Rear Admiral Oliver P-Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, submitted a report on the Battle of Chosin Lake to the Marine Corps Commander on December 17, 1950. In his report, he argues that the turning point in the campaign came on November 30, when the Volunteers had not annihilated Marines before that. At the beginning of the campaign, the volunteers had the advantage of surprise, mobility and numbers. U.S. Marine Corps units have superior firepower, air superiority, and team spirit. By the 30th, some of the advantages of the volunteers had become disadvantages. The surprise of their attack vanished, and the mobility they had acquired in the rugged environment of northeastern North Korea (because they were armed with light weapons and carried very little supplies) began to work against them because they could not withstand the heavy fire and ran out of ammunition and food. For the Marines, in turn, time was on their side, and their advantage became stronger. They recovered from the surprise attacks of the Volunteers and methodically figured out how to use their powerful firepower against the Volunteers. Control of air supremacy allowed the Marines to receive regular supplies and attack volunteers from the air day and night.
Here is the full text of Rear Admiral Smith's letter to the Marine Corps commander:
I am currently in Masan. On December 15, I sailed from Heungnam Port to Busan aboard the U.S. Navy transport ship USS Bayfield [APA 33]. Some members of the shore forces, parts of the amphibious tracked landing vehicle battalion, members of the Naval Artillery Group and the Tactical Air Control Group were temporarily left in Xingnan by the Tenth Army, and the entire division will arrive near Masan today. I don't yet know what our mission is. When the remnants of the Tenth Army will reach the Busan area, the Tenth Army will be part of the 8th Army. General Shepherd had already raised the need for time to the Tenth Army so that the division could integrate replacement personnel, repair equipment and resupply. The Army was aware of this need, not only for us, but also for the 7th Infantry Division, which had lost two infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion. However, the Tenth Army had no say on this issue.
You've probably read a lot of misinformation in the newspaper, and it's best to give you a factual note about what we've been doing for the past two weeks. When I wrote to you for the last time, the 8th Army had not yet launched an offensive. At that time, my task was to establish a blocking position in Liutan and advance north with the rest of the division to the northeastern border of China. As I explained to you, I did not urge the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments, which had reached the Chosin Reservoir, to advance quickly. I act this cautiously for two reasons. First, I wanted to make sure that a 50-mile major supply route, 14 of which were rugged mountain roads, could be blocked by bad weather. I also wanted to stock up on the amount of ammunition and supplies that could be used for several days in the lower corner at the southern end of the reservoir. Secondly, I wanted to transfer Lewis Burwell-Puller, the commander of the 1st Regiment, to my rear to protect the main supply line, who could not come because of other tasks.
Commander Smith and his two regimental commanders, the commander of the Fifth Regiment and the Commander of the First Regiment
By November 23, both the 5th and 7th Marines engaged in firefights with the Volunteers, with the 5th Marines east of the Chosin Lake Reservoir and the 7th Marines west of the Chosin Lake Reservoir. The 7th Regiment was advancing toward the blocking position in Liutanli, which had been assigned by the army. On the 15-mile road between Hagaru-ri and Liutan-ri, the 7th Regiment had to cross a 4,000-foot pass and was hampered by enemies, barricades, and snowdrifts. Patrols sent by the 5th Regiment advanced toward the northern end of the reservoir.
On 24 November, the 8th Army launched an offensive. The attack was accompanied by General MacArthur's instructions, which explained the impending "massive compression encirclement." For the first time, I knew that the 1st Marine Division would be the northern "pincer" of this encirclement. At a briefing on November 25, the military explained the details. I will be the main offensive force of the Army in a west-facing area of operations. I will attack Wupingli along the road in Liutanli.
Cut off roads and railways there and send one column to the Sino-North Korean border in Kuup-tong and another to the north to Kanggyeo. The 7th Infantry Division will take over my previous task of advancing north on the eastern side of the reservoir and from there to the China-North Korea border. The Infantry Division would take over the protection of the main supply line to Hagaru-ri (this never happened; by the end of the operation I had to remain one battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment at Zhenxingli at the foot of the mountain and another battalion in the ancient soil at the top of the hill. Otherwise, this important part of the main supply line will not be protected). According to the battle plan, the army assumed responsibility for the engineering maintenance of the main supply line to Hagaru-ri. It also agreed to store supplies for 10 days in Ha ki-yu. I doubt that the military will be able to do that. In any case, the enemy has not given us the opportunity to prove whether it can do it.
The time of attack given by the army was 08:00 on November 27. By November 26, 7th Regiment Commander Homer Lizberg and all 7th Regiment personnel were in Liutan. I decided to keep him in the Liutanli area and let the 5th Regiment attack west through his defensive zone. The 5th Regiment had not engaged in large-scale fighting since the attack on Seoul. The attack went as planned, but soon after, both the 5th and 7th Regiments were under heavy attack by the Volunteers, and by 28 November, casualty reports had made the seriousness of the Volunteer attacks unspeakable. Meanwhile, the 8th Army Front was collapsing. No message was received from the army about halting the attack or retreating. In this case, I felt it rash to let the commander of the Fifth Regiment, Raymond Murray, continue to try to advance, and I instructed him to consolidate his position west of Willow Pond at that time. At the same time, I instructed Lizberg to open the main supply line between Liutan-ri and Hagaru-ri, which had been blocked by the Volunteers, and a section of the road between Hagaru-ri and Kojō-ri.
On the same day, November 28, I moved my operational command post to Hagaru-ri, which was carried out by helicopter, considering that the main supply line was cut off by the volunteers, which was the only feasible way. Fortunately, before the road was cut off, we were able to get some vehicles and staff into The Lower Hakata.
Lizberg's efforts to open the main supply line between Yanagitan-ri and Hagaru-ri were unsuccessful on the 28th. He reported that he would dispatch a battalion the following day, 29 November, to open the main supply line. On November 28, Puller organized task force Dresdale to open up the main supply line between Guturi and Hagaru-ri. The force was commanded by Lt. Col. Dreisdale, Royal Marines. It included the Royal Marine Commando (235 men), G Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, and a rifle company of the 31st Infantry Regiment advancing north (the troops of the 7th Infantry Division advancing north included a battalion of the 31st Regiment, a battalion of the 32nd Regiment, and a field artillery battalion to replace the 5th Marine Regiment on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir). In addition to the above units, the Drysdale Column included our two M26 [Pershing] tank companies, each with one less platoon and one convoy of trucks. The column will depart on the twenty-ninth day. I'll cover its actions later.
On the night of November 28 and 29, the enemy launched a fierce attack on Hagaru-ri. The attack began at 21:30 and lasted all night. The enemy attacked first from the south, then to the west, and then to the east. Our defensive force consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment (missing G Company), as well as personnel from our headquarters and service units. Our casualties were 500, of which about 300 were from infantry units and 200 from headquarters and service units. The headquarters battalion alone suffered 60 casualties.
We realized early on the importance of Usumari as a base. On November 16, Rear Admiral Field Harris, Marine Corps 1st Air Wing Commander, and I tentatively approved the location for the Douglas C-47 improvised runway in Hagaru. Our 1st Engineer Battalion began work on 19 November, and on 1 December, the C-47 used the airstrip for the first time, even though only 40 percent of the work was completed at that time. This airstrip is essential for evacuating the wounded and resupplying the air in case our roads are interrupted by weather or enemy movements. In order to protect this airstrip and the supplies we have accumulated there, We must control Hagaru-ri.
The march of the Dreisdale contingent from Guturi to Hagaru-ri not only opened the way, but also provided us with the reinforcements needed to defend Hagaru-ri. The Dreisdale contingent set out from Guturi on the morning of November 29 and engaged in a fierce firefight with the enemy halfway through to Hagaru-ri. At one point, Dreisdale wanted to return to Guturi, but I sent him a message asking him to keep going as far as he could. He had the convoy of trucks return to Guturi under the protection of the tank company and some infantry units, while the rest of the column continued to advance to the lower yuri. The convoy of trucks returning to Guturi was attacked by enemy forces once again approaching the main supply line. Before they returned to Gutuli, mortar shelling was fierce, tanks and trucks were severely damaged, and there were considerable casualties. Dreisdale continued to fight as he advanced down to Hagaru-ri, and by late afternoon, about 150 British Royal Marine Commandos and G-Company had arrived in Hagaru-ri.
The Army's convoy never arrived, although some of the scattered soldiers returned to the ancient soil. We came to the conclusion that considerable force was needed to open up the Lord's supply money between Shimogaru-ri and Kotouri. We will not have any such troops until the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments return to Hagaru-ri.
On November 29, a battalion of the 7th Marine Corps attempted to restore the main supply line, but to no avail. I then ordered Lizberg to use the entire 7th Regiment the next day, November 30, to restore the main supply line. At the same time, I ordered Murray to withdraw his regiment to Willow Pond. Late on the night of November 29, I received a call from the army (radio communication) saying that the entire plan of the offensive had been changed, that the army camp on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir had now lost contact with us, that it would be assigned to me, and that I was going to rescue them. I'm going to withdraw from the 5th and 7th Regiments and assemble around Hagaru-ri.
On November 30, the Army handed over to me command of all troops south to Shuidong, which is located four or five miles below the mountain. The unit consisted of an infantry battalion of the 31st Regiment on its way up the hill and various engineering and service units. On November 30, Puller was attacked quite fiercely in the ancient tulip, but he held the defensive line.
On the afternoon of November 30, The Commander, General Almond, flew in to see me. At this point, he had given up the idea of consolidating his position near Shimogaru-ri. He wanted us to retreat in the direction of Xianxing and stressed the need for speed. He authorized me to burn or destroy equipment and supplies, and said that supplies would be obtained by airdrop when I retreated. I told him that my actions would depend on my ability to evacuate the wounded, that I would have to fight back and not discard the equipment, and that I therefore intended to bring out most of my equipment. The problems of regiments 5 and 7 cannot be separated. By November 30, they had accumulated about 450 wounded people in need of protection. The only viable approach is to pool their resources. The two regimental commanders drafted a joint operational order (at which point a deputy division commander would come in handy) and the document was airlifted to me by helicopter, and I approved the order. In short, the 7th Regiment would be the spearhead of the breakout from Liutanli, and the 5th Regiment would be responsible for covering the rear. The artillery and convoy were in the middle, and the wounded who could walk were armed and marched in line on the road. Other wounded were loaded onto trucks.
Marines retreating from the mountains
The road that the two regiments had to cross was tortuous. From Liutanli, the road first goes south through the narrow valley, then turns east to turn east into Hagaru-ri. Around halfway through, the road crosses a 4,000-foot pass and then descends to Shimogaru-ri. The last section of the road more or less follows the ridgeline, providing the enemy with no opportunity to block as when the road began. As later events showed, the 7th and 5th Regiments fought the road to the pass, but the road down to Yukiri, although also blocked, was relatively easy.
American pirate attack aircraft attacked volunteer positions
During these operations, a company of the 7th Marine Regiment had a unique and extraordinary experience, which was Company F. When he initially advanced toward Willow Pond, Lizberg left Company E and F to occupy the high ground leading to the rear road. Lizberg later rescued Company E, but was unable to reach Company F, which was located at the top of the hill. The F Company was completely surrounded, but it occupied an excellent position. With precise airdrops, we were able to provide it with ammunition and rations. The company killed 18 people and wounded 60, but it held its ground for more than three days and was replaced by the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Corps from the mountains of Liutanli.
Night 30 November - December 1, Shimogaru-ri was attacked again, but we held the defensive line. This time we were stronger because Company G of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment and the British Royal Navy Commandos joined our defences. Attacks come from the southwest and east. Attacks from the east fell in areas under the responsibility of the battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Banks commanded the service battalion to repel the enemy attack.
U.S. troops conducted airdrops and helicopter evacuations of the wounded
By December 1, the situation for the treatment of the wounded had become grim. Captain Dr. Eugene Green had 600 casualties waiting to be evacuated in Hakata. The wounded were the responsibility of the C and E Medical Company. If the army camp east of the reservoir breaks through, it is estimated that it will bring more than 400 casualties. (In fact, we even transported more than 900 wounded from these battalions.) We estimate that the 5th and 7th regiments will bring 500 casualties. (In fact, they brought 1,500 casualties.) Obviously, the only way to solve our casualty problem is to complete the C-47 road. (OY [light observation aircraft] and helicopters cannot alleviate our casualty burden.) Our engineers worked around the clock on the C-47 runway. For two nights, work had to be interrupted due to enemy attacks, and sappers guarded the defensive line near the site. The defense line was only 300 yards from the end of the runway. The conditions at the airport are quite rough. 3,800 feet long and 50 feet wide, no taxiway, 2% slope to the north. The soil was black loam, but it was frozen. Our equipment has encountered considerable difficulties in permafrost. As I described, on December 1, the runway was considered 40% complete.
The airstrip in Hagaru-ri
At the suggestion of the aircrew, we decided to conduct a test flight of the C-47 after noon on December 1. The plane made a fully successful landing at about three o'clock in the afternoon, transporting 24 wounded. The plane filled with stretcher patients takes about half an hour. Outpatients are transported faster. At first, we could only accommodate two planes on the ground at the same time. Eventually, as the venue improves, we are able to accommodate six aircraft on the ground without blocking the runway. There is sunlight from about 07:00 to 17:45, and the use of easy roads is limited to these times. After the first plane landed, more planes came. Five more wounded on board the plane were transported that afternoon. If it weren't for a plane loaded with 105mm of ammunition that was damaged on the landing gear, we could have transported more wounded. The plane was too heavy to push off the runway and we had to unload its cargo, wasting precious time. (We tried to get incoming aircraft to load ammunition and other supplies needed to supplement the airdrops.) I will complete the evacuation of the wounded from Hagaru in chronological order, because this is entirely an unusual thing and a very remarkable achievement.
On the evening of December 1, the scattered soldiers of the Army Camp in Hudong began to arrive at Shimogaru-ri. During the day on December 2nd we airlifted 919 casualties, most of them from the Army Barracks. On the morning of December 3, doctors evacuated all remaining wounded by air evacuation. This gives us the opportunity to transport out the remains of the dead that we have accumulated. The casualty toll of the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments is now estimated to have risen to 900. At 19:35, the advance force of the 7th Marine Regiment arrived at the outer positions of Shimogaru-ri, followed by a team of wounded on foot. The column continued to advance during the night, each vehicle bringing more wounded, some lying on the hood of the jeep. By morning, hospital facilities were clogged with wounded. On December 4, 1,000 casualties were evacuated by air. On December 5, another 1,400 wounded were evacuated by air. When we retreated from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri on December 6, all the casualties were evacuated. I believe that this evacuation is unprecedented. Force commanders (whose determination and self-sacrifice have allowed the wounded to be rescued), medical personnel (whose dedication and tireless efforts have saved many lives), marine and air force crews deserve credit. (They landed at the risk of bad tube weather and a rudimentary landing track.) ）
(To be followed up)