[注12] Bell and Boas (2003) “Falun Gong and the Internet,” p. 287.

Bell and Boas. Falun Gong and the Internet[A]. 287（2003）

[注13] Kavan (2005). Print Media Coverage.

Kavan. Print Media Coverage.(2005)

[注14] Ibid.

ditto

[注15] E.g., in this regard refer to Sheng Jiang (2015) “Is Falun Gong’s Wikipedia page objective?” https://www.quora.com/is-Falun-Gongs-Weikipedia-page-objective (Accessed 19 June 2016) and User: Colipon/Falun Gong. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Colipon/Falun_Gong (Accessed 20 June 2016).

For example, in this regard, it refers to Sheng Jiang's (2015) "Is Falun Gong's Wikipedia Page Objective?" https://www.quora.com/is-Falun-Gongs-Weikipedia-page-objective (updated June 19, 2016) with the username Colipon/Falun Gong

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Colipon/Falun_Gong (Updated on 20 June 2016)

[注16] Simson L. Garfinkel (2008). “Wikipedia and the Meaning of Truth: Why the online encyclopedia’s epistemology should worry those who care about traditional notions of accuracy.” MIT Technology Review.

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/411041/wikipedia-and-the-meaning-of-truth/ (Accessed 9 July 2016). For some academicians, Wikipedia “seems to represent the worst of how the Internet has dumbed down the research process, with its easily accessible but unsubstantiated (if not downright false)information.” Darren Crovitz and W. Scott Smoot (2009).

“Wikipedia: Friend, Not Foe.” The English Journal 98:3, p. 91.

Simson L. Garfenbell (2008), "Wikipedia and the Meaning of Truth: Why the Epistemology of Online Encyclopedias Should Worry Those Who Focus on Traditional Notions of Precision," MIT Technology Review

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/411041/wikipedia-and-the-meaning-of-truth/ (Posted on July 9, 2016)

Some intellectuals have argued that Wikipedia's "ease of access to unverified information, if not entirely wrong, seems to show the worst side of how the Internet can degrade the research process." Darren Crovitz and W. Scott Smoot (2009), Wikipedia: Friends Not Enemies, English Journal, p. 91

[注17] Kavan (2005). Print Media Coverage.

Kavan (2005), print media coverage

[注18] Zhao (2003) “Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle,” pp.214-215.

Zhao (2003) Falun Gong, Identity and Resistance to Struggle, pp. 214-215

[注19] Kavan (2008) “Falun Gong in the Media,” p. 3.

[注20] Zhao (2003) “Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle,” p. 215.

Zhao (2003) Falun Gong, Identity and Resistance to Struggle, p. 215

[注21] Li Hongzhi (1998) “Digging Out the Roots.” http://en.falundafa.org/eng/jjyz72.htm. Downloaded 20 June 2016

Li Hongzhi (1998) "Digging the Roots", http://en.falundafa.org/eng/jjyz72.htm downloaded on June 20, 2016

[注22] Ibid.

ditto

[23] http://www.chinesepress.com/

[注24] Lewis (2016) “Sucking the ‘De’ out of Me.”

Louis (2016) "Falun Gong Wants to Absorb "Virtue" from Me"

[注25] Associated Press, “Chinese Show Off Repentant Falun Gong” (2005).

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26902-2005Jan21_2.html Accessed: 5 June 2015.

Associated Press "Chinese Publicly Repent of Joining Falun Gong",

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26902-2005Jan21_2.html, published on June 15, 2015

[注26] Eric Konigsberg, “A Glimpse of Chinese Culture That Some Find Hard to Watch.” New York Times (26 February 2008).

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06yregion/06splendor.html?scp=1&sq=A+Glimpse+of+Chinese+Culture+That+So me+Find+Hard+to+Watch&st=nyt Accessed: 5 June 2015

艾瑞克·孔尼伯格（Eric Konigsberg），《一场有人难以看下去的中国文化演出》（A Glimpse of Chinese Culture That Some Find Hard to Watch），《纽约时报》（2008年2月26日）

[注27] Junpeng Li (2013) “The Religion of the Nonreligious and the Politics of the Apolitical: The Transformation of Falun Gong from Healing Practice to Political Movement, Religion,” Politics and Religion 7, pp. 177-208.

Li Junpeng (2013) "The Religion of the Unbelievers and the Politics of Nothing Politics: The Transformation of Falun Gong from Healing Practice to Political Movement and Religion", Religion and Politics, No. 7, pp. 177-208

[注28] James R. Lewis and Nicole S. Ruskell (forthcoming), “Understanding Falun Gong’s Martyrdom Strategy as Spiritual Terrorism,” In James R. Lewis, ed. Cambridge Companion to Religion and Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

James S. R. Lewis and Nicole S. Laskell, "Understanding Falun Gong's Martyrdom Strategy as Spiritual Terrorism", in The Cambridge Guide to Religion and Terrorism (edited by James R. Lewis), Cambridge University Press, UK

[注29] Margaret E. Keck and Karen Sikkink (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Margaret S. E. Cork and Karen Skink (1998), Activists Beyond Borders Beyond Borders: Networks of Initiatives in International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University News Agency Published on Archive Records. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not related to the Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR).