The Battle of Guandu, one of the three major battles in the late Eastern Han Dynasty, was a classic battle in which the weak defeated the strong and the few won more. Through this campaign, Cao Cao laid the foundation for the unification of the north, while Yuan Shao declined from then on until he withdrew from the stage of history.
We've learned and understood this way for years, and we've never had a different view of it. It was not until I read Pei Songzhi's "Three Kingdoms" a few days ago, when I saw Pei Songzhi's doubts about the Battle of Guandu winning more with less, that I felt that his comments were quite reasonable. Pei Songzhi's comment goes something like this:
When Cao Cao first started his army, there were "5,000 people," and since then, he has won almost 100 battles and lost only 23 out of 10. Especially after the attack on the Yellow Turban Army, more than 300,000 people were accepted, plus the forces annexed by other victories, although it is not clearly recorded, there must be quite a few; Although there is combat attrition, it should not be as small as the various history books.
So, in the Battle of Guandu, what was the comparison of the military strength of Yuan Cao and the two sides? After consulting some materials, although the specific data differed slightly, it was roughly the same: Yuan Shao's total strength was about 110,000, and Cao Cao's was about 20,000. The record in the "Records of the Three Kingdoms" is: "It was Shi Yuan Shao who merged with Gongsun Zan and the land of four states, and there were more than 100,000 people. On Cao Cao's side, it was: "Shigong's soldiers are less than 10,000, and the wounded are twelve or three." "In this way, it is more than ten thousand to seven or eight thousand. According to the former, the ratio of forces between Yuan Shao and Cao Cao was 5:1, or at least 10:1 according to the Records of the Three Kingdoms.
Cao Cao raised troops to fight Zhuo in the sixth year of Zhongping (189 AD), when "there were 5,000 people". In the winter of the third year of Chuping (192 AD), after defeating the Yellow Turban Army, "more than 300,000 people were surrendered, more than 100,000 men and women, and those who received their elite were called Qingzhou soldiers." Since then, Cao Cao has continued to fight battles, except for a small defeat at Lü Bu in the first year of Xingping (194 AD) and a sneak attack by Zhang Xiu in the second year of Jian'an (197 AD). By the time of the defeat of Yuan Shao at the Battle of Guandu in the fifth year of Jian'an (200 AD), Cao Cao had only raised his army for more than ten years, and during these more than ten years, he was almost sure to win and defeat, and there was no crushing defeat like the later Battle of Chibi. So, in this case, how can there be a dilemma of "less than 10,000 soldiers"?
It should be remembered that the Battle of Guandu was not an encounter battle, it lasted for a year and five months (June 199 to October 200). This determines that both sides are well aware of each other's situation and will not be suddenly confused due to unclear circumstances, which is also the most obvious difference between encounter and protracted war. The "Records of the Three Kingdoms" recorded, "A little before the Shaolian camp, Yishayuan was the tun, tens of miles east and west. The public is also divided into camps and equivalent. "How can it be possible to hold on a front of tens of miles, hold on to the opponent for a year and five months, and where the opponent has an army, that is, "divided battalions and equivalent", if there are only seven or eight thousand troops, how can it be done?
Therefore, Pei Songzhi questioned: "Uniting camps and defending each other is different from destroying the decisive battle. "Although Wei Taizu has no way to change, he is a little out of the world, and there are thousands of soldiers, and he has to resist in time? In theory, plagiarism is not. In other words, camp confrontation and charge duel are two different situations, and if there is not enough hard power in the field, relying only on change and strategy will not make much difference.
Pei Songzhi believed that in this war, Cao Cao's forces must be "not very few" for the following reasons:
First, Yuan Shaotun had tens of miles of troops, but Cao Cao could divide his troops to fight against him. If the troops are insufficient, they can only clench into a fist and beat people, instead of spreading out the limited forces and making their own strength smaller. The so-called victory with less can only be that the whole may be less, but the part should be superior, if the troops are insufficient, and then scattered use, it will cause the overall weakness and the local weaker, and Cao Cao, who has been in battle for a long time, will definitely not make such a mistake.
Second, if Yuan Shao had ten times the strength, he should have surrounded Cao Cao and trapped him, cutting him off from entering and leaving. That is, the so-called "ten rules to encircle and five to attack". However, Cao Cao could send Xu Huang to intercept Yuan Shao's grain trucks and burn them. A few months later, he could personally command another 5,000 men to attack Yuan Shao's grain convoy - escorted by an army of more than 10,000 people led by Chun Yuqiong and five others, and "kill Qiong and others." In this process, "Yang Jing returned without resistance," that is, these actions were carried out with great fanfare, but Yuan Shao was powerless to stop them.
Third, numerous history books say that Cao Cao "pit 80,000 people, or 70,000 clouds." If 780,000 people are scattered, 78,000 people will not be able to bind them back one by one, but most of the troops will be "killed", so what force can stop them? A force strong enough to stop them, of course.
In addition, there is indirect corroboration. After the siege of White Horse was lifted, Yuan Shao sent troops to pursue Cao Cao, and "Shao cavalry general Wen Chu and Liu Bei rode five or six thousand horses back and forth", "When the horse was less than 600, he attacked the army, broke the big one, and cut the ugly." "This is also a battle with huge disparity in strength, and it is a cavalry contest, and the victory is also Cao Fang. However, in volume 13 of the "Records of the Three Kingdoms", "Zhong Xiuhua Xin Wang Lang Biography", it is recorded that "Taizu was in Guandu, held with Yuan Shao, and sent more than 2,000 horses to the army. Taizu and Shushu said: 'It is urgent to get the horse that is sent.' Even if Cao Fang's cavalry had no horses, it should be able to equip at least two thousand cavalry troops at this time, how could it be "less than six hundred"?
In that case, how did the Battle of Guandu gradually become what we know later? Pei Songzhi's guess is: "The narrator wants to be surprised by the rare, not the actual record." "Who is the narrator?
First, naturally, the author of the "Records of the Three Kingdoms" was Chen Shou, who served as an official in the Shu Han, and after the fall of the Shu Han, he joined the Jin Dynasty. Jin inherited Wei and unified the country, so the Wei state still had a special position in the Jin Dynasty, so in the "Records of the Three Kingdoms", the "Book of Wei" was listed first, and the emperors of the Wei state were recorded in the "Benji", while the emperors of Wu and Shu could only be included in the "biography". As a Shu courtier, Chen Shou was already familiar with the Battle of Chibi, which was almost a battle for the establishment of the state in which Shu Han and Wu and Wei became one of the "three leggeds". Then, the Battle of Guandu, which would be no less important to Wei, was shaped into a miracle of winning more with less, self-sufficient to curry favor with the rulers of the Jin Dynasty. However, judging from Chen Shou's personal character and character and his writing style of "straight writing and realism" at that time, it is not very likely that he will do so.
Second, in Chen Shou's "Records of the Three Kingdoms", the historical sources of the "Book of Wei" are mainly the "Book of Wei" by Wang Shen of official Xiu and the "Wei Luo" by Yu Feng, who wrote privately. Yu Feng's writing style and personal morality were no less than Chen Shou's, and Wang Shen moved to the position of Scattered Horse Chang Attendant and Attendant during the Zhengyuan period of Cao Xin's reign, in charge of works, and co-compiled the Book of Wei with Xun Yan and Ruan Zhi, mostly hidden by those in power. Moreover, his personality was not commendable, as a confidant of Cao Xian, when Cao Xin wanted to sue Sima Zhao for the sake of great power, Wang Shen immediately did not hesitate to "sue King Wen", resulting in Cao Xin being killed, and he himself was made a marquis of Jin for his informant merits. Therefore, from his consistent practice, if it is a matter of "seeing the rare and surprising", Wang Shen is a more suitable candidate than Chen Shou and Yu Feng.
Of course, history has become history, and we may never have the answer to the real historical facts. However, this is the joy and charm of learning and reading, and different perspectives and opinions present us with different landscapes and pictures, allowing us to linger and enjoy it. If you have a certain opinion, it will increase the joy. If you think so, why is it?