Latest interview with Mearsheimer: The situation in Ukraine has changed, why do I still insist that I am wrong in the United States?

Recently, the American political scientist John J. Mearsheimer was interviewed about the latest developments in the 2022 Ukraine crisis, which is not a personal monologue of Melsheimer, but presents a fierce confrontation between the views of the interviewer and the interviewee, interviewed by Isaac Chotiner. This article is translated by Onamin and the original article was published in The New Yorker. Mearsheimer is known for his offensive realist views, and his major works include The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. In the 2014 Crimean crisis, a widely circulated opinion piece by Mearsheimer argued that the root cause of Russia's behavior was NATO's eastward expansion, and that behind the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was a clash of realist logic and liberal ideas; the West exaggerated Russia's willingness to "invade" in order to push the blame for the crisis on Russia.

Core Summary

Compared to 2014, the situation has changed in 2022. Does Millsheimer still stick to his original views? The first core of the debate: is the nature of Russia's behavior imperialist, or realist? Mearsheimer used the American Monroe Logic as an analogy to Russia's actions, while the interviewer Jodina was not afraid to point out that the American Monroe Logic was in fact imperialism. Mearsheimer's response showed that what mattered to him was how great power politics unfolded, and that the distinction between realism or Monroe logic and imperialism was not. The second core of the debate: Is Russia's ultimate goal to "rebuild" its empire, or to pursue a limited geopolitical space? Jodina noted that Putin's february speech saying Ukraine is a "fictional" country seemed to imply that Putin had some intentions for Ukraine. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, does not see anything wrong with recognizing the "fictitiousness" of the Ukrainian state, which, in the final analysis, is "fictitious." Starting from the actual balance of power, he believes that Russia cannot pursue the occupation of Ukraine throughout the territory, and russia's fundamental purpose is limited territorial demands and regime change. Overall, Millsheimer stuck to his basic position in 2014. Realism is an important paradigm for understanding international politics, but, as we can see from interviews, the equations of realism are increasingly being buffeted by nationalist and imperialist analysis, and ultimately any kind of simplistic analysis and dogmatic beliefs can be subverted by the development of events. The Eurasian Society for Systems Science has compiled this article for the reader's thoughts. This article was originally published in New Yorker and represents the views of the author only.

Since the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer has long been one of the prominent critics of U.S. foreign policy. His co-authorship with Stephen Walter, Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, is perhaps his most talked-about work in recent years. As a supporter of great power politics, Mearsheimer was a representative figure of the realist school of international relations. In this school of view, in order to safeguard their own interests and safeguard national security, countries will preemptively take action against their opponents. For years, Millsheimer argued that the U.S. push for NATO's eastward expansion and the ongoing process of establishing friendly relations with Ukraine increased the likelihood of war between nuclear powers and laid the groundwork for a series of actions by Putin against Ukraine. After Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, Millsheimer directly pointed out: "The United States and its European allies bear most of the responsibility for this crisis." ”

The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict has reignited the long-standing debate over U.S.-Russia relations. While many critics argue that Putin will pursue an aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet member states, whether the West intervenes or not, Mearsheimer maintains his position that the United States is responsible for Russia's provocations. This interview discusses whether the current war can be stopped, whether it makes sense to see Russia as an imperial force, and what exactly Putin's ultimate plan for Ukraine is.

5001

Is it monroeism, but not imperialism?

Joe: Looking at Russia and Ukraine now, why do you think the world has come to this point?

MM: I think the real source of the problem at the moment has to start with the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Shortly thereafter, NATO issued a statement saying that Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO. The Russians made it clear at the time that this was an existential threat to them, which had touched their bottom line. Over time, however, we have incorporated Ukraine into the Western world, making it a Western fortress that stands on Russia's borders. Of course, this expansion strategy includes more than just NATO. While NATO is at the heart of the expansion, the EU's role, which means turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, cannot be ignored. From Russia's point of view, this is certainly an existential threat.

Joe: You say "turn Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy," but I don't have much confidence in the United States "transforming "somewhere" into a "liberal democracy." What if the Ukrainian people themselves wanted to live in a pro-American liberal democracy?

M: If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy and joins NATO and the European Union, the Russians will absolutely not accept it. Without the expansion of NATO and the European Union, Ukraine, as a newly formed liberal democracy, could live more broadly with the United States and the West, and may also be fortunate to emerge from its current situation. In the end, a three-pronged strategy was pursued: EU expansion, NATO expansion, and the transformation of Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.

Joe: You've been saying "turn Ukraine into a liberal democracy," and the problem is that it seems to be a matter of decision by ukrainians themselves. NATO can certainly decide who to admit, but what we saw in 2014 was that many Ukrainians themselves wanted to be seen as part of Europe. If you tell them now that they can't be liberal democracies, it's almost some kind of imperialism, right?

M: This is not imperialism, this is great power politics. When you're a country like Ukraine, close to a big country like Russia, you have to keep an eye on what the Russians think. If you poke them in the eye with a stick, they will immediately retaliate. The countries of the Western Hemisphere know this very well when dealing with the United States.

Joe: So it's essentially Monroe doctrine.

M: Absolutely. In the Western Hemisphere, we will not allow any country to invite a distant power to bring its troops into the country.

Joe: Yes, but the United States will not let the countries of the Western Hemisphere decide their own foreign policy, even though most of them are democracies. This is indeed an act of imperialism, right? Essentially, we are saying that we have some kind of say in the foreign affairs of these democracies.

M: We do have that statement, in fact, we overthrew the elected leaders of the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War because we weren't happy with their policies. That's how the great powers behave.

02

Was the focus of post-Cold War U.S. diplomacy the spread of democracy?

Joe: Of course we did, but I wonder if we should do that. When we think about foreign policy, should we try to create a world where neither the United States nor Russia does?

MM: That's not how the real world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued in the [post-Cold War] unipolar world. We are wandering the world trying to build liberal democracies. Of course, our main focus is on the greater Middle East, and you know how it turned out. Not very good.

Joe: I think it's hard to say that in the seventy-five years after World War II, or in the thirty years after the End of the Cold War, the policy in the Middle East has been to create liberal Middle Eastern democracies.

M: I think it's hard to say that the U.S. policy in the Middle East has been to create liberal Democracies in the Middle East for the seventy-five years after World War II, or the thirty years after the End of the Cold War.

Joe: That's true in Iraq, but it's not in the Palestinian territories, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, or anywhere else, right?

MM: This is really not the case in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. To be clear, the point of the Bush Doctrine is that if we can build a liberal democracy in Iraq, there will be a domino effect. Starting with Syria and Iran, and even Saudi Arabia and Egypt, they will eventually become democracies. This is the philosophical basis of Bushism. The Bush Doctrine is not just about turning Iraq into a democracy. We have a bigger plan.

Joe: Of course we can argue about how much the Bush administration wants to create a bunch of democracies in the Middle East and really think that's going to happen. It's just my personal feeling that they haven't put much enthusiasm into turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy.

M: Well, I don't think it's wise for you to give the example of Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. perspective, Saudi Arabia is one of the most difficult cases to change. Saudi Arabia has a lot of influence over us because of oil, and it's certainly not a democracy. But you have to look at what we said before, that bush doctrine is based on the belief that we can eventually democratize the greater Middle East. It certainly won't happen overnight, but it will eventually become a reality.

Joe: I guess my point is that facts speak louder than words. And no matter how brilliantly Bush spoke in his speeches, I don't think U.S. policy at any point in recent history has been an attempt to ensure that liberal democracies are created around the world.

MM: There is a big difference between how the United States behaves in a unipolar world and how it behaves in other historical processes. I agree with you when you talk about U.S. foreign policy in the broader course of history, but the unipolar moment is a very special period. I am convinced that, in a unipolar world, we are firmly committed to the spread of democracy.

In the case of Ukraine, it is very important to make this clear. Until 2014, we did not envision NATO expansion and EU expansion as policies aimed at containing Russia. Before February 22, 2014, no one really thought Russia was a threat. Nato's expansion, the European Union's expansion, and the transformation of countries like Ukraine and Georgia into liberal democracies, were all aimed at creating a vast strip of peace that stretched throughout Europe, both Eastern and Western Europe. Its purpose is not to contain Russia. As a result of all this, now this major crisis has erupted and we have to start shirking our responsibilities. Of course we never blame ourselves. We blame the Russians. So we made up the story that Russia was bent on invading Eastern Europe, that Putin was interested in building a bigger Russia and possibly even rebuilding the Soviet Union.

03

What is the ultimate goal of Russia?

Joe: Let's go back to 2014. I was reading an article that you wrote at the time that said, "According to popular views in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be almost entirely blamed on Russia." Some argue that Putin's annexation of Crimea was motivated by a long-term desire to rebuild the Soviet Union, and that he may also be involved in the rest of Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe. You go on to point out, "But this statement is wrong. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," Diplomacy magazine, September/October 2014, will this happen in the past few weeks make you change your mind? Maybe that statement at the time was closer to the truth than you thought?

M: I think I'm still right. I think the evidence is clear, we don't think he was the aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story we made up so that we can blame him. My view is that the Western world bears the primary responsibility for this catastrophe, especially the United States. But without a single U.S. policymaker, hardly any U.S. foreign policy agency willing to acknowledge such arguments, they would say it was the Russians who were responsible. When you look like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued in a unipolar world (after the Cold War). We are wandering the world trying to build liberal democracies. Of course, our main focus is on the greater Middle East, and you know how it turned out. Not very good.

Joe: I was very interested in your article at the time, because you said that the idea that Putin might end up in the rest of Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe was wrong. Given the military conflicts now taking place in other parts of Ukraine, from an hindsight perspective, do you now think that the argument you opposed in the first place might be more justified?

M: It's hard to say at the moment whether he'll end up in the rest of Ukraine, and I'm not here to nitpick, because that means he wants to conquer all of Ukraine and then turn to the Baltic states, which means his goal is to create a bigger Russia or rebuild the Soviet Union. At this point, I don't see any evidence that it's true. Judging by the current conflict map, it's hard to say exactly what he's doing. It seems to me that he will occupy Donbass, and it is not difficult to see that Donbass will be two independent states or one large independent state. But beyond that it's unclear what else he has to do. I mean, it's clear that he's not actually touching western Ukraine at the moment.

Joe: But the Russian bombs were already thrown there, right?

M: That's not the key issue. The key question is what exactly did you conquer and where did you end up holding on? I was talking to someone the other day about the goal of these troops from Crimea, and the man told me that he thought the Russians would turn west and occupy Odessa. I've been talking to other people lately, and another part of them don't think the Russians are going to do that. Do you want to ask me what will happen in the end? No, I don't think any of us know exactly what's going to happen.

Joe: Don't you think Putin is plotting to take Kiev?

MM: No, I don't think he wants to take Kiev. I think he is interested in occupying at least the Donbass, perhaps more, especially in the Eastern Region; secondly, he wants to establish a pro-Russian government in Kiev, a government that is in harmony with Moscow's interests.

Joe: I thought you were saying he wasn't interested in capturing Kiev.

MM: No, his fundamental purpose is regime change. This means that he will not conquer Kiev permanently.

Joe: That means creating a government in Ukraine that is friendly to Russia and has a certain say in Russia, right?

M: Yes, that's it. It is important that we understand that this is fundamentally different from conquering and controlling Kiev. Do you understand what I'm saying?

Joe: Yeah, that's it. It is important that we understand that this is fundamentally different from conquering and controlling Kiev. Do you understand what I'm saying?

MM: I have questions about your use of the word "empire." As far as I know, no one is talking about this issue from an imperialist point of view at the moment. This is great power politics, and what the Russians want is to establish a regime in Kiev that serves Russia's interests. Eventually, the Russians may be willing to coexist with a neutral Ukraine, and there is no need for Moscow to exercise any real control over the Kiev government. Maybe they just want a neutral and not pro-American regime.

Joe: You said no one mentioned "imperialism," but putin specifically mentioned and lamented the loss of "territory of the former Russian Empire" in his speech. So this is what Putin took the initiative to say.

M: What does this two things say together? I'm not so sure. He did believe it was a fictional country. I would add that all countries are fictional. Millsheimer borrows Benedict Anderson's view of the "imagined community" that any student of nationalism will tell you. We invented the concept of these national identities, which are full of myths of all kinds. So he's right about Ukraine, just like he did about the United States or Germany. More importantly: he understood that he could not conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a Great Russia or the reborn former Soviet Union. He couldn't do that. His actions in Ukraine are of a completely different nature. He is clearly occupying some territory. In addition to Crimea in 2014, he will also seize some territory from Ukraine. Moreover, he definitely wants to bring about regime change. It's hard to say exactly where this will go, but he won't conquer all of Ukraine. Trying to do so would be a huge mistake.

Joe: That is, do you think that if he tried to do that, your whole analysis would change with it?

MM: That's right. My argument is that he is not going to rebuild the Soviet Union or try to build a larger Russia, and he is not interested in conquering Ukraine and incorporating it into Russia. It is important to understand how we concocted the story that Putin is extremely aggressive and that he bears primary responsibility for the Ukraine crisis. The arguments invented by the foreign policy institutions of the United States and the West as a whole revolve around his interest in building a Great Russia or reviving the former Soviet Union. It has been suggested that after the conquest of Ukraine he would turn to the Baltic states. I don't think he's going to do that. First, the Baltic States are members of NATO, and —

Joe: Is that a good thing?

M: No.

Joe: You said Putin wouldn't invade the Baltic states, in part because they were part of NATO, but they shouldn't be part of NATO.

M: Yeah, but those are two very different questions. I'm not sure why you put the two together. I think whether they should be part of NATO has nothing to do with whether they are currently part of NATO. They are NATO members, protected by Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty – and that's what matters most. Moreover, there is no evidence that Putin wants to conquer the Baltic states. In fact, there is no evidence that he wants to conquer Ukraine.

Joe: It seems to me that if he wants to resurrect the Russian Empire before the former Soviet Union. He seemed to have a strong criticism of the Soviet Union, right?

M: I don't know if it's critical.

Joe: He expressed this view in a long article by Putin last year. He accused Soviet policies of allowing Soviet republics such as Ukraine to have a degree of autonomy.

M: But he also said, as I read to you before: "Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart." This contradicts what you just said. This sentence actually expresses that he misses the Soviet Union, right? We are talking here about his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is, do you think Russia has the ability to do this? Russia's GDP is not as good as that of the United States state of Texas.

Joe: Countries are always trying to do things that they don't have the ability to do. You can say to me, "Who thinks the United States can quickly repair Iraq's power system?" None of us have solved these problems in the United States. "But we still think we can do it, we still try to do it, but we fail, right? The United States was unable to do whatever it wanted during the Vietnam War, and I'm sure you would say that's why the United States shouldn't have started these wars. I agree with all that. But this does not mean that our estimates of our own abilities are correct or rational.

M: I'm talking about Russia's basic strength – the economic power it has. Military power is built on economic power. You need a certain economic base to build a really strong army. To conquer Ukraine and the Baltic states and rebuild the former Soviet Empire, a large army was needed, and contemporary Russia simply did not have a corresponding economic base. There is no reason to fear that Russia will become the regional hegemon of Europe. Russia poses no serious threat to the United States. We do face serious threats in the international system. The competitor we face is China. Our policies in Eastern Europe are weakening our ability to respond to the greatest threats we face today.

04

What should the West do?

Joe: What do you think our policy toward Ukraine should be now? Why does the current policy affect our China policy?

M: We should withdraw from Europe and focus on China. Second, we should strive to establish friendly relations with the Russians in order to unite Russia and control China. In a world where China, Russia, and the United States coexist, the United States should draw Russia to its side. On the contrary, what our stupid policy in Eastern Europe has done is to turn Russia completely to the other side. This violates the principle of balance of power.

Joe: I went back and reread your 2006 article about the Israeli lobby in the London Review of Books. You talked about Palestine, and you said something that I very much agree with, and that is: "There's a moral issue here. The United States lobby effectively contributed to Israel's occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory as complicit in the crimes committed against the Palestinians. "I know you think of yourself as a tough, stubborn old guy who doesn't talk about morality, but it seems to me that you're implying that there's a moral issue here. I'm curious, what do you think about what's happening in Ukraine right now, on a moral level?

M: I went back and reread your 2006 article about the Israeli lobby in the London Review of Books. You talked about Palestine, and you said something that I very much agree with, and that is: "There's a moral issue here. The United States lobby effectively contributed to Israel's occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory as complicit in the crimes committed against the Palestinians. "I know you think of yourself as a tough, stubborn old guy who doesn't talk about morality, but it seems to me that you're implying that there's a moral issue here. I'm curious, what do you think about what's happening in Ukraine right now, on a moral level?

Joe: This advice seems a little less feasible right now. With the conflict reaching such a point, will Ukraine still have time to appease Russia?

MM: I think it's very likely that the Ukrainians will reach some form of compromise (modus vivendi) with the Russians, because the Russians are now finding themselves in trouble by occupying Ukraine and trying to control ukraine's politics.

Joe: So you're saying that the occupation of Ukraine is going to be a tough process?

MM: That's right. That's why I don't think the Russians will occupy Ukraine for long. But it is clear that they will at least occupy Donbass, and can only hope that they will not occupy the Wudong region more. I think the Russians are smart, they're not going to want to take over all of Ukraine.