"Frontier Time and Space" Zheng Jiexi | Diplomacy between Kim Young-ri and Governor Konishi before the Korean War

Original title: "Exploring diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK on the eve of the Korean War: Focusing on the Diplomatic Activities of Kim Yeong-ri and Governor Konishi"

Zheng Jiexi

He graduated from the Graduate School of Literature of Kansai University in 2011 with a Ph.D. in Cultural Negotiation, and is now an associate professor at the School of Overseas Chinese at Wenzhou University and a distinguished professor in Oujiang. His research interests are the history of Sino-foreign relations. He has presided over a number of national, provincial and ministerial projects and published many papers.

This article has been authorized by the author and published on the WeChat public platform for the first time.

Summary: On the eve of the korean war, The Japanese general Konishi sent a letter to Shen Weijing, the envoy, asking him to mediate between them and help the DPRK general Jin Yingrui avoid the fate of "dying in the festival of war." Before this document was issued, Governor Konishi had revealed the Japanese plan of action to Kim Young-shwe and planned for the North Korean side to deal with the Japanese general Kiyomasa Kato, hoping to use the hand of Korea to attack Kato Kiyomasa to avoid the outbreak of war. After this document was issued, Kim Ying-ri "leaked a military plane" to President Konishi in order to "intimidate", and then "abandoned the city and withdrew" when the Japanese army launched an attack in order to live fully, so that he bore the insult of "traitor" and "negative country", but the King of Korea unexpectedly tried to excuse him. Through the exploration of President Konishi's document, it can be found that it covers many little-known diplomatic secrets, and there was an extraordinary diplomatic relationship between Japan and North Korea at that time.

Keywords: Wanli Korean War; Governor Konishi; Kim Young-rui; Diplomatic Documents; Japan-North Korea Relations

I. Introduction

In May and June of the twenty-fifth year of the Wanli Dynasty (1597), on the eve of the Korean War, Shen Weijing, an emissary of the Ming Dynasty who had painstakingly mediated the cause of peace in East Asia in Korea, received the following special diplomatic document:

Yu Tianchao guerrilla Shen Laoyetai: Fuwen Korean Terracotta Jin defense made Tsukusan Castle Shou die in Yining. Gai defense emissaries, between four or five years and the small servants to know the prime, discuss peace, so the Japanese king and the ministers are well known. The defensive envoys of the present will hold on to Yining and want to decide the ambition of the male and female. Fu Yining, the key road of Jeolla Province, the Japanese army and soldiers jointly climbed the city, then the defense made it necessary to keep the festival and die in battle, but at any cost! May the lord make it clear to the king of Korea that he will defend the city in Yining and defend the same under the lord's curtain, so as to make up for the future peace. After the Day of Death, the defense will make others more peaceful, and it will remain in the ears of the sun and the moon. May the old man fight hard! Although far and near, it will become a great thing, and the hard work of a fast life will be lived. Fu Wei Liang looked at it.

Ding You May 26 Governor Toyotomi

This is an upward document, and the sender "Governor Toyotomi" will be President Konishi on the same day, the recipient "Old Master Shen" is Shen Weijing, the deputy envoy of the Ming Dynasty who once served as an envoy to Japan, and the "Korean Terracotta Warriors and Horses Defense Envoy" refers to Kim Ying-rui, the envoy of the Korean Gyeongsang Right Province, who once planned the cause of peace in East Asia together with Governor Konishi and Shen Weijing on behalf of the DPRK. According to the situation at that time, because the Korean war was imminent, Kim Ying-rui was responsible for holding on to Yining, and the established operational plan of the Japanese army must capture Yining, governor Konishi considered that When Jin Yingrui was besieged, he would definitely "die in battle", so it was deeply deplorable, he predicted that the Japanese and the DPRK would resume peace talks in the future, worried that after Kim Ying-rui's death in battle, the DPRK's "peace talks" would "stay in the sun and moon" because they did not understand the negotiations between the two countries, so he sent a letter to Shen Weijing hoping that he would intercede for Kim Yingrui and persuade the Korean king to replace Kim Yingrui. Save his life for future peace talks.

The Wanli Korean War occurred in the 20th year of the Wanli Dynasty (1592), when Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea, Korea quickly collapsed and was on the verge of extinction, and the Ming Dynasty responded to Korea's request for help and intervened in the war militarily and diplomatically. The war lasted seven years, consisting of two phases of military conflict (1592-1593, 1597-1598) and more than four years of diplomatic negotiations (1593-1597). During diplomatic negotiations, the two sides briefly agreed on a peace plan in which the Ming Dynasty crowned Toyotomi Hideyoshi as King of Japan, but was defeated in the subsequent canonization campaign, and the Korean war resumed. According to common sense, the pre-war planning of the two opposing sides is generally based on the urgent task of efficiently killing and injuring the enemy's living forces, but Governor Konishi has gone against the grain and dared to risk the suspicion of collaborating with the enemy to send a letter to Shen Weijing, hoping that he can mediate between them to make the enemy general Jin Yingrui all survive. What kind of diplomatic secrets are behind this document?

With regard to Japan-DPRK relations during the Wanli Korean War, a series of relevant research results have emerged so far since Uemura's publication of his treatise, but most of them focus on the diplomatic activities of the DPRK's communication envoys and the DPRK diplomatic monk Weizheng, but they have very little to do with Kim Ying-ri, who also had more diplomatic contacts with the Japanese side, and the study of only Wei Xusheng, Kim Jing-hee, Choi Guan, Samuel Hawley, and Kitajima Wanji has been slightly involved. Among them, the first three use literary works to narrate history, and the basis of historical events is vague; Samuel Holly's works are popular historical readings, although there are no major problems in the narrative of historical events, but they rely too much on subjective assumptions in historical interpretation, and the conclusions lack sufficient evidence and are slightly biased; Kitajima Wanji is stuck in a single historical material, and the relationship between the historical events has not yet been further examined, but the questions raised by them are undoubtedly helpful to broaden their horizons and give people great enlightenment.

In response to the above questions, this article will mainly take the relevant diplomatic documents in the "Records of the Joseon Dynasty" as the basic historical materials, supplemented by the documents in the Mingxian Diplomatic Documents Collection "The Great Document Track" and the collection of the time and anthology of the two countries, through exploring the diplomatic negotiations between Governor Konishi and Kim Yingrui on the eve of the Wanli Korean War, excavating the diplomatic secrets behind this document, and examining the special Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the DPRK on the eve of the Wanli Korean War.

2. The initial diplomatic representations between Kim Ying-ri and Governor Konishi

Governor Konishi sent a letter to Shen Weijing's previous Japanese-DPRK diplomacy, which was mainly divided into two stages: communications before the outbreak of the war and Japanese-DPRK diplomacy during the war. Among them, the diplomatic activities of the messengers and the diplomatic activities of the DPRK diplomatic monks and governments have been covered by previous studies, and will not be repeated. I would like to first briefly consider Kim Ying-ri's diplomatic activities with Japan in the early stage.

Kim Ei-sui was known for his bravery in battle and for his use of the Imperial Household, and although he had a correspondence with the Japanese general Kato Kiyomasa, his substantive diplomatic activities with Japan began in October of the 22nd year of the Wanli Calendar (1594) when he plotted the "Haman Talks" with Governor Konishi. The Ming Dynasty had previously unilaterally made a resolution to "strike and seal tribute" and suspend negotiations. In order to open up the diplomatic situation, the Japanese side repeatedly submitted letters to the DPRK to ask for peace, but most of them did not receive a reasonable answer. The diplomatic representations between the Japanese side and the DPRK at that time can be found in a diplomatic document written by Zong Yizhi to Han Chun-hyo, the observer of Gyeongsang-do, on August 22 of the Wanli calendar. According to this diplomatic document, as early as the eighteenth year of the Wanli Calendar (1590) before the outbreak of the war, there were three messengers of correspondence between Hwang Yoon-gi, Kim Sung-il, and Hsu Ching, followed by correspondence diplomacy between the Japanese side Gyeong-joo Hyun-su and Yanagawa to escort the three envoys back to China, and between The Korean envoys Wu Yiling and Shen Xishou, and after the Korean court did not respond, there was also the correspondence diplomacy between Zong Yizhi and local officials in Busan and Donglai, but the Korean court ignored it. After the outbreak of the war, the Japanese side sent back to the North Korean side that The translator Jing Yingshun, who had been captured during the war, made peace in a general letter, but there was still no follow-up news. The Japanese side also sent Jingru Xuansu, Zhuxi Zongyi, and Yanagawa to negotiate peace with Li Dexin, the judge of the Joseon Li Cao, in the Datong River Boat, but the results were not cleared. Zong Yizhi's reason for this letter is that he hopes that when Japan asks the Ming Dynasty to "open the old tribute road," it will be able to "communicate with one letter, and if it talks and "repairs the old good", then "the Wu soldiers will also be withdrawn.". After this letter, Zong Yizhi continued to write more frequent letters with Governor Konishi, Yanagawa Ande, and others to Lee Deok-shin, Han Chun-hyo, and Gyeongsang-do's envoys Li Xue and Kim Ying-rui, hoping to hold diplomatic talks. The reason why the Japanese side is eager to hold diplomatic talks with the DPRK high-level is that "the matter of the Ming Dynasty's promise of tribute has been decided, and when it comes to the DPRK's extremely unavoidable intentions, it is even more important for us to invite soldiers, so our Shangguan and others especially want to see the DPRK Shangguan Yi, hoping that through direct talks with the DPRK "Shangguan," that is, high-level officials, the DPRK court will no longer obstruct the Ming Dynasty's "tribute" to Japan.

Although the TOP level of the DPRK side replied after receiving the letter from the Japanese side, only Kim Ying-rui was the only one who really responded to the Japanese side's request to make substantive diplomatic representations with it in the form of talks. Jin Yingrui then held diplomatic talks with Governor Konishi at GuDan in Xian'an on November 22 of that year, the records of which were detailed in Zhao Qingnan's "Miscellaneous Records of Chaos". The talks ended with Japan sending a "letter of surrender" to the DPRK in exchange for the DPRK's "playing the Heavenly Dynasty with the japanese tribute." During this diplomatic activity with Japan, Jin Yingrui was "firmly discouraged from Guo Fenyang's entry into the front line, which can be described as a "famous general of the rare world, and undoubtedly left a deep impression on the Japanese side; in addition to "treating him with great respect" and "extreme sincerity" during the talks, the Japanese side also presented him with horses, swords, and military food after the talks, believing that the results of the talks were very obvious. The person concerned, Yanagawa, recalled in a later letter to Li Yuanyi, the envoy of the Dprk Metropolitan Inspection, that "last year, Mitong was humble to the Defense of Jin, and the defense sent Li Hongfa into the camp to stay less, in order to reveal the mind of the servant, and if the vanguard and the righteous wisdom would meet the Defense of Jin, then your country was suspected of disintegrating and disappearing." Therefore, your country has done its own thing", believing that the talks between the Japanese side and Kim Ying-rui are quite essential, which has caused Japan and the DPRK to "suspect the disintegration of the ice", mistakenly believing that after the talks, the DPRK has "made things happen on the top" for Japan, which contributed to the Ming Dynasty's "Xugong" beautiful affair with Japan. Kim Ying-rui's diplomatic ability has undoubtedly won the recognition of the Japanese side.

However, Kim Ying-s diplomatic activities with Japan have been evaluated in North Korea with mixed reviews. As the Japanese side commented, many people on the DPRK side did recognize Kim Yeong-ri's diplomatic activities, such as the Bing Cao Judgment Lee Heng-fu called him "summoning slaves, such as seducing children with bread", and the King of Korea believed that he "rode alone to see the elders, and it was also very much" to see the elders. However, there were many voices of criticism within the Korean court, because Kim Ying-rui called the other party an "adult" in his correspondence and the transcript of the talks with Governor Konishi, which was quite defiled within the Korean court, and many ministers believed that he "respected thieves and thieves, lost his rebellious feelings, and was intimate and private", "extremely defiant, and infinitely ashamed of the country", and had the crime of "flattering thieves without kings", and demanded that he be extrapolated to the crime. On the other hand, Kim Young-ri's diplomatic talks with the Japanese side were sent by Marshal Kwon Kyung-ho of the capital, and although he had repeatedly launched the Korean king, the KOREAN and Chinese courtiers were mostly opposed to such diplomatic representations. In addition, Kim Ying-rui's diplomacy with Japan was still an ultra vires act at that time, because under the Ming Dynasty's tribute system, Korea, as a vassal state of the Ming Dynasty, did not have the right to make private representations with Japan, and whether the Ming Dynasty allowed Japan's "tribute" request, Korea and Japan should "wait intently" and "not meet privately", and diplomatic negotiations between the two countries should first report to the Ming Dynasty, otherwise it will open a "suspicious end" between the two countries. Therefore, Kim Ying-rui's diplomacy with Japan actually violated the taboo of the Ming Dynasty, and after this matter was learned by the Ming side, most of the Korean courtiers proposed to ask for the punishment of Kim Ying-rui and others, but the Korean king did not want to really punish Kim Ying-rui, only punished with a military staff, and only used the form to deal with the Ming Dynasty. Although the subsequent diplomacy between Tomorrow and Japan and the DPRK ultimately failed, Kim Ying-rui laid the groundwork for the future cause of peace through the "Xian'an Talks" and a series of diplomatic activities with Japan since then.

3. Governor Konishi on the eve of the battle

As mentioned earlier, on the eve of the re-election of the Wanli Korean War, Governor Konishi specially sent a letter to Shen Weijing, the envoy, asking him to intercede with the King of Korea on behalf of Kim Young-ri to help Kim Young-ri escape the fate of "dying in the festival". In fact, Governor Konishi and Kim Ying-ri had frequent diplomatic contacts before, as early as December of the twenty-fourth year of the Wanli Calendar (1596), shortly after the news of the failure of the canonization was introduced to Korea, in order to avoid the recurrence of war, the King of Korea had ordered the Imperial Household to "make Kim Ying-shwe, Parallel Commander, etc. must not be thick knotted, and if the plan is pure, then allow something", trying to take advantage of the friendship between Kim Ying-rui and Governor Konishi, instructing Kim Yingrui to privately contact Governor Konishi and instigate him to conspire with the DPRK to deal with Kato Kiyomasa.

Regarding the diplomatic relations between Governor Konishi and Kim Ying-ri at that time, the Canadian scholar Samuel Holly touched on it in the section "Li Shunchen's Imprisonment" in the fourth part of the popular history book "The Nongchen War", "The Deadlock", arguing that Governor Konishi sent "spies" to provide Jin Yingrui with information about the location and time of Kato Kiyomasa's fleet, which was actually Konishi's ulterior motive, only to "fool the right soldiers to make Kim Yingrui and the Seoul government", and this "strategy" eventually led to the imprisonment of the famous North Korean general Li Shunchen. In turn, it helped the invading Japanese army to completely destroy the Korean water army in the ensuing war. However, the authors do not present much valid evidence, mainly based on the subjective assumption that "the facts may be just like this". As Sun Weiguo commented, Samuel Holly has superb storytelling skills, and his works are highly interesting and readable, but because the author is basically based on second-hand materials, rarely explores the original materials, and does have "slightly biased" flaws, his views need to be treated with caution. In fact, in the initial stage after the defeat of the canonization, Toyotomi Hideyoshi was not entirely determined to fight again, he maintained "war" and "two-handed preparations", Governor Konishi and his kowa clique did not have the political tendency to support Toyotomi Hideyoshi's re-invasion of Korea again, let alone the "far-sightedness" of "strategizing" to frame Li Shunchen to remove obstacles to subsequent operations, and he was still trying to explore various possibilities for diplomatic repairs with the Ming Dynasty and the Korean Talking Group. The re-war plan to thwart Kato Kiyomasa was indeed an important node where his diplomatic repair could be successful, and Governor Konishi especially hoped to use the hand of the Korean naval forces to crush Kato Kiyomasa's re-voyage to Korea in order to strike at Kato Kiyomasa's credibility in Japan, regain his right to speak in front of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and then lead the situation in Korea to the ideal track of avoiding war and peace. Kitajima Manji also pointed out this situation in his book. The following is a detailed discussion of The "collaborator" program and other war avoidance measures in response to the Korean King's proposal by Governor Konishi.

(1) Governor Konishi's "collaborating with the enemy" plan

How Kim Ying-ri contacted Governor Konishi is not known, but Governor Konishi did respond positively to it and planned a "co-enemy" plan to cooperate with the DPRK to achieve peace opportunities. This was a major hidden issue in Japanese-DPRK diplomacy at that time. According to a note written by Kim Ying-shwe to the King of Joseon, Governor Konishi informed Kim Young-shō of Kato Kiyomasa's military operations in the first month of the twenty-fifth year of the Wanli Calendar, saying that Kato Kiyomasa, who was advocating the war, "has arrived at Tsushima on the fourth day of the first month, and the downwind will not be crossed soon", and that the sea has recently been smooth, and Kiyojō can easily cross the sea into Korea, suggesting that the Korean naval forces "quickly enter Geoje Island and spy on the day when the Qing thieves cross the sea", and if the wind is smooth, The Qingzheng fleet "will always come to Geoje", at which time the Korean naval army should intercept Kiyohake's fleet If the sea was blowing "positive east wind", then The Qingzheng fleet would "go straight to the realm of Jizhang and Xisheng", and the two places were far from Geoje Island, and although the Korean naval army could not effectively attack the Qingzheng fleet, it could still send a large number of warships to wait in strict formation and coerce The Qingzheng to return to Japan. Because Kiyomasa advocated the war, he boasted to Toyotomi Hideyoshi before sending troops, saying that as long as he sent troops to Korea, he could "uncover a pole and determine Korea", otherwise please "destroy my clan". If the DPRK side adopted Governor Konishi's plan, Kiyomasa's fleet would either be intercepted and damaged, or forced to return to Japan, and its boast would not be broken, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi would certainly be convicted of "misconduct", so that the "harmony" plan advocated by Governor Konishi would be adopted by Toyotomi Hideyoshi. It can be seen from this that at that time, in addition to revealing the situation of Japan's military operations to the DPRK side, Governor Konishi had even planned for the DPRK side a "collaborating enemy" strategy against Kato Kiyomasa, but the development of the situation did not go as Envisaged by Governor Konishi. Gyeongsang-do's consolation made Hwangshin report to the King of Korea at the time that because the North Korean side "set a deadline" and "caused the wrong chance", Kato Kiyomasa's fleet landed smoothly on the southern coast of Korea in Seosonpo, Gade Island, Andopo and other places on the southern coast of Korea, and Governor Konishi's plan to "collude with the enemy" to seek peace failed because of the inaction of the Korean side. Upon hearing this news, the King of Korea was deeply sighed and blamed himself for "the mainland is sincere and inferior to the world" and "the mainland is inferior to the long-term."

President Konishi advocated peace, knowing that only by proving Kato Kiyomasa's claims were wrong could his claims be adopted by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and that it would be more feasible to use the hand of North Korea to obstruct Kato Kiyomasa's invasion of Korea. Therefore, Against Toyotomi Hideyoshi's wishes, Governor Konishi privately revealed Kato Kiyomasa's military plan of action to Kim Ying-ri and planned a "co-ordination" plan for North Korea to seek peace, but failed due to North Korean reasons.

(2) Other war avoidance measures for Governor Konishi

Governor Konishi revealed to the North Korean side the Japanese military action plan and planned a "collaboration with the enemy" plan for the North Korean side to intercept and coerce Kato Kiyomasa's fleet, and although these efforts were ultimately defeated, he continued to take other remedial measures after Kato Kiyomasa crossed the sea to avoid or delay the war. This is reflected in the following two aspects:

First, the momentum of the Korean army was exaggerated to deter the Japanese army in Korea.

After crossing the Korean army, Governor Konishi praised the Japanese army in the DPRK that "it has been in the midst of the military revolution for a long time, is familiar with the art of using soldiers, and has prepared more warships" and exaggerated the "few to more than a thousand" Ark divisions of the DPRK side, so that the Japanese army will first be afraid of itself, dare not act rashly, and avoid war prematurely. As a result, the Japanese troops in each front "looked very carefully and kept the Uighurs under their control, so that they could not act arbitrarily, in order to provoke the anger of Korea." Governor Konishi was still communicating with the DPRK side in advance, on the one hand, asking the DPRK to send a fleet of ships to Busan to show off its force and deter the Japanese army in the DPRK; on the other hand, it revealed to the Japanese army in advance that the DPRK side 's military plan of "during the 80s and 90s of the first month (February) of this month, the boat master Ding Ning entered the foreshore of Busan to cover the grain road", so as to confirm the fact that the DPRK naval warships are strong and strong. However, the DPRK side did not seriously deal with it in the end, and although it responded to The Boat Division sent by Governor Konishi to the front ocean of Busan on the tenth day of February, there were only sixty-three boats, and because "there were very few Boat Divisions," Governor Konishi 's "broadcasting" and "returning to the void" made it greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Korean naval strength to deter the Japanese army. After that, Governor Konishi and others continued to praise the military posture of the DPRK to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, saying that the DPRK "is now a strong soldier and horse, and the boats are very strong, although the strength of the mainland may not be taken lightly, this is not a trivial matter, and it is a matter of starting an army and fighting, and it is necessary to consider it at your discretion", but there is no doubt that it is necessary to take the political risk of deceiving Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

Secondly, to harmonize the conditions of peace to avoid the outbreak of war.

The direct cause of the re-battle of the Wanli Korean War was the defeat of the Ming Dynasty to crown Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The reason why it failed was because the canonization did not coordinate the relations between Japan and The DPRK under the Ming Dynasty's tribute system. Toyotomi Hideyoshi's appeal was for Japan to establish its superiority over Korea and enhance its international status, so the canonization alone would not meet its needs. Therefore, after the canonization, Toyotomi Hideyoshi ostensibly still obeyed the authority of the Ming Dynasty and avoided breaking with it, but turned the spearhead to Korea, putting all the responsibility for the failure of the canonization on the dprk, and asking the DPRK to send the prince to Japan to ensure its special superiority over the DPRK. But neither the Ming Dynasty nor North Korea could accept toyying Toyotomi Hideyoshi's request. The final plan issued by Myeongshinjong at the beginning of the first month of the 25th year of the Wanli calendar was that he would not agree to the dispatch of the prince to Japan by Korea, but instructed that he could send his attendants to reconcile with him.

Since there was no agreement on the prince's visit to Japan, could the Korean vassals be sent to Japan to reconcile with Toyotomi Hideyoshi within the peaceful conditions acceptable to the Myeongjin Sect? President Konishi and his Kowa clique did make a certain degree of effort to coordinate the conditions of peace in accordance with the treatment plan proposed by the Myōjin Sect. Governor Konishi's Yanagawa courier returned to Japan at one point after negotiating with the Dprk at the beginning of the 25th year of the Wanli Calendar to report on the progress of the negotiations to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and on March 15 he wrote to Kim Ying-shō, saying that when he reported diplomatic negotiations with Terasawa Masanari to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, because the Dprk side refused to hand over the prince, Toyotomi Hideyoshi "asked him about the easy article", and although Yanagawa's courier did not receive a prior commitment from the Korean court, he first "answered with a number of years of tax". It is hoped that the DPRK side will approve the coordination plan proposed by Toyotomi Hideyoshi after he agrees. Subsequently, Governor Konishi wrote to Shen Weijing on April 24, trying to reconcile the peace conditions into two articles: "accompanying the vassals to Japan" and "honoring all things", that is, replacing the prince with the dispatch of escorts to Japan by Korea and gifts to Japan, and has sent Terasawa Masanari and Yanagawa back to Japan to report to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, hoping that Toyotomi Hideyoshi will agree to the plan. President Konishi's letter is to hope that Shen Weijing will also communicate well with the King of Korea in advance, "work hard with each other to achieve great things", and not let the "DPRK minor breach of promises" be "untrustworthy" because of poor communication, which will eventually affect the overall peace situation.

However, japan's diplomacy with Mingxian was in many chaos at that time. On the one hand, the phenomenon of the DPRK sending troops to attack and kill zero-handedness occurs from time to time, and not only is there little sincerity in peace talks, but there is also the possibility of intensifying contradictions between the two sides and accelerating the outbreak of war. On March 17 of that year, Governor Konishi wrote a letter to Jin Yingrui on this matter, warning him. On the other hand, at this time, two talking groups with different political views and competing relations appeared within the Japanese military stationed in Korea. During the previous period of diplomatic negotiations, Toyotomi Hideyoshi entrusted diplomatic power to the Japanese generals stationed in Korea twice: the first time in the second year of Bunroku (1593) to ishida Sansei, Masuda Nagamori, Otani Yoshiki, and The chief of Konishi, and the second time in the fourth year of Bunroku (1595) to The President Konishi and Terasawa Masanari. The members of the diplomatic representatives who were entrusted twice belonged to the same political camp, with Governor Konishi at the core, and the diplomatic tone was basically the same, and there were no contradictions in communicating with Toyotomi Hideyoshi. However, during this period of diplomatic negotiations, two diplomatic groups appeared on the Japanese side, with Governor Konishi and Masashi Terasawa as representatives, and Kiyomasa Kato as the representative. The two diplomatic groups have their own diplomatic paths, the former continuing the previous diplomatic path with the envoy Shen Weijing and the Korean general Kim Ying-sui, and the latter being kato Kiyomasa and the North Korean diplomatic monk Weizheng. As soon as Kato Kiyomasa landed, he wrote to the Korean court, saying, "On the orders of His Highness the Great Lord, he will sail again... Sending emissaries to Korea", in the tone of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's diplomatic agent, he demanded that the DPRK side send people to come to the talks, and then on March 21 of that year, it held formal diplomatic talks with the Korean court sent by the Weizheng, insisting that the DPRK side must meet the two conditions of "the prince crossing the sea" and "offering tribute" proposed by the DPRK to avoid war. The two diplomatic blocs had a certain degree of competition, differed in their views on diplomatic conditions, and disagreed in their reporting on diplomacy to Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

Shen Weijing was obviously also aware of the seriousness of the problem, and instructed Yanagawa to send a letter to Governor Konishi and Masanari Terasawa, hoping that the two would "recruit Qingzheng to discuss with him" and try to reconcile the contradictions between the two diplomatic groups, believing that "three people must agree with one heart and one mind", "if three people agree, then the big thing can be completed", and "if the three people do not agree, this matter will not be successful.". However, Governor Konishi and Kiyomasa Kato have always been in dissonance, and their contradictions are difficult to reconcile, and they only want Akiyoshi to send troops to intercept and kill Kato Kiyomasa, and they refuse to cooperate with them at all. Shen Weijing had also considered a plan to negotiate peace with Kato Kiyomasa alone, in order to make Weizheng "talk to Kiyomasa and listen to his ideas", and planned to go to Gyeongju to meet kato Kiyomasa directly, but because of the refusal of the DPRK to cooperate, the trip was ultimately unable to make the trip. Later, the actual situation was that Governor Konishi and Kiyoshi Kato were going their separate ways diplomatically, and each sent someone to report their specific negotiations to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, but there was a big discrepancy in its contents. Governor Konishi was interested in making diplomatic compromises with the DPRK, advocating that the conditions for coordination and peace be "good with the minister and the currency," but Kato Kiyomasa took a tough attitude, resolutely demanded from the DPRK side the two conditions of "the prince crossing the sea" and "offering tributes." On the basis of the talks between him and Wei Zheng, he informed Toyotomi Hideyoshi that the DPRK side said that "the good things that the princes and ministers do are not allowed by the mainland, and they are punished in the Heavenly Dynasty.", pointing out that the DPRK simply could not agree to President Konishi's proposal and exposed That Governor Konishi "accepted bribes to the DPRK and did not dare to betray his favor." Not in the real world". Because of Kato Kiyo's attack from behind, coupled with the "killing" of the Japanese troops stationed in Korea by the Korean boat division at that time, Toyotomi Hideyoshi finally believed that the Konishi clique was deceitful and rejected its coordination plan.

Generally speaking, after the failure of the canonization, Governor Konishi did make more efforts to promote the success of repair diplomacy, but his situation was quite difficult, and he needed to communicate with Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the Ming Dynasty and the Korean parties at the same time, on the one hand, he reported to Toyotomi Hideyoshi without authorization the coordination plan that the DPRK had not actually promised, there was a risk of not being additionally recognized by the DPRK, and on the other hand, he was attacked by his rival Kiyoshima Kato, which eventually led to the coordination plan he advocated was not recognized by Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Konishi's efforts to reconcile the conditions for peace ultimately failed.

Fourth, Jin Yingrui in the early stage of the re-war

The month after Governor Konishi sent a letter to Shen Weijing, Shen Weijing was detained by the Ming court because of the complete failure of diplomacy with Japan, and was soon escorted back to Beijing and imprisoned for death. In just one month, can Shen Weijing properly arrange the matter entrusted by Governor Konishi? Did the situation turn out to be as President Konishi had hoped? According to the report on the situation in Yining written by Ding Yunyou, the observer of Chungcheong Province, to the King of Korea, Kim Ying-rui was not removed at that time, but "abandoned the city and retreated to Shaanxi" during the battle. It can be seen that Jin Yingrui finally abandoned the city to avoid war and did not "die in the festival", and the result coincided with the expectations of Governor Konishi. It is not known whether Shen Weijing had fully communicated with the King of Joseon before his detention and arranged the matter entrusted to him by Governor Konishi, but shortly after sending a letter to Shen Weijing, Governor Konishi also wrote a letter to Kim Young-sui, the contents of which are contained in the secret letter written by Marshal Kwon of the Capital to the King of Joseon:

The Korean Terracotta Army's Defense Envoy Foot: Since the Japanese Flat Transfer Letter is still driving, so even if you want Shi Luo, everything is too big or small, and you can smell it under the foot. Not long after, the Japanese soldiers crossed the Ming Tun stay. Day and night pain, what a benefit! Fu Wei Liang looked at it.

Ding You, the third day of the first month of June, President Toyotomi

The inscription date of President Konishi's post, which was signed on the third day of the first month of June, seven days later than his post to Shen Weijing, revealed a considerable amount of information: before writing this post, Governor Konishi had already sent a general secretary to inform Jin Yingrui of the Japanese military plan; in this post, Governor Konishi expressed his deeply sad but powerless sad state of mind about the serious consequences of the Japanese military operation to be carried out after "not many days." The purpose of this letter is obviously to hope that Jin Yingrui can "brightly detect" the current severe situation and remind him not to make unnecessary sacrifices in the next war. Kim Yeong-ri undoubtedly reported governor Konishi's letter to marshal Kwon-ho, who in turn compiled the text of the post and reported it to the king of Joseon in the form of a secret letter. Judging from the arrangement of this secret petition in the Records of Xuanzu, it should have been delivered to the King of Korea before June 14.

Judging from the objective facts, Jin Yingrui did respond to the reminder of Governor Konishi that he did not "die in the festival" when the Japanese army was advancing, but took the initiative to "abandon the city and retreat". So, how did the King of Korea react to the secret revelation of the Kwon-hoon? Did Kim Young-serry's choice to passively respond to the war in order to survive get permission from the King of Korea in advance? According to the "Records of Xuanzu", the Joseon Dynasty's Sixian Government made an extremely severe condemnation of Kim Yeong-sui's act of "abandoning the city and retreating from the army," saying that When Kim Ying-ri was engaged in the war with the Japanese army, he "collapsed on his own and had no intention of cleaning up," causing his own country to "collapse in the hearts of the army and disintegrate the towns," causing an extremely bad impact. However, the King of Korea believed that Kim Young-suri was confronting the Japanese army, and "Xu Wei was not guilty of the crime."

It is not known whether Shen Weijing had conveyed in advance the matter entrusted to him by Governor Konishi and persuaded the King of Joseon to preserve Kim Ying-sui, but the King of Joseon had indeed received a secret letter from Quan, and although he did not replace Kim Ying-rui and "made him guard Yining", he undoubtedly acquiesced in the private negotiations between Kim Ying-ri and Governor Konishi, and deliberately excused Him after Kim Young-ri "abandoned the city and withdrew". This move by the King of Joseon was an anomaly, and it was entirely possible that there was a reason for it —Shen Weijing had either persuaded the King of Korea in advance, or that the King of Korea had allowed Kim Young-ri to "abandon the city and withdraw from the army" after receiving the secret notice of quan.

The development of the situation is not limited to this, Jin Yingrui not only has the crime of "abandoning the city and withdrawing from the army", but also suspects of "collaborating with the enemy" and "betraying the country". This accusation, which came mainly from the Ming Dynasty, was far more serious than what the Sixian Government had said about "abandoning the city and retreating from the army." At that time, the highest responsible person in charge of the military affairs of the Ming Dynasty in the rear, Jing Luo Xingjie, exposed Jin Yingrui to Emperor Mingshenzong in his inscription: "The general jin Yingrui, the country's general, and the idle mountain water soldiers will go to the nest, and qu will first report to the governor with a book two days ago, so that qu is prepared, and it is a great danger to take it with this heavy army." Also writing to Myeongshinjong on this matter was Yang Ho, the manager in charge of directing the operations of the Ming army in Korea on the Korean front. Yang Ho's inscription was ordered by Chin to be reviewed by the Military Department, saying that Kim Ying-rui's behavior was "traitorous and traitorous to the country", and suspected that "Kim Ying-rui is not the only one who is thoroughly obedient", and asked Emperor Myeongshinjong to issue a decree to the DPRK to "rebuke his monarchs for righteousness", which shows the seriousness of the situation.

The contents of the Bingbu reply were approved by the order of Emperor Myungshin and the bingbu was transferred to the two procedures, which Xing Jiu sent to the King of Korea on the ninth day of the first month of September and the twelfth of September to order him to reply. The King of Joseon received these two messages from Xing Jie on September 16 and September 19, respectively, and his first reply was on September 22, but only said that "the defeat of Xuanshan was really out of a vain attempt to intercept the thief ship, and the defeat was completely regrettable", and the accusation of Kim Ying-rui's "thorough obedience" was deliberately evaded, and did not involve a word, and a few days later, he began to reply to the consultation plan again:

On September 19 of this year, the quasi-Chincha Governor Jiliao Baoding and other military affairs and grain and food allowances were also served by the Shangshu of the Imperial Imperial Army Department and the right deputy capital of the Metropolitan Inspection Yuan, YuShi Xing, consulted on the past... Jin Yingrui confronted the thief for a long time, and he knew that this thief was afraid of the heavenly soldiers, and when he heard about the division period, he vainly wanted to use his prestige to act lightly and fearfully, although his heart was not out of treason, and the leakage of military aircraft was really painful. Now dismissed as a soldier, he wears his own guilt. Although the small state is very entrusted, it should also have a little law and discipline, and if there are those who have escaped and betrayed the country, how dare they tolerate loans and abandon their own social welfare?

The King of Joseon's first reply was purely for coping purposes and was to delay the negotiation of a final settlement plan. Its determination of Jin Yingrui's characterization of "not out of treason" and the treatment plan of "dismissing him from his post as a soldier and wearing guilt and serving himself" must have undergone some careful consideration, and in this way, he took a certain risk in confessing to the Ming Dynasty. Because the King of Joseon needed to confess not only to JingLuo Xingyue, but also to the Ming Dynasty and the Ministry of Migration and Ceremonies, and the Ministry of Soldiers. In the song of the presented Myeongshinjong, the King of Joseon also used the same wording as the first reply to Xing Jiu, deliberately circumventing the explanation of Kim Ying-rui's handling, and only resolutely denying the DPRK's "willingness to be a widow" in the recital, repeatedly pleading with Myeongsang to "save the small state", and vowing to express his obedience. The DPRK king's speech to the Ministry of Ceremonies and the Ministry of War put forward many reasons for handling Kim Ying-rui's issue leniently, saying that the "truth" of Kim Ying-rui's "leakage of the machine" lies in "the momentum of the Buyang Heavenly Soldiers, and it is necessary to intimidate the heart of thieves" and "have no other feelings," and also that Kim Ying-rui has "worked a little hard" and has recently "gained a little more," and that there are "bow horse tricks" as the argument, looking for various reasons to explain the rationality of making a lenient treatment plan.

The King of Korea tried his best to excuse Kim Ying-rui, and in addition to considering Kim Yeong-ri's "micro-labor" and "bow horse skills", I am afraid that it has something to do with his initial attempt to instigate Governor Konishi's attitude toward Japan and Kim Yeong-ri's own diplomatic experience in this war. Whether it is war or peace, Jin Yingrui is a rare talent in the DPRK. In fact, during the Battle of Ulsan at the end of the twenty-fifth year of the Wanli Calendar, Yang Ho, the manager of the Ming Dynasty, instructed Jin Yingrui to take him to Ulsan To "open an edict of misfortune" to promote the surrender of Kato Kiyomasa, undoubtedly recognizing Jin Yingrui's diplomatic talents and trying to borrow them. If Kim Ying-ri dies prematurely in battle, it will be difficult for the DPRK side to find an ideal candidate with rich experience in negotiations with Japan like him, and the resumption of diplomacy to achieve peace is bound to be affected to a certain extent, and the preservation of Kim Ying-ri will undoubtedly leave room for the future cause of peace.

5. Conclusion

During the Wanli Korean War, North Korea, as the main victim of the war, undoubtedly hoped to achieve peace with minimal losses, and diplomacy was undoubtedly an ideal way to solve this problem, and the importance of Kim Ying-ri and others in charge of diplomacy with Japan is self-evident. As a perpetrator, Not all of the war participants were enthusiastic about this war of aggression, and some of them, such as Governor Konishi, who was once in charge of diplomacy with Ming and North Korea, were also very eager to end the war by peaceful means. Although Kim Young-ri's early diplomatic representations with Governor Konishi were quite criticized at the Korean court and did not conform to the regulations of the Ming Dynasty, they undoubtedly won the acquiescence of the Korean king. Kim's diplomatic prowess was also recognized by the Japanese side, and its diplomatic efforts laid the groundwork for future peace activities.

Some unexpected new situations emerged in Japan-DPRK diplomacy on the eve of the Korean War: after learning of the failure of the canonization, the King of Korea instructed Kim Ying-rui to instigate Governor Konishi to conspire against Kato Kiyomasa, who then responded positively, revealing Kato Kiyomasa's military action plan to Kim Ying-shwe and providing the DPRK with the "plan of the boat division", hoping to defeat Kato Kiyomasa's re-voyage to Korea through the hand of Korea, attack Kato Kiyo's credibility in Japan, and regain his right to speak in front of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. This enabled his own lordship and political views to be adopted by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and thus led the situation in Korea to the ideal track of avoiding war and peace. Shortly thereafter, under the inevitable situation of war, Governor Konishi sent letters to Shen Weijing and Jin Yingrui separately, hoping that Jin Yingrui would escape the fate of "dying in the festival" and reserve the seeds for the resumption of negotiations between Japan and the DPRK in the future. On the other hand, at the end of July of the 25th year of the Wanli Calendar, Jin Yingrui "leaked a military plane" to Governor Konishi, the purpose of which was to "intimidate" the Japanese army, but was suspected of "traitor"; later, when the Japanese army attacked Yining in early August, Jin Yingrui responded positively to two documents of Governor Konishi, "abandoning the city and withdrawing" in order to live fully, so that he was despised in the two countries, and carried the insults of "traitor" and "negative country", but the King of Korea unexpectedly braved great pressure to exonerate him.

It can be seen from this that in the context of the war at that time, the east Asian peace forces have been surging secretly, on the one hand, they have not hesitated to use unconventional means such as "collaborating with the enemy" to promote the development of the cause of peace, and on the other hand, they have also made every effort to preserve this power when they have suffered serious setbacks. Through the exploration of President Konishi's document, it can be found that it contains many little-known diplomatic secrets, and there was an extraordinary special diplomatic relationship between Japan and North Korea at that time.

[Note] The article was originally published in Ancient Civilizations in April 2021. For easy reading on mobile phones, notes and references are omitted.

Editor-in-charge: Li Jing