Xu Kai's "rights" regarded Xunzi's idea of "dividing" under the threshold

"Rights" depend on the idea of "dividing" Xunzi under the threshold

About author丨Xu Kai, Assistant Researcher and Ph.D., School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Research Direction: History of Science of Song Ming.

The original article is published in Dongyue On Cong, Issue 07, 2018.

Abstract: "Rights" is a basic and core concept in modern political philosophy. Whether there is a concept of "rights" in traditional Confucian political philosophy is still controversial. In modern times, the "points" in Xunzi's political philosophy have been considered to be equivalent to "rights". In Western political philosophy, "rights" are biased towards "natural rights" based on equality; while Xunzi's "division" is the stipulation and arrangement of individuals or classes in the state and social organizations, which have the function of forming rules of order and maintaining a harmonious state, so they cannot be equated with "rights". Through the reinterpretation and elaboration of traditional Confucian doctrine and the convergence with Western political philosophy, there is a possibility that Confucianism will be compatible with the concept of "rights".

Keywords: fen; rights; Xunzi; Confucianism

I. Confucianism and the Concept of "Rights"

In modern political philosophy, "rights" are one of the most basic and important concepts. In political life, rights have always played an important role, the most prominent of which, for example, on the one hand, the emergence of the government and the legitimacy of its power come from the transfer of every citizen's rights; on the other hand, one of the basic functions and roles of the government is to guarantee that the legitimate rights of every citizen are not infringed. Because the concept of rights is so foundational and extremely important, since the emergence of the theory of rights in the West in the late Middle Ages, almost every important political philosopher has had his own definition and division of the concept of rights.

However, when looking back at the concept of rights in ancient and modern China and abroad, a thought-provoking and rather complex question arises: Is the concept of rights universally applicable? Or, furthermore, is there a concept of "rights" in traditional Chinese Confucianism? Some scholars believe that the concept of rights is a concept peculiar to Western political philosophy. As Goys says, "The idea that individuals can 'own' rights is a historical invention peculiar to the late Middle Ages in the West... China has operated very well without this concept for thousands of years. Lê Han Ki also said: "Rights are by no means a universal phenomenon that exists in any era and space of mankind... Thinking of politics as a set of legitimately constructed rights is a unique historical development of the political conception in Western Europe. ”

Another view seeks to show that in traditional Chinese Confucian political doctrine, the concept of rights, although not explicitly explicitly proposed, still exists and is seriously explored. In modern times, Liang Qichao, Xiao Gongquan, and Zhang Dainian all believe that there is a recognition of rights in Confucianism; some contemporary scholars have also argued that Confucianism has the concept of "rights". For example, if a scholar believes that Confucianism attaches importance to the "right to life" of the people, he said: "From the perspective of individual rights and interests, the most basic right of man is the right to life, and the right to life is the basis of all other rights... There is no better way to look at how much a scholar attaches importance to the right to life than to look at its attitude toward the lives of the masses, the common people, and the villains. In this regard, Confucius and Confucianism can be called the originator of simple humanitarianism, and Confucius and Mengmeng are very concerned about the safety of life of the public and respect the lives of small people. Some scholars also believe that "Confucianism attaches great importance to the survival rights and interests of life, especially the survival rights of human beings", and on this basis, further argue that "Confucianism advocates that the people have the right to resist tyranny and overthrow tyranny." Other scholars acknowledge that while "the basic ideas of Confucianism are incompatible with the ideas behind the rights (human rights and even animal rights) espoused in modern liberal democratic societies," it is possible for Confucianism to accept most of the now recognized rights if one were given a different interpretation of "rights [in the usual Western way]. ”。

In addition, some Western scholars have made specific distinctions on the concept of "rights", arguing that the concept of "rights" in Confucianism should be discussed separately. For example, Luo Siwen invoked Sumner Twiss's theory to divide "rights" into three stages of continuity, natural development, or categories: civil and political rights, social and economic rights, and solidarity rights rights), emphasizing that while it is true that the first stage of civil and political rights is lacking in Confucianism, Confucianism, which pays more attention to the interests of the community, may leave a place for the second stage of social and economic rights. Similarly, David B. Wong divides the basis of "rights" into "autonomous ground" and "communal ground", arguing that traditional Confucianism can provide new proofs of the concept of "rights" on the "community basis" and complement the shortcomings of the traditional "autonomous foundation" of the concept of "rights".

The author believes that the question of whether there is a concept of rights in Confucianism is extremely complex in theory. On the one hand, the definition of the concept of rights, the origin of its legitimacy, including the analysis of connotations, etc., are very difficult and there are different views; on the other hand, Confucianism is not a stable and consistent school of thought in the development of its history, and different scholars have very different views, and even attack each other, but all consider themselves to be Confucians. After Confucius, the great divisions of the Confucian factions and the fierceness of the disputes are well known. In this way, the complexity of the two aspects makes it extremely difficult to solve this problem. In order to avoid branches and troubles, this paper intends to try to explain whether there is a concept of rights in Xunzi's doctrine through a detailed analysis of the division of Xunzi's political philosophy, especially the concept of "division".

2. The understanding of "rights" and "divisions": equivalence and controversy

Xun Zi was a collection of pre-Qin Confucians, and his political philosophy of "Long Li Yi Yi Yi Yi On the one hand, Xunzi's thinking is manifested as rationalism, so he likes to say that logic is "corrected"; on the other hand, it is manifested as an objective spirit, so he prepares political etiquette. In China's subsequent history and ideological development, neither of these aspects has been well inherited and brought into play. Perhaps for this reason, in modern times, many scholars have re-emphasized Xunzi's thought, especially his political philosophy, or hope to connect with Western political philosophy. In this process, it is also inevitable to compare and correspond some of the names in the Xunzi doctrine with certain concepts in Western political philosophy, in which "division" and "rights" are a pair of obvious examples.

Liang Qichao said when comparing Xunzi's idea of etiquette with the legal system of the Legalists: "At the end of the Warring States period when Xunzi was born, the Legalists were already established, and there were many people who influenced each other in their thoughts, so the so-called rituals of Xunzi were close to the nature of the so-called Legalists at that time... Shen Zi also said: "When a rabbit goes, a hundred people chase it; the rabbit is in the city, and it is ignored; if it does not want the rabbit, it is indisputable." 'Xun Zi's point of separation is the same as this. In other words, the struggle for power is transformed into the determination of rights. The determination of rights is demarcated by vertical measurement, and it is the fundamental spirit of the rule of law. (5) In Liang Qichao's view, although Xunzi "divides words and rituals", his foothold is the same as that of the Fa. He understood Xunzi's "division" as "right", and understood the identification of this "right" as a "fundamental spirit of the rule of law", and the "measurement boundary" established by "right" is also within the framework of "law".

In fact, in Liang Qichao's mind, "rights" and "rule of law" are not the best political arrangements, and he even said fiercely, "The nature of 'profit', which is lower than the concept of efficiency, is for the concept of rights." ...... The essence of rights as things contains infinite expansiveness, and there is never a day when they are considered satisfied. "Confucianism insists on the concept of rights as the source of all evil." However, he also seems to have some reservations about Xunzi's attitude toward "etiquette", believing that those who "rule with etiquette" of Xunzi and "carry Confucius's so-called 'Tao to Virtue and Qi with courtesy' are probably not necessarily also. It is closer to the "rule of law" of the Legalists, but it is inferior to the Law in terms of efficiency and cannot be implemented mechanically, so the ritual of Xunzi and the Law of the Legalists can only be fought and lost. In other words, Liang Qichao believes that Xunzi's "etiquette" is not complete, far from Confucianism and close to law, and the "rights" equivalent to "division" are only clearly measured and demarcated within the framework of law, but it is not the highest political arrangement to determine the contention.

When analyzing the purpose of Xunzi's "ritual", Xiao Gongquan pointed out: "The real purpose of the ritual is to seek the maximum satisfaction of the material life of the entire people by means of abstinence. While the approach is close to negative, its effect is clearly positive. Gai Xunzi believed that 'life cannot be without groups', and must cooperate in the division of labor, and then it can be saved. However, if human nature is evil, the problem of double difficulties is bound to occur in the life of the group, one is that the uncertainty of individual rights is to be enjoyed, and the other is that the uncertainty of personal obligations is to slacken work. The solution lies only in the establishment of rituals, so that rights and obligations are determined and well known. Therefore, the society is stable and the people are happy. Xiao Gongquan's saying that "making rituals is clearly divided" is also a connection between "points" and "rights", but the difference is that he adds a content of "obligation" and grasps the ideological connotation of "points" of the Xunzi theory itself more accurately. Because Xun Zi said: "The way of the world is clearly divided." Covering the surface of the land, more manure and fertilizer fields, is also a matter for farmers. Punctuality to the people, long work, and the people, so that people do not steal, is the general of the matter also. ...... If the husband does both, loves, and controls, although the years are fierce and the waters and droughts are destroyed, so that the people will not suffer from frost, it is also a matter of the saints and sages. (Xunzi Fuguo) it does not seem unfounded to understand "things" as "obligations."

What distinguishes Xiao Gongquan from Liang Qichao is that he attributes the spirit or purpose behind Xunzi's "rule of etiquette" to "the greatest satisfaction of the material life of all the people" rather than a "spirit of rule of law." Under this purpose, "clear division" becomes a means of restraining desires and making materials sufficient, rather than the determination of measuring boundaries within the framework of the rule of law. Therefore, Xiao Gongquan particularly emphasized the aspect of Xunzi's "etiquette and nurturing also", believing that Xunzi attached special importance to material production and economic life and was optimistic. He said: "The purpose of the ceremony is to cultivate, and the means are 'other'. ...... If the ritual system is carried out, then people will be at peace, and the chaos and desolation will arise for no reason. It can be seen that "division" is an important means of "raising the liturgical person", in terms of obligation, in order to increase production and create material wealth; in terms of rights, it is to separate the differences and so on to restrain desires. Its ultimate purpose is for social stability and people's well-being.

Zhang Dainian also corresponded to "division" and "rights" in his "Essential Theory of Conceptual Categories of Classical Chinese Philosophy". He said: "'Rights' and 'obligations' are important concepts in modern thought, and they are also important terms in modern Chinese. These two words are translated from foreign languages, and there are no nouns in ancient Chinese texts that have exactly the same meaning as these two words. However, there is a word in the ancient Chinese classics that represents both rights and obligations, which can be said to indicate the unity of rights and obligations. The word is 'points'." But he only received a few pieces of material, and briefly said, "The concept of 'division' contains profound meanings and indicates the unity of rights and obligations, but this concept is more general, and it is not as clear as dividing rights and obligations into two concepts." The idea of 'division' teaches us that rights and duties are closely combined. This is also a special emphasis on the unity of "rights" and "obligations" in the concept of "division", which is similar to Xiao Gongquan's theory.

Although the understanding of the spirit and purpose behind Xunzi's "rule of etiquette" is not the same, and the views on "division" as a means of "rule by etiquette" and the analysis of the connotation of "division" are also different, in general, their common points are also quite clear, that is, they all associate and equate the concept of "division" with the concept of "rights", and equate Xunzi's "clear division" with "determination of rights".

The question is whether there is another way to understand Xunzi's "division" than to equate it with the concept of "rights"? When Mou Zongsan explained Xunzi Thought, he also attached great importance to the concept of "division", but he did not associate "division" with "rights". His analysis of the characteristics of Xunzi's thought is mainly in two aspects: on the one hand, it is heavy intellectualism, which is not very different from the traditional Chinese system of heavy benevolence, so it is regarded as a different branch. Its performance is heavy logic, clear organization, happy unification, and can be corrected. On the other hand, it has an objective spirit, which is different from Mencius's heavy subject spirit and absolute spirit, but is manifested as "the organization of politics, the establishment of the state, and the affirmation of history and culture." Therefore, Xunzi attaches great importance to the etiquette system, because "the ritual constitution is actually the objectification of benevolence and righteousness."

Mou Zongsan believes that the true meaning of "division" should be sought in this objective spirit. He said: "The root of objective quantiles and so on should be in the value of personality. Objectification in the organization becomes the quantile, etc., which is the righteousness. The hierarchy of personality value, the hierarchy of objective quantiles, and so on, is the basic concept of Confucianism. He also said, "Man is righteous and distinguished." ...... Xun Zi said that 'man' is from the beginning an objective being in the 'quantile hierarchy', that is, an existence in objective reason. He also said: "Xunzi heavy groups, heavy divisions, heavy righteousness, long li righteousness and killing poetry books, knowledge and unity and one system, are all manifestations of the objective spirit." Divide by righteousness, unify and unify, and respond to the same, then the group is calm and condensed. The objective spirit is the spirit of the respect group, and the honor group is the righteous way of respecting the group. (The formation of the group must be based on the division of righteousness.) Points are also the manifestations of individuality. (1) From this, it can be seen that MouZong's three words "points" are actually a kind of value hierarchy and difference, and this "equality of quantiles" corresponds to "righteous ways". "The righteous, it is advisable." All things have their own suitability in their corresponding "quantiles", each fully displaying its individuality, which becomes the so-called "group". Therefore, the "division" that is in line with the righteous way is also linked to the "objective spirit" of the noble group, and everyone has its own position, which can constitute a harmonious group, that is, it can express the so-called "objective spirit", so the ritual system, talking about the social state, will eventually fall on this "point". According to Mu Zongsan, "division" is only closely related to the "righteous way" and "objective spirit", but the reality is far from the concept of "rights".

So, is there any connection between Xunzi's "division" and the concept of "rights" in Western political philosophy, and can it be equated? The following is intended to first make a simple distinction between the concept of "rights", and then analyze the true meaning of Xunzi's "division" in detail, and then compare the two to try to make a reasonable answer to this question.

III. The Contrast Between "Rights" and "Divisions": Xi Zhe and Xun Zi

In Western political philosophy, "rights" are judged according to their origins, and there are mainly two schools of doctrine, one school believes that "rights" are innate, with so-called "natural rights" and "natural human rights"; the other school believes that "rights" are acquired, and regards it as an artificial arrangement under a specific political system.

The former is based on the idea that all men are created equal. As Pierre Le Roux said: "To establish the basis of political rights, equality for all must be achieved; In the modern western political philosophical tradition, many scholars have recognized this "natural right" and "natural human right" based on equality. As Hobbes believed, all people are equal in the state of nature, and now the inequality that arises in human beings is caused by civil law. Natural differences between people either don't exist or are politically irrelevant. All should therefore recognize the natural law of the equality of all human beings, so that human beings can enter into a peaceful environment, can they establish societies, and can live a political rather than natural life.

Locke also said, "[The state of nature] is a state of equality,...... It is abundantly clear that people of the same species and of equality are born without distinction to enjoy all the same advantages of nature, and are able to use the same physical and mental faculties, and that all men should be equal and have no subordination or control. He adds: "The state of nature has a natural law which everyone should obey, which governs it; and reason, that is, natural law, teaches all mankind who intend to obey reason: since man is equal and independent, no one may infringe upon the life, health, liberty or property of others." Here, Locke, through his affirmation of the "state of nature" of equality for all, laid a solid foundation for the most basic "natural rights" such as the right to life, the right to health, the right to liberty, and the right to property.

To be fair, due to historical circumstances and cultural traditions, there is indeed a lack of this concept of "natural rights" based on the equality of all people in the pre-Qin Confucians, including Xunzi. For example, David B. Wong, after quoting a passage in xunzi zi dao that discusses whether the son, the subject should obey the father, or the king should obey or advise, has analyzed that, on the one hand, because this obligation of counsel is not open to all subjects, but to ministers of a specific rank, "The obligation of Xunzi does not correspond to the right of free speech enjoyed by all citizens in the modern sense of freedom and democracy." On the other hand, since the obligation to make such suggestions is not always open, but occurs only at specific and relatively rare moments (in order to correct particularly serious errors in the ruling order), "perhaps there is no right to general speech corresponding to the obligation to make suggestions." ”

This example undoubtedly shows that the concept of "rights" in the sense of "natural rights" does not exist in Xunzi's political philosophy. Is there another possibility, then, that is, whether there is a concept of "rights" in the sense of artificial arrangement in a certain political system in Xunzi's political philosophy?

As pointed out in Mou Zongsan's analysis above, Xunzi Thought manifests itself in both rationalism and objective spirituality. Because of its objective spirit, it attaches great importance to the organization and operation of national politics, which is its degree of etiquette and righteousness; because it emphasizes rationalism, it uses this discerning reason to make etiquette and righteousness. For example, Xun Zi said: "The Holy King of the Ancients regarded the evil nature of man as dangerous and unjust, and the rebellion and not rule, but he caused righteousness and righteousness for it, and he made the law degree, corrected it by correcting people's emotional nature, and led it by disturbing people's emotional nature." ("Sexual Evil") also said: "The first king was evil and chaotic, so he made rituals and righteousness divided, so as to feed people's desires and give people's demands." Let desire be inexhaustible in things, and things must not yield to desire, and the two will be held together. It is the cause of righteousness. It can be seen that in Xunzi's political philosophy, etiquette is rather a man-made invention and arrangement.

As mentioned above, Liang Qichao said that Xunzi was "a ceremony of dividing words", and Xiao Gongquan also said that Xunzi "made a ceremony to distinguish between clear divisions", although the former believed that Xunzi's ceremony was close to the law, and the latter believed that the purpose of Xunzi's ceremony was to cultivate, but both recognized that "division" and "etiquette" were closely related. In other words, the objective framework of the "rites" that all recognize artificial arrangements for invention is composed of rational stipulations and arrangements for different "divisions". Since both of them believe that "division" is equivalent to "rights", the question becomes: as an artificial invention and arrangement in a specific political order, is "division" equivalent to "rights"? Let's first look at Xunzi's own statement:

Introspection within oneself is the same as that of the hundred kings, and the key to the ritual law is also the key. Then the peasants divide the land and cultivate, Jia divides the goods and sells, the hundred work is divided and persuaded, the scholars and masters are divided into duties and listen, the kings of the founding princes divide the land and keep, and the three princes and general parties discuss, then the Son of Heaven will work together and stop. If you go in and out, the world is not even, and there is no discernment, which is the same as the hundred kings and the great division of the ritual law. ("The King")

The way of the world is clearly divided. Covering the surface of the land, more manure and fertilizer fields, is also a matter for farmers. Punctuality to the people, long work, and the people, so that people do not steal, is the general of the matter also. The high ones are not drought, the lower ones are not water, the cold and summer and the festivals and the grains are ripe at the time, which is also a matter of the world. If the husband does both, loves, and controls, although the years are fierce and the waters and droughts are destroyed, so that the people will not suffer from frost, it is also a matter of the saints and sages. ("Rich Country")

As far as the above two paragraphs are concerned, the provisions and explanations on "sub-points" are actually quite specific and clear. First of all, "points" are the opposite of "totals". In the same way, goods, fortifications, positions, and territories were divided and ruled by merchants, craftsmen, scholars, and princes. And these different "points" must be "discussed in general" when it comes to the three dukes, and when the Son of Heaven comes, they must "stop together". It is precisely because of this distinction between "points" and "totals" that Xun Zi said: "The man is a king, so the pivot of the pipe division must also be." (Rich Country)

Second, "points" refers to "duties". Farmers, generals, and even sages all have their own "ministries" in their different "branches." It requires that everyone in the hierarchy must keep their part and do their job well. According to Mu Zongsan, different "quantiles and equals" belong to the "righteous way". Xun Zi also said, "How can it be done?" A: Righteousness. Therefore, righteousness is divided into rules and regulations. (The King's System). It can be seen that on top of the "righteous way" of the right meaning, there is also a "benevolent way" of unity and harmony of the whole righteousness. It is precisely because of this unity of the "benevolent way" that we can see that at the level of the "righteous way", the stipulated arrangement of "points" and the meaning of keeping their points. Therefore, Xunzi said: "The ancient kings were divided and equal to each other, so that they were beautiful or evil, thick or thin, or happy or happy, or sharp or labor,...... It will be Akihito's text, Tongren's Shunya. By linking "points" with "benevolence and righteousness", XunZi explained that it is precisely within the framework of the norms and etiquette of "points" that everyone can be made to be careful, encouraged, and appropriate, so that the social state can smoothly organize and operate, and achieve the goal of peace and smoothness in the world.

Fourth, "points" cannot be equated with "rights": discernment and participation

Through the above-mentioned relief of "points", it is not difficult to see that "points" are rather an arrangement of specific individuals or classes in the state and social organizations, with the function of forming rules of order and maintaining a harmonious state. It also provides a force that enables humans to "be able to pack" and thus be more powerful and stronger than other populations. But in any case, it is difficult to equate with "rights".

Dongfang Shuo believes that "ming li set points" should be understood as a kind of "extreme achievement of objective structure". "The actual meaning of the objective structure of etiquette is to place the whole social population in the 'quantile hierarchy' necessarily contained in the law of etiquette and righteousness to obtain its proper identity, and by virtue of this identity to see the precise and undoubted implementation of Confucian moral obligations, if so, then man is no longer the rise of the oligarchic self-sufficient subjective spirit, but in the objective framework of etiquette, rich in his specific moral identity and moral obligation, and if so, the Confucian ideal of benevolence and righteousness is no longer only the magic of personal virtue and wisdom. And it can be objectified by interceding with ceremonies. According to Dongfang Shuo's view, a more appropriate understanding of "quantile" should be the implementation of moral obligations, rather than the determination of individual "rights".

Indeed, from the analysis of the text of Xunzi, farming, selling, fortification, ministry, soil keeping, etc., rather than far-fetchedly understanding them as the "rights" of peasants, merchants, craftsmen, scholars, and princes, it seems that moral obligations are more in line with Xunzi's original meaning. Moreover, Xunzi has clearly stated that "clear division" is a "thing" of different "divisions", and the "thing" here should obviously be interpreted as a "thing" of "division as a", which is naturally far from "rights". According to David B. Wong above, in Xunzi's political philosophy, there is more duty than the corresponding "rights" guaranteed by it. Dongfang Shuo also argues that "rights" should be divided into "legal rights" in the broader sense and "individual rights" in the narrower sense, and believes that "legal rights" can be compatible with Confucianism, while "individual rights" are absent from Confucianism. This is similar to the view of some Western comparative ethicists, who believe that the West takes the position of the individual and emphasizes "individual rights", while Confucianism focuses on the perspective of the community, and its core value is the "common good" of the community. Although there is tension between the two, they are not completely mutually exclusive.

So whether it is to give "rights" a "communal ground" argument to distinguish it from the Western tradition's "autonomous ground", or to divide "rights" into several stages, that after the first stage of the Western tradition, civil and political rights, Confucianism can be compatible with the second stage of social and economic rights, and many arguments show the efforts and intentions of scholars to rethink and define the concept of "rights" in an attempt to show that Confucianism can be compatible with the concept of "rights". Or at least try to prove that Confucian political theory does not violate the concept of "rights", and that through the reinterpretation and elaboration of today's people, it can be combined with the two major political philosophical traditions of Confucianism and the West for the benefit of the well-being of all mankind. Doesn't this prove in turn that Confucianism does lack the concept of "rights" in the Western political and philosophical tradition?

Conclusion: More reflections on the concept of "rights"

Finally, let's go back to the argument at the beginning of this article and make some necessary clarifications and responses. Some scholars believe that "the most basic right of man is the right to life, and the right to life is the basis of all other rights", while Confucianism attaches great importance to the "right to life" of ordinary people and ordinary people, and cites Confucius's "hurting people without asking the horse" and Mencius's benevolent government advocating "intolerable heart" against the hegemony of "killing people and winning the wilderness", as examples. However, Confucius's question of whether to ask a horse seems to be regarded as a simple and natural humanistic concern, and it seems far-fetched to say that this is a determination of the right to life. Mencius's criticism, on the other hand, is in line with a common Confucian attitude and sentiment in politics, namely concern for ordinary people and even the most uninformed among them, even if they are completely unable to pose any threat to the regime. Confucianism has always emphasized the obligations and responsibilities of those at the top, and rarely recognized the "rights" of those at the bottom. As Rossmann astutely points out: "Xunzi's concern for the welfare of the sick, the poor, the marginalized and the illiterate is of great significance, but it does not appear in the political science papers of his contemporaries on the other side of the globe." If what we want to learn is the obligation of the member of whom the state needs its most urgent needs, then when we go to read Plato's Republic and The Law and Aristotle's Politics, we will find a blank. ”

Both Goys and Le Han Ki believe that the concept of "rights" "is a historical invention unique to the late Middle Ages in the West" and later "became a popular concept that dominates the world", which is not a universal phenomenon that exists in any era and any space, and in principle, there is even a concept of not using subjective rights to carry out social life at a higher level of civilization. Although such a statement is not lacking in praise for Confucianism, it is indeed a fact that many scholars in the West hold such a view. As CraigK. Ihara says, "The promotion of the idea of individual rights depends on giving special attention to individual claims, which are determined by a particular social circumstance." If moral systems can function well or even better without invoking the concept of individual rights, there is no need to promote the concept of individual rights. He also gave the example that raising children is the duty of parents and family branches, and it is also emotionally in line with human nature, and if a family degenerates to the point where it cannot be expected to rely on parents' feelings for children to ensure the growth of children, then "the discussion and formulation of children's rights may become an unpleasant necessity."

As mentioned earlier, "rights" is a concept unique to Western political philosophy, which was indiscriminately coveted in the late Middle Ages, and after the development and improvement of modern political philosophers, it eventually became one of the basic and core concepts of Western political philosophy. As has been shown above, in the political doctrine of Xunzi, one of the important representatives of traditional Confucian political philosophy, "division" cannot be equated with the concept of "rights". Of course, the ancients cannot be harshly criticized here, and there is no need to force the distinction between the good and the bad. It is worth noting that in the process of globalization dominated by Western culture, the concept of "rights" seems to have become a natural and self-evident theoretical presupposition, and even this criterion is ancient, which cannot but be said to be dangerous and worthy of vigilance. But on the other hand, we live in today's society, and it is true that it is different from the environment in which the ancients pondered and established arguments, and "rights" are almost one of the basic concepts that cannot be circumvented in today's political philosophy, so we cannot fail to think seriously.