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Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

author:Natural selection

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At the beginning of 1945, although the strength of the Japanese army in the land of China was still not to be underestimated, its defeat had already appeared, because in the Pacific Theater, the navy and air force of the Japanese army were constantly destroyed by the US army, and the Japanese army was plunged into the ocean of people's war in the land of China.

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

Oil painting of the All-out War of Resistance

An intuitive phenomenon is that the offensive operations of the Japanese army have long been inferior to before, and with the progress of the war, the number of new recruits of the Japanese army is large, and most of them are old, weak, sick and disabled, and the combat ability of the Japanese army has long been different from the past.

Once the Japanese army is defeated, it means that the common enemy of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will disappear, so who can win the initiative strategically will directly affect the course and outcome of the struggle, so both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are laying out and plotting the situation.

At this time, Yan Xishan, who was in Shanxi, set his sights on the Shangdang, because the strategic position of the Shangdang was too important.

Shangdang, located in the southeast of Shanxi Province, is another name for the ancient city of Changzhi, which is bordered by Hebei and Henan provinces through the Taihang Mountains to the east, Linfen to the west through the Taiyue Mountains, Wuyun Mountain to the north and Jinzhong to the north, and Xinxiang City in Henan province through Wang Mangling to the south.

Because Shangdang was at the junction of Shanxi, Henan, and Hebei, and Shangdang was occupied by our army, it blocked the passage of the Kuomintang army to the north.

That is to say, after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, if Chiang Kai-shek wanted to transport his elite troops from the southwest to north and northeast China by land, the Shangdang area was an important strategic passage, and our army's occupation of Shangdang choked the throat of the Kuomintang army's march into north and northeast China.

Yan Xishan even fantasized that if he occupied Shangdang, he would be able to prevent Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army from entering North China, and he would have the opportunity to monopolize North China, so he would have the opportunity to fight with Chiang Kai-shek.

Another important reason is that the Shangdang area is considered to be "in the world", so there is an old saying: "He who wins the Central Plains wins the world, and if he wants to win the Central Plains, he must first occupy the Shangdang." ”

Born in 1883, Yan Xishan received a feudal education from an early age, so he was very superstitious, and once when he went to Luochuan, because Luochuan was pronounced "Falling River" and Yan Xishan's word was "Bochuan", he moved to Yichuan, and he felt that Yichuan and Bochuan were more suitable.

There is a spirit vulture temple on Mount Wutai in Shanxi, and Yan Xishan will burn incense and worship the Buddha every time he passes through here. It was also because of his mother, who said that he had been held out of the Vulture Temple, and that he was related to the Vulture Temple. After this, Yan Xishan felt that he was different from ordinary people, and he felt that he might be the reincarnation of a god.

Whether from the perspective of military strategy or from the perspective of superstition, Yan Xishan had a special affection for the Party. Therefore, in 1945, when the defeat of the Japanese army had already appeared, Yan Xishan had a crooked mind about the Shangdang.

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

The first on the left is Yan Xishan

On February 16, 1945, Yan Xishan held the fourth backbone meeting of the Comrades' Association to study the question of how to seize the fruits of victory after the surrender of the Japanese army, and in this regard, Yan Xishan was much smarter than Chiang Kai-shek.

Yan Xishan's main confidants attended the meeting, including Yan Xishan's beloved general Shi Zebo.

Born in 1899, Shi Zebo, a native of Zhangwangtun Village, Botou Fu Town, Cangzhou, Hebei Province, graduated from the 8th Infantry Section of the Baoding Army Officer School, started from the grassroots level after graduation, and later served as a regimental commander and division commander, and was promoted to commander of the 19th Army in September 1943.

In the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, in order to save the unfavorable situation of the Nationalist army on the battlefield, Shi Zebo once went into battle shirtless and led the commando team to desperately seize a commando point near the Japanese army's south Huaihua. Subsequently, a guerrilla war with the Japanese army was fought in the area of Lüliang Mountain, and the wisdom and courage were fought, and many victories were won, which boosted the morale of the Jin army in the War of Resistance.

In a word: Shi Zebo was one of the few generals in the Yan Xishan department of the Chinese Kuomintang army who could fight, and Yan Xishan knew this very well.

As soon as the Fourth Backbone Conference was over, Yan Xishan summoned Shi Zebo to consult him on the occupation of the Shang party, and Shi Zebo said:

"You can go, but you can't stand, because you can't concentrate your troops, you can't occupy such a big place, and if you disperse your troops, you will be eaten one by one."

Shi Zebo is a military general who has studied our army's campaign tactics quite a bit, and it should be said that Shi Zebo's view is still very correct.

However, Yan Xishan did not think so, he believed that on the whole, the Kuomintang army was much stronger than the Chinese communist army, and in terms of the comparison of shanxi's troops, the troops he had in his hands were not only superior in numbers, but also in weapons and equipment.

Both Shi Zebo and Yan Xishan's views have their own truths, because one is considered from the perspective of the campaign and the other is considered from the strategic point of view, but the strategic issue must be realized by the campaign, and Yan Xishan does not realize this, nor does Chiang Kai-shek realize a little.

Therefore, on August 15, 1945, as soon as Japan announced its surrender, Yan Xishan suggested to Chiang Kai-shek to sneak into the Shangdang, and Chiang Kai-shek also wanted to use this to test the strength of the Ccp in order to gain leverage in the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek quickly gave Yan Xishan an order: immediately sneak attack on shangdang.

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

Chiang Kai-shek

On August 19, the fourth day of Japan's unconditional surrender, Yan Xishan, commander of the Second Theater of operations of the Kuomintang Army, ordered Shi Zebo, commander of the 19th Army, to command 4 infantry divisions, 1 advancing column (equivalent to a division), and some puppet troops totaling 17,000 people to invade the Jinji-Hebei Luyu base area on a large scale.

Although Shi Zebo did not approve of this military action, under yan Xishan's strict orders, he had to carry out the order.

However, what Shi Zebo did not expect was that this military operation was surprisingly smooth, and Shi Zebo led all the soldiers and horses to advance from Linfen, Fushan, and Yicheng to the Shangdang from Linfen, Fushan, and Yicheng under the cover of the Japanese puppet army along the way. But there was no obstacle on the way, as if there were no CCP troops in this area at all.

This made Shi Zebo have the illusion that the strength of the Eighth Route Army was not so strong, and Liu Bocheng was not so powerful, but was this really the case? The answer, of course, is no.

In fact, after an all-out war of resistance, the Chinese Communists have established a very systematic and efficient intelligence network, and the Kuomintang army has CHINESE intelligence personnel everywhere, while the Kuomintang intelligence personnel within the CCP have basically been eliminated.

Before Shi Zebo attacked shangdang, the CCP's underground party in Taiyuan learned of the intelligence and quickly passed it on to the intelligence department of the Jinji-Hebei Luyu Military Region of the Eighth Route Army, which immediately reported the situation to Liu Bocheng in Yan'an, because Liu Bocheng had returned to Yan'an in 1943 to participate in the rectification movement and the party's "Seventh National Congress."

When Liu Bocheng saw that the stakes were very high, he immediately reported the situation to Chairman Mao, and Chairman Mao pondered for a moment and then asked Liu Bocheng: If the Kuomintang army is allowed to occupy Shangdang, will our army be sure to take back Shangdang?

Chairman Mao's meaning is obvious: if the Kuomintang army captures Shangdang, it will be politically passive, and the CCP will be in a favorable position politically. If our army can take back shangdang, then our army can not only eliminate the Kuomintang army that occupied shangdang, but also gain political initiative.

Of course, all this is based on the premise that our army can take back the party.

Liu Bocheng often dealt with Yan Xishan's army, he knew the combat effectiveness of yan army, and he said to Chairman Mao with great certainty that he could take back the party from the Yan army.

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

Szepo

Liu Bocheng is a well-known military figure in our army and has never made assurances that he is not sure, and Chairman Mao knows this very well, and he immediately decided: Our army must not stop the Kuomintang army from sneaking up on the party.

Liu Bocheng immediately agreed with this plan set by Chairman Mao, which is tantamount to combining strategic and campaign issues, which is completely different from Yan Xishan's decision.

The Nationalist army is about to launch a large-scale offensive, our army has obtained reliable information, but Chairman Mao has ordered that it should not be blocked; Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan have made a plan against Chairman Mao's plan, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army, and Chen Cheng's views are even more optimistic, he believes that the military strength of the Chinese Communists is not worth mentioning, and later in the full-scale civil war, Chen Cheng clamored for the settlement of military problems within three to five months.

Because Chairman Mao ordered the Yan army to occupy the Shangdang area, the result was a strange phenomenon of Shi Zebo occupying the Shangdang area without spending a single shot.

In this regard, Li Da, deputy commander of the Taihang Military Region of the Eighth Route Army who controlled the Shangdang area at that time, wrote in his 1985 memoirs:

"In order to expose Yan Xishan's criminal act of encroaching on the fruits of the victory of our army and people in the war of resistance in front of the people of the whole country, when the ministry passed and attacked our liberated areas, our army did not block it, but let it pass. In this way, the people will see clearly that it is Chiang Kai-shek's Yan army that is launching an offensive to seize the fruits of the people's victory. If this were not the case, how could Yan Bu have entered my Taixing hinterland so smoothly? ”

After Yan Xishan attacked and occupied Shangdang, our party immediately exposed Yan Xishan's criminal deeds.

On September 11, 1945, Zhou Enlai, who was in Chongqing, told the pro-democracy Zhang Lan about Yan Xishan's attack on the Liberated Areas in the Shangdang area, and Zhang Lan said angrily:

"Openly sending telegrams to invite you to negotiate and then waging war behind your backs will absolutely not allow the Kuomintang to be so arrogant!"

On the afternoon of September 14, 1945, Zhang Lan bluntly rebuked the Kuomintang negotiators Zhang Qun and Shao Lizi:

"Why didn't Yan Xishan save Mr. Jiang a little face?" Chongqing is talking, Shanxi is fighting, isn't this laughing at the world? Isn't Mr. Jiang embarrassed? ”

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

Negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of Chongqing

Zhang Qun knew in his heart that Yan Xishan's entry into the Shangdang was instructed by Chiang Kai-shek, but he pretended to be confused with understanding:

"This is Yan Xishan's personal action."

Although Yan Xishan's sneak attack on the party was successful, the Kuomintang fell into great passivity politically; various democratic parties condemned Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan for provoking a civil war, and the broad masses of the people also learned of Chiang Kai-shek's ugly act of openly negotiating peace but launching a military offensive in private, and the CPC won the political initiative.

The Kuomintang army occupied Shangdang, and while winning the political initiative, the CCP also began to recover Shangdang militarily.

Chairman Mao talked with Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were about to return to the Taihang base area, and asked them to return to the front, let go of the fight, and said:

"The comrades are worried about my safety to negotiate. We know Chiang Kai-shek as a person. If you fight better on the front line, I will be safer, if I don't fight well, I will be more dangerous, and if you win the battle, it will be easier for me to negotiate, otherwise it will be more difficult. ”

Although Liu Bocheng told Chairman Mao in advance that he could take back the Shangdang area, in fact the difficulties at that time were still very great.

At that time, the Jinji-Hebei Luyu base area controlled more than 80 counties, with a population of 24 million, nearly 300,000 troops and 400,000 militia. But there were no regular field regiments, which were scattered throughout the country to conduct guerrilla warfare

To this end, Liu Bocheng took an extraordinary measure, that is, to form a field corps while gathering troops, and Liu Bocheng pointed out the key points of this battle to the point:

"The most urgent task at present is to concentrate and disperse the troops fighting, depending on who concentrates quickly, gathers together, and forms a fist, which is victory."

A great advantage of our army is that it carries out the orders of its superiors without conditions, and under the instructions of Liu Bocheng, The Jinji-Hebei Luyu quickly formed three field columns of Taihang, Taiyue, and Southern Hebei, and greatly expanded the militia.

Liu Bocheng drew a column and local armed forces from these units, totaling more than 31,000 people, to retake Shangdang, and 50,000 militiamen to cooperate in the battle.

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

Oil painting of the Shangdang Campaign

This kind of action of fighting while forming and fighting at the same time makes Liu Bocheng remember it vividly. After liberation, Liu Bocheng recalled with emotion:

"Tens of thousands of guerrilla fighters, still wearing colorful clothes, gathered up and went to the front, and thousands of militiamen lined up in neat lines to participate in combat work."

On the other hand, Liu Bocheng asked the troops to innovate the method of tackling tough problems. Because the firepower of the participating units is very weak, it is difficult to rely on the existing firepower to carry out the task of attacking the stronghold.

According to the data, there are only 6 mountain guns in the entire Jinji-Hebei Luyu Military Region, only half of the regiments have 2 to 4 mortars, 3 to 4 heavy machine guns, and most of the new soldiers use large knives and spears, even rifle ammunition is extremely scarce, and many rifles only have a few bullets.

It was very difficult to attack the shangdang with such weak firepower to occupy the defensive facilities. However, this was difficult for the participating troops, who created the tunnel blasting method and first used this method to conquer Xiangyuan County.

Xiangyuan County is located in the north of Changzhi 90 miles, the city defense is relatively strong, for this reason, the 13th Regiment of the Taihang Military Region dug more than 100 meters of tunnels to the bottom of the city wall, with a coffin full of explosives to blow up the city wall, the siege troops took advantage of the situation to pour into the city, after 4 hours of fierce fighting, killed 350 enemy people, captured 450 enemy.

The victory in the Xiangyuan Offensive Battle represents the success of our army's use of the tunnel offensive method.

Field troops have been formed and the method of tackling tough battles has also been innovated, but after all, attacking fortifications on cities is not our army's strong point, and it is time-consuming and laborious, and the casualties are not small, so how to induce the enemy to go out of the fortifications to carry out field battles is a problem that Liu Bocheng pondered.

To this end, Liu Bocheng adopted the tactic of encircling points and providing reinforcements, fighting a field battle with the enemy's reinforcements to annihilate the enemy, and then attacking the stronghold. As a result, our army annihilated 23,000 reinforcements from Yan Xishan in a single field battle.

The Shangdang Campaign was the first large-scale annihilation battle carried out by the troops in the Liberated Areas after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan against the kuomintang army's offensive, in which more than 35,000 enemy personnel were annihilated, including 31,000 prisoners, including 27 general-level officers, 24 mountain artillery, more than 30 mortars, more than 2,000 light and heavy machine guns, and more than 16,000 long and short guns.

Compared with the military victory, our army is more politically advantageous because it not only consolidated the rear area of the Jin-Hebei Luyu Liberated Zone, but also strengthened the position of the Chinese Communists in the Chongqing negotiations.

Sure enough, as Chairman Mao expected, Chiang Kai-shek, who had suffered repeated heavy blows on the battlefield, had to restrain his arrogance at the negotiating table and agree to the CPC's proposal.

Chairman Mao made a plan, and Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan all made plans, including Chen Cheng, a think tank of the Kuomintang army

Chairman Mao

Just two days before the end of the Shangdang Campaign, on October 10, 1945, after 43 days of negotiations, the Kuomintang and the Communists finally signed the Minutes of the Talks between the Representatives of the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists (the "Double Tenth Agreement").

Therefore, afterwards, everyone lamented that Chairman Mao's decision was too clever.

Tianxuan is the author's pen name, who has studied history and philosophy and is welcome to pay attention to it.

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