Anti-lost, accessible by elevator
Safety Island newspaperman Liu Yadong A
First, the domestic understanding of the polarization of the Russo-Ukrainian war
The War in Ukraine was the first large-scale war in the era of self-media, and since the beginning of the war, it has produced a strong flow of information that was not available in previous wars, and in recent days, almost all the hot topics on Weibo and WeChat have been about the Conflict in Ukraine.
People who have the heart can find that most of the information such as the latest war reports disseminated in these self-media or communication tools is unverified fake news. Many scholars believe that the Russo-Ukrainian War created a new form of war, in which the self-media played an extremely important role, and both sides of the war constantly created false information that met people's appetites, using self-media with high communication efficiency to feed the audience, swaying public sentiment, and then influencing the diplomatic decisions of various governments.
Affected by these fake news flooded with self-media, the domestic understanding of the war situation in Ukraine has shown a polarized (or torn) state, some people imagine the Russian army too badly, some people imagine the Ukrainian army too bad. People are mixed with their own emotions, value judgments and false and real news, constructing the picture of the Ukrainian battlefield, in fact, these two understandings and the truth are very different.
What is the situation in Ukraine and in what direction will it evolve in the future? These are two issues of common concern and lack of reliable sources. This article synthesizes the reports of authoritative media such as Russia, Singapore, Israel, Germany, and the United States, as well as the relevant reports of think tanks (mainly CSS and ISW) that have in-depth research on the situation in Ukraine, and make some preliminary summary and analysis of these two issues.
Second, the situation of the Russian offensive
Russia's offensive Ukrainian troops were about 175,000-200,000, the Ukrainian defensive force was about 200,000, and the two sides participated in the battle nearly 400,000 troops; in addition, each side had nearly 100,000 auxiliary troops, adding up to nearly 600,000 people. With further military mobilization, the number of people on both sides would soon reach one million, a war of this scale that was unique in the half century since the Vietnam War. Moreover, the Russo-Ukrainian War, which took place in Europe, the center of global civilization, was destined to be an important event in the annals of history.
Most of the Russian offensive forces were strong Russian troops, and they all had sufficient actual combat experience, showing the determination of the Kremlin to be determined to win. The Russian offensive mainly followed three directions, namely, the northern offensive from Chernobyl and Chernihiv on the border between Belarus and Ukraine to Attack Kiev; the Eastern Front offensive starting from the Russian mainland, targeting Kharkov; and the southern offensive from Crimea, targeting Kherson.
The operational objectives of the Russian army are obviously: to borrow From the north through Belarus, straight into Kiev, the heart of Ukraine (Kiev is only 100 kilometers away from the Border between Belarus and Ukraine), quickly take Kiev in two or three days, completely paralyze the Ukrainian command system, and crush the will of national resistance; take Kharkov, the second largest city from the east, with a large proportion of Russians, and transform it into a permanent occupation in the future; from the weak defensive force of the south, the division will go north, so that Ukraine will suffer from the enemy, and finally meet the Russian army from Kiev to the south. In this way, the Russian army could completely occupy eastern Ukraine and force Ukraine and the West to accept peace talks.
However, the real combat effectiveness of the Russian army does not allow the Kremlin's perfect strategic planning to be realized. In the few days since the beginning of the war, except for the fact that the Russian army has occupied a few relatively small cities, none of the important strategic targets have been taken, and both sides have been deadlocked, and repeated battles have been launched. Several of the key battles are as follows.
1. Battle of Antonov Airfield. On 24 February, the Russian 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade sent about 200 fighters to try to occupy the airfield and then build a bridgehead to attack Kiev, so that the Air Force could bring in a steady stream of soldiers to raid Kiev and take it in one fell swoop. The Russians took the airfield after about 3 hours of fighting, but then the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard launched a counter-offensive and regained control of the airport. This most important air base near Kiev was finally occupied on the 25th by ground forces coming in from the Belarusian border, but by occupying the airport, the plan for a surprise attack on Kiev failed, giving the Ukrainian organization valuable time to defend Kiev.
2. Battle of Kiev. Kiev is the core of the offensive and defensive forces of both sides, and the offensive forces sent by Russia are the 35th Joint Armed Red Flag Army, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, and the 71st Guards Air Assault Brigade, which are the ace units of the Soviet Army in World War II. In addition, the main force of the attack was also the 90th Guards Tank Division and other units.
On the morning of February 25, Russian troops bursting in from the direction of Belarus began to enter the Oberon District in northern Ukraine, just 9.7 kilometers from the highest parliament building in Ukraine. On the 26th, the Russian army launched an artillery attack on Kiev for more than 30 minutes, and then the ground troops fought with the Ukrainian army near Troyishina and Shulyavka, and street fighting also occurred in many places, but the Russian attack failed. At the same time, the Russians also attacked Vasylkiv, southeast of Kiev, which was the southern gateway to Kiev, and had a military airfield, which could form a siege of Kiev if captured, but the Russian offensive plan was not successful.
(Schematic of the Battle of Kiev, and the location of Vasylkiv, if the Russian army occupied the city, it would obviously be able to encircle Kiev from north to south))
Now the urban area of Kiev is still completely under the control of the Ukrainian army, the Russian army retreated about 31 kilometers from Kiev, they concentrated on the destruction of several oil depots and power plants in the suburbs on the 28th, hoping to weaken the city's energy supply and weaken the will of the citizens to resist. The Ukrainian government has launched a military mobilization, distributing some 25,000 assault rifles, about 10 million rounds of ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenades and launchers to civilians.
3. Battle of Kharkov. Located 20 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border, Kharkiv has a total population of 1.53 million, of which ethnic Russians account for nearly 40%, and is the economic and cultural center of eastern Ukraine. Even if Russia did not occupy Kiev, if it had occupied Kharkov, it would have meant that the eastern gateway of Ukraine would have been wide opened, which would have a great impact on the war situation.
At 5:30 a.m. on the 24th, the Russian 423rd Guards Motorcycle Rifle Regiment, the 20th Guards United Armed Forces, the 200th Motor Infantry Brigade, and the 25th Guards Motorcycle Brigade began to attack Kharkov, but they were strongly resisted by the Ukrainian army and militia organizations, approaching the outskirts of Kharkov at 1 p.m.; on the 25th and 26th, the two sides fought in several villages and towns on the outskirts, and the speed of the Russian offensive was greatly delayed; on the 27th, the Russian vanguard entered part of the streets of Kharkov City, but in the afternoon Kharkiv Governor Oleh Synyehubov announced that all Russian troops entering the city were wiped out and 6 tanks were destroyed. On the evening of the 28th, the Russian army again intensified its fire on Kharkov, resulting in at least several deaths, but the city remained completely under Ukrainian control.
(Schematic diagram of the Battle of Kharkov, Source: War Institute - ISW)
4. Battle of Sumy. Sumy is a city of about 250,000 people on the Russian-Ukrainian border. In the early morning of the 24th, the Russian army began to enter Sumy, the 27th Ukrainian Artillery Brigade met the battle, and by about one o'clock in the morning of the 25th, the Russian army was repulsed. On the 26th, the Russians attacked Sumy again and occupied half of the city, but after a day of fighting, the Russians were repulsed again on the 27th.
(The area around the Battle of Sumy has been occupied by Russian troops, but the Ukrainian army in Sumy is still holding out))
5. Battle of Kherson. After the loss of Crimea, Kherson became the most important gateway to southern Ukraine. In the early morning of the 24th, the Russian 20th and 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Divisions, the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade, and the 7th Air Guards Assault Division set out from Crimea and launched a three-dimensional attack on Kherson, more than a hundred kilometers away. By the evening of the same day, Russian ground forces had reached the outskirts of Kherson, and the two sides fought for the Antonovsky Bridge on the Dnieper River, and eventually the Ukrainian troops successfully defended the bridge.
In addition, the Russian army tried to seize another traffic choke point - the Henichsk Bridge, the Ukrainian Marine Corps 26-year-old engineer Vitalii Skakun was ordered to blow up the bridge, because there was not enough time to retreat from the bridge, Vitalii Skakun still decided to sacrifice himself to detonate the mine, and finally delayed the Russian attack.
On the 26th, Ukrainian troops forced the troops attacking Kherson to retreat through air strikes, and the city is still under Ukrainian control. On the afternoon of the same day, the Russians, who had failed to attack Kherson, tried to bypass the city and attack Mykolaiv in its northwest direction, forming a posture of enveloping it, and by about 18:30, Russian tanks arrived on the outskirts of Mykolaiv, but after three hours of fighting, the Russians were repulsed. On the evening of the 28th, the Russian army launched another attack on Mykolaiv, and the mayor of the city has issued a resistance mobilization order to all citizens.
(Schematic of the Battle of Kherson, Source: ISW)
To sum up, although Russia has secretly made full preparations and has a great advantage in weapons and equipment, it has not occupied a city of more than 200,000 people after several days of fighting (the two largest cities occupied are Melitopol near Crimea, 150,000 people; Konotop near Kharkiv, 80,000 people), the effective occupation of land is less than 5% of its total area, the Ukrainian government can still effectively rule most parts of the country, and far and continuously mobilize war resources to counterattack Russia.
The command tactics of the Russian army also exposed shortcomings, and did not organize superior forces to surround and annihilate the Ukrainian army, and now what is happening is a small-scale contact war, and the main force of the Ukrainian army is not significantly damaged (however, the results announced by the Ukrainian government are not credible, and it is impossible to annihilate more than 3500 Russian troops with the strength of the Ukrainian army). Now that the Ukrainian army is getting more and more courageous, the Russian army is in a position of protracted war that it fears the most. This means that the Russian army on the Ukrainian battlefield has not yet tasted the sweetness of the "dumplings" of blitzkrieg warfare, and has entered the Stalingrad mode of street warfare and war of attrition in advance.
(Red is the russian occupation zone, part of the Crimea, Donbass territory, source: ISW )
This also proves that the so-called "fighting nation" of Russia has always been a false myth that is falsely spread. Russians do have the courage to not be afraid of war, but the more important factors for winning modern wars are organizational scheduling, scientific decision-making, logistics support and other institutional management aspects, and Russia is just lacking in this regard. Judging from the results of Russia's foreign wars in modern times, it has only had an absolute chance of winning against Asian tribes or countries with seriously unequal strength, and for any country with modern organizational capabilities (Japan, Poland, Finland, China), Russia has lost, even if it wins or pays a very high price. Therefore, Russia's performance on the battlefield in Ukraine is both unexpected and reasonable.
Third, the analysis of the future war situation
In the first negotiations in Belarus on January 28, both sides held the mentality of using negotiations to buy time to prepare for war. For the Russian army, the first four days of operations fully exposed its command and supply deficiencies, and the Kremlin hoped to use the opportunity of negotiations to continue to dispatch troops, transport supplies, and prepare for a large-scale attack. For its part, Ukraine also wants to buy time to wait for the arrival of Western aid weapons.
Therefore, the outside world is not optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations, the negotiations have just ended, Russia launched a new fire attack on the northern, eastern and southern fronts, and the high command demanded that a large city be seized at all costs in the past two days. Yesterday, the US satellite photographed the 3-kilometer-long transport convoy of the Russian army, the withdrawal of Russian expatriates in Europe, the evacuation of expatriates in Russia, and the demarcation of the evacuation channel for Kiev citizens by the Russian military command, which seem to be a sign that the mountain rain is coming.
(Hundreds of Russian armored vehicles and transport vehicles massed in northern Kiev, photographed by U.S. satellite service company Maxar Technologies, source: theguardian.com)
2. Given Russia's continued victories in the geopolitical interests of Crimea, Georgia, Armenia, Syria, Belarus and Kazakhstan since 2014, the pre-war Kremlin grossly underestimated its ability to resist Ukraine and the speed and determination of the West to fight back. However, when the battlefield offensive was blocked, and the West threw out SWIFT bombs and economic sanctions, the Kremlin's confidence was seriously frustrated, and it turned to a nuclear threat, showing a dilemma.
Now for every day the war drags on, Russia's odds of winning are reduced by one point. Obviously, for Moscow, a beautiful quick decision is the best way to do it, as was the case with the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 or the Anglo-Armagh War of 1982, but this possibility now seems to be very little.
3. Although the West has stated that it will not enter the war, it can, on the one hand, let the Ukrainian army hold Russia back through weapons assistance (the first US military aid arrived in Ukraine on Monday); on the other hand, it can weaken the support of Russian nationals and Putin cronies for the war through economic sanctions. Anti-war demonstrations erupted in 57 Russian cities on Sunday, with the ruble plunging 30 percent on Monday and some banks running. The transmission effect of Western sanctions will continue to ferment in Russia in the future, which will shake Moscow's determination to fight.
Western sanctions have also triggered global energy, commodity and food prices, jeopardizing the Economic Recovery of the West after the epidemic, so there is great internal resistance to the implementation of sanctions in the West. However, the West's determination this time is clearly stronger than the 2014 Crimean crisis, and yesterday's Survey by Huayou showed that more than 90% of the public supported the Biden administration's further sanctions against Russia beyond military action.
(36 countries around the world have banned flights from Russia, and almost all international flights at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport have been cancelled)
4. Given Russia's military superiority, the Russian army still has the hope of occupying Kiev, Kharkov and Kherson at a relatively high cost. But the performance of both sides on the battlefield in recent days has shown that the Kremlin's desired goal of destroying The Ukrainian military and breaking the Ukrainian backbone is no longer possible.
This means that the victory of the Russian army on the battlefield is at best military, but it has little political significance. Now Ukraine and the West are looking at Russia's inability to support the psychology of protracted war, and without making any concessions, even if Russia occupies a few more cities, it is difficult to become a chip on the negotiating table, and the final result is only withdrawal. Moreover, the indefinite expansion of the war would increase ukrainian hatred of Russia, which is also a result that the Kremlin did not want to see throughout the war planning.
5. The setback of moscow's challenge lies in its gambling mentality, fantasizing about doing 2,000 yuan of business at a cost of 200 yuan and making a huge profit of 1,000 yuan with a small and big profit. Given that Russia's economy is only one-twenty-fifth the size of the total camp of NATO members, its chances of winning can only be based on the small probability of a perfect quick battle, if this road does not work, there is no room for recovery, and the west, which is rich and powerful, has many calm ways to deal with it. The wisest way for Russia now seems to be to stop the loss early and choose a decent way to end the war, although it is disgraceful, but at least it can guarantee the political stability of the country in the short term and keep the national strength from major damage.
Russia has no more capital to fight a war of attrition with the West, and after the Crimean crisis, its GDP shrank by nearly 40%, per capita income fell to about $9,000, and the economic development gains from 2001 to 2008 were consumed. If the war in Ukraine produces the same economic lethality, then the size of Russia's GDP may fall below $1 trillion, and the per capita income may fall below $5,000, which may slide economically into a "third-rate country" and is likely to trigger domestic political turmoil.
6. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a tragedy of two peoples, and both sides should be painfully aware of it. Ukraine should realize that its short-sighted behavior in diplomacy since independence, as well as the growing nationalism of its people, have led it from a potential European superpower to a hunting ground for great power rivalry. The Russian nation should also abandon the superstitions handed down from the Tsarist era to force, indulge in the tradition of blackmail and gambling, devote themselves to governing the country, developing the economy, ensuring people's livelihood, and winning in international competition with economic, scientific and technological superiority is the right way to govern the country!
This article is reproduced with permission from the WeChat public account: Fuchengmen No. 6 Courtyard (ID: xihuamentalk), written by BJ Wang Mingyuan