Xie Tao: How to view the role of the US Congress in Sino-US relations: Take the China bill from 1973 to 2006 as an example

Xie Tao: How to view the role of the US Congress in Sino-US relations: Take the China bill from 1973 to 2006 as an example

Author: Xie Tao is an associate professor at the Center for American Studies, School of English, University of Foreign Chinese, Beijing

Source: World Economics and Politics, No. 1, 2009

WeChat platform editor: Zhou Yue

The author collects the bills of the US Congress specifically targeting China from 1973 to 2006 and classifies them in detail by type, content, nature of policy, and final outcome. On this basis, the author uses the new institutionalism as a theoretical guide to analyze the policy impact of the legislative rules of the US Congress on China. The analysis results show that the US council system, the bicameral system, and the president's limited veto power have formed a constraint on the exercise of diplomatic power by Congress, so it is difficult for the US Congress to pass substantive legislation to impose its will on china policy on the president. However, by influencing public opinion in the United States, formulating procedural legislation, and using the law of expected behavior, the US Congress can determine the agenda of Sino-US relations to a large extent and set up various obstacles in bilateral relations, thereby slowing down the development of Sino-US relations. The author concludes by arguing that to effectively limit the negative impact of the U.S. Congress in U.S.-China relations, China should shift the core of its work toward the United States from Congress to the president.

【Keywords】U.S. Congress; China Policy; China Bill

How to Assess Congress’s Role in U.S.-China Relations

——An Analysis of China Bills in 1973-2006

Abstract

All China-specific bills introduced in Congress between 1973 and 2006 were collected and classified. With this dataset of China bills, the author analyzed the role of Congress in U.S.-China relations, using the new institutionalism. The results indicate that the committee system, bicameralism, and presidential veto combine to make it extremely difficult—if not altogether impossible—for Congress to impose its policy preferences on the president through substantive legislation. Yet by enacting procedural legislation, influencing public opinion, and utilizing the rule of anticipated reactions, Congress has been quite influential in determining the agenda of U.S.-China relations. Moreover, it has often set up roadblocks that slow down the development of bilateral relations. The policy implications of the findings are also discussed.

Key Words: U.S. Congress, China Policy, China Bill

I. Preamble

American scholars have long recognized the important role that the US Congress plays in Sino-US relations. Herbert Carroll once wrote: "Congress has played an important role for a long time when it comes to communist China, forcing the president to formulate China policy only within the narrow scope prescribed by Congress." Another prominent scholar of Sino-US relations said of congress: "Although the Constitution stipulates that the president is responsible for formulating foreign policy, on several occasions, Congress has not hesitated to take the power to formulate China policy from the president. As long as Congress is determined, its role in the Sino-US relationship is not only far-reaching but also enormous." In contrast, the study of the US Congress in China started much later. It wasn't until the early 1990s that Chinese scholars began to turn their attention to the U.S. Congress. In 2001, the Chinese government set up a congressional working group at the U.S. Embassy, demonstrating the great importance that government decision-makers attach to the U.S. Congress. Subsequently, academic research results on the US Congress in China sprung up, setting off a climax of congressional research and greatly promoting the understanding of the US Congress by Chinese scholars, policymakers and ordinary people.

However, the author found that a large part of the results of many congressional research results is a general introduction, that is, it only makes a more detailed description of the legislative mechanism of Congress (especially the committee system), the bond between members and voters, the role and influence of interest groups in the legislative process, the diplomatic power of Congress, and the conflict between Congress and the president in foreign policy. While a few studies have analyzed the role of the U.S. Congress in U.S.-China relations, these findings are case studies and historical analyses that do not utilize systematic, comprehensive data. It is particularly noteworthy that the US Congress is a legislative body, but no Chinese scholar has yet systematically studied the various legislative acts of the US Congress against China, such as bills, hearings, and speeches by members of the national assembly.

The author has collected bills, resolutions, and amendments specifically addressed by the U.S. Congress for China from 1973 to 2006 (unless otherwise specified, hereinafter collectively referred to as the bills) and has classified them in detail according to their type, content, nature of policy, and final results. On this basis, the author uses new institutionalism as a theoretical guide to analyze in detail the impact of legislative rules in the National Assembly's China policy. The author believes that although the US Congress has a strong policy tendency in Sino-US relations, the intricate legislative system (especially the committee system, the bicameral system, and the president's limited veto power) has formed an omnipresent constraint on the use of foreign power by Congress, so it is difficult for the US Congress to pass substantive legislation and impose its will on the president on its China policy. However, by influencing U.S. public opinion, enacting procedural legislation, and using the law of expected behavior, the U.S. Congress can in many cases determine the agenda of Sino-US relations, and often places various obstacles in bilateral relations, thereby slowing down the development of Sino-US relations.

Legislative rules of congress and new institutionalism

The Senate and House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress have enacted a variety of cumbersome legislative rules. Of these diverse rules, the rules governing the composition, responsibilities and jurisdiction of the various legislative commissions are the most important. This is mainly due to the central position of committees in the legislation of Congress, and these rules and regulations are the source of the power of the committees and the cornerstone of the committee system. A prominent congressional scholar brilliantly wrote: "All legislative rules have only one purpose, and that is to establish the privileges of the standing committees of the Congress." In short, except in exceptional circumstances, each bill must be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the President Pro Tempore of the Senate to various committees that have jurisdiction over the content of the bill. The bill can only be discussed and voted on by the entire Senate or the House of Representatives after the committee has reviewed and issued an opinion report, otherwise it will remain on the committee forever. Under such a system, the committee has the power of life and death over each bill and determines the legislative agenda of Congress.

In addition to the rules set by both houses of Congress themselves, the U.S. Constitution details the legislative process, the most important of which is the bicameral system and the president's limited veto power over congressional legislation. Under a bicameral system, each bill must pass through the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the text adopted by both houses must be identical before it can be sent to the president for signature as law. However, due to differences in voter base, power and tenure, senators and members of the House of Representatives often consider issues from different perspectives, with the result that they often have different opinions on the same issue, so that many bills can only be passed in the Senate or the House of Representatives, and cannot become laws. The original intention of the founding pioneer of the United States in establishing the Senate was to let it contain the House of Representatives and prevent the latter from overly obeying the will of the people and passing some unwise laws to harm the long-term interests of the country. It is said that when George Washington, the first president of the United States, was asked by Thomas Jefferson why he wanted to establish the Senate, he asked rhetorically: "Why did you pour tea in a teacup?" Jefferson replied, "It's to cool the tea." Washington said, "That's right. The Senate was created to cool down bills passed by the House. ”

The Constitution provides for bicamerality, while also providing for the president's limited veto power. The president has the right to veto bills passed by Congress, but the president's veto power is not absolute. As long as there is a 2/3 majority vote in both houses, the president's veto can be overturned. The reason why the founding pioneers of the United States wanted to establish the president's veto power was to prevent Congress from eroding the president's power. At the same time, in order to prevent the president from abusing the veto, they gave Congress the power to overturn the president's veto. In this way, Congress and the president hold each other back and watch each other, thus avoiding abuse of power by either side. However, congress has a total of 535 members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and it is very difficult to coordinate and unify so many members to reach the two-thirds majority provided for in the Constitution. In contrast, the president has only one person, who can veto a bill without consulting with others, just with a big stroke of the pen. In short, the constitutional veto gives the president essentially an absolute advantage in the power struggle with Congress.

Together, these rules constitute the legislative system of the U.S. Congress, and the rules within Congress (especially the various rules governing committees) are at the heart of the new institutionalism in the field of congressional studies. In short, neo-institutionalism is a powerful complement to rational choice theory. Although both presuppose rational individuals and instrumentality of behavior, the latter places more emphasis on the various rules of behavior faced by rational individuals in their choices. If there are no rules that limit individual behavior, and decisions are made on the principle of simple majority, then any collective decision-making body may have a "social choice problem," or majority cycling. According to neo-institutionalism, the establishment of various institutions to limit the behavior of rational individuals can achieve equilibrium, thus avoiding the emergence of a circular majority. This equilibrium state is called structure-induced equilibrium, and the system that induces this equilibrium is called equilibrium institution.

In the eyes of the neo-institutionalists, the parliamentary committee system is a balanced system. If every member of parliament had the right to propose any bill, and every bill had to be discussed in plenary, then under the principle of simple majority, a circular majority would be inevitable, leading to the paralysis of the entire legislative process. Under the committee system, however, since each committee has a vital and vital power over the bills in its area of jurisdiction, the committees effectively control the legislative agenda, ensuring that only one policy is discussed at each plenary meeting rather than multiple policies, thus avoiding a circular majority.

Although the core of the new institutionalism in the field of congressional studies is the committee system, its basic logic can also be used to analyze the Bicameral system and the president's limited veto. In neo-institutionalist terms, the commission system is an endogenous rule, while bicameralism and the president's veto are exogenous rules. As a rational individual, the actions of each parliamentarian are purposeful. However, the passage of each bill depends not only on the legislative motivation of the member and the degree of his support for the bill, but also on the legislative process and rules. The commission system, the bicameral system, and the president's limited veto power together constitute the legislative rules of Congress. The introduction of any policy is the result of the interaction between legislative rules and the legislative motives of parliamentarians. Next, I will take the China bill of the US Congress from 1973 to 2006 as an example to illustrate how legislative rules limit the role of Congress in Sino-US relations.

3. China Bill of Parliament

According to the author's statistics, from 1973 to 2006, the US Congress had a total of 875 bills on China. Tables 1 and 2 classify Chinese bills in the House of Representatives and Senate according to policy content and type of bills, respectively. The House of Representatives has a total of 543 bills on China, including 189 concurrent resolutions, 90 simple resolutions, 37 joint resolutions, 163 bills, and 64 amendments. The total number of joint resolutions and general resolutions is 279, accounting for 51% of all Chinese bills in the House of Representatives. These two types of bills cannot become binding laws even if passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, so why should members of the House of Representatives introduce such bills? This issue will be discussed later. Among the 543 bills, there are 167 on the Taiwan issue, of which 112 are joint resolutions and 21 are general resolutions, which together account for 80% of all Taiwan bills. These data show that the vast majority of the house of representatives' bills dealing with the Taiwan issue do not have any legal effect. In addition to the Taiwan issue, human rights, most-favored-nation treatment, export controls, general trade and Tibet are also the focus of the Deputies' concerns, with bills on them 75, 48, 45, 35 and 29 respectively. In addition, members of the House have also paid attention to issues such as funding from the United Nations Population Fund, China's accession to the World Trade Organization, and foreign aid.

Table 1: U.S. House of Representatives Bills On China (1973-2006)

Joint resolution	General resolutions	Joint resolution	bill	amendment	total
Taiwan, China	112	21	5	22	7	167
General issues of Chinese rights	33	15	1	22	4	75
Extend China's most-favored-nation status	2	21	22	3	48
Export controls to China	3	5	4	11	22	45
General trade issues	4	7	22	2	35
Tibet, China	11	7	9	2	29
United Nations Population Fund appropriations	14	14
China joined the World Trade Organization	1	9	10
Foreign aid	1	5	6
other	25	32	6	41	10	114
total	189	90	37	163	64	543

The total number of Chinese bills in the Senate is 332, which is a little less than in the House of Representatives. Among them, there are 57 joint resolutions, 74 general resolutions, 20 joint resolutions, 78 bills and 103 amendments. Like the House of Representatives, the number of bills on Taiwan is the largest, at 80, accounting for 24% of all Chinese bills in the Senate. However, in absolute numbers and percentages, the Senate has far fewer bills on Taiwan than the House of Representatives. In addition, the Senate's joint resolutions and general resolutions on Taiwan total 48 articles, accounting for 60% of all Taiwan bills, which shows that the situation in the Senate is similar to that of the House of Representatives, that is, most of the bills on Taiwan will not have legal effect even if passed. Like the House of Representatives, human rights, most-favored-nation treatment and Tibet are at the forefront of the Senate's attention, with bills on them 60, 31 and 22, respectively. Second, trade (Article 17), export controls (Article 17), and China's "WTO accession" (Article 9) have also attracted the attention of senators. In conclusion, from the data in Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that the issues in Sino-US relations that are of concern to the Senate and the House of Representatives are almost identical.

Table 2: U.S. Senate-Related Chinese Bills (1973-2006)

Joint resolution	General resolutions	Joint resolution	bill	amendment	total
Taiwan, China	27	21	4	10	18	80
General Chinese rights issues	9	16	2	8	25	60
Extend China's most-favored-nation status	1	7	18	5	31
Tibet, China	6	10	3	3	22
General trade issues	2	6	2	4	3	17
Export controls to China	2	1	4	2	8	17
China joined the World Trade Organization	6	3	9
United Nations Population Fund appropriations	1	1
other	10	20	1	27	37	95
total	57	74	20	78	103	332

Figure 1 categorizes Chinese bills from another perspective. First, of the 875 bills, only 259 were discussed in the Senate or the House of Representatives, and the remaining 616 were aborted in various committees. According to the legislative process of Congress, except in exceptional circumstances, each bill is assigned to the corresponding committee and can only be sent to the whole for discussion after the committee has reviewed it. Since most Of China's bills are unfriendly, the committee system has actually played a role in stabilizing Sino-US relations. This will be discussed in more detail later. Second, Democratic lawmakers proposed 394 bills, while Republican lawmakers proposed 475. From 1973 to 2006, democrats were congressional majorities for most of the time, with more members than Republicans. This shows that the Republican Party is more active than the Democratic Party in its China policy. Third, in these 34 years, the total number of Chinese bills submitted in the first year of each Congress is 578, while the total number of Chinese bills submitted in the second year of each Congress is 297, the former is almost twice as high as the latter. Since the legislative agenda for the first year of each congress is not particularly crowded, if a bill is introduced at this time, the committees and plenary have enough time to consider it, so many members choose to introduce the bill in the first year. Finally, it should be pointed out that in the period from 1973 to 1988, there were only 210 Chinese bills, compared with 665 in 1989-2006. Although the two periods of time are the same, both are 17 years, but the number of bills in the latter is more than three times that of the former, which shows that 1989 was a watershed in the US Congress's China policy.

Figure 1: Classification of Chinese bills in the U.S. Congress

Note: Nonpartisan lawmakers introduced 6 bills during this period, which are not counted among the bills submitted by Democrats and Republicans.

Figure 2 depicts the number of bills in the U.S. Congress regarding China each year from 1973 to 2006. As can be seen from the chart, the number of Chinese bills each year roughly coincides with the major events in Sino-US relations. For example, the 1978 China Bill had only 6 articles, but in 1979 it suddenly increased to 37 articles because Congress had a heated discussion in 1979 about President Carter's recognition of China and future relations between the United States and Taiwan, culminating in the passage of the controversial Taiwan Relations Act. For example, the Chinese bill in 1997 had 80 articles, while in 1996 there were only 22 articles. The return of Hong Kong to China, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States, and a large-scale congressional investigation into alleged illegal political contributions from Chinese in the 1996 presidential campaign are all reasons for the sharp increase in the number of Chinese bills in 1997. Overall, Figure 2 seems to confirm what a U.S. Expert on China called U.S.-China relations "a bilateral relationship shaped by major events." ”

Figure 2: Time Trend Chart of U.S. Congressional Proposals on China (1973-2006)

By analyzing the policy content of the China bill in Congress at different times, we can also see the three important stages that Sino-US relations have gone through. The first stage: from the end of World War II to the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the Taiwan issue has always been the core of the US Congress's China policy. The four laws that later had a significant impact on U.S.-China relations were the China Aid Act of 1948, the Formosa Resolution of 1955 and the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 Act) was passed during this time. Moreover, between 1973 and 1979, there were a total of 109 Chinese bills in the National Assembly, and as many as 65 on the Taiwan issue. The second stage: from 1989 to 2000 China's accession to the World Trade Organization. Human rights in China are an important goal of the US Congress's China policy at this stage. Congress has been trying to force the Chinese government to improve human rights on the condition that trade most-favored-nation status is conditional. In the past 12 years, the total number of Chinese bills in the National Assembly has been 500, of which 209 are on the right to Chinese. The third stage: from 2001 to the present. China's huge trade surplus with the United States, the renminbi exchange rate, intellectual property rights, and the quality of Chinese exports to the United States have become the focus of discussion among members of Congress. The U.S. Congress had a total of 52 bills on Sino-US trade between 1973 and 2006, 24 of which were introduced between 2001 and 2006. In short, the distribution of China's bills in Congress at different times basically reflects the changes in the substantive issues of Sino-US relations. Bilateral relations have passed through the most difficult initial stage of political and ideological contradictions, and have entered a stage of consolidation and development, mainly economic and trade disputes.

How legislative rules limit the role of Congress

(1) Committee system

Figure 1 already illustrates the important impact of congressional committees on U.S.-China relations. Of the 875 bills against China, only 259 were reviewed by the committee and sent to the general assembly for discussion, while the remaining 616 were dismissed. Of the 259 bills, only 37 were not passed in plenary discussion. It should be noted here that the 875 bills include 167 amendments. Because of the special legislative rules of the Senate, any senator may propose an amendment to a bill (other than a bill concerning annual appropriations) in the context of a plenary discussion, and the content of the amendment may have nothing to do with the bill under discussion. In the House of Representatives, however, MPs have no right to propose amendments if they are approved in advance by the Rules Committee or by a committee that reviews the bill. If these 167 amendments were removed, the number of bills against China would be 708, and the number of bills that were finally discussed was 119, of which only 14 were not passed. In other words, as long as a Chinese bill passes the committee level, the chance of it passing at the plenary session is as high as 88%. On the other hand, there is only a 17 percent chance that a Chinese bill will pass the committee's review and be sent to the whole for discussion. Since the vast majority of Chinese bills are "anti-China bills," the committee system has actually played a positive role in the normal development of Sino-US relations.

A few examples can illustrate how congressional committees have influenced China policy. Senator Max Baucus of Montana chaired the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee from 1991 to 1994. Baucas, himself a free-trader, is a strong opponent of abolishing China's most-favored-nation status or attaching any conditions to its extension. Since bills involving China's most-favored-nation treatment must be reviewed by his subcommittee, and Baucus himself strongly opposed them, the result was that in his four years in office, not a single such bill had been reviewed by the committee, let alone submitted to the entire Senate for discussion and voting. Another example is Senator Craig Thomas from Wyoming. From 1995 to 2001, he was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia-Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thomas himself is very supportive of the development of Sino-US relations and opposes Congress's erection of obstacles on most-favored-nation status. During his tenure, conservative members of the Senate have repeatedly tried to attach human rights conditions to the extension of most-favoured-nation status, but none of their bills have been reviewed by the subcommittee. Before Clinton's visit to China in 1998, Thomas successfully prevented a series of anti-China bills from passing in the Foreign Relations Committee, thus ensuring the smooth progress of Clinton's trip to China.

Of course, there are also a small number of lawmakers who try to use the committee system policy to undermine Sino-US relations, and former Rep. Benjamin Gilman from New York can be said to be the best example. Gilman was chairman of the House Committee on International Relations from 1995 to 2000. Since he himself is a "loyal supporter" of Taiwan, any bill that attempts to strengthen so-called "U.S.-Taiwan relations" or supports so-called "Taiwan independence" is always given special treatment in his committee. During his six-year tenure, six bills reaffirming U.S. security commitments to Taiwan were reviewed by the committee and passed in the House of Representatives. In addition, in 1997, the committee approved six "anti-China bills" condemning China's human rights, demanding an increase in the number of human rights supervisors at the US Embassy in China, allocating additional appropriations to Radio Free China, punishing China for selling missiles to Iran, and advocating the provision of an anti-ballistic missile defense system to Taiwan, and these six bills were also passed in the House of Representatives.

(2) Bicameralism

The Bicameral system in the United States in another way limits the role of Congress in Sino-US relations. One of the reasons why the U.S. Congress tried to impose economic sanctions on China in 1989 was the inability to agree between the two chambers. The House of Representatives attached sanctions against China to a foreign aid authorization bill, but the bill did not pass in the Senate. The Senate attached the sanctions bill to the annual State Department Authorization Act, but President Bush vetoed it for other reasons, and his veto was not overturned. Later, the House passed a new sanctions bill, but due to the jurisdictional dispute between Senate committees, the bill ultimately failed to pass in the Senate.

The inability of the two chambers to agree is also one of the main reasons why Congress has not been able to abolish China's trade most-favored-nation treatment or impose conditions on it. From 1990 to 2001, the House of Representatives voted annually on a joint resolution that sought to abolish China's trade most-favored-nation treatment, and it passed it every year in the three years from 1990 to 1992. However, the Senate voted on a similar joint resolution only once in 1999, and the bill did not pass. In addition, the House of Representatives twice voted in 1992 to overturn President Bush's veto of a bill that conditionally extended China's most-favored-nation treatment, but at this critical juncture in determining the future direction of Sino-US relations, the Senate twice disappointed the House of Representatives and did not have enough votes to overturn Bush's veto. On the issue of most-favored-nation status, at least, the Senate has acted as what Washington calls "cooling." No matter how "anti-China" sentiment is in the House of Representatives, without the cooperation of the Senate, it cannot abolish China's most-favored-nation status or impose any conditions.

(c) The President's limited veto power

In the history of Sino-US relations, there are a total of 4 articles on China bills that have been vetoed by the US president. With the exception of President Carter, who exercised veto power once in 1977, the other three were during The George W. Bush Sr. Congress did not attempt to overturn Carter's veto in 1977, but Bush's three vetoes were met with strong opposition from Congress each time. President Bush first used the veto in 1989, when Congress passed the so-called Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act, which sought to give "political asylum" to Chinese students and scholars in the United States. The bill was unanimously passed in the House of Representatives and passed by oral vote in the Senate. President Bush vetoed the bill on Nov. 30. Subsequently, the House of Representatives and the House of Representatives failed to pass the resolution overturning Bush's veto by a margin of 4 votes (the House of Representatives voted 390 to 25). The Senate was 62 votes to 37). (Very good, thank you)

President Bush vetoed two China bills in 1992. His first veto was the U.S.-China Act of 1991. The bill imposes harsh human rights conditions on the extension of China's most-favored-nation status in 1992. The bill was passed in both houses of Congress as early as July 1991, with a vote of 313 to 112 in the House of Representatives and 55 to 44 in the Senate. However, the Senate did not pass a joint report on the bill until February 1992. President Bush vetoed the bill in March. The House of Representatives voted 357 to 61 to overturn Bush's veto, but the Senate voted 60 to 38. In the end, due to the difference of 7 votes in the Senate, Congress failed to overturn Bush's veto.

A few months later, Congress passed The U.S.-China Act of 1992. The bill also imposes harsh human rights conditions on the extension of China's trade most-favored-nation status in 1993, but unlike the bill passed in 1991, congress only imposes high tariffs on the products of Chinese state-owned enterprises. The House of Representatives passed the bill by a large majority (339 votes to 62) in July 1992, while the Senate passed it by a verbal vote in September, after which President Bush vetoed the bill. As in the previous two times, Congress failed to overturn Bush's veto and was dragged back by the Senate. The House of Representatives voted 345 to 74, while the Senate had only 58 votes, 9 votes less than the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution.

In short, under the restrictions of various legislative rules, even if the majority of members of congress have a strong "anti-China" tendency, it is difficult for them to transform their policy tendencies into specific policies. According to the author's statistics, from 1973 to 2006, a total of 15 Chinese bills were passed by the National Assembly and signed by the president, becoming binding laws. Of the 875 Chinese bills, 410 are non-legally binding resolutions (including ordinary and common resolutions) even if passed. There are also 167 bills that are amendments, which cannot become laws alone, but can only become laws together with the amended bills. If these two types of bills are excluded, only 298 can become laws alone, while only 15 can become laws. In this way, there is only a 5% chance that a Chinese bill will become law (15 divided by 298). Therefore, if the number of laws passed is taken as the criterion for measuring the role of the Congress, then the Congress can be said to be "thunder is loud and rain is small" in its China policy.

Why are there so many Chinese bills?

Since the possibility of becoming a law is very small, why do members of Congress still have to propose so many Chinese bills? First, even if a bill doesn't become law, it can allow lawmakers to make their position on a policy, especially policy issues of particular concern to voters, campaign donors, or interest groups. So, in many cases, the importance of a bill is not whether it can become law, but the political signal it sends. Nancy Pelosi, the current speaker of the House of Representatives, is a case in point. One of the sharpest critics of China on Capitol Hill, she has introduced many bills that seek to link human rights to China's most-favored-nation treatment. She knew in her heart that these bills could not become law because of the strong opposition of the president and trade liberals in Congress. But she continues to advocate for such bills in order to win the support of Asian voters (especially Chinese voters) and San Francisco Bay Area liberals. She herself once said, "Don't forget: Fighting for human rights is the common belief of the people of San Francisco!" Her tough stance on Chinese rights was an important reason why Pelosi became a rising star in American politics in the early 90s, and laid the foundation for her to rise all the way to become the first female speaker in U.S. history.

Second, as long as a bill is passed in the Senate or the House of Representatives (or both houses), even if it is an ordinary or common resolution that has no legal effect, it also shows the outside world the collective tendency of Congress in a certain policy. If the vote is overwhelming or unanimous, other policymakers in Washington must be aware of the consequences of confronting Congress. In other words, even if the bills passed by Congress do not themselves pose any substantial threat, they can induce the political organizations and individuals concerned to take the actions or inactions that Congress expects, which is commonly referred to as the "rule of anticipated reaction." In May 1995, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a joint resolution requiring the U.S. government to issue visas to Taiwan's so-called "former president" Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States. The Senate passed the same bill two months ago, with only one vote against. Faced with this situation, President Clinton had to renege on his original promise to the Chinese government and instead agree to grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui because he anticipated that Congress might pass mandatory legislation (such as a joint resolution or bill) requiring the U.S. government to issue visas. If Clinton exercised his veto, Congress might have had enough votes to overturn his veto.

Finally, while the vast majority of Chinese bills have not been passed in committees or at plenary discussions, even dealing with a small portion of them can keep the executive branch busy. Exhausted, the executive branch often has to make concessions on certain bills to appease Congress, thus avoiding the latter taking more drastic measures that will cause more damage to the relationship. In 1993, President Clinton spent a great deal of time and energy persuading Congress not to pass the amendment proposed by Senator Frank Murkowski. The amendment stipulates that the U.S. government's relations with Taiwan should be governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, not the 1982 August 17 communiqué. Clinton's lobbying ultimately failed to prevent the amendment from passing in Congress and becoming law. In addition, on the eve of Clinton's visit to China in 1997, the House of Representatives Christopher M. Christopher Cox suddenly proposed 11 unfriendly bills specifically targeting China. In order for the U.S.-China summit to run smoothly, Clinton had to make concessions on two issues that were not particularly important: increasing funding for Radio Free Asia and sending more U.S. State Department officials to monitor the human rights situation in China.

Vi. How to Evaluate the Role of Congress in Sino-US Relations

As a legislature, Congress's first task is to codify its own policies. Therefore, it is easy to think of the number of laws passed as an important indicator of the impact of the State. According to this criterion, then congress's role in Sino-US relations is not very large, because in the period from 1973 to 2006, only 15 bills involving China eventually became laws, and of these 15 laws, only the Taiwan Relations Act had a significant and far-reaching impact on Sino-US relations. But substantive legislation is not the only way in which countries can influence their China policy. Congress has deeply branded U.S.-China relations by changing decision-making procedures or creating new decision-making bodies, channeling public opinion, and creating expected behavior.

The U.S. Congress passed a law in 1980 requiring the State Department to report annually on the human rights situation in China, forcing the U.S. government to make human rights an important element of its China policy. Because the annual human rights report is critical of the Chinese government, the Chinese government always spares no effort to refute it. Since 1999, the Chinese government has also published an annual white paper on the human rights situation in the United States. In addition, the U.S. Congress passed a law (PL107-228) in 2001 establishing the Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. Previously, the executive branch was not concerned about the Tibet issue, except for the annual human rights report on Tibet. Congress created the office to force the executive branch to pay attention to the Tibet issue while also providing a lobbying channel for Tibet supporters. The most famous of procedural legislation, and the ones that had the greatest impact on U.S.-China relations, was none other than the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The amendment amends the Trade Act of 1974 to provide that the United States does not grant most-favoured-nation treatment to non-market economies (i.e., communist countries) unless the president exempts the provision. But Congress can overturn the president's immunity through a joint resolution, which the president can veto. Beginning in 1990, Congress used the Jackson VanNick Amendment to repeatedly try to abolish China's trade most-favored-nation treatment or to attach various conditions to its extension, causing long-term instability in Sino-US relations. It wasn't until Congress passed a bill granting permanent most-favored-nation treatment to China in 2000 that U.S.-China relations emerged from the shadow of the Jackson VanNick amendment.

The law of expected behavior, which has been mentioned earlier, refers to the strategic behavior of rational individuals in decision-making, that is, changing their own behavior by predicting the reactions of other actors. It is precisely because of strategic behavior that we cannot judge the influence of Congress and the president simply by what is happening in front of us. On the one hand, the president can publicly state his position on a policy (such as threatening to use the veto) to prevent Congress from taking some action. Congress, on the other hand, can also show its policy preferences (such as discussing a bill) to the outside world, thereby preventing the president from taking certain actions. In the U.S.-China relationship, there are countless examples of expected behavior. In 1999, the Taiwan authorities applied to the United States to purchase some advanced weapons, such as long-range early-warning radar systems, but the Clinton administration was slow to make a decision. At this time, Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House Council on International Relations, wrote a letter to Clinton urging the president to approve arms sales to Taiwan as soon as possible. Gilman also wrote a letter to Secretary of State Albright, declaring that if Clinton did not approve, then he would introduce a bill in Congress to approve arms sales to Taiwan in the form of legislation. Meanwhile, Senator Jesse Helms introduced a bill calling for strengthening U.S.-Taiwan military ties, known as the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. The bill was later introduced to the House of Representatives and passed in the House of Representatives in 2000. Although the bill did not eventually become law, it made clear to the Clinton administration Congress's tough position on arms sales to Taiwan, making it difficult for the latter to refuse Taiwan's demand for weapons purchases.

By holding public hearings and inviting members of Congress, executives, lobbies, or experts and scholars to express their opinions and suggestions on relevant policies, Congress can often guide or change the direction of American public opinion, indirectly influencing the president or other policymakers. A prominent scholar of U.S.-China relations wrote: "These hearings, which are often broadcast live on television, not only affect the discourse of the media, Congress, and ordinary people, but also set a line for the decision-makers of the executive branch that cannot be easily crossed." Congress held a series of high-profile hearings in 1966 to discuss U.S. policy toward China. After the hearing, members of Congress basically reached a consensus that the United States should change its foreign policy and take the initiative to reconcile with China. This series of hearings has greatly changed the attitude of the American public toward China and laid an indispensable public opinion foundation for the normalization of Sino-US relations.

Another example of how a state can influence public opinion is human rights. From 1989 to the present, human rights have always been one of the hot issues in Sino-US relations, and it is also one of the Most Concerned China Issues of the American People. The reason for this is that the frequent hearings on Chinese rights held by Congress can be said to be "indispensable." Christopher Smith is one of the most prominent critics of Chinese rights on Capitol Hill. Of all the members of Congress, he presided over the largest number of hearings on Chinese rights. In 1995, his first year as chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the House committee on international relations, he held five hearings on Chinese rights. He also invited Chinese government officials to attend hearings, and each time the Chinese government refused to attend, he accused the Chinese government of being unwilling to cooperate with the United States on human rights issues, so he held more hearings to discuss and attack Chinese rights. These hearings have undoubtedly prompted the American people to be more concerned about Human Rights in China and support a relatively tough measure against China on the issue of human rights.

In short, the commission system, the bicameral system, and the president's limited veto power make it difficult for Congress to impose its will on the executive branch through substantive legislation. As a result, Congress often influences the agenda of U.S.-China relations through procedural legislation, channeling public opinion, and using the law of expected behavior, or by creating obstacles in the formulation and implementation of China policies by the executive branch, thereby slowing down the development of bilateral relations. A scholar on Sino-US relations wrote: "The strong critical attitude of Congress against China has become a stumbling block on the way forward in Sino-US relations. This constant stream of criticism distracts policymakers and forces them to justify China policy before a critical (and sometimes hostile) Congress."

VII Concluding remarks

Based on the results of this article's analysis, the author believes that Chinese scholars and policymakers should not overreact to the so-called "anti-China bills" and vigorously criticize and attack each such bill. Doing so will not only further stimulate the hostility of lawmakers who are not friendly to China, but may also alienate those who would otherwise support the normal development of Sino-US relations. Instead, we should adopt an attitude of letting nature take its course and let these bills fend for themselves in layers of legislative rules within Congress and in the power struggle between Congress and the president. After all, from the establishment of diplomatic relations to the present, except for the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Congress has not passed any laws that have a significant negative impact on Sino-US relations.

Looking further, the authors argue that to effectively limit congressional negative impacts in the U.S.-China relationship, the core of China's work on the United States should shift from Congress to the president. First, the president's veto is like a sword of Damocles hanging over Congress's head, reminding Congress not to easily confront the president at any time. Until now, there is no precedent for Congress to successfully overturn the president's veto of China's bill. Although this does not mean that Congress will not overturn the president's veto of a certain Chinese bill in the future, it at least shows the huge obstacles and pressures faced by the "anti-China" faction in Congress from the president. Second, as the only official elected by all Americans, the PRESIDENT of the United States often proceeds from the perspective of the interests of the whole country when formulating china policy, rather than focusing on the narrow interests of voters or his own policy tendencies, as many members of Congress do. Finally, there are 535 members of Congress and only one president, so it is far more difficult to work on the former than the latter. Through regular summits, the leaders of the two countries can increase mutual understanding and thus build trust, but regular exchanges with 535 parliamentarians are almost impossible.

Of course, shifting the focus to the president doesn't mean ignoring the existence of Congress. In fact, we still need to vigorously strengthen and improve the work of Congress. For example, we should make full use of the expanding economic and trade exchanges between the two countries and play the card of voter interests. Within Congress, the focus of our work should be on the Senate. In the House of Representatives, various legislative rules greatly limit the influence of individual members on the legislative process and outcome. Yet there are hardly any legislative rules in the Senate that restrict senators from freely discussing and amending bills, so each senator can either scrap a smooth bill halfway through or bring a moribund bill back to life. The famous Jackson Vannick Amendment and the McCorsky Amendment were both introduced in the Senate and eventually became law. In short, after having a full and accurate understanding of the role of Congress in Sino-US relations, we should carry out congressional work in a targeted manner, and at the same time shift more attention and work direction to the PRESIDENT.

[Next day:2008-06-22]

[Revised:2008-12-08]

[Editor-in-Charge: Zhao Yuanliang]

*Disclaimer: This article only represents the personal views of the author and does not represent the position of this official account

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