Two consecutive World Cups have failed to reach the final round, and even winning the European Championship last year has failed to cover up the team's problems, and now it is finally possible to conduct a comprehensive review.
1. Mancini tactical details have been adjusted to the best of their ability
From large-scale selection to the selection of the best 11 people, Mancini has been constantly finding the best squad and suitable playing style according to the ability and chemistry of the players in recent years, and the coaching staff has been the greatest in this regard.
At the start of the game 4-3-3, Federico Chiesa was responsible for blasting/breaking down the defensive line; Lorenzo Insigne/Domenico Berardi was on both sides, taking up feet/hanging passes at the right time or hitting a wall with teammates in a tight space; center Chiro Inmobile competed for the first point/turned and walked obliquely. The three midfielders have a clear division of labour: Niccolò Barrera is responsible for advancing/tandeming the frontcourt in the middle; Marco Verratti is in the middle and front of the midfield to see opportunities to pass the ball; and the core of the team, Jorginho, controls the rhythm, is responsible for the scheduling and long passes of the backcourt, as well as the promotion of the backcourt. Substitute Manuel Locatelli often provided variations later in the game to reinforce the midfield confrontation. Evergreen Chiellini directs the backcourt and is responsible for keeping an eye on the opposing centre-forward and making tactical fouls at the right time; Bonucci uses long passes to crack the opponent's front, and Giovanni Di Lorenzo stabilizes and moves into the middle when Leonardo Spinazzola goes after the assist. When Leonardo Spinazzola was injured, Giovanni Di Lorenzo took turns with Emerson to assist. Donnarumma improved the stability of the defence and made several key saves.
You must know that understanding tactics and executing tactics on the field are two different things, and it is absolutely invaluable that Italian players can implement them in multiple games, all because the national team training time is limited and the players come from different teams, making it difficult for the national team manager to lay out the tactics as carefully as the club manager. In fact, Mancini can adjust the national team that is not too high in personal ability to the extreme, ensure the lower limit of the team's performance through tactical adjustment, and rely on one or two players with outstanding personal ability to break the dilemma, successfully winning the European Championship is already the highest peak of the team, and after the defeat in the World Cup qualifiers, it is also the best time for the team to change blood.
2. Comprehensive defensive basic set + midfield pressure
Historically, Italy has been the most defensively detailed country in Europe and even in the world. As early as the 1930s, the only two-time World Cup-winning coach in history, Pozzo, required the center forward to have the ability to pass long distances to both wings, mainly using people to stare at people in defense, and the attack to complete the attack with the minimum number of people, which can be described as establishing Italy's future style of play.
By the 1960s and 1970s, Catenaccio had become popular, starting with Giuseppe Viani (then in charge of Salenetana), then AC Milan manager Nereo Rocco (whose disciple was Giovanni Trapattoni), and Inter Milan manager Eleño Herrera, who had built catenaccio forward and won two Champions League titles each.
Then in the '70s and '80s, Trapattoni managed Juventus to win everything, and its tactical philosophy of Zona mista required players to cover the pitch completely, moving uniformly from left to right or right to left, consistently moving sideways to fill the position, defending in the midfield area and using human eyes in the backfield area. Among them, the free man (Gatano Sirea) mainly reads the game and prejudges, while the centre-back (Claudio Gentile) has a strong physique and is responsible for the top, interception and active confrontation.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Arigo Saki, the master of tactical revolution, led AC Milan to win two consecutive Champions Leagues and finished runner-up at the 1994 World Cup through regional joint defense, compressed space, high defensive line and offside tactics. By the mid-1990s, Lippi had led Juventus through Serie A, emphasizing defensive flexibility and the diversity of players' playing styles, with multiple wingers serving as both full-backs, wing-backs and midfielders, often swapping left and right full-backs during matches, restricting each other's play, and using attacking players with different characteristics according to the situation on the field.
The millennium Serie A environment was more complicated, with two capital teams, Lazio/Roma, breaking the monopoly of AC Milan and Juventus, but failed to last. Then in 2006, the telephone door incident broke out, making Inter Milan a solo player and dominating Serie A. Overall, serie A in the millennium did not have breakthrough defensive tactics, mostly relying on the single defense ability of defenders and tight positioning, and at the same time it was the last tango of a group of top central defenders in Europe and the Americas, and the next decade began to have faults.
Then in the 1910s, Conte's second season at the helm of Juventus revived the three-back formation, and the BBC+ Buffon combination became a classic, and the national team followed. His successor Allegri returned to the back-backs, but defended from 4-4-2 to 3-5-2.
Since mancini took charge of the national team in 2018, he has used the then top italian pair of central defenders Chiellini and Bonucci as the defensive base, with Federico Chiesa, Lorenzo Insigne/Domenico Berardi, Chiro Inmobile, Niccolò Barrera, Marco Verratti and others as a frontcourt pressure, which is different from the defensive strategy of the previous national team.
In simple terms, the main reason why the team can play the defensive requirements of Mancini and the coaching staff is that the single defensive ability and tacit understanding of a pair of central defenders have reached a superior level, so that the team has a stable defensive basic plate, and then adjusted, so that the midfielders can rest assured that they can press forward.
After Mancini took over, Italy was more aggressive in playing than ever, focusing on pressing forward and pressing the defensive line forward. But when Chiellini and Bonucci withdrew from the national team, did the other veteran Archerbi and the new generation of Bastoni, Alessio Romanioli, Mancini Jr. and Rugani have enough strength to top? Judging from the performance of Serie A and international competitions in recent years, the answer seems to be no, mainly because the single defense ability of the above-mentioned people is not as good as that of the previous generation, coupled with the limited number of co-productions in international competitions, the awareness and tacit understanding of each other's complements remain to be seen.
In other words, under the premise that the basic plate of the defensive line has been greatly reduced, what is the situation of the pressure in the front?
Taking last year's European Championship as an example, according to the famous football data website FBref and Wyscout data, Italy's midfield rush performance is actually average:
Of the 24 participating teams, Italy ranked 9th with a PPDA of only 11.93 (1st Spain 5.86, 2nd Poland 8.24th)
PPDA (passes allowed per defensive action) is the number of passes by the (numerator) attacking side divided by the number of defensive moves the (denominator) defender makes in midfield (i.e. within 60 yards of the opposing goal), including interceptions, scrambles and fouls. The smaller the PPDA value, the higher the defensive intensity of the defensive side in the midfield, and conversely, the larger the value means that the defensive side's defense is more loose. It is worth noting that the PPDA does not include a line covering, which is also a kind of defensive position.
Italy's Medale intensity is 18th with just 4.9 points (1st Spain 7.6, 2nd Austria 5.9th).
Challenge intensity (counting defensive moves made by a defender to an opponent every minute after losing possession, such as defensive duels, loose ball duels, interceptions, tackles, the higher the number, the more intense the defense)
Italy averaged 136.6 times (ranked 18th) on the other side, 36.6 successful pressures per game (20th in the row), a pressure success rate of 26.8% (ranked 13), 38.4 times (5th place) in the third area of the attack, and 2.13 successful interceptions per game in the third area of the attacking (10th).
Even if you look at the five major leagues in Europe, although the PPDA value of Serie A ranks second (10.85), only Turin is in the top ten (Turin's PPDA value actually ranks first among the top five leagues, 6.97). In terms of pressuring the opponent's data, Serie A only ranked 3rd, and the number of interceptions and successful interceptions in the interception third area was even 4th. In addition, the defensive performance of the serie A team's midfield is not standard, such as the number of blocks ranked 3rd, while the number of tackles + interception ranked 4th.
In summary, whether it is the Italian national team or the Serie A team, although it is more active than ever to press the opponent, it is still in the transition stage, still groping, and always needs time.
3. Lack of player selection
Generally speaking, if the league is at a high level and competitive, local players have been given enough opportunities to hone in daily competitions, and participation in the European Championship helps to broaden horizons and improve psychological quality, which has generally allowed the national team manager to have a sufficient talent pool. The question is, has the league level and competitiveness in Serie A been sufficient in recent years? In the past, with the help of top foreign aid to improve the level of local players, thus driving the league to become the top in Europe, but now due to the lack of high-quality foreign aid in the league (the number of foreign aid does not mean high quality), coupled with Juventus 9 consecutive league gaps, the last champion Inter Milan needed to sell the main force due to financial difficulties, and the European results of the front teams were stronger and less satisfactory.
In the past decade, Only Juventus have reached the Champions League final twice, but they are only runners-up; the second-level Europa League or the predecessor UEFA Cup or Champions League, the last time the Italian team crowned the throne has been traced back to Lazio and Bernardo in 1999, and as for the Europa League, only Inter Milan won the runner-up in the 19/20 season. In other words, the last time an Italian team won the European Championship dates back to 2010 Champions League winner Inter Milan!
Although Serie A has ranked 3rd in the total coefficient of the Europa League in the past 20 years (274.87 points), it is actually only leading the Bundesliga by a few margins (3.1 points), and is thrown 57 points and 85 points by the Premier League and La Liga respectively! Among them, the 2006 telephone door incident is a key factor, far-reaching, not only makes foreign aid switch to other leagues, investors are deterred, coupled with the rich side of the Premier League, all the weapons of various countries, La Liga double male and crazy to grab the best players in individual positions, so that Serie A in the 10s there are very few top foreign aid to join. Even if Juventus 9 consecutive players attracted C Ronaldo to join, but in fact, the peak has passed, but most of the acquisitions are for the main players of domestic opponents, indirectly weakening the competitiveness of the league, because the rest of the teams simply do not have the financial resources to acquire high-quality players to supplement the lineup. In addition, the Milan duo mostly beckoned to frustrated soldiers, Atalanta had limited financial resources, and Roma, Lazio, and Napoli failed to attract big stars due to their achievements.
In addition to the decline in league competitiveness, the playing time of local players is also worth paying attention to. According to Transfermarket, this season's Local Players in Serie A have only played 35.7%, ranking fourth in the five major Leagues in Europe, only higher than the Premier League 33.8% (57% in La Liga, 46.1% in Ligue 1, and 42% in the Bundesliga). The teams with more than 50% of the local players playing are Empoli (currently 12th), Sampdoria (15th), Cagliari (17th) and Genoa (18th), while the top three in the league table, Milan and Napoli, are only 22-28%. In addition, the number of young players in Serie A (U23) played the least of the five major leagues, with only 7.5% (18.2% in Ligue 1, 10.2% in La Liga, 9.5% in the Premier League and 8.8% in the Bundesliga).
Since players lack opportunities to hone at home, what about the exodus of players?
The selection of the national team is mainly from local league + outflow players. Among the current regular players of the Italian national team, the core players of the exodus are only Marco Verratti, Jorginho, Donnarumma and Emerson. Is it enough?
According to Soccerway, there are 17 Italian players who have flowed to the highest level of European leagues (Premier League, La Liga, Bundesliga, Ligue 1, Dutch First Division, Portuguese Premier League) this season. As for the number of Players from England, France, Germany and Spain who have flowed to the above leagues (including Serie A), the following are as follows: England has 24 players, France has more than 140 players, Germany has 62 players and Spain has 96 players. It can be seen that the number of Italian players outflow is the smallest of the five major leagues in Europe, and the proportion of local players playing in the league is small, which greatly limits the number of managers selected. If so, since it is difficult for local players to play in Serie A and the competitiveness of the league is insufficient, it should be a large-scale exodus to find opportunities to hone.
4. The quality of coaching is still there
The Coverciano Training Center, located at the Technical Headquarters of the Italian Football Federation (FIGC), has been dedicated to producing outstanding coaches over the years, including Ancelotti, Conte, Luciano Spalletti, Allegri, Sarri, Simeone Inzaghi, Gasperini and, in recent years, Pirlo, Alberto Gilardino, Cannavaro and others. According to Michael Cox's book Zonal Marking: The Making of Modern European Football, Gianni Leali, former Governor of Coverciano, once described that they would not only teach one formation/system, but would pay more attention to the diversity of systems, even all possible formations. Looking at Europe, while Italian coaches have not been coaching each team for too long over the years, goal-oriented philosophies can always succeed in different leagues.
Through the generations, Serie A coaches have been good at flexibly applying different formations/kicks to opponents for many years, and there is a guarantee of on-the-spot tactical adjustments. However, many coaches have doubts about the mentality of the European Championship, especially the Europa League, often sending sub-selections to compete, and even if they attack strongly, the results are not as good as ideal.
5. Renewed emphasis on individual competence
Serie A has tried to change the style in recent years, the game scene is more aggressive, strengthening the backcourt organization, pressing the frontcourt, and pushing the defensive line forward. The Serie A playing environment is indeed gradually in line with the general environment, and Chiellini also said in an interview with former teammate Malkisio on Amazon Prime Video in March this year that former coach Conte was the first person to change their football vision, emphasizing the importance of the establishment of the backcourt and the possession of the ball in the foot, but the problem is that the defensive base plate that has always been proud is weakening, and even changing the youth training mode to adapt to the needs of modern football, resulting in a fault in the position of the center-back.
As a football power, Italy has dominated the world for almost 90 years, and it is reasonable to adhere to its own style and tradition, although it is no problem to learn from the strengths of others, but the premise is that it is necessary to have a strong single defensive ability of the central defender to properly implement the frontcourt, otherwise it will only lose sight of one or the other. As Chiellini told in an interview in 2017 about the impact of "Guardiola football" on the Italian guard, criticizing the current guard for not knowing how to keep an eye on defense and is losing its defensive DNA, and Spain's tiki taka is not italy's football philosophy.
After the 2006 phone-gate incident, winning the World Cup, then going out of the group stages in 2010 and 2014, not scoring the World Cups in 2018 and 2022, in other words, four consecutive World Cup disappointments, the Italians have lost completely!
That being the case, why not muster up the courage to break the modern tactical framework and limitations, re-cultivate new talents in the youth system and strengthen their individual abilities, especially for the two positions that Italy is most proud of: the central defender and the No. 9 and a half.