The Strategic Question of China's Revolutionary War
(December 1936)
Mao Zedong's work, written to sum up the experience of the Second Civil Revolutionary War, was a lecture at the Red Army University established in northern Shaanxi. According to the author, this work has only completed five chapters, and there are still strategic offensives, political work, and other problems, because the Xi'an Incident occurred, and there was no time to write it again, so I put it on hold. This was the result of a great controversy within the Party on military questions during the Second Revolutionary Civil War, expressing the opinion of one line against another. Regarding this line controversy, the Zunyi Conference convened by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in January 1935 reached a conclusion, affirming Mao Zedong's opinion and rejecting the erroneous line. Immediately after the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China moved to northern Shaanxi in October 1935, Mao Zedong immediately delivered a report in December entitled "On tactics against Japanese imperialism", which systematically resolved the problems in the party's political line during the Second Civil Revolutionary War. The following year, in 1936, Mao Zedong wrote this work, which systematically explained the strategic aspects of China's revolutionary war.
Chapter One: How to Study War
Section 1: The law of war develops
The Laws of War – This is a question that anyone who guides war cannot fail to study and solve.
The Law of Revolutionary War - this is a question that anyone who directs a revolutionary war cannot fail to study and solve.
The Law of China's Revolutionary War - this is a question that anyone who guides China's revolutionary war cannot but study and cannot fail to solve.
We are now engaged in war, our war is a revolutionary war, and our revolutionary war is waged in China, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Therefore, we must study not only the laws of war in general, but also the laws of special revolutionary wars, and even more special laws of China's revolutionary wars.
Everyone understands that no matter what you do, if you don't understand the situation of that thing, its nature, its connection with things other than it, you don't know the law of that thing, you don't know how to do it, you can't do that thing well.
War - the highest form of struggle which has begun since the existence of private property and classes and which is used to settle the contradictions between classes and classes, nations and nations, states and states, political groups and political groups, at a certain stage of development. Without understanding its circumstances, its nature, its connection with things other than it, without knowing the laws of war, without knowing how to guide it, we cannot win a war.
Revolutionary war - Revolutionary class war and revolutionary national war have their special circumstances and character, in addition to the situation and character of the general war. Therefore, in addition to the general laws of war, there are some special laws of it. Without understanding these particular circumstances and nature, without understanding their particular laws, we cannot guide the revolutionary war and we cannot win the war in it.
The Chinese revolutionary war, whether it is a civil war or a national war, is waged within the special circumstances of China, and the comparative general war, the general revolutionary war, has its special circumstances and special nature. Thus, in addition to the laws of general war and general revolutionary war, there are some special laws of its kind. If we do not understand this, we will not be able to win the battle in the chinese revolutionary war.
Therefore, we should study the laws of war in general; we should also study the laws of revolutionary war; and finally, we should also study the laws of revolutionary war in China.
We have long refuted the opinion of those who are wrong; they say: It is enough to study the laws of war in general, and specifically to do so in accordance with the military ordinances published by the reactionary Chinese Government or the reactionary Chinese military schools. They do not know that these ordinances are merely the laws of general warfare, and that they are all copied from foreign countries, and that if we copy them exactly the same and use them without changing their form or content in the slightest, we must be cut to the point of being able to defeat the war. Their reasoning is: why shouldn't something that has been shed in the past be bloody? They do not know that while we should respect the experience of past bloodshed, we should also respect our own experience of bloodshed.
Another opinion is also wrong, which we have already refuted; they say: It is enough to study the experience of the Russian revolutionary war, specifically, to do so in accordance with the guiding laws of the Soviet civil war and the military regulations promulgated by the Soviet military apparatus. They do not know that the laws and regulations of the Soviet Union, which contain the peculiarities of the Soviet Civil War and the Red Army of the Soviet Union, are equally cut to the point of being cut and lost if we copy them exactly the same and do not allow any changes. The reason for these people is: The war in the USSR is a revolutionary war, our war is also a revolutionary war, and the USSR is victorious. They do not know that although we must pay special respect to the soviet experience of war, because it is the most recent experience of revolutionary war, which was acquired under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin, we must also respect the experience of the Chinese revolutionary war, because the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army have many special circumstances.
There is also another opinion of the people who is wrong, and we have long refuted this opinion; they say: The experience of the Northern Expedition from 1926 to 1927 is the best, and we should learn from it, specifically, the long drive of the Northern Expedition and the seizure of the big cities. They do not know that the experience of the Northern Expedition should be learned, but it should not be copied rigidly, because the situation of our war has changed. We should only adopt those things of the Northern Expedition that can still be applied in the present situation, and we should prescribe our own things according to the present situation.
From this point of view, the different situations of war determine different laws of war guidance, and there are differences in time, region, and nature. Speaking from the conditions of time, war and the guiding law of war are all developed, and each historical stage has the characteristics of each historical stage, so the law of war also has its own characteristics and cannot be rigidly transferred to different stages. Judging from the nature of war, revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war each have their own different characteristics, so the laws of war also have their own characteristics, and they cannot be rigidly transferred to each other. Judging from the geographical conditions, all countries and all nationalities, especially large countries and large nations, have their own characteristics, so the laws of war also have their own characteristics, and they cannot be rigidly transferred. When we study the guiding laws of war at different historical stages, of different natures, in different regions and nationalities, we should focus on its characteristics and its development, and oppose the mechanistic theory of war.
And that's not all. For a commander, at first he will command small corps, and later he will command large corps, which is for him to progress and develop. One place is not the same as many places. At first, they would fight in a familiar place, and later in many places, which was another progress and development for a commander. Because of the technological, tactical, and strategic development of the enemy and us, the situation at each stage of a war is different. Those who will command at the low level will also command at the high level, which is even more progressive and developed for a commander. It can only be adapted to a certain corps, a certain place, and a certain stage of the development of the war, which is called no progress and no development. There is a kind of person who has never made any progress again, with a skill and a hole in his view, and although this has some effect on the revolution in one place and one time, it has no great effect. We demand war instructors who have a big role to play. All the laws guiding war develop in accordance with the development of history and in accordance with the development of war; there is nothing immutable.
Section II: The purpose of war is to eliminate war
War- this monster of human slaughter, the development of human society will eventually eliminate it, and it will be eliminated in the near future. But there is only one way to eliminate it, that is, to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose class counter-revolutionary war with class revolutionary war. In the history of war, there are only two types of justice and injustice. We are in favour of a just war and against an unjust war. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. The age of human war life is coming to an end in our hands, and the wars we wage are undoubtedly part of the final war. But the war we are facing is undoubtedly part of the greatest and most brutal war. The greatest and most brutal unjust counter-revolutionary war is pressing upon us, and if we do not raise the banner of a just war, the majority of mankind will be devastated. The banner of mankind's just war is the banner of saving mankind, and the banner of China's just war is the banner of saving China. The war waged by the majority of mankind and by the majority of the Chinese is undoubtedly a just war, the supreme honor of saving mankind and Saving China, and the bridge that turns the history of the whole world into a new era. Human society has progressed to the point where classes have been abolished, the state has been abolished, and at that time there will be no more wars, no counter-revolutionary wars, no revolutionary wars, no unjust wars, no just wars, and this is the epoch of permanent peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war begins with our desire to demand the abolition of all wars, which is the line that distinguishes us Communists from all exploiting classes.
Section III: The strategic question is something that studies the laws governing the overall situation of war
As long as there is war, there is the overall situation of war. The world can be the overall situation of war, a country can be the overall situation of war, an independent guerrilla zone, a large independent aspect of combat, or it can be the overall situation of war. Anything that has the character of taking care of all aspects and stages is the overall situation of the war.
Studying the law of war guidance with an overall nature is the task of strategic science. Studying the laws of war guidance with a local nature is the task of campaign science and tactics.
Why is it necessary to require campaign commanders and tactical commanders to understand some degree of strategic law? Because we understand the global thing, we will use the local thing even more, because the local thing is subordinate to the global thing. It is a mistake to say that strategic victory depends on tactical victory, because it does not see the main and primary problem of victory or defeat in war, but cares well or poorly for the overall situation and the stages. If there are important shortcomings or mistakes in the overall situation and in the care of the various stages, the war must be lost. To say, "If you are not careful, you will lose everything in the whole market", you are talking about a global situation, that is, a decision that is decisive for the overall situation, not a partial one that has no decisive significance for the overall situation. This is true of chess, and it is also true of war.
However, something of a global nature cannot be separated from the part and is independent; the whole world is composed of all its parts. Sometimes, some parts are destroyed or failed, and the whole world can not have a major impact, because these parts are not decisive things for the whole world. Some tactical or campaign defeats or failures in warfare often do not cause the overall situation of the war to deteriorate, because these defeats are not decisive things. But if most of the battles that make up the overall situation of the war fail, or if one or two decisive battles fail, the whole situation changes immediately. Most of the battles and one or two battles mentioned here are decisive things. In the history of war, there are those who have suffered a defeat after winning consecutive battles or even abandoned all their achievements, and some who have fought a victorious battle after eating many defeats and thus opened up a new situation. The "successive victories" and "many defeats" mentioned here are all local and have no decisive effect on the overall situation. The "one defeat" and "one victory" mentioned here are both decisive things. All of this illustrates the importance of taking care of the big picture. The most important thing for those who command the overall situation is to put their attention on taking care of the overall situation of the war. Mainly, according to the situation, we should take care of the composition of the troops and corps, the relations between the two campaigns, the relations between the various stages of operation, and the relations between all the activities of our side and all the activities of the enemy.
When it comes to the relationship between the overall situation and the locality, this is not only the relationship between strategy and campaign, but also the relationship between campaign and tactics. The relationship between the action of the division and the action of the regiment and the battalion, and the relationship between the action of the company and the action of the platoon, is an example. The chief of any rank should focus his attention on the questions or actions that are most important and decisive for the overall situation under his command, and should not on other problems or actions.
To say that it is important, to say that it is decisive, cannot be prescribed according to general or abstract circumstances, but must be prescribed according to specific circumstances. The choice of assault direction and assault point during combat should be stipulated in accordance with the current enemy situation, terrain, and the situation of one's own troops. In places where supplies are abundant, care should be taken not to overnat the soldiers, and in places where supplies are insufficient, care should be taken not to make the soldiers hungry. In the white area, the subsequent battle can be lost because of the leakage of only one message; in the red area, the problem of leaking the message is often not the most important. In some battles, senior commanders are necessary to participate personally, while others are not. In a military school, the most important issue is the selection of the principal teachers and the prescribing of educational guidelines. A popular assembly should pay the main attention to mobilizing the people to attend and to proposing appropriate slogans. And all that. In short, one principle is to pay attention to those important joints that are related to the overall situation.
To study the guiding law of the overall situation of war, we must think about it with our hearts. Because of this kind of overall thing, the eyes can't see, you can only understand it by thinking about it with your mind, and you can't understand it without thinking about it. But the whole picture is made up of parts, and people with local experience, people with experience in campaign tactics, if they are willing to think about it with their hearts, can understand those more advanced things. Strategic issues, such as the so-called care of the relationship between the enemy and ourselves, the care of the relationship between the various campaigns or the various stages of operation, the care of certain parts of the overall situation (decisive), the care of the characteristics of the overall situation, the care of the relationship between the front and the rear, the care of attrition and replenishment, combat and rest, concentration and dispersion, attack and defense, advance and retreat, shade and exposure, the main offensive and assist aspects, the assault and suppression aspects, the centralized command and dispersed command, protracted and quick decisive battles, position warfare and mobile warfare, Our own army and friendly forces, these branches and those branches, superiors and subordinates, cadres and soldiers, veterans and recruits, senior cadres and subordinate cadres, old cadres and new cadres, red and white areas, old and new areas, central and marginal areas, hot and cold weather, victorious and defeated, large corps and small corps, regular army and guerrilla unit, destroying the enemy and winning the masses, expanding the Red Army and consolidating the Red Army, military and political work, past tasks and present tasks, present tasks and future tasks, The differences and connections between the tasks in that case and the tasks in this case, the fixed and non-fixed fronts, the civil and national wars, this historical stage and that historical stage, and so on, are all things that cannot be seen by the eye, but if you think about it with your heart, you can understand it, you can catch it, you can master it. That is to say, all the important questions of war or warfare can be solved on a higher level of principle. To achieve this is the task of studying strategic questions.
Section 4 The important problem is to be good at learning
Why organize the Red Army? Because use it to defeat the enemy. Why study the laws of war? For these laws are to be used in war.
Learning is not an easy thing to do, and it is even more difficult to use. The knowledge of war is taken in the lecture hall or in the books, and although many people speak the same way, they have the distinction between winning and losing when they fight. The history of war, as well as our own war life, proves this.
So, what's the point?
We cannot demand de facto victorious generals, which have been rare since ancient times. We demand brave and wise generals who win battles in general in the course of war — generals with both wisdom and courage. To achieve the dual perfection of wisdom and courage, there is a method to be learned, and this method should be used when studying, and this method should also be used when using.
What method? That is to familiarize ourselves with the situation in all aspects of the enemy and us, to find out the laws of their actions, and to apply these laws to their own actions.
The military decrees issued by many countries indicate the necessity of "applying the principle of application according to the circumstances" and indicate the method of disposition in the event of defeat. The former is not to let the commander subjectively make mistakes because of the principle of death; the latter is to tell the commander how to deal with it when the commander subjectively makes a mistake or when the objective situation changes unexpectedly and irresistibly.
Why make mistakes subjectively? It is precisely because the deployment and command of war or combat is not suitable for the local situation at that time, and the subjective guidance and the objective real situation do not correspond, are not right, or do not resolve the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity. It is inevitable that people will do everything, and there is only a difference between being able to do it comparatively and not being able to do it comparatively. Militaryly, it is required to win more battles relatively, and on the contrary, it requires relatively few defeats. The key here is to reconcile the subjective and the objective.
Take the tactical example. The point of attack is selected on a certain wing of the enemy's position, and it is the enemy's weak point, and the surprise attack is thus successful, which is called subjective and objective conformity, that is, the reconnaissance, judgment and determination of the commander, which correspond to the actual situation of the enemy and its configuration. If the attack point is selected on the other wing, or in the center, and the result is that it hits the enemy's nail and cannot be attacked, it is called a non-conformity. The timing of the attack is appropriate, the reserves are used without delay or early, and all kinds of combat dispositions and combat actions are beneficial to us and unfavorable to the enemy, that is, the subjective command and the objective situation in the whole battle are all in line with each other. It is extremely rare in war or battle, because the two sides of a war or battle are hordes of armed living people who keep each other secret, which is very different from the disposal of still life or everyday events. However, as long as the command is generally suitable for the situation, that is, in the decisive part, that is, the basis of victory.
The correct deployment of the commander comes from the correct determination, the correct determination comes from the correct judgment, the correct judgment comes from the thoughtful and necessary reconnaissance, and the thinking on the connection of various reconnaissance materials. The commander uses all possible and necessary means of reconnaissance to extract the various materials of the enemy's situation obtained from reconnaissance, to extract the falsehood and the truth, to ponder from this and the other, from the surface and the inside, and then to add the situation on his own side, to study the contrast and mutual relations between the two sides, and thus to constitute a judgment, to make a determination, to make a plan,—— which is the process of the military man's whole understanding of the situation before making every strategy, campaign or battle plan. Careless military strategists, who do not do so, base military planning on a consensual basis, which is utopian and unrealistic. The reason why reckless and enthusiastic militarists are not free from being deceived by the enemy, seduced by the superficial or one-sided situation of the enemy, encouraged by the irresponsible and unsinferential advice of their subordinates, and therefore from running into a wall, is that they do not know or are unwilling to know any military plan, which should be based on the necessary reconnaissance and careful reflection on the situation between the enemy and ourselves and their interrelationship.
The process of knowing the situation exists not only before the establishment of the military plan, but also after the establishment of the military plan. When a plan is carried out, from the beginning to the end of the war, this is another process of understanding the situation, that is, the process of implementation. At this point, whether the things in the first process are in line with the actual situation needs to be re-examined. If the plan and the situation do not conform, or do not fully conform, it is necessary to make a new judgment according to the new understanding, to make a new determination, to change the plan and to adapt it to the new situation. Some of the things that change are almost every battle, and all the things that are changed are also occasional. The reckless family does not know how to change, or does not want to change, but blindly does it, and the result is that it must hit a wall.
The above is a strategic action, or a campaign and combat action. If the experienced soldier is an open-minded soldier, he is familiar with the temper of his own troops (commanders, combatants, weapons, supplies, etc., and their totality), the temper of the enemy's troops (likewise, commanders, combatants, weapons, supplies, etc., and their totality), and all other conditions related to war, such as politics, economy, geography, climate, etc., so that such a soldier can guide war or operation with relative certainty and be able to win the battle more than ever. This is the result of understanding the situation between the enemy and ourselves for a long time, finding out the law of action, and resolving the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity. This process of understanding is very important, and without this kind of long experience, it is difficult to understand and grasp the laws of the whole war. Being a truly capable senior commander is not something that can be done in a fledgling or merely good at the role of a soldier on paper, and must be studied in war to be able to do so.
All principled military laws, or military theories, are summaries of past war experiences made by predecessors or presents. The bloody lessons of these past wars should be studied with emphasis. This is one thing. But there is also the fact that these conclusions are examined from one's own experience, that is, that one absorbs what is useful, that rejects what is not needed, and that increases what is peculiar to oneself. This latter thing is very important, without which we cannot direct the war.
Reading is learning, using is learning, and it is more important to learn. Learning from war – that's our main method. People who do not have the opportunity to enter school can still learn war, that is, learn from war. Revolutionary war is a matter for the masses, and it is often not a matter of studying well before doing it, but doing it and then studying it, and doing it is studying. There is a distance between the "common people" and the soldiers, but it is not the Great Wall, but it can be quickly eliminated, and the method of eliminating this distance is to eliminate the revolution and the war. To say that it is not easy to learn and use is to say that it is not easy to learn thoroughly and use it skillfully. To say that ordinary people will soon become soldiers is to say that this door is not difficult to enter. Combining the two, we can use an old Chinese saying: "There is nothing difficult in the world, but I am afraid of those who have a heart." "It is not difficult to get started, but further study is also possible, as long as you have the heart, as long as you are good at learning."
The laws of the military, like the laws of other things, are the reflection of objective reality in our minds, and everything is objectively practical except our minds. Therefore, the objects of learning and understanding, including both the enemy and ourselves, should be regarded as the objects of study, and only our minds (thoughts) are the subjects of research. There is a kind of person who knows himself and knows the other, and there is another kind of person who knows the other and knows the secret, and they are unable to solve the problem of studying and using the laws of war. The phrase "know each other and know oneself and never lose a hundred battles" in the book of Sun Wuzi, a great military scientist in ancient China, includes studying and using two stages, including the law of development from understanding objective reality, and deciding to act in accordance with these laws to overcome the current enemy; we should not take this sentence lightly.
War is the highest form of struggle between nations and nations, states and states, classes and classes, political groups and political groups; all laws concerning war are used by nations, states, classes and political groups waging wars for their own victory. There is no problem in winning or losing a war, which is mainly determined by the military, political, economic, and natural conditions of the two sides. However, not only that, but also depends on the ability of both sides to exercise subjective guidance. The military may not attempt victory in the war beyond the limits permitted by the material conditions, but the military may and must strive for the victory of the war to the extent permitted by the material conditions. The stage of the military's activities is built on the objective material conditions, but the military people can direct many live dramas with sound, color, and majesty by virtue of this stage. Therefore, the guides of our Red Army, on the established objective material basis, namely, the military, political, economic and natural conditions, must exert our might and raise the whole army to overthrow the national and class enemies and change this bad world. Here our capacity for subjective guidance is and must be used. We do not allow any Red Army commander to become a reckless man who bumps and runs amok; we must encourage every Red Army commander to become a brave and wise hero, with not only the courage to overcome all odds, but also the ability to control the changing and developing of the whole war. Commanders swim in the sea of war, and they do not sink themselves, but make themselves decide to reach the other shore step by step. The law that guides war is the swimming technique of war. That's our approach.
Chapter II: The Communist Party of China and the Revolutionary War of China
The Chinese revolutionary war, which began in 1924, has passed two stages, namely, the stage from 1924 to 1927 and the stage from 1927 to 1936; the future is the stage of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. These three stages of revolutionary war are led by the Chinese proletariat and its party, the Communist Party of China. The main enemy of China's revolutionary war is imperialism and feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie can take part in the revolutionary war at a certain historical moment, it is unwilling and unable to lead the Chinese revolutionary war on the road to complete victory because of its selfishness and political and economic independence. The Chinese peasant masses and the urban petty bourgeois masses are willing to take an active part in the revolutionary war and are willing to bring it to complete victory. They are the main force of the revolutionary war; yet the peculiarities of their small production limit their political vision (some of the unemployed have anarchic ideas), so they cannot be the right leaders of the war. Therefore, at an era when the proletariat had already entered the political arena, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war had to fall on the shoulders of the Communist Party of China. At such a time, if any revolutionary war does not or goes against the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party, that war is bound to be lost. For of all strata and political groups in semi-colonial China, only the proletariat and the Communist Party are the least narrow-minded and self-serving, the most far-sighted and the most organized, and they are also the most open-minded in accepting the experience of the world's advanced proletariat and its party and applying it to their own causes. Thus only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, overcome the narrowness of the peasant and petty bourgeoisie, the destructiveness of the masses of the unemployed, and also overcome the vacillation and incompleteness of the bourgeoisie (if the Communist Party's policy is not wrong), and set the revolution and the war on the road to victory.
The revolutionary war of 1924-1927 was, basically, waged under the political influence and political cooperation of the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat and its party over the Chinese national bourgeoisie and its party. But at the critical juncture of revolution and war, first and foremost because of the rebellion of the big bourgeoisie and also because of the voluntary renunciation of revolutionary leadership by the opportunists in the revolutionary ranks, the revolutionary war was defeated.
The agrarian revolutionary war from 1927 to the present is being waged under new circumstances. The enemy of war is not only imperialism, but also an alliance of the big bourgeoisie and the big big landlords. The national bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is the tail of the big bourgeoisie. The Communist Party is the only one who leads this revolutionary war, and the Communist Party has formed absolute leadership over the revolutionary war. This absolute leadership of the Communist Party is the most important condition for persevering the revolutionary war to the end. Without such absolute leadership of the Communist Party, it is impossible to imagine that a revolutionary war could have such persistence.
The Communist Party of China has heroically and resolutely led China's revolutionary war, and in the long fifteen years before the people of the whole country, it has expressed itself as a friend of the people, and every day it is to protect the interests of the people, to stand at the forefront of the revolutionary war for the sake of the people's freedom and liberation.
With its own experience of arduous struggle and the bloody sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of heroic party members and tens of thousands of heroic cadres, the Communist Party of China has played a great educational role among tens of millions of people throughout the nation. The great historical achievements of the Communist Party of China in the revolutionary struggle have given China, which is now at a critical juncture of the incursion of the national enemy, a condition for salvation and survival, and this condition is that there is a political leader who is trusted by the majority of the people and who has been tested by the people for a long time and thus selected. What the Communist Party says now is more acceptable to the people than any other party. Without the hard struggle of the Chinese Communist Party over the past fifteen years, it would have been impossible to save the country from a new danger of national subjugation.
In the revolutionary war, in addition to the two mistakes of Chen Duxiu's right opportunism and Li Lisan's "left" opportunism, the Communist Party of China also made the following two mistakes: First, it was "Left" opportunism from 1931 to 1934, which caused extremely serious losses in the agrarian revolutionary war and obtained the result of weakening the Red Army by losing its base in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. This mistake was corrected at the Zunyi meeting of the enlarged Politburo in January 1935. Second, it was Zhang Guotao's right-wing opportunism from 1935 to 1936, a mistake that developed to the point of undermining the discipline of the Party and the Red Army and inflicting heavy losses on some of the main forces of the Red Army; however, thanks to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the consciousness of the Party members and commanders and combatants in the Red Army, this mistake was finally corrected. All these mistakes, of course, are unfavorable to our Party, our revolution and the war, but they have finally been overcome by us, and our Party and our Red Army have been tempered stronger from the overcoming of these mistakes.
The Communist Party of China has led, and continues to lead, a revolutionary war of vigorous and glorious victory. This war is not only the banner of the liberation of China, but also of international revolutionary significance. The eyes of the revolutionary peoples of the world are looking at us. At the stage of the new anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, we will guide the Chinese revolution to its completion and will also have a profound impact on the revolution in the East and the world. The revolutionary wars of the past have proved that we need not only a correct Marxist political line, but also a Marxist correct military line. Fifteen years of revolution and war have tempered such a political and military line. In the new stage of the future war, we believe that this line will be further developed, enriched and enriched in accordance with the new environment, so as to achieve the goal of defeating the national enemy. History tells us that the correct political and military line was not naturally and peacefully produced and developed, but from struggle. On the one hand, it has to fight against "Left" opportunism, and on the other hand, it has to fight against Right opportunism. It is impossible to overcome these harmful tendencies that jeopardize the revolution and the revolutionary war, and to overcome them thoroughly, the building of the correct line and the victory of the revolutionary war. I often mention erroneous opinions in this pamphlet for this purpose.
Chapter III: The Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War
Section I The importance of this issue
Those who do not admit, do not know, or do not want to know the peculiarities of the Chinese revolutionary war regard the Red Army's operations against the Kuomintang army as the same as the general war or the Soviet civil war. The experience of the Soviet Civil War led by Lenin and Stalin is of world significance. All Communist Parties, likewise, are guided by this experience and lenin and Stalin's theoretical synthesis of this experience. But this is not to say that we should mechanically apply this experience under our conditions. Many aspects of China's revolutionary war have their own characteristics that distinguish them from those of the Soviet civil war. It is of course a mistake not to estimate this characteristic, or to deny it. This was fully demonstrated in our Ten Years' War.
Our enemies have made similar mistakes. They did not recognize that fighting the Red Army required a strategy and tactic different from other operations. They rely on their superiority in all respects, despise us, and stick to their old tactics. This was the fourth period of the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" in 1933 and the situation before it, and the result was their successive defeats. The first to raise new opinions on this issue in the Kuomintang army was the Kuomintang reactionary general Liu Weiyuan and later Dai Yue. In the end, their opinions were adopted by Chiang Kai-shek. This is the process by which Chiang Kai-shek's Lushan Officers' Training Corps and the reactionary new military principles it implemented in the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign came into being.
However, when the enemy changed his military principles to suit the situation of fighting the Red Army, there were people in our ranks who returned to the "old ways". They advocate a return to the general situation, a refusal to understand any particular situation, a refusal to understand the experience of the history of bloody battles of the Red Army, a contempt for the forces of imperialism and the Kuomintang, a contempt for the strength of the Kuomintang army, and a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. As a result, all revolutionary base areas except the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region were lost, the Red Army was reduced from 300,000 to tens of thousands, the Communist Party of China was reduced from 300,000 to tens of thousands, and the Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas were almost completely lost. In short, it was a great historical punishment. They call themselves Marxist-Leninists, but in fact they have not learned anything about Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said: The most essential thing of Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, lies in the concrete analysis of concrete situations. These comrades of ours have forgotten this.
It can be seen from this that without understanding the characteristics of China's revolutionary war, we cannot guide China's revolutionary war and cannot guide China's revolutionary war on the road to victory.
Section II: What are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?
So, what are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?
I thought there were four main characteristics.
The first feature is that China is a semi-colonial power with uneven political and economic development, and it has undergone the revolution of 1924-1927.
This characteristic points out that China's revolutionary war has the possibility of development and victory. When from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928, shortly after the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in China, some comrades in Jinggangshan, the border area between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, raised the question of "how long will the red flag be fought?" Because this is the most basic question, we cannot go any further without answering the question of the existence and development of the Chinese revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army. The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1928 gave another answer to this question. The Chinese revolutionary movement has since had a correct theoretical basis.
Now let's take a look at this question separately:
China's political and economic development is unbalanced -- the existence of a weak capitalist economy and a serious semi-feudal economy, the simultaneous existence of a number of industrial and commercial cities of the modern style and the vast countryside that have stagnated, the simultaneous existence of millions of industrial workers and peasants and handicraft workers under the rule of tens of millions of old systems, the simultaneous existence of the great warlords in charge of the central government and the small warlords in the provinces, the simultaneous existence of the so-called central army subordinate to Chiang Kai-shek and the so-called miscellaneous army belonging to the warlords of the provinces. A number of railway routes and motor roads exist at the same time as the common unicycle roads, roads that can only be walked with feet and roads that are not easy to walk with feet.
China is a semi-colonial country – the disunity of imperialism affects the disunity of the Chinese ruling clique. There is a difference between a semi-colonial country dominated by several countries and a colony dominated by one country.
China is a big country - "the east is not bright and the west is bright, and the black south has the north", and there is no room for maneuver.
China has gone through a great revolution – ready for the seeds of the Red Army, ready for its leaders, the Communist Party, and ready for the people who have participated in a revolution.
That is why we say that China is a great country that has undergone a revolution, with uneven political and economic development and semi-colonial development, and this is the first characteristic of China's revolutionary war. This characteristic not only basically stipulates our political strategy and tactics, but also basically defines our military strategy and tactics.
The second characteristic is the strength of the enemy.
What is the situation with the Kuomintang, the enemy of the Red Army? It is the party that has seized power and has relatively stabilized its power. It received assistance from the main counter-revolutionary countries of the world. It has transformed its army—an army that is different from any chinese army of any historical epoch, but largely the same as that of the modern countries of the world; the supply of weapons and other military supplies is much stronger than that of the Red Army; and its army is greater than that of any chinese army of any historical epoch, and more than the standing army of any country in the world. Its army is truly very different from the Red Army. It controls the political, economic, transportation, and cultural hub or lifeblood of all of China, and its regime is a nationwide regime.
The Chinese Red Army is in the face of such a powerful enemy. This is the second characteristic of China's revolutionary war. This characteristic makes the operations of the Red Army indispensable and different from the general wars, as well as the Soviet Civil War and the Northern Expedition.
The third characteristic is the weakness of the Red Army.
The Chinese Red Army was born after the defeat of the First Great Revolution, starting with the guerrillas. Not only in the period of reaction in China, but also in the period of relative political and economic stability of the reactionary capitalist countries of the world.
Our regime is a scattered and isolated regime in the mountains or secluded areas, without any external assistance. The economic and cultural conditions in the revolutionary base areas are backward in comparison with those of the Kuomintang regions. The revolutionary base areas are only the countryside and small cities. Its area was very small at first, and later it was not very large. Moreover, the base areas are fluid; the Red Army has no really consolidated base areas.
The number of the Red Army is small, the weapons of the Red Army are poor, and the supply of materials such as grain and clothing of the Red Army is very difficult.
This feature is in sharp contrast to the previous one. The strategy and tactics of the Red Army took place in this sharp contrast.
The fourth characteristic is the leadership of the Communist Party and the agrarian revolution.
This feature is the inevitable result of the first feature. This feature gives rise to two things. On the one hand, the Revolutionary War in China, although in a period of reaction in China and in the capitalist world, was able to be won because it had the leadership of the Communist Party and the assistance of the peasantry. Although the base areas are small, they have great political power, and they are in opposition to the huge Kuomintang regime, which makes it very difficult for the Kuomintang to attack militarily, because we have the assistance of the peasants. The Red Army, though small, has a strong fighting capacity, for the Red Army personnel under the leadership of the Communist Party are produced from the agrarian revolution and fight for their own interests, and there is political agreement between commanders and combatants.
On the other hand, it became a sharp contrast with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was opposed to the agrarian revolution and therefore had no peasant assistance. Although its army is large, it cannot make the masses of soldiers and many lower-level cadres from small producers consciously fight for the Kuomintang, and the officers and men are politically divided, which reduces its combat effectiveness.
Section III: This gives rise to our strategy and tactics
The political and economic imbalance of the semi-colonial powers, the strong enemies, the weak Red Army, and the agrarian revolution after a great revolution are the four main characteristics of China's revolutionary war. These characteristics stipulate the guiding line of China's revolutionary war and many of its strategic and tactical principles. The first and fourth characteristics prescribe the possible development of the Chinese Red Army and the possible victory over its enemies. The second and third characteristics stipulate that the Chinese Red Army cannot develop quickly and cannot defeat its enemies quickly, that is, that is, the protracted war and, if not done well, may also fail.
These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. Both aspects exist at the same time, that is, there are both smooth and difficult conditions. This is the fundamental law of China's revolutionary war, and many laws arise from this fundamental law. Our ten-year history of war proves the correctness of this law. Whoever opens his eyes and fails to see these laws of a fundamental nature cannot guide China's revolutionary war, and he cannot enable the Red Army to win the war.
It is clear and correct to define the strategic direction, opposing adventurism when attacking, conservatism when defending, and escapism when transferring; opposing guerrillaism of the Red Army while acknowledging the guerrilla character of the Red Army; opposing protracted warfare and strategic quick decisive battles in opposing the strategic protracted war and the quick decisive battle of the campaign; opposing fixed lines of battle and position warfare, recognizing non-fixed lines of operation and movement warfare; opposing defeat warfare and acknowledging annihilation warfare; opposing the two fist doctrines of strategic direction, and acknowledging one fist doctrine Oppose the system of the great rear, recognize the system of the small rear; oppose absolute centralized command, recognize relative centralized command; oppose the purely military viewpoint and Kou doctrine, recognize the Red Army as the propagandists and organizers of the Chinese revolution; oppose banditry and recognize serious political discipline; oppose warlordism, recognize restricted democratic life and military discipline with authoritarian powers; oppose the incorrect sectarian cadre policy, recognize the correct cadre policy; oppose the policy of isolation, recognize the allies who strive for all possible; and finally, Opposition to the stagnation of the Red Army in the old stage and the development of the Red Army to a new stage - all these questions of principle require a correct solution. The strategic issues we want to talk about now are to explain these problems well on the experience of the ten years of bloody war history of China's revolutionary war.
Chapter IV "Encirclement and Suppression" and Counter-"Encirclement and Suppression" - the main forms of the Chinese civil war
For ten years, from the day the guerrilla war began, the "encirclement and suppression" of the enemy was often encountered around any independent Red Guerrilla or Red Army, around any revolutionary base area. The enemy regarded the Red Army as a foreign object and wanted to capture it as soon as it appeared. The enemy always followed the Red Army and always surrounded it. This form has not changed over the past decade, and if there is no national war in place of the civil war, it will not change until the day when the enemy becomes weak and the Red Army becomes strong.
The activities of the Red Army took the form of anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns. The so-called victory mainly refers to the victory of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, which is the victory of strategy and campaign. Opposition to a "encirclement and suppression" is a campaign, often organized by several large and small or even dozens of battles. Even if many battles are won before a "encirclement and suppression" is basically broken, it cannot be said that victories have been won strategically or in the entire campaign. The history of the Red Army's wars in the past ten years is a history of anti-"encirclement and suppression."
The enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and the Red Army's counter-"encirclement and suppression" adopt each other's two forms of combat, namely, attack and defense, which are no different from ancient and modern Wars at home and abroad. However, the Chinese civil war is characterized by a long period of repetition between the two. In a "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy opposes the Defense of the Red Army with an attack, and the Red Army opposes the enemy's attack with defense, which is the first stage of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. The enemy opposes the Red Army's offensive with defense, and the Red Army opposes the enemy's defense with its offensive; this is the second stage of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. Any "encirclement and suppression" includes these two stages and is repeated for a long time.
To speak of long-term repetition is to speak of the repetition of wars and forms of combat. This is a fact that anyone will know at a glance. "Encirclement and suppression" and counter-"encirclement and suppression" are repeated forms of war. The first stage of the enemy's attack on us and our defense against the enemy, and the second stage of the enemy's attack on us with defense and our attack against the enemy with attack are the repetition of the form of battle in each "encirclement and suppression."
As for the content of wars and battles, it is not simply repeated, but different from time to time. This is also true, and anyone will know it at a glance. The law here is that the scale of "encirclement and suppression" and counter-"encirclement and suppression" is getting bigger and bigger every time, the situation is becoming more complicated every time, and the battles are more and more intense each time.
However, it is not without ups and downs. After the fifth "encirclement and suppression," because the Red Army was greatly weakened, the southern base areas were all lost, and the Red Army moved to the northwest, not in the most important position of threatening the domestic enemy as in the south, the scale, situation, and combat of the "encirclement and suppression" were relatively small, simpler, and more relaxed.
What was the defeat of the Red Army? Strategically speaking, only when the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign has not succeeded at all can it be called a failure, and it can only be called a partial and temporary failure. For the fundamental defeat of the civil war was the overthrow of the entire Red Army, but there was no such fact. The loss of the vast base areas and the transfer of the Red Army are temporary and partial defeats, not permanent and total defeats, although this part includes ninety percent of the Party and the army and the base areas. We call this a continuation of the defense, and we call the pursuit of the enemy a continuation of the offensive. That is to say, in the struggle between "encirclement and suppression" and anti-"encirclement and suppression," we did not turn from defense to attack, but were on the contrary, our defenses were broken by the enemy's attacks, our defenses became retreats, and the enemy's attacks became pursuits. However, when the Red Army reached a new area, for example, we moved from Jiangxi and other places to Shaanxi, and the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" appeared again. Therefore, we say that the strategic retreat of the Red Army (the Long March) is the continuation of the strategic defense of the Red Army, and the strategic pursuit of the enemy is the continuation of the enemy's strategic offensive.
China's civil war, like any ancient and modern Chinese and foreign war, has only two basic forms of combat: attack and defense. The characteristics of the Chinese civil war are the long-term repetition of "encirclement and suppression" and the anti-"encirclement and suppression" and the long-term repetition of the two forms of combat, attack and defense, and include such a thing as a great strategic transfer (Long March) of more than 10,000 kilometers.
The same is true of the so-called defeat of the enemy. Their strategic failure is that their "encirclement and suppression" has been broken by us, our defense has become an offensive, the enemy has shifted to a defensive position, and it must be reorganized to have another "encirclement and suppression." The enemy does not have the same situation as we call a strategic shift of more than ten thousand kilometers, because they are the rulers of the whole country, they are much stronger than us. However, some things have been done. It has happened that the enemy in the white strongholds besieged by the Red Army broke through in a number of base areas and retreated to the white areas to reorganize the offensive. If the civil war had been prolonged and the red army's victory had been more extensive, this kind of thing would have increased. But their results could not be compared with those of the Red Army, for they did not have the assistance of the people and there was inconsistency between the officers and men. If they had also learned from the long-distance transfer of the Red Army, they would have been wiped out.
During the period of the Lisan Line in 1930, Comrade Li Lisan did not understand the protracted nature of the Chinese civil war, so he could not see the long-term and repeated law of "encirclement and suppression" and breaking and breaking in the development of China's civil war (at that time there were already three "encirclement and suppression" on the border between Hunan and Gansu, two "encirclement and suppression" in Fujian, and so on). This makes the mistake of "Left" opportunism.
The "Left" opportunism of 1931-1934 did not believe in the law of "encirclement and suppression" repeatedly. In the base areas of the Eyu-Anhui Border Region, there is a so-called "partial division" saying that some leading comrades there believe that the Kuomintang after the failure of the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign is nothing more than a partial division, and that if it wants to attack the Red Army, imperialism must personally take charge as the main force. The strategic policy under this estimate is that the Red Army will fight Wuhan. This is consistent in principle with some comrades in Jiangxi calling on the Red Army to fight Nanchang, opposing the work of uniting the various base areas, opposing the in-depth operation of enticing the enemy to go deep, placing the victory of a province on the basis of the seizure of the provincial and central cities, and holding that "opposing the five 'encirclement and suppression' is a decisive battle between the revolutionary road and the colonial road.", and so on. This "Left" opportunism sowed the seeds of the erroneous line in the struggle of the Eyu-Anhui Border Region against the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" (21) and the Central Region of Jiangxi against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression", which forced the Red Army to be in an incompetent position in the face of the enemy's serious "encirclement and suppression" and inflicted great losses on the Chinese revolution.
It is also completely incorrect to say that the Red Army should not adopt defensive means at all, which is directly linked to the repeated "Left" opportunism that denies "encirclement and suppression".
Revolution and revolutionary war are offensive – this statement certainly has its correctness. Revolution and revolutionary war from the beginning to the development, from small to large, from the absence of power to the seizure of power, from the absence of the Red Army to the creation of the Red Army, from the absence of revolutionary base areas to the creation of revolutionary base areas, always have to attack, cannot be conservative, and the tendency of conservatism should be opposed.
Revolution and revolutionary war are offensive, but there are also defenses and retreats – this is perfectly true. Defending for the sake of attacking, retreating for the sake of advancing, facing the side in order to go head-on, and taking detours for the sake of taking a straight path are inevitable phenomena in the development of many things, not to mention military movements.
The former of the two above-mentioned assertions may be politically correct, but it is not correct to move to the military. Politically, it is only true in one case (when the revolution is advancing) that it is moved to another (when the revolution retreats: total retreat, as in 1906 (22), China in 1927; partial retreat, for example, in the Treaty of Brest in 1918 (23)). Only the latter statement is the whole truth. The "Left" opportunism of 1931-1934, mechanically opposing the use of military defensive means, is nothing but a very naïve idea.
When will the repeated forms of "encirclement and suppression" end? In my opinion, if the civil war is prolonged, it will be at a time when the strength of the enemy and the enemy and ourselves have changed fundamentally. If the Red Army changes to a point where it is stronger than its enemies, then this repetition is over. At that time, we encircled and suppressed the enemy, and the enemy tried to counter-encirclement and suppression, but the political and military conditions would not allow the enemy to obtain the same status as the Red Army in the form of anti-"encirclement and suppression". At that time, the form of "encirclement and suppression" was repeated, and even if it was not said to be completely over, the general end could be asserted.
Chapter V: Strategic Defense
In this topic, I would like to explain the following issues: (i) active defense and passive defense; (ii) preparations for opposing "encirclement and suppression"; (iii) strategic retreat; (iv) strategic counteroffensive; (v) the beginning of the counteroffensive; (vi) the question of concentrating forces; (vii) movement warfare; (viii) rapid decisive battles; and (ix) annihilation warfare.
Section 1: Active Defense and Passive Defense
Why start with defense? After the defeat of China's first national united front from 1924 to 1927, the revolution became a deep and cruel class war. The enemy is the ruler of the whole country, and we have only a small army, so we are fighting against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" from the beginning. Our offensive is closely linked to breaking the "encirclement and suppression," and the fate of our development depends entirely on whether we can break the "encirclement and suppression." The process of breaking through the "encirclement and suppression" is often tortuous and tortuous, not straightforward. The first and most serious problem is how to preserve strength and wait for the opportunity to break the enemy. Therefore, the question of strategic defense became the most complex and important issue in the operations of the Red Army.
In our Ten Years' War, two tendencies often occurred toward the question of strategic defense, one was to despise the enemy, and the other was to be intimidated by the enemy.
Because of their contempt for the enemy, many guerrillas failed, and the Red Army's "encirclement and suppression" of the enemy on several occasions could not be broken.
At the beginning of the revolutionary guerrillas, the leaders often did not see the situation between the enemy and ourselves correctly. They saw themselves victorious in a place with a sudden armed uprising, or mutinied out of the White Army, and the circumstances were smooth for a while, or they could not see them despite the severity of the environment, and therefore tended to despise the enemy. On the other hand, there is no understanding of one's own weaknesses (inexperience, weak strength). The enemy's strength and our weakness were originally objective phenomena, but people were unwilling to think about it, blindly talked only about offense, not defense and retreat, and mentally disarmed the defense, thus leading their actions in the wrong direction. Many guerrillas failed as a result.
The Red Army was unable to break the "encirclement and suppression" for the same reason, including the defeat of the Red Army in the Hailufeng area of Guangdong in 1928 (24), and the fact that the Red Army in the Eyu-Anhui Border Region in 1932, under the guidance of the so-called Kuomintang partial division theory, made the opposition to the fourth "encirclement and suppression" lose its ability to take yuru measures.
There are many examples of setbacks for the enemy to be intimidated.
Contrary to those who despise the enemy, people place too much importance on the enemy and too much on themselves, so they adopt an unnecessary retreat policy and mentally disarm the defenses in the same way. The result was either the defeat of the guerrillas, the defeat of certain campaigns of the Red Army, or the loss of the base areas.
The most conspicuous example of the loss of a base area is the loss of the central base area in Jiangxi during the opposition to the fifth "encirclement and suppression." The error here arises from a right-leaning view. Fearing the enemy like a tiger, the leaders fortified everywhere and resisted step by step; they did not dare to hold an offensive that would have been advantageous to the rear of the enemy, nor did they dare to boldly let go of their hands to lure the enemy deeper and gather and annihilate them; as a result, they lost the entire base area and enabled the Red Army to make a long march of more than 12,000 kilometers. However, this kind of mistake is often preceded by the mistake of the "Left" leaning over the enemy. The military adventurism of attacking the central city in 1932 was the root cause of the passive defensive line that was later adopted in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the enemy.
An extreme example of intimidating the enemy is the retreatist "Zhang Guotao line." The defeat of the Western Route Army of the Fourth Front of the Red Army west of the Yellow River (25) was the final bankruptcy of this line.
Active defense, also known as offensive defense, is also called decisive battle defense. Passive defense, also known as exclusive defense, is also called pure defense. Passive defense is actually a false defense, and only active defense is a real defense, a defense for counter-offensive and offensive purposes. As far as I know, there is no valuable military book, any relatively intelligent military expert, and no matter whether ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, whether strategic or tactical, there is no one who does not oppose passive defense. Only the stupidest, or the most arrogant, hold up passive defense as a magic weapon. However, there are such people in the world who do such things. This is a mistake in the war, a military manifestation of conservatism, and we should resolutely oppose it.
The rising and rapidly developing imperialist countries, i.e., the military leaders of Germany and Japan, actively advocated the interests of strategic offensive and opposed strategic defense. This kind of thinking is not at all in line with China's revolutionary war. The german and Japanese imperialist militarists pointed out that an important weakness of the defense was that it did not lift the hearts of the people, but rather shook them. This means that class contradictions are fierce, and that the interests of war belong only to the reactionary ruling class and even to the reactionary ruling faction. Our situation is different. Under the slogan of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can unite the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the aggressed. The Red Army during the Soviet Civil War also defeated the enemy in the form of defense. Their war was waged not only under the slogan of defending the Soviets when the imperialist countries organized the White Party offensive, but also under the slogan of defending the capital in the period of preparation for the October uprising. The defensive warfare of all just wars not only has the effect of paralyzing political dissidents, but can also mobilize the backward masses of the people to join the war.
Marx's statement that the offensive should not cease at the moment after the armed uprising (26) means that the masses who rise suddenly by taking advantage of the enemy's lack of preparation should not be allowed to have the opportunity to conserve or restore power, and take advantage of this moment to catch the reactionary ruling forces in the country by surprise, and not to be satisfied with the victory that has been won, to despise the enemy, to relax the attack on the enemy, or to cower, to sit idly by and lose the opportunity to destroy the enemy, and to invite the defeat of the revolution. That's right. This is not to say, however, that the enemy and we are already in a military confrontation, and that the enemy is superior, and that when oppressed by the enemy, the revolutionaries should not resort to defensive means. If you think so, you're the number one fool.
Our past wars, in general, were offensives against the Kuomintang, but militarily they took the form of breaking through "encirclement and suppression."
Militarily, our war is an alternating application of defense and offense. For us, it is okay to say that the attack is after the defense, or that the attack is before the defense, because the key is to break the "encirclement and suppression". "Encirclement and suppression" did not break the previous defense, and once the "encirclement and suppression" was broken, the offensive began, which was only two stages of one thing, and the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and itsnother "encirclement and suppression" were linked. Of these two phases, the defensive phase is more complex and important than the offensive phase. This stage contains many questions about how to break the "encirclement and suppression." The basic principle is to recognize positive defense and oppose negative defense.
In terms of civil war, if the strength of the Red Army exceeds that of the enemy, then there is generally no need for strategic defense. At that time, the policy was only a strategic offensive. This change depends on the general change in the forces of the enemy and us. At that time, the remaining means of defense are only partial things.
Section 2: Preparations for Opposing "Encirclement and Suppression."
With regard to a planned "encirclement and suppression" by the enemy, if we do not have the necessary and adequate preparations, we will inevitably fall into a passive position. The temporary pawns are in a hurry, and there is no certainty of victory. Therefore, while preparing for "encirclement and suppression" with the enemy, it is absolutely necessary to make our preparations for countering "encirclement and suppression." The arguments against preparation that have occurred in our ranks are childish and ridiculous.
There is a difficult problem here, prone to arguments. That is, when will we end our offensive and enter the preparatory stage of opposing "encirclement and suppression"? For when we are in a victorious offensive and the enemy is in a defensive position, the enemy's preparations for "encirclement and suppression" are carried out in secret, and it is difficult for us to know when they will begin their offensive. Our preparations for the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign began early, inevitably reducing the interests of the offensive and sometimes exerting a number of undesirable influences on the Red Army and the people. For the main step in the preparatory phase is the military preparation for retreat, and the political mobilization for the preparation of retreat. Sometimes preparing too early becomes waiting for the enemy; waiting for a long time and the enemy is coming, he has to restart his own attack. Sometimes our re-offensive is just beginning, and we happen to encounter the beginning of the enemy's attack, putting ourselves in a difficult position. Therefore, the choice of timing to start preparing has become an important issue. To determine this timing, we must focus on the situation between the enemy and ourselves and the relationship between the two. In order to understand the situation of the enemy, it is necessary to collect material from the political, military, financial and social opinion of the enemy. In analyzing these materials, it is necessary to make sufficient estimates of the enemy's entire strength, not to exaggerate the extent of the enemy's past defeats, but it is also impossible not to underestimate the contradictions within the enemy, the financial difficulties, the effects of past defeats, and so on. For one's part, we must not exaggerate the extent of past victories, but we must not underestimate the impact of past victories.
But the question of the timing of the start of preparation, in general, is better to lose it too early than to miss it too late. Because the latter's losses are smaller than those of the former, and their interests are prepared and invincible.
The main problems in the preparatory stage are the preparation of the Red Army for retreat, political mobilization, the recruitment of new recruits, the preparation of finances and food, the disposition of political dissidents, etc.
The so-called preparation of the Red Army for retreat means not to make the Red Army move in a direction that is not conducive to retreat, not to attack too far, not to make the Red Army too tired. This was a necessary disposition of the main Red Army on the eve of a major enemy attack. At this time, the attention of the Red Army was mainly focused on the creation of the battlefield, the collection of materials, the expansion of itself and the training of its own plans.
Political mobilization is the first important issue in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression." That is to say, to tell the personnel of the Red Army and the people of the base areas clearly, resolutely and fully about the inevitability and urgency of the enemy's offensive, the seriousness of the enemy's offensive endangering the people, and, at the same time, about the weaknesses of the enemy, the fine conditions of the Red Army, our will to win, the direction of our work, and so on. We call on the Red Army and the entire people to struggle against "encirclement and suppression" and to defend the base areas. Apart from military secrecy, political mobilization must be made public and seek to be universal to everyone who might espouse the interests of the revolution. The important joint is to persuade the cadres.
The recruitment of new recruits must proceed from two aspects: on the one hand, the degree of political consciousness and population of the people; on the other hand, the situation of the Red Army at that time and the possible limits of the Red Army's attrition in the entire anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.
The financial and food issues, needless to say, are of great significance to opposing "encirclement and suppression." It is necessary to take into account the possibility of prolonging the time of "encirclement and suppression." It should be calculated that the main thing is the Red Army, and then the people in the revolutionary base areas, and the minimum material needs in the whole struggle against "encirclement and suppression".
Political dissidents must not be unguarded; but we must not be too vigilant against their rebellion and take excessive vigilance. There should be a distinction between the landlords, the merchants, and the kulaks, mainly by explaining them politically, winning their neutrality, and organizing the masses to monitor them. Only the very few elements that are most dangerous can be used by severe means, such as arrests.
The degree of victory in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression" is closely linked to the degree of completion of tasks in the preparatory stage. The relaxation of preparations that occurs from the light of the enemy, and the panic that occurs from being frightened by the enemy's attack, are all undesirable tendencies that should be resolutely opposed. What we need is a warm and calm mood, a tense and orderly work.
Section III: Strategic Retreat
Strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior army in the face of the attack of an advantageous army, because it is concerned that it cannot quickly break its attack, in order to preserve its military strength and wait for the opportunity to break the enemy. However, the military adventurists are firmly opposed to such a step, and their proposition is the so-called "defense against the enemy outside the country".
Who does not know that two boxers are right, smart boxers often take a step back, and stupid people are fierce, and they use the full copy collar, but the result is often knocked down by the concessionaire.
The head of HongJiao in "Water Margin" wants to beat Lin Chong in Chai Jin's home, calling several "come", "come" and "come", and the result is that Lin Chong, who has given in, sees the flaws of Hongjiao's head and kicks over Hongjiao's head (27).
In the Spring and Autumn Period, Lu and Qi (28) fought, and Lu Zhuanggong initially did not wait for the Qi army to be tired to fight, but was later stopped by Cao Jie, who adopted the policy of "the enemy is tired and we fight", defeating the Qi army, resulting in a famous battle in the history of Chinese warfare in which the weak army defeated the strong army. Consider the narration of the historian Zuo Qiuming (29):
"Spring, Qi Shi cut me. Battle of the Dukes. See you cao. His townspeople know: What is the purpose of the meat eaters? Key: Meat eaters despise and fail to strategize. It's insight. Q: Why fight? Gong Yue: Clothing and food are at peace, and those who dare to be dedicated will divide people by themselves. Right: Xiao Hui is not all over, Minfu Congye. Gong Yue: Sacrifice the jade veil, and if you dare to add it, you will believe it. Right: Xiao Xin Wei Fu, God Fu Fu Ye. Public: The prison of the little and the big, although it cannot be observed, will be loved. Right: Loyalty to the genus also. Can be a war. War then please from. Multiply the male by it. Battle against the long spoon. The male will drum it. KEY: No. Qi ren three drums. KEY: Yes. Qi Division was defeated. The public will be galloping. KEY: No. Looking down at its ruts, climbing and looking at it, I know: It can be done. So they chased the division. Both, ask the public why. Right: Fu war, courage also. One drum blows, then declines, three exhausts. He exhausted my surplus, so he gave it. The great power of the husband is unpredictable, and there is fear and ambush. I look at its chaos, look at its flag, so I chase it away. ”（30）
The situation was that the weak resisted the strong. The text points out the political preparation before the war - winning the trust of the people, describes the position conducive to the transfer to the counter-offensive - the long spoon, describes the time conducive to the beginning of the counter-offensive - when he exhausted his own surplus, recounted the timing of the beginning of the pursuit - the time when the rut was chaotic. Although it was a small battle, it was also said to be the principle of strategic defense. There are many examples of victories in Chinese war history that have been achieved by combining this principle. The Battle of Chenggao of Chu Han (31), the Battle of Kunyang of the New Han Dynasty (32), the Battle of Yuan Cao Guandu (33), the Battle of Chibi of Wu Wei (34), the Battle of Yiling of Wu Shu (35), the Battle of Qin and Jin (36) and other famous battles were all won by the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, with the weaker giving way first and attacking later, thus winning.
Our war began in the autumn of 1927, when there was no experience at all. The Nanchang Uprising (37) and the Guangzhou Uprising (38) failed, and the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising (39) in the xiang'e-Gansu border area also fought several defeats and moved to the Jinggangshan area on the xianggan-gansu border. In April of the following year, the troops preserved after the failure of the Nanchang Uprising also passed through Shonan and were transferred to Jinggangshan. However, from May 1928 onwards, the basic principles of guerrilla warfare of a simple nature adapted to the conditions at that time had been produced, that is, the so-called sixteen-character recipe of "the enemy advances and retreats, the enemy garrisons us to disturb, the enemy is tired and I fight, and the enemy retreats and I pursue." This sixteen-character military principle was recognized by the Central Committee before the establishment of the Third Line. Later, our operational principles were further developed. When the Jiangxi base area first countered "encirclement and suppression," the policy of "enticing the enemy to go deeper" was put forward, and its application was successful. When the enemy was defeated in the third "encirclement and suppression," the principle of operation of the entire Red Army was formed. At this time, it was a new stage of development of military principles, the content was greatly enriched, and the form had changed many times, mainly beyond the previous simplicity, but the basic principle was still the sixteen-character recipe. The sixteen-character recipe cites the basic principles of counter-"encirclement and suppression," the two stages of strategic defense and strategic offensive, and the two stages of strategic retreat and strategic counteroffensive in defense. What came after that was just its development.
Beginning in January 1932, however, after the party's resolution on the first victory of one province and a few provinces after the crushing of the three 'encirclements and suppressions', which contained serious errors in principle, the "Left" opportunists fought against the correct principles, and finally withdrew a set of correct principles and established another set of so-called "new principles" or "formal principles" contrary to this. From now on, what used to be something can no longer be called regular, that is "guerrillaism" that should be denied. The anti-"guerrilla" air reigned for three full years. Its first stage was military adventurism, the second stage turned to military conservatism, and finally, the third stage became escapism. It was not until January 1935, when the Party Central Committee convened an enlarged Politburo meeting in Zunyi, Guizhou, that the bankruptcy of this erroneous line was declared and the correctness of the past line was re-recognized. What a great price it took!
Comrades who vigorously oppose "guerrillaism" say that it is wrong to lure the enemy deeper and have abandoned many places. Although we have won battles in the past, aren't we now different from the past? Wouldn't it be better not to give up the land and defeat the enemy? Wouldn't it be better to defeat the enemy in the enemy zone or at the junction of the enemy zone in our zone? What was in the past did not have any formality, just the methods used by the guerrillas. Now that our country has been established, our Red Army has been regularized. Our battle with Chiang Kai-shek is a state battle, a battle of the big army and a big army. History should not repeat itself, and the "guerrilla" thing should be abandoned in its entirety. The new principles are "completely Marxist", and what was in the past was produced by the guerrillas in the mountains, and there is no Marxism in the mountains. The new principle is the opposite of this: "Take one as ten, take ten as a hundred, be brave and courageous, take advantage of the victory and catch up", "attack all lines", "seize the central city", "hit people with two fists". When the enemy attacks, the methods of dealing with them are to "keep the enemy out of the country's gates," "preemptively attack," "not to destroy the altar jars," "not to lose any inch of land," and "divide the troops by six roads."; it is a "decisive battle between the revolutionary road and the colonial road"; it is a short surprise attack, a fortress war, a war of attrition, and a "protracted war"; it is a great rear doctrine, which is absolutely centralized command; and finally, it is a large-scale relocation. And whoever does not recognize this is punished, given the title of opportunist, and so on.
Undoubtedly, all the theory and practice are wrong. This is subjectivism. This is the manifestation of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism and revolutionary acute disease when circumstances are smooth; when circumstances are difficult, they change into life-saving, conservative and escapist according to the changes in circumstances. This is the theory and practice of the reckless and the layman, something that has no Marxist smell at all, something that is anti-Marxist.
Here we only talk about strategic retreat, Jiangxi is called "enticing the enemy to go deeper", and Sichuan is called "tightening the position". Former military theorists and practitioners have also admitted that this is the policy that the weak army must adopt at the beginning of the war when fighting against the strong army. Foreign military experts once said: "In strategic defensive operations, most of them first avoid unfavorable decisive battles, so that when favorable circumstances are favorable, they seek decisive battles." "That's totally true, and we haven't added anything to that either.
The purpose of the strategic retreat was to preserve military strength and prepare for a counteroffensive. Retreat is necessary because in the face of a strong enemy's attack, if you do not make a step back, you will endanger the preservation of military strength. In the past, however, many people resolutely opposed retreat, believing that it was a "purely defensive line of opportunism". Our history has proven this objection to be completely wrong.
In preparing for a counteroffensive, it is necessary to select and create certain conditions that are favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy, so that the balance of forces between the enemy and us will change, and then enter the stage of counter-offensive.
According to our past situation, it is probably necessary to obtain at least two or more of the following conditions in the stage of retreat, so that we can be considered to be beneficial to us and unfavorable to the enemy, so that we can turn ourselves into a counter-offensive. These conditions are:
(a) to actively assist the people of the Red Army;
(2) positions favorable for combat;
(c) the total concentration of the main forces of the Red Army;
(d) discovering the weak parts of the enemy;
(e) to make the enemy tired and depressed;
(6) Causing the enemy to make mistakes.
This condition of the people is the most important condition for the Red Army. This is the condition of the base areas. And because of this condition, the fourth, fifth, sixth and other conditions are also easy to cause or discover. Therefore, when the enemy launched a large-scale attack on the Red Army, the Red Army always retreated from the white areas to the base areas, because the people in the base areas were the most active in assisting the Red Army against the White Army. There is also a difference between the marginal areas of the base areas and the central areas; for blocking information, reconnaissance, transportation, participation in war, and so on, the people in the central areas are better off than the marginal areas. Therefore, when Jiangxi opposed the first, second, and third "encirclement and suppression" in the past, it was selected in the areas with the best or better conditions for the people. This characteristic of the base areas brought about great changes in the operations of the Red Army in comparison with those of ordinary operations, and was also the main reason why the enemy had to adopt fortress doctrine (40) later.
The retreating army can choose the advantageous positions it desires, so that the attacking army has to take our range, which is an excellent condition for internal combat. If a weak army wants to defeat a strong army, it is impossible not to pay attention to the condition of position. But this condition alone is not enough, and other conditions are required to cooperate with it. The first is the conditions of the people. In addition, it requires easy enemies, such as the enemy is tired, or has made a mistake, or the enemy who is advancing along the road is relatively ineffective. When these conditions are not met, even if there is a fine position, they can only ignore them and continue to retreat in order to meet the conditions they want. The white areas do not have excellent positions, but they do not have excellent conditions for the people. If other conditions had not yet been created or discovered, the Red Army would have to retreat to the base areas. The difference between the marginal and central areas of the base area is also roughly the same.
With the exception of local forces and suppressed forces, all assault forces are based on the principle of total concentration. When we attack a strategically defensive enemy, the Red Army is often scattered. As soon as the enemy launched a large-scale attack on us, the Red Army practiced the so-called "retreat from the heart." The end point of retreat is often chosen in the middle of the base area; but sometimes it is also in the front and sometimes in the rear, depending on the situation. This desire to retreat can completely concentrate the main forces of the Entire Red Army.
Another necessary condition for a weak army to fight a strong army is to pick the weak and fight. However, when the enemy begins to attack, we often do not know which of the enemy's divisions is the strongest, which is the weakest, which is the weakest, and which is weak, and needs a reconnaissance process. It often takes a lot of time to achieve this. Strategic retreat is necessary, and this is also a reason.
If the enemy attacking is far superior to our army in number and intensity, and we demand a change in the contrast between strength and weakness, we can only achieve our goal when the enemy goes deep into the base areas and suffers the hardships of the base areas, just as the chief of staff of a certain brigade of Chiang Kai-shek said during the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign, "fat dragging thin and thin dragging to death," and as Chen Mingshu, commander-in-chief of the Western Road of the "encirclement and suppression" army, said, "the national army is dark everywhere, and the Red Army is bright everywhere." At such times, the enemy army, though strong, was greatly weakened; the troops were tired, morale was depressed, and many weaknesses were exposed. Although the Red Army is weak, it is replenished and replenished to work. At this time, the comparison between the two sides can often achieve a certain degree of equilibrium, or the absolute superiority of the enemy army is changed to a relative superiority, the absolute inferiority of our army is changed to a relative inferiority, and even the enemy army is inferior to our army, and our army is superior to the enemy army. When Jiangxi opposed the third "encirclement and suppression", the Red Army carried out an extreme retreat (the Red Army concentrated in the rear of the base area), but it could not defeat the enemy without this, because the "encirclement and suppression" army at that time was more than ten times more than the Red Army. Sun Tzu's words of "avoiding his sharpness and striking him inert" (41) refers to making the enemy tired and depressed in order to reduce his superiority.
The last requirement for retreat is to inflict and discover the enemy's faults. It must be understood that it is impossible for any wise commander of the enemy army to fail to make a single mistake for a long time, so the possibility of us taking advantage of the gap between the enemy always exists. Enemies make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes make mistakes and sometimes give them a gap to take advantage of. And we can artificially inflict the mistakes of the enemy, such as Sun Tzu's so-called "manifestation" (showing the form in the east and hitting the west, that is, the so-called sound east hitting the west). In doing so, the end point of retreat cannot be limited to a certain region. Sometimes there is no gap to take advantage of when retreating to the area, so they have to take a few more steps back and wait for the enemy to take advantage of the "gap."
The favorable conditions for retreating are roughly as described above. This is not to say, however, that a counter-offensive cannot be launched until these conditions are fully met. It is impossible and unnecessary to have these conditions in place at the same time. However, in the light of the enemy's current situation, to strive for a number of necessary conditions, which should be taken into account by the army fighting on the inside line with a weak enemy and a strong enemy, the opposing opinion on this is incorrect.
The decision on where to end the retreat must be based on the whole situation. If it seems to be in the interest of the local situation to turn me into a counter-offensive, if it is not at the same time favorable to me in the eyes of the whole situation, it is not correct to decide on the basis of this to withdraw to the end. For the beginning of the counter-offensive must be calculated for subsequent changes, and our counter-offensive always begins locally. Sometimes the end point of retreat should be selected in the front of the base area, such as the second and fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" in Jiangxi and the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" in Shaanxi and Gansu. Sometimes it must be in the middle of the base area, such as the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in Jiangxi. Sometimes it was in the rear of the base area, such as the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in Jiangxi. These are all determined by linking the local situation to the whole situation. In jiangxi's fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression, our army did not talk about retreating at all, because it did not pay attention to the local situation and the whole situation, which was really a reckless method of destruction. The situation is caused by conditions; the connection between the local situation and the whole situation should be judged from whether the conditions imposed by the enemy and us at that time are local and in the whole, and whether they are conducive to our beginning of the counter-offensive to a certain extent.
The end point of retreat can be roughly divided into three types: the front, the middle and the rear part of the base area. But is it a fundamental refusal to fight in the white zone? No. We refuse to fight in the white zone, but only refer to dealing with the enemy's large-scale "encirclement and suppression." The disparity between the strength and weakness of the enemy and ourselves is enormous, and only under the principle of preserving our military strength and waiting for the opportunity to break the enemy can we advocate retreating to the base areas and advocating enticing the enemy to go deeper, because only by doing so can we create or discover conditions conducive to the counter-offensive. If the situation is not so serious, or if the gravity of the situation is simply such that the Red Army cannot even start a counter-offensive in the base areas, or when the counter-offensive is unfavorable and requires further retreat in order to seek a change in the situation, then it is also necessary to admit that the end of the retreat should be chosen in the white zone, at least in theory, although we have little experience in the past.
The end point of the white area retreat can also be roughly divided into three types: the first is in front of the base area, the second is on the side of the base area, and the third is behind the base area. At the first end point, for example, during the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in Jiangxi, if the Red Army did not have internal disunity and the division of the local party, that is, the two difficult problems of the establishment of the third line and the AB regiment (42), it is conceivable to concentrate forces to hold a counter-offensive between the three points of Ji'an, Nanfeng, and Zhangshu. Because the enemy's military strength advancing from the two rivers (43) in Ganfu at that time was not very advantageous to the Red Army (100,000 vs. 40,000). Although the people's conditions are inferior to those in the base areas, there are conditions for positions, and they can be broken by the enemy when he advances in separate ways. At the second end point, for example, during the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in Jiangxi, if the scale of the enemy's offensive at that time was not so large, and the enemy had advanced all the way from Jianning, Lichuan, and Taining at the junction of Fujian and Gansu, and the strength of this road was suitable for our attack, it can also be assumed that the Red Army was concentrated in the white area in western Fujian, and the enemy would not have to be broken first, and there would be no need to detour thousands of miles to Ruijin to Xingguo. At the third end point, as in the case of the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in Jiangxi mentioned above, if the enemy's main force had not been to the west but to the south, we might have been forced to retreat to the Huichang, Xunwu, and Anyuan areas (where the white areas were), leading the enemy even further south, and then the Red Army would fight from south to north toward the interior of the base area, and then there would not be many enemy troops inside the northern base area. But all these explanations are hypothetical, inexperienced, and can be regarded as something special, not as a general principle. For us, when the enemy holds a large-scale "encirclement and suppression," the general principle is to lure the enemy deeper and retreat to the base area to fight, because this is the way to break the enemy's offensive with the greatest certainty.
Those who advocate "keeping the enemy out of the country" oppose strategic retreat on the grounds that retreating loses land and endangers the people (the so-called "breaking the altar jars and cans"), which also has a negative impact on the outside world. In the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, it is said that we will take a step back, the enemy's fortress will advance one step, and the base area will be overwhelmed day by day and cannot be restored. If it was useful to lure the enemy deeper in the past, then the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of fortress doctrine was useless. To deal with the fifth "encirclement and suppression," we can only use the method of dividing troops to resist and short surprise attacks.
It is easy to answer these comments, and our history has already answered them. With regard to the loss of land, it is often the case that only loss can not be lost, which is the principle of "taking what you want with it first" (44). If what we lose is land, but what we gain is to defeat the enemy, to restore the land, and to expand the land, this is a profitable business. In market transactions, the buyer cannot acquire the goods without losing money; The loss caused by the revolutionary movement is destruction, and its achievement is the construction of progress. Sleep and rest lose time, but gain the energy to work tomorrow. If there is any stupid person who does not know this and refuses to sleep, he will have no spirit tomorrow, which is a business of erosion. This is precisely because of this that we have eroded the enemy during the period of the fifth "encirclement and suppression." Unwilling to lose a part of the land, the result is the loss of all the land. Abyssinia's (45) hard battle also resulted in the loss of the whole country, although the reason for the defeat of the Albanian state was not only this.
The same goes for the problem of endangering the people. If we do not break some altar jars and jars in the homes of some people for a while, we must make the whole people break the altars and jars for a long time. Fear of temporary bad political influence will come at the cost of long-term bad influence. After the October Revolution, if the Russian Bolsheviks refused to make peace with Germany according to the opinion of the "Left Communists", the newborn Soviets were in danger of dying.
This "Left" view, which looks like a revolution, stems from the revolutionary impatience of petty-bourgeois intellectuals and from the partial conservatism of the peasant small producers. They only start from one part in looking at problems, have no ability to look at the overall situation, are unwilling to link today's interests with tomorrow's interests, link some interests with the interests of the whole, and seize what is partial and time-consuming. Yes, everything that, according to the specific conditions of the time, seems to be of interest to the overall situation at that time and to the whole period, especially the decisive part and the time, should be seized, otherwise we will become self-effacing, or laissez-faire. Retreat must have an end, and this is the truth. However, this must not rely on the myopia of small producers. What we should learn is the cleverness of the Bolsheviks. Our eyesight is not enough, we should rely on telescopes and microscopes. The Marxist method is politically and militarily a telescope and a microscope.
Of course, strategic retreat is difficult. The choice of the beginning of the retreat, the choice of the end point of retreat, and the political persuasion of the cadres and the people are all difficult issues that must be resolved.
The question of the timing of the retreat is significant. If our retreat during the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in Jiangxi was not at the right time, that is, if it was too late, at least the extent of our victory would be affected. Retreating too early and too late, of course, has a loss. But in general, the loss of being too late is greater than being too early. Retreating in time and making oneself fully in the position of taking the initiative will have a great impact on reorganizing the situation after reaching the end of retreat and turning to the counter-offensive with ease. Jiangxi smashed the enemy's first, second, and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and calmly and unhurriedly dealt with the enemy. Only in the third campaign, because it was not expected that after the enemy's disastrous defeat in the second campaign, the new offensive would come so quickly (on May 31, 1931 we ended the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" operation, and on July 1, Chiang Kai-shek began their third "encirclement and suppression"), the Red Army was very tired by the hasty detour and concentration. How this time is chosen depends entirely on the collection of the necessary materials and the judgment from the general situation of the enemy and us, in the same way as the method used at the beginning of the preparatory stage of the selection stage mentioned earlier.
Strategic retreat is a very difficult question to persuade cadres and the people when the cadres and the people have not yet experienced it, when the authority of the military leadership has not yet reached the point where the decision-making power of strategic retreat is concentrated in the hands of the fewest people or even one person and the cadres are convinced. Because the cadres had no experience and did not believe in strategic retreat, they encountered great difficulties on this issue in the early stages of the first and fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" and in the entire period of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. During the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, due to the influence of the Lisan line, the opinions of the cadres were not to retreat but to attack until they were persuaded. During the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, due to the influence of military adventurism, the cadres' opinion was against preparation. During the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the cadres' opinions began with the idea of continuing military adventurism against enticing the enemy to go deeper, and later became military conservatism. Zhang Guotao's line does not believe that we cannot establish our base area in the Tibetan and Hui (46) areas, and we will not believe it until we hit a wall, which is also an example. Experience is necessary for cadres, and failure is the mother of success. But it is also necessary to accept the experience of others with an open mind, if you have to treat your own experience in everything, otherwise you will not accept it with stubborn opinions, which is completely "narrow empiricism". We have suffered a lot of such losses in the war.
The people, because of their lack of experience, did not believe in the necessity of strategic retreat than when Jiangxi first opposed "encirclement and suppression." At that time, the local party organizations and the masses of the people in Ji'an, Xingguo, Yongfeng and other counties all opposed the retreat of the Red Army. However, after this experience, in the subsequent times when opposing "encirclement and suppression," there was no problem at all. Everyone believes that the losses in the base areas and the hardships of the people are temporary, and everyone has the confidence that the Red Army can break the "encirclement and suppression." However, the trust of the people is closely linked to the trust of the cadres, so the main and first task is to persuade the cadres.
The whole function of strategic retreat lies in the transfer to the counter-offensive, and strategic retreat is only the first stage of strategic defense. The key to the decision of the whole strategy lies in whether the ensuing counter-offensive stage can be won.
Section IV: Strategic Counteroffensive
The victory over the attack of the enemy, which is absolutely superior, depends on the situation that has changed in the stage of strategic retreat, which has been created in the stage of strategic retreat, which has changed in the interest of us and unfavorable to the enemy, and which has changed when the enemy begins to attack, and which is caused by various conditions. This has already been said before.
However, the conditions favorable to us and the existence of the situation that favour us and the enemy have not yet brought defeat to the enemy. This kind of condition and situation has the possibility of determining victory or defeat, but it is not yet the reality of victory and defeat, and the victory or defeat of the two armies has not yet been realized. To achieve this victory or defeat, it depends on the decisive battle between the two armies. Only a decisive battle can solve the problem of who wins and who loses between the two armies. This is the whole task of the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. The counter-offensive is a long process, the most exciting and active stage of defensive warfare, that is, the final stage of defensive warfare. The so-called active defense mainly refers to this kind of counter-offensive with a decisive strategic nature.
Conditions and situations are created not only in the stage of strategic retreat, but also in the stage of counter-offensive. The conditions and situations at this time are not exactly the same as those in the previous stages and belong to the same form and the same nature.
It can be of the same form and of the same nature, for example, the greater fatigue and attrition of the enemy at this time, but the continuation of fatigue and attrition in the previous stage.
But there will inevitably be completely new conditions and situations. For example, if the enemy fights one or more defeats, the conditions favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy are not only the fatigue of the enemy and so on, but also the new conditions under which the enemy defeats the battle. The situation has also taken on a new change. The enemy's movements were hectic and improper, and the superiority and inferiority of the two armies were different from those of the previous ones.
If one to a few defeats do not belong to the enemy, but to our army, then the favorableness of the conditions and the situation will also change to the opposite. That is to say, the disadvantages of the enemy decrease, and the disadvantages of ours begin to occur and even expand. This is again completely new and different from the previous one.
Whichever side fails, it directly and rapidly provokes a new effort on the part of the loser, that is, an effort to save the crisis, to free oneself from this newly emerging condition and situation that is unfavorable to us and to the enemy, and to recreate the conditions and situations that are favorable to us and to oppress the enemy.
The efforts of the victors, on the contrary, are to develop their own victories, to inflict greater damage on the enemy, to increase or develop conditions and situations favorable to us, and to prevent the other side from completing its attempt to extricate itself from disadvantage and to save the situation.
Therefore, no matter where it is said, the struggle in the decisive stage is the most intense, complex, and changeable in the whole war or the whole campaign, and it is also the most difficult and arduous, and in terms of command, it is the most difficult season.
In the counter-offensive stage, there were many problems, the main ones being the beginning of the counter-offensive, the problem of concentrating troops, the problem of movement warfare, the problem of quick decisive battle, and the problem of annihilation warfare.
The principles of these questions, whether in terms of the counter-offensive or in the offensive, are invariably different in their basic nature. In this sense, it can be said that a counter-offensive is an offensive.
However, the counter-offensive is not exactly offensive. The principle of counter-offensive is applied when the enemy is attacking. Offensive principles are applied when defending the enemy. In this sense, there are several differences.
For this reason, although many of the problems of combat are here all described in the counter-offensive department of strategic defense, and only a few other problems are dealt with in the strategic offensive department to avoid duplication, when we apply them, we must not ignore their similarities or differences.
Section 5: The Question of the Beginning of the Counteroffensive
The question of the beginning of the counter-offensive, the so-called "first war" or "prelude war".
Many bourgeois militarists advocate caution in the initial war, both in strategic defense and strategic offensive, and especially in defense. We have raised this issue seriously in the past, and in the past. Jiangxi's campaign against the enemy's first to fifth "encirclement and suppression" has given us a wealth of experience, and it is not without merit to study these experiences.
During the first "encirclement and suppression," the enemy attacked the Red Army base area in eight columns from north to south from north to south, from the line of Ji'an and Jianning. At that time, the Red Army was about 40,000 people, concentrated in the Huangpi and Xiaobu areas of Ningdu County, Jiangxi Province.
At that time, the situation was: (1) The "advance and suppression" army was only 100,000 people, and none of them were of Chiang Kai-shek's concubines, and the overall situation was not very serious. (2) The enemy Luo Lin Division defended Ji'an, west of the Ganjiang River. (3) The enemy's three divisions, Gong Bingfan, Zhang Huizhan and Tan Daoyuan, advanced to occupy the area southeast of Ji'an and northwest of Ningdu in Tomita, Donggu, Longgang, and Yuanyuan. The main force of Zhang Shi is in Longgang, and the main force of Tan Shi is at the source. Tomita and Donggu did not trust the Red Army for a while because the people were deceived by the AB Regiment and opposed the Red Army, and it was not suitable to choose a battleground. (4) The enemy forces Liu he's division was far away from Jianning in the White District of Fujian Province, and did not necessarily cross into Jiangxi. (5) The enemy's mao bingwen and Xu Kexiang divisions advanced to the area between Guangchang and Ningdu in the areas of Toupi, Luokou, and Dongshao. Toupi is a white area, Luokou is a guerrilla zone, and Dongshao has an AB regiment, which is easy to leak information. Moreover, after beating Mao Bingwen Xu Kexiang and then fighting to the west, I was afraid that the three divisions of Zhang Huizhan, Tan Daoyuan, and Gongbing Fan would concentrate in the west, and it would not be easy to win a decisive victory and would not be able to solve the problem in the end. (6) The Zhang and Tan divisions were the main forces of the "encirclement and suppression, the commander-in-chief of the "encirclement and suppression" army, Lu Diping, chairman of Jiangxi, was a subordinate unit, and Zhang was also the commander-in-chief of the front. By eliminating these two divisions, the "encirclement and suppression" was basically broken. The two divisions each had about 14,000 men, and Master Zhang was divided into two places, and it was an absolute advantage for me to fight one division at a time. (7) The area around Longgang and The source, where the main forces of the Zhang and Tan divisions are located, is close to our concentration, and the people are in good condition and can approach in shade. (8) Longgang has excellent positions. The source is not easy to fight. If the enemy attacks Xiaobu and I, the position will be good. (IX) I can concentrate the maximum number of troops in the direction of Longgang. In the xingguo of the southwest of Longgang, there is still an independent division of more than a thousand people, which can also detour behind the enemy. (10) After our army made a breakthrough in the middle and opened a gap in the enemy's front, the enemy's eastern and western columns were separated into two distant groups. Based on the above reasons, our first battle was decided to fight and fight Zhang Huizhan's main force, two brigades and a division headquarters, and all 9,000 people, including the company commander, were captured, and not one person and one horse were missed. The victory in a battle frightened Tan Shi to run to Dongshao, and Xu Shi to run to Toupi. Our army pursued Tan Shi again to destroy half of it. Two battles were fought in five days (December 30, 1930 to January 3, 1931), so the enemies of Tomita, Donggu, and Toupi retreated one after another, and the first "encirclement and suppression" ended.
The situation during the second "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: (1) The "advance and suppression" of 200,000 troops, He Yingqin, as commander-in-chief, was stationed in Nanchang. (2) As in the first "encirclement and suppression, all of them were Chiang Kai-shek's non-concubine troops. Cai Tingkai's Nineteenth Route Army, Sun Lianzhong's Twenty-sixth Route Army, and Zhu Shaoliang's Sixth Route Army were the strongest or stronger, and the rest were weaker. (3) The AB regiment was purged, and the people in the base areas all supported the Red Army. (4) Wang Jinyu's Fifth Route Army arrived from the north, expressing fear, and its left wing Guo Huazong and Hao Mengling's two divisions were roughly the same. (5) Our army started from Futian and swept eastward, expanding its base areas in the Jianning, Lichuan, and Taining areas at the junction of Fujian and Gansu, and soliciting funds so as to facilitate breaking the next "encirclement and suppression." If it is fought from east to west, it will be limited to the Ganjiang River, and there will be no room for development after the end of the war. If you finish the game and then turn east, it will take time to work hard. (6) Although the number of our army has decreased slightly compared with the last battle (more than 30,000), it has been replenished for four months. Based on the above reasons, nai decided to fight the first battle with Wang Jinyu and Gongbing Domain (a total of eleven regiments) in the Tomita region. After the victory, he then beat Guo, Sun, Zhu, and Liu (47). In fifteen days (May 16-31, 1931), he walked 700 miles, fought five battles, and surrendered more than 20,000 guns, breaking the "encirclement and suppression" with great pain. When wang Jinyu was beaten, we were between the two enemies of Cai Tingkai and Guo Huazong, more than ten miles away from Guo and more than forty miles away from Cai, and some people called us "drilling the horns", but in the end we drilled through. Mainly because of the conditions of the base areas, coupled with the inconsistency of the various units of the enemy army. After Guo Shi's defeat, Hao Shi fled back to Yongfeng in the night and was spared.
The situation at the time of the third "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: (1) Chiang Kai-shek personally served as commander-in-chief, and was divided into commanders-in-chief of the left and right central and third roads. He Yingqin of the Middle Road, stationed in Nanchang with Jiang Tong; Chen Mingshu on the right road, stationed in Ji'an; zhu Shaoliang on the left road, stationed in Nanfeng (48). (2) 300,000 "advancing" troops. The main force was Five divisions of Jiang Yuan's clan, including Chen Cheng, Luo Zhuoying, Zhao Guantao, Wei Lihuang, and Jiang Dingwen, with nine regiments in each division, totaling about 100,000 people. The second was Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Han Deloitte's Third Division (49), with 40,000 people. The second was Sun Lianzhongjun, 20,000 people. Yu Jun was not of the Jiang clan and was weaker. (3) The strategy of "advancing and suppressing" is a "long drive straight in," which is very different from the "step by step battalion" of the second "encirclement and suppression" in an attempt to oppress the Red Army on the Ganjiang River and eliminate it. (4) The end of the second "encirclement and suppression" and the beginning of the third "encirclement and suppression" last only one month. After the bitter battle, the Red Army did not rest or replenish (about 30,000 people), and then detoured thousands of miles back to the Xingguo concentration in the western part of the Gannan base area, when the enemy was already separated and forced to face it. Under the above circumstances, the first policy we decided was to make a breakthrough through Futian through Wan'an by Xingguo, and then from west to east, sweeping past the enemy's rear liaison line, so that the enemy's main force would penetrate deep into the Base Area of Gannan and be placed in a useless place, making this the first stage of the operation. And the enemy will turn back to the north, will be very tired, and take advantage of the gap to hit those who can be beaten, for the second stage. The center of this policy is to avoid the enemy's main force and fight its weakness. However, when our army was advancing toward Tomita, it was discovered by the enemy, and the two divisions of Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying arrived. I had to change my plans and return to the Happy Polder in the west of The Xingguo, where only this polder and dozens of squares in its vicinity were left to allow our army to concentrate. After a day of concentration, Nai Zhiji rushed to the east in the direction of Liantang in the east of Xingguo County, Liang Village in the south of Yongfeng County, and Huangpi in the north of Ningdu County. On the first day, by night, he passed through the forty-mile gap between Jiang Dingwenshi and Jiang, Cai, and Han Jun, and turned to Liantang. The next day he made contact with the outpost of Shangguan Yunxiangjun (Shangguan commanded one of his own divisions and Hao Mengling's division). On the third day, the battle against the Official Division was the first battle, the fourth day was the second battle against Hao Mengling's division, and then the three-day trip to Huangpi to fight Mao Bingwen division was the third battle. All three battles were won, and more than 10,000 guns were surrendered (50). At this time, all the main forces of the enemy army to the west and south turned their flags to the east, concentrated their eyes on Huangpi, and marched forward violently, looking for me to fight, and taking a dense encirclement posture to approach our army. Our army sneaked past a large mountain with a gap of twenty miles between Chiang, Cai, Han, and Chen and Luo, and returned from the east to the territory of Xingguo in the west. By the time the enemy found out that I was advancing further west, I had rested for half a month, but the enemy was hungry, tired, and powerless, and determined to retreat. I also took advantage of his retreat to beat Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Jiang Dingwen, and Han Deloitte, eliminating a brigade of Jiang Dingwen and a division of Han Deloitte. The two divisions of Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai were confronted and let them escape.
The situation at the time of the fourth "encirclement and suppression" was that the enemy was advancing toward Guangchang in three ways, with the main force on the East Road and the two divisions on the West Road exposed to us and approaching our concentration. Therefore, I was able to first attack the western part of Yihuang and eliminate the two divisions of Li Ming and Chen Shiji in one fell swoop. The enemy separated two divisions from the left road to cooperate with the middle road and then advanced, and I had to destroy one of his divisions in the southern area of Yihuang. After the two campaigns paid more than 10,000 guns, this "encirclement and suppression" was basically broken.
In the fifth "encirclement and suppression," the enemy advanced with a new strategy of fortress doctrine and first occupied Lichuan. However, I tried to restore Lichuan, to keep the enemy out of the base area, to fight the enemy's consolidated position north of Lichuan and the saltpeter of the white area. The First World War was not won, and it hit the Zixi Bridge in the southeast, which was also the enemy's consolidation position and the white area, and it was not victorious. After that, he fought between the enemy's main force and the fortress, completely falling into a passive position. In the end, the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war lasted for a year, and there was absolutely no way to be active on its own. In the end, he had to withdraw from the Jiangxi base area.
The above-mentioned experience in our army's operations during the first to fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" period proves that the Red Army, which is in a defensive position, wants to break the powerful "advance and suppression" army and the first battle of the counter-offensive, which has a very great bearing. The victory or defeat of the first battle has a great impact on the overall situation, and even on the last battle. Therefore, the following conclusions are drawn:
First, we must win. We must have the enemy's situation, terrain, people, and other conditions that are beneficial to us and unfavorable to the enemy. Otherwise, it is better to back down and hold the heavy standby. There are always opportunities, and there is no way to fight. When the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign was fought, tan Daoyuan was first attempted to strike Tan Daoyuan, but only because the enemy could not break away from the condescending position at the source, our army marched twice, but it withdrew patiently twice, and after a few days it found Zhang Huizhen, who was good to fight. During the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, our army marched to Donggu, only to wait for Wang Jinyu to break away from his Futian to consolidate his position, preferring to risk leaking news, rejecting all suggestions of a quick attack, forcing the enemy to live, and waiting for twenty-five days before finally meeting the requirements. Although the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" was such a stormy situation, thousands of miles back to the division, and the enemy discovered our plan to detour to its side, we still patiently turned back, switched to the middle breakthrough, and finally fought the first good battle in Liantang. During the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, Nanfeng Buke resolutely took the step of retreat, and finally turned to the enemy's right wing, concentrated on the Dongshao area, and began a great victory in southern Yihuang. Only during the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, he did not know the great importance of the initial battle, was shocked by the loss of a city in Lichuan, and proceeded from the attempt to save the enemy in the north, but after Yu Xunkou did not expect to encounter a victory (destroying the enemy's division), he did not regard this battle as the first battle, did not look at the changes inevitable caused by this battle, and rushed to attack the invincible saltpeter. One step on the other hand loses the initiative, which is really the stupidest and worst way to play.
Second, the plan for the first battle must be an organic prelude to the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign, there must be no really good first battle. That is to say, even if a victorious battle is fought in the first battle, if the battle is not only not beneficial to the whole battle, but is harmful, the battle will only be considered a defeat even if it is won (for example, the Battle of Xunkou during the fifth "encirclement and suppression"). Therefore, before fighting the first battle, we must think about how the second, third, fourth, and even final battles will be fought in general, and if I win one battle after another, how the overall situation of the enemy will change, and if it is defeated, how it will change. Although the results may not be as expected, we must carefully and earnestly understand them in light of the overall situation of both sides. Without the overall situation in the chest, it will not really shoot a good chess piece.
Third, think of the next strategic phase of the article. If we only care about the counter-offensive, regardless of the victory of the counter-offensive, or in the event of a failure of the counter-offensive, the following approach will still not fulfill the responsibility of the strategic guide. When the strategic instructor is in one strategic stage, it should be counted in most of the subsequent stages, or at least to the next stage. Although future changes are unpredictable and the farther away you look, the more elusive you look, but the general calculation is possible, and it is necessary to estimate the prospects for the future. The way of guiding, which takes one step at a time, is not good for politics, and it is also bad for war. One step should be taken by looking at the specific changes in that step, in order to modify or develop one's own strategic campaign plan accordingly, and if you do not do so, you will make the mistake of taking a risk. However, a policy that runs through the entire strategic stage and even several strategic stages, is generally figured out, and has been generally thought out for a long period of time, is by no means indispensable. Failure to do so will lead to the mistake of hesitation and stagnation, which is actually suitable for the strategic requirements of the enemy and traps oneself in a passive position. It must be understood that the commander-in-chief of the enemy has a certain strategic vision. Only by making ourselves superior in our training will we have the possibility of strategic victory. The main reason why the strategic guidance of the "Left" opportunist line and the Zhang Guotao line during the period of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the enemy was that it was not done. In short, the stage of retreat must be counted to the stage of counter-offensive, the stage of counter-offensive must be counted to the stage of attack, and the stage of attack must be counted to the stage of retreat. Without this calculation, the stakes that are tied to the immediate future are the way to failure.
Victory must be won; the whole campaign plan must be taken care of; the next strategic stage must be taken care of: these are the three principles that must not be forgotten when the first battle is fought, at the beginning of the counter-offensive.
Section VI: The Issue of Concentrating Troops
Concentrating forces appears to be easy, but it is quite difficult to implement. Everyone knows that winning more is the best way to win less, but many people cannot do it, and on the contrary, they always disperse their forces, because the instructor lacks strategic acumen, is confused by the complex environment, and is therefore dominated by the environment, loses his autonomy, and adopts coping doctrine.
No matter how complex, severe, and tragic the environment, the first thing a military instructor needs is to organize and use his own power independently and autonomously. It is common to be forced by the enemy to a passive position, and it is important to quickly restore the initiative. If you can't get back to that position, the following is a failure.
Initiative is not utopian, but concrete, material. The most important thing here is to preserve and assemble the largest and most dynamic army.
Defensive warfare is inherently prone to falling into a passive position, and defensive warfare is not as good as offensive warfare, which can fully exert its initiative. However, defensive warfare can have an active content in a passive form, and it can be transferred from the passive stage in form to the active stage in form and content. A completely planned strategic retreat is formally forced out of this, and in content it is to preserve military strength, wait for the opportunity to break the enemy, and lure the enemy to go deep and prepare for a counter-offensive. Only those who refuse to retreat and rush to battle (such as saltpeter battles) seem to be striving for the initiative on the surface, but in fact they are passive. The strategic counter-offensive, on the other hand, not only takes the initiative in content, but also abandons the passive posture of retreat in form. As far as the enemy is concerned, the counter-offensive is the effort of our army to force it to give up its initiative and at the same time to give it a passive position.
In order to fully achieve this goal, the concentration of forces, the movement of the war, the rapid decisive battle, and the war of annihilation are all necessary conditions. The concentration of forces is the first and the main thing.
The reason why it is necessary to concentrate forces is to change the situation between the enemy and ourselves. First, it is to change the situation of advance and retreat. In the past, it was the enemy who advanced and we retreated, but now we are trying to achieve our goal of advancing and retreating from the enemy. The purpose of concentrating forces to win a battle was achieved in this battle, and it also affected the whole campaign.
Second, it is to change the situation of attack and defense. Retreating to the end of retreat is basically a negative stage in defensive warfare, that is, the stage of "defending.". The counter-offensive belongs to the active stage, that is, the stage of "attack". Although the entire strategic defense has not departed from the defensive nature, compared with the counter-offensive and the retreat, it is not only in form but also in content, something that has changed. Counter-offensive is a transitional thing between strategic defense and strategic offensive, and with the nature of the eve of a strategic offensive, the concentration of forces is aimed at this purpose.
Third, it is to change the situation on the inner and outer lines. Armies that are strategically fighting on the internal front, especially the Red Army, which is in an environment of "encirclement and suppression," suffer many disadvantages. But we can and should change it in battle or battle. A large "encirclement and suppression" of our army by the enemy army has been changed to a number of small encirclement and suppression of the enemy army by our army. The strategic division and combined attack of the enemy against our army should be changed to the combined attack of our army on the enemy's campaign or battle. Change the strategic superiority of the enemy against our army into the superiority of our army in battle or battle against the enemy. Strategically strong enemy forces are placed in the position of the weak in battle or battle. At the same time, change the status of the strategically weak to the position of the strong in the battle or in combat. This is the so-called external operation in internal operations, encirclement and suppression in "encirclement and suppression", blockade in blockade, offensive in defense, superiority in inferiority, strong among weak, advantage in disadvantage, and initiative in passivity. To win victory from strategic defense, we basically rely on the concentration of forces.
In the history of the Chinese Red Army, this question has often become an important issue of debate. At the Battle of Ji'an on October 4, 1930, the advance and attack were carried out without waiting for the full concentration of forces, but fortunately the enemy (Deng Ying's division) fled on his own, and our attack itself did not work.
Beginning in 1932, there was the slogan of "all-round attack," which called for attacks from the east, west, south, and north sides of the base areas. This is not only wrong in strategic defense, but also in strategic offensive. When there is no fundamental change in the whole situation of the contrast between the enemy and the enemy, whether it is strategy or tactics, there are two aspects of defense and attack, clamping down and assault, and in fact there is very little so-called all-round attack. The slogan of the all-out attack is military egalitarianism that accompanies military adventurism.
By 1933, the military egalitarians had the so-called "two fists to beat people", dividing the main force of the Red Army into two, in an attempt to win in two strategic directions at the same time. The result was a fist that was rendered useless, a fist that was tired, and there was no greatest victory possible at the time. In my opinion, under the condition of the presence of a strong enemy army, no matter how many troops one one has, in a time period of time, there should be only one main direction of use, not two. I am not opposed to two or more directions of operation, but the main direction, at the same time, should have only one. The Chinese Red Army appeared in the battlefield of the civil war as a weak person, and its record of defeating the strong enemy and shocking the world depended on the concentration of troops. No matter which big victory, this can be proved. "One for ten, ten for a hundred" is a strategic statement, a comparison of the whole war between the enemy and ourselves; in this sense, we are indeed so. Not for campaigns and tactics; in that sense, we should never. Whether in a counter-offensive or an offensive, we always gather our strength to fight the enemy. The battle against Tan Daoyuan in the Dongshao area of Ningdu County, Jiangxi in January 1931, the battle against the 19th Route Army in the Xingguo County, Jiangxi Province in September 1931, the battle against Chen Jitang in the Shuikouwei area of Nanxiong County, Guangdong Province in July 1932, and the battle against Chen Cheng in the Tuancun area of Lichuan County, Jiangxi in December 1933, all suffered losses from the concentration of troops. Battles such as Shuikouwei and Tuancun were generally counted as victories, and they were also considered major victories (the former defeated Chen Jitang's twenty regiments, and the latter defeated Chen Cheng's twelve regiments [51]), but we have never welcomed such victories, and in a sense it can be said that it was a defeat. Because there is no seizure or no more than consumption, it seems to us to be of little significance. Our strategy is "one for ten" and our tactic is "ten for one," which is one of the fundamental laws for us to defeat the enemy.
Military egalitarianism reached its extreme by the time of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1934. The "six-way division of troops" and "the full line of resistance" thought that the enemy could be subdued, but the result was that the enemy was controlled, because of the fear of losing land. Concentrate the main force in one direction, and the other directions are left with the clamping force, which naturally causes the loss of land. However, this was a temporary local loss, at the cost of victory in the direction of the assault. The assault direction is victorious, and the loss of the clamping direction can be restored. The enemy's first, second, third, and fourth "encirclement and suppression" all caused us to suffer losses of land, especially when the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" was almost completely lost in the Base Areas of the Red Army in Jiangxi, but as a result our land was not only restored, but also expanded.
Because the strength of the people in the base areas is invisible, the erroneous mentality of fearing that the Red Army will stay away from the base areas often occurs. This mentality occurred in 1932 when the Red Army in Jiangxi went far away to fight in Zhangzhou, Fujian, and when the Red Army turned to Fujian to attack after the victory of the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1933. The former feared the occupation of the entire base area, while the latter feared the occupation of a part of the base area, opposed the concentration of troops and advocated the division of troops to guard, and the results proved to be wrong. In the eyes of the enemy, the Red Army, which on the one hand feared the advance of the base areas and on the other hand, the Red Army, which went to the white areas, was their main danger. The enemy's attention is always directed toward the location of the main Red Army, and it is rare to abandon the main Red Army and go exclusively to the base area. When the Red Army was defending, the enemy's attention was still focused on the Red Army. The plan to reduce the base areas is part of the enemy's whole plan; but if the Red Army concentrates its main forces to destroy its way, the enemy command will have to turn their attention and their forces greater towards the Red Army. Therefore, the enemy's plan to shrink the base area can also be destroyed.
"During the five 'encirclement and suppression' periods of fortress doctrine, we could not concentrate on fighting, but could only divide our troops and defend ourselves into short surprise attacks." This statement is also incorrect. The enemy's bastional combat method of advancing in three miles and five miles and pushing in ten miles and eight miles was completely promoted by the Red Army's own step-by-step resistance. If our army abandons the method of warfare of resisting the enemy on the inside line, and then turns to the enemy's inner line when necessary and possible, the situation must be different. The law of concentrating forces is precisely the instrument for defeating fortressism.
The concentration of forces we advocate does not include the abandonment of guerrilla warfare by the people. The lisan line advocated the abandonment of small guerrilla warfare and the "concentration of a single gun in the Red Army", which has long been proved to be wrong. The people's guerrilla war, from the point of view of the whole revolutionary war, and the main Red Army are each other's left and right hands, and the guerrilla war with only the main Red Army and no people is like a one-armed general. The conditions of the people in the base areas, specifically, and especially in the case of combat, are those of the armed people. The enemy is regarded as fearful, and mainly at this point.
It is also necessary to place the detachments of the Red Army in a secondary direction of operations, and not everything must be concentrated. The concentration of forces we advocate is based on the principle of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority over battlefield operations. For strong enemies, or on the battlefield of vital importance, it should be approached with absolute superiority, such as the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" battle on December 30, 1930, which concentrated 40,000 people to fight Zhang Huizhan's 9,000 people. For example, in the final battle of the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign on May 31, 1931, Liu Heding's division of 7,000 men was fought against Jianning, and the Red Army only used more than 10,000 men.
Nor does it mean that you have to have superior troops every time. In some cases, it is also possible to appear on the battlefield with relatively inferior or absolutely inferior troops. Relative disadvantages, such as the fact that there is only a small Red Army in a certain area (not a small army and not concentrated), in order to break the offensive of a certain superior enemy, when the people, terrain or weather conditions can give us great assistance, the guerrillas or small detachments clamp down on its front and one wing, and the Red Army concentrates all its strength to suddenly attack a part of its other flank, of course, it is also necessary and can be victorious. When I attacked a part of one of its flanks, the balance of forces still applied the principle of superiority over inferiority, and victory over less. Absolute disadvantages, such as guerrilla attacks on large white armies, attacking only a small part of them, apply the same principles.
The idea that a large army is concentrated in one battlefield and is limited by terrain, roads, supplies, garrisons, etc., should also be seen separately. These restrictions differed in degree between the Red Army and the White Army, for the Red Army was able to endure greater difficulties than the White Army.
We win more with less — we say this to the rulers of China as a whole. Again, we win more than we do— we say this to the enemy in all parts of the battlefield. It is no secret that the enemy is generally familiar with our temper. Yet the enemy cannot cancel our victory, nor can it avoid their losses, for they do not know when and where we do so. We keep this a secret. The Red Army's operations were generally surprise attacks.
Section 7: Movement Warfare
Mobile warfare, or positional warfare? Our answer is: mobile warfare. In the absence of a large number of troops, no replenishment of ammunition, and only one Red Army fighting around in each base area, position warfare is basically useless to us. For us, position warfare is basically impossible to use when defending, but it is also impossible to use it when attacking.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Red Army's operations due to the strength of the enemy and the technical weakness of the Red Army is that there are no fixed lines of operation.
The combat line of the Red Army is subordinated to the operational direction of the Red Army. The direction of the operation is not fixed, and the combat line is not fixed. Although the general direction does not change for a period of time, the small direction within the general direction changes at any time, and if one direction is restricted, it must be turned to the other. After a period of time, the general direction was also limited, and even this general direction had to be changed.
During the revolutionary civil war, the lines of battle could not be fixed, and this was the case even in the Soviet Union. The Soviet army differs from our army in that it is not as fixed as ours. All wars cannot have an absolutely fixed line of battle, and the change of victory or defeat does not allow this. But relatively fixed lines of war are often seen in general warfare. The exception is an exception for an army such as the Chinese Red Army, which is in its current stage, with a huge disparity between the enemy and ourselves.
The irregularity of the combat line affects the irregularity of the territory of the base area. It is common to shrink and extend when it is large, and it often occurs when it rises and falls. This territorial mobility is entirely derived from the mobility of war.
The mobility of war and territory has also affected the various construction work in the base areas. A construction plan of several years and months cannot be imagined. The frequency of change in plans is a common thing for us.
Acknowledging this characteristic is in our interest. Proceeding from this characteristic, we should set our agenda, do not fantasize about a war without retreat, do not be shocked by the temporary movement of territory and military rear, and do not attempt to establish a concrete plan for a long period of time. Adapt our thoughts and work to the situation, prepare to sit down, prepare to walk, and do not throw away the dry food bag. Only by working hard in the current mobile life can we strive for a comparative non-flow in the future, and can we strive for final stability.
He ruled the strategic policy of the so-called "regular war" in the period of the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" campaign, denied this fluidity, and opposed the so-called "guerrillaism". The comrades who opposed the movement had to pretend to be the rulers of a big country, and the result was an unusually large movement—the twenty-five thousand miles of the Long March.
Our workers' and peasants' republic is a state, but today it is still an incomplete state. Today we are still in the period of strategic defense of civil war, our regime is still far from a complete national form, the number and technology of our army are far from that of the enemy, our territory is still small, and our enemy wants to destroy us at all times to be happy. To define our policy from above is not to oppose guerrillaism in general, but to honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army. Shame is useless here. On the contrary, guerrillaism is our characteristic, our strength, our tool for defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to abandon guerrillaism, but not today. Guerrillaism must be something shameful and must be discarded in the future, but today it is something precious and must be upheld.
"If you can win a fight, you will fight, and if you can't win, you will leave." This is the popular interpretation of our movement warfare today. There are no military experts in the world who only admit to fighting and not admitting to leaving, but it is not as strong as we are. For us, we usually spend more time walking than fighting, and it is good to fight a big battle every month on average. All "walking" is for the purpose of "fighting," and all our strategic campaign principles are based on a basic point of "fighting." However, there are several situations before us that are not easy to fight: first, there are more enemies in front of us; second, although there are not many enemies in front of us, they are very close to the neighboring enemies, and sometimes they are not easy to fight; third, generally speaking, any enemy who is not isolated but occupies a very solid position is not easy to fight; fourth, when fighting and unable to solve the battle, it is not good to continue fighting. At all these times, we are ready to go. Such a walk is permissible and necessary. Because we recognize the necessary to go, we are under the conditions of first acknowledging the necessary fight. The basic characteristics of the red army's mobile warfare are here.
Basically, mobile warfare is not the rejection of necessary and possible positional warfare. When we are in strategic defense, we must restrain the stubbornness of certain fulcrums in the aspect, and when we encounter an isolated and helpless enemy when we attack strategically, we should admit to using position warfare to deal with it. We have had a lot of experience in taking such position warfare to defeat the enemy; many cities, fortresses, and villages have been opened by us, and to a certain extent, the enemy's field positions have been broken through by us. In the future, we will increase our efforts in this regard and make up for our weaknesses in this regard. It is entirely appropriate for us to promote positional attack and positional defence, which is required and permitted by the circumstances. What we oppose is simply the adoption of general trench warfare today, or the equal treatment of trench warfare and mobile warfare, which is not permissible.
The guerrilla nature of the Red Army, the lack of fixed lines of combat, the mobility of the base areas, the mobility of the construction of the base areas, did not change at all in the Ten Years' War? There are variations. The first stage before the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign from Jinggangshan to Jiangxi was the first stage, in which guerrillaism and mobility were great, and the Red Army was still in its infancy, and the base area was still a guerrilla zone. From the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" to the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" as the second stage, guerrilla and mobility have shrunk a lot in this stage, the front army has been established, and the base areas containing millions of people already exist. From the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" to the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" as the third stage, guerrilla mobility has narrowed even more. The Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Council have been established. The Long March is the fourth stage. Because of the erroneous denial of small guerrillas and small flows, there comes a big guerrilla and a big flow. It is currently the fifth phase. As a result of the failure to defeat the fifth "encirclement and suppression" and the large-scale movement, both the Red Army and the base areas were greatly reduced, but they had already established their footing in the northwest and consolidated and developed the base areas of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The three main fronts of the Red Army have unified command, which is unprecedented.
According to the nature of the strategy, it can also be said that the Period from the Jinggangshan Period to the Fourth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Period is a stage, the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Period is another stage, and the Long March is now the third stage. During the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, people mistakenly repudiated the previously correct policy, and today we have correctly negated the erroneous policy of the people during the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign and revived the previous correct policy. However, it is not to deny everything in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, nor is it to resurrect everything that was before. What was resurrected is what was good in the past, and what is negated is what was wrong in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.
Guerrillaism has two sides. On the one hand, informality is not centralized, not uniform, not strict discipline, and simplified working methods. These things were brought about by the Red Army itself in its infancy, and some of them were exactly what was needed at the time. At the advanced stage of the Red Army, however, it is necessary to gradually and consciously remove them, to make the Red Army more concentrated, more unified, more disciplined, more thorough in its work, that is to say, to make it more regular. In operational command, it is also necessary to gradually and consciously reduce the guerrilla nature that is unnecessary at the advanced stage. Refusal to move forward in this respect, stubbornly pausing in the old stage, is impermissible, harmful and detrimental to large-scale operations.
On the other hand, the policy of mobile warfare is the guerrilla nature of the strategic and campaign operations that are still needed now, the unaffordable mobility of the base areas, the flexible change of the plan for the construction of the base areas, and the regularization of the construction of the Red Army without being untimely. In this respect, rejecting historical facts, opposing the retention of useful things, rushing out of the present stage, and blindly running towards the so-called "new stage" that is unattainable and of no practical significance at present is equally impermissible, harmful, and detrimental to the present war.
We are now on the eve of the next new stage in the technology and organization of the Red Army. We should be prepared to move to a new phase. It is wrong not to make such preparations, and it is not conducive to future wars. In the future, the technical and organizational conditions of the Red Army will change, the building of the Red Army will enter a new stage, and the comparative fixation of the Red Army's operational direction and combat lines will appear; the battle of positions will increase; the mobility of war, territory and construction will be greatly reduced, and in the end it will be eliminated; and what is now restricting us, such as the superior enemy and the consolidated positions it holds, cannot limit us.
We now oppose, on the one hand, the erroneous methods of the "Left" opportunist rule, and on the other hand, the revival of many of the irregularities of the red army's infancy that are not needed at present. But we must resolutely restore the many valuable principles of army building and strategic tactics that the Red Army has used all the way to win battles. We must sum up all the good things of the past and make them systematic, more developed and richer military lines in order to strive for victory over the enemy today and to prepare for a new stage in the future.
In the practice of mobile warfare, there are many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgment, determination, combat deployment, command, shading, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, attack, position attack, position defense, encounter, retreat, night combat, special combat, avoiding the strong and fighting the weak, besieging the city to fight for assistance, feinting, air defense, being between several enemies, fighting beyond the enemy, continuous combat, no rear combat, the necessity of recuperating, and so on. These problems have manifested many characteristics in the history of the Red Army's warfare, and they should be described in a coherent manner in campaign science and should be summed up, and I will not say them here.
Section 8: Quick Decisive Battle
Strategic protracted war, battle and quick decisive battle of battle, these are two sides of the same thing, two principles of equal emphasis on the civil war, and can also be applied to the war against imperialism.
Because of the strength of the reactionary forces, the revolutionary forces grow gradually, and this defines the protractability of the war. In this regard, it is necessary to suffer losses in a hurry, and it is not correct to advocate a "quick decision" on this. The revolutionary war that has been fought for ten years may be surprising to other countries, but it is as if the eight strands of articles have only broken the topic, undertaken the topic, and started the lecture (52), and many lively articles are still to come. In the future, under the influence of all internal and external conditions, there is no doubt that the speed will be greatly increased than in the past. Because the international and domestic environment has changed, and there will be greater changes to come, it can be said that we have moved away from the slowly developing situation of fighting alone in the past. However, it should not be intended that it will succeed tomorrow. The spirit of "extinguishing this pilgrimage" (53) is good, and the specific plan of "extinguishing this pilgrimage" is not good. Because the reactionary forces in China are supported by many imperialists, our revolutionary war will continue to last until the domestic revolutionary forces have accumulated enough to break through the main positions of the internal and external enemies, and until the international revolutionary forces have broken and suppressed most of the international reactionary forces. Proceeding from this point, stipulating the strategic principle of our long-term combat is one of the important principles of strategic guidance.
The principles of campaign and combat, on the contrary, are not protracted but quick. Striving for quick decisions in battles and battles is the same in ancient and modern China and abroad. On the issue of war, both ancient and modern China and foreign countries have all demanded a quick decision, and protracted protracted periods have always been considered unfavorable. But China's war alone cannot but be treated with the greatest patience and with protracted war. Some people ridiculed our approach as "boxing tactics" during the establishment of the Third Line (saying that we can only take big cities by fighting in the past), and ridiculed that we had to wait until our hair was gray before we could see the victory of the revolution. This kind of emotion that manifests acute illness has long proved to be wrong. But their criticism is quite right, if not on strategic issues but on campaigns and battles. The reasons are: first, the Red Army's weapons, especially ammunition, have no source; second, the White Army has many units, and the Red Army has only one unit, and to break through an "encirclement and suppression" it is necessary to prepare for a rapid continuous battle; third, although the White Army is divided into divisions, it is mostly relatively dense, and if one of them cannot quickly settle the battle, the rest will come. For these reasons, it is impossible not to carry out a quick decisive battle. For us, it's often the case to settle a battle in hours, a day or two. Only under the principle of "besieging the city and providing assistance" is the purpose of fighting the enemy, but to fight and aid the enemy, and the battle against the enemy is prepared for a fairly long time, but it is still a quick decision to aid the enemy. When strategic defense is held, the strongholds in the clamping area are firmly held, and when the strategic offensive is attacked, the isolated and helpless enemies are fought, and the white strongholds in the base areas are destroyed, and these times often give a lasting policy to the campaign or battle. However, these protracted battles only helped and did not hinder the rapid decisive battle of the main Red Army.
The quick showdown is not a matter of mentally wanting to do so to be successful, and many specific conditions must be added. The main conditions are adequate preparation, losing no time, concentrating superior forces, encircling roundabout tactics, good positions, and fighting enemies in motion, or enemies who are stationed but whose positions are not yet consolidated. It is impossible not to resolve these conditions and to seek a quick decision in a battle or battle.
Breaking a "encirclement and suppression" is a big battle, and the principle of quick fixation rather than the principle of enduringness still applies. This is because the human, financial, and military conditions of the base areas cannot be sustained.
But under the general principle of quick fixation, it is necessary to oppose unjustified impatience. It is absolutely necessary for the highest military and political leading organ in a revolutionary base area to estimate these conditions in the base areas and the situation of the enemy, not to be intimidated by the enemy's menacing power, not to be frustrated by the difficulties that can still be endured, not to be discouraged by certain setbacks, and to give the necessary patience and durability. Jiangxi broke the first "encirclement and suppression" only one week from the beginning of the war to the end, broke the second "encirclement and suppression" only half a month, broke the third "encirclement and suppression" for three months, the fourth time was three weeks, and the fifth time survived for a whole year. However, when he was forced to break through the fifth time without breaking the "encirclement and suppression", he also showed that he was in an undue hurry. Depending on the situation, it can be spent for two or three months to rest the army. If that were the case, and if the leaders after the breakout were a little smarter, the situation would be very different.
Nevertheless, it does not undermine what we call the principle of striving to shorten the duration of the entire campaign. In addition to the conditions of the campaign battle plan, such as striving to concentrate troops and moving wars, and the period of service to eliminate the enemy's effective forces on the inner line (in the base areas) and to quickly resolve the "encirclement and suppression", when the "encirclement and suppression" has proved that it cannot be solved on the internal line, it is necessary to use the main force of the Red Army to break through the enemy's siege line and transfer to our outer line, that is, the enemy's inner line, to solve this problem. Today, when fortressism is developed, this means will become a regular means of warfare. Two months after the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, when the Fujian Incident occurred, the main force of the Red Army should undoubtedly break through to the Suzhou-Zhejiang-Anhui-Gansu region centered on Zhejiang, and gallop between Hangzhou, Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuhu, Nanchang, and Fuzhou, transforming strategic defense into a strategic offensive, threatening the enemy's fundamental stronghold, and seeking combat in the vast areas without fortresses. In this way, we will be able to force the enemy attacking the western fujian region in southern Jiangxi to return to its fundamental stronghold, crush its attack on the Jiangxi base area, and assist the Fujian people's government,—— and this method will certainly be able to assist it with certainty. If this plan is not used, the fifth "encirclement and suppression" will not be broken, and the Fujian People's Government will have no choice but to fall. By the time of the one-year war, although it was no longer conducive to leaving Zhejiang, it was still possible to take a strategic offensive in the other direction, that is, to advance to Hunan with the main force, not through Hunan to Guizhou, but to the central part of Hunan, and to mobilize the enemy in Jiangxi to Hunan and destroy it. This plan is not used, and the hope of breaking the fifth "encirclement and suppression" is finally broken, leaving the Long March with one road.
Section 9: War of Annihilation
The idea of "struggling to exhaust" was untimely for the Chinese Red Army. "Bi Bao" is not the Dragon King to the Dragon King, but the beggar to the Dragon King, which is not funny. For the Red Army, which gave almost everything to the enemy, the basic policy was the war of annihilation. Only by annihilating the enemy's living forces can we break the "encirclement and suppression" and develop the revolutionary base areas. Killing or injuring the enemy is taken as a means of annihilating the enemy; otherwise it is meaningless. We are depleted by killing and wounding the enemy, and replenished by annihilating the enemy, so that we not only compensate for the consumption of our army, but also increase the strength of our army. Defeat is not basically the decisive thing for a strong enemy. The war of annihilation has an immediate and significant impact on any enemy. For a man, it is better to break ten of his fingers than to break one of his fingers; for the enemy, it is better to destroy ten of his divisions than to annihilate one of his divisions.
With regard to the first, second, third, and fourth "encirclement and suppression," our policy is a war of annihilation. The enemy annihilated at each time is only a part of the total enemy, but the "encirclement and suppression" is broken. In the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the opposite approach was adopted, in fact, helping the enemy to achieve their goals.
Annihilation warfare and the concentration of superior forces and the adoption of encirclement and detour tactics are of the same significance. Without the latter, there would be no former. Conditions such as people's sponsorship, a good position, a good enemy to fight, and surprise are all indispensable to achieve the goal of annihilation.
It is meaningful to crush, or even to let the enemy flee, but it is only for the main force of our army to hold an annihilating battle against a certain enemy in the whole battle or the whole campaign; otherwise it is meaningless. Again, this is an occasion where something is lost and something is gained and meaningful.
We must build a military industry so that it does not contribute to dependency. Our basic policy is to rely on the military industry of imperialism and domestic enemies. The arsenals in London and Hanyang, which we have the right to, are sent by enemy convoys. This is the truth, not the joke.
【Notes】
[1] The concept of "reality", according to the Chinese characters, has two meanings: one refers to the real situation, and the other refers to people's actions (that is, what ordinary people call practice). Mao Zedong's application of this concept in his writings was often pun-on.
[2] Sun Wuzi (孙武子) was a famous military scientist of the Spring and Autumn Period in China who wrote thirteen articles of Sun Tzu. For the introduction to this article, see "Sun Tzu Plotting to Attack".
[3] From the founding of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 to the time Mao Zedong wrote this article in 1936, it was exactly fifteen years.
[4] Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), a native of Huaining, Anhui. One of the main leaders of the May Fourth New Culture Movement. After the May Fourth Movement, he accepted and propagated Marxism and was one of the main founders of the Communist Party of China. He was the main leader of the party for the first six years after its founding. Chen Duxiu's right-leaning opportunism refers to the right-leaning capitulationist error represented by Chen Duxiu in the first half of 1927. At that time, he gave up his leadership over the peasant masses, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, especially the leadership of the armed forces, advocated all unity, denied struggle, and adopted a policy of compromise and surrender to the conspiracy activities of the Kuomintang rightists against communism and the people, so that when Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, representatives of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, betrayed the revolution one after another and launched a surprise attack on the people, the Communist Party of China and the broad masses of the revolutionary people could not organize effective resistance, resulting in the defeat of the first domestic revolutionary war. On August 7 of the same year, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an emergency meeting in Hankou to sum up the lessons of the defeat of the Great Revolution and put an end to the rule of Chen Duxiu's right-leaning capitulationism in the Party Central Committee. Subsequently, Chen Duxiu was pessimistic and disappointed in the future of the revolution, accepted the Trotskyist views, set up a small organization within the party, carried out anti-party activities, and was expelled from the party in November 1929. He was arrested by the Kuomintang government in October 1932 and released from prison in August 1937. He died in Jiangjin, Sichuan in 1942.
[5] Li Lisan (1899-1967), a native of Liling, Hunan. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1921 and was one of the main leaders of the Chinese workers' movement. Li Lisan's "Left" opportunism refers to the mistakes of "Left" adventurism represented by him during the Second Civil Revolutionary War. On June 11, 1930, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, under the leadership of Li Lisan, adopted a resolution entitled "A New Revolutionary Upsurge and the First Victory of a Province or Provinces," advocating that all parts of the country should be prepared for an immediate uprising. Soon, an adventurous plan for organizing an armed uprising in the central cities of the country and concentrating the red army on the central cities of the whole country was drawn up, and the leading organs at all levels of the Party, the Youth League, and the trade unions were subsequently merged into action committees at all levels to prepare for the armed uprising, bringing to a standstill all regular work. In September of the same year, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, correcting Li Lisan's mistake of "Left" adventurism. Later, Li Lisan accepted the party's criticism of his mistakes, recognized and corrected his mistakes, and continued to be elected as a member of the Central Committee at the Seventh and Eighth National Congresses of the Communist Party of China.
[6] In January 1931, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) and others, with the support of the Comintern and its representative Mif, gained a leading position in the Party Central Committee. Politically, they confuse the boundaries between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, juxtaposing anti-bourgeois and anti-imperialist and anti-feudal; denying the obvious changes in domestic class relations after the September 18 Incident, and regarding the middle forces as the "most dangerous enemy"; and continuing to promote the "theory of the center of the city", advocating that the Red Army seize the central cities to achieve the first victory in one province and several provinces and form a national victory. Militarily, adventurism was first promoted, then conservatism and escapism. Organizationally, sectarianism is practised, and those who disagree with their erroneous ideas are "brutally fought and ruthlessly attacked." Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism ruled within the Party for four years, causing heavy losses to the Party and the revolutionary cause. In January 1935, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held the Zunyi Conference and established the correct leadership of the new Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, thus ending the rule of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism in the Party Central Committee.
[7] The Zunyi Conference refers to an enlarged meeting held by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in Zunyi, Guizhou, during the Long March in January 1935. This meeting focused on discussing and correcting military and organizational mistakes, put an end to the rule of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism in the Party Central Committee, established the correct leadership of the new Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, and saved the Red Army and the Party at the most critical juncture.
[8] See notes [23] and [24] of this volume on tactics against Japanese imperialism.
[9] The Lushan Officers' Training Corps was an organization organized by Chiang Kai-shek to train anti-communist military cadres, founded in July 1933 and located in Lushan, Jiangxi Province. The regiment conducted military and political training for officers of Chiang Kai-shek's forces besieging the Red Army in order to popularize the construction of pillboxes and other methods of attacking the Red Army. By 1934, the training had been extended to officers of non-concubine units in order to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek's control over local warlords.
[10] The new military principle of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" mentioned here mainly refers to the "fortress policy" of the Kuomintang reactionaries in advancing in bunkers and advancing step by step. See note [4] in this volume, "Concern for the Lives of the Masses and Attention to Working Methods".
[11] See Lenin's Communism. In it Lenin criticized the Hungarian Communist Kuhn Bella, saying: "He ignored the essence of Marxism, the living soul of Marxism: a concrete analysis of specific situations. (The Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 39, People's Publishing House, 1986, p. 128)
[12] The First Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Xianggan Border was held in May 1928 in Maoping, Ninggang County, Jiangxi Province. The congress analyzed the political situation at that time, discussed the tasks of developing the Party's organization, going deep into the agrarian revolution, consolidating and expanding the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas, and preliminarily answered the question raised by some people in the Red Army about "how long will the Red Flag be fought?" The congress also elected the CPC's Xianggan Border Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as its secretary. This meeting promoted the development of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area.
[13] See note [11] in this volume, "The Spark of a Star Can Burn the Plains".
[14] See notes [4] and [5] on correcting erroneous ideas within the Party in this volume.
[15] Banditry refers to the act of looting without discipline, organization and clear political goals.
[16] Refers to the Long March of the Central Red Army (The First Front) from Ruijin and other places in Jiangxi to northern Shaanxi. See note [22] in this volume, On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism.
[17] See note [7] in this volume, "The Spark of a Star, Can Burn the Plains".
[18] In July 1929, the Kuomintang troops stationed in the three provinces of Gansu, Fujian, and Guangdong launched the first "encirclement and suppression" against the Red Fourth Army and the revolutionary base areas in western Fujian. The Former Committee of the Red Fourth Army decided to use the first column and the fourth column to stay in western Fujian to persist in guerrilla warfare, and the military headquarters led the second and third columns to attack central Fujian. In September, the main force of the Red Fourth Army attacking Fujian encountered great difficulties in the middle of the way, so it returned to western Fujian and annihilated the enemy troops in Shanghang and Wuping successively. At the same time, under the leadership of the CPC Fujian Special Committee and together with the broad masses of armed forces, the First and Fourth Columns carried out guerrilla warfare, forcing the Gansu enemy to retreat to Changting and Liancheng, and the Guangdong enemy to retreat to Yongding. The first "encirclement and suppression" was thus crushed. In early January 1930, the Kuomintang troops in the provinces of Gansu, Fujian, and Guangdong "encircled and suppressed" the Red Army in western Fujian with the strength of fourteen regiments in seven routes. In order to smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression," the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army decided to advance into Jiangxi and attack the rear of the jiangxi enemy army, the main force of the "encirclement and suppression" army. The enemy army in Jiangxi hastily returned to save itself, and the enemy army in Fujian also withdrew from western Fujian due to internal conflicts. In this way, the enemy's second "encirclement and suppression" was soon broken.
[19] The "partial division" is not the main force, but only a part of the flank.
[20] From December 1930 to May 1931, the Kuomintang troops carried out two "encirclement and suppression" campaigns against the revolutionary base areas of Eyuwan, both of which were defeated by the Red Army. In September 1931, Chiang Kai-shek began to plan the third "encirclement and suppression" of the revolutionary base areas in Eyu-Anhui. By November of the same year, the number of Nationalist troops massed around the base area had reached fifteen divisions. Due to the unprecedented upsurge in the people's anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek struggles throughout the country after the September 18 Incident, the contradictions within the Kuomintang intensified day by day, and the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" operations have been delayed in starting. The Red Fourth Front, which was established in early November, took the initiative to attack in order to sabotage the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" plan, and by June 1932, it had launched four campaigns in Huang'an, Shang (Cheng) Huang (Chuan), Sujiabu, and Huang (Chuan) Guang (Shan), annihilating about 60,000 enemy troops and completely bankrupting the Kuomintang army's third "encirclement and suppression" plan for the revolutionary base areas of Eyuwan.
[21] In June 1932, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized more than 300,000 troops to carry out the fourth "encirclement and suppression" of the revolutionary base areas in Eyu-Anhui. Zhang Guotao, who was then the secretary of the Eyu-Anhui Central Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, was overwhelmed by the victories of the previous three anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns; in the face of the serious "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang troops, instead of leading the Red Army to make preparations for opposing "encirclement and suppression," he forcibly ordered the Red Army to besiege the enemy's fortified cities and prepare to capture Wuhan. When the enemy attacked on a large scale, instead of adopting the operational policy of enticing the enemy to go deep and waiting for an opportunity to counterattack, he ordered the Red Army to rush to meet the attack, so that the Red Army fell into a passive position. In October 1932, the main force of the Red Fourth Front was forced to move to the outside line. After that, they never returned to the base areas, and the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" struggle in the revolutionary base areas of Eyu-Anhui was defeated.
[22] Refers to the decline of the revolution in Russia after the defeat of the revolution of 1905, which turned from a period of high to a period of gradual decline. See Section III of Lenin's Infantile Disease of the "Leftists" in the Communist Movement (The Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 39, People's Publishing House, 1986, pp. 6-11) and Chapter III, Sections 5 and 6 of The Concise Course on the History of the United Communist Party (Brazzaville) (People's Publishing House, 1975 edition, pp. 88-105).
[23] The Treaty of Brest was a peace treaty concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Brest-Litovsk (present-day Brest) in western Russia in March 1918. At that time, the German imperialist army was invading the territory of the Soviet Republic, the old Russian army on the front had disintegrated, and the new revolutionary army had not yet been organized. In order to prevent the newly established Soviet Republic from dying under the blows of the German army, Lenin advocated a temporary retreat, accepted the terms of land cession and indemnity proposed by German imperialism, and immediately signed a peace treaty. The signing of this peace treaty gave the Soviet Republic time to consolidate the power of the proletariat, to adjust its economy, to build up the Red Army, to maintain its leadership over the peasantry, to gather strength, and to crush the White Army and the armed interventionists of Britain, the United States, France, Japan and Poland in 1918-1920.
[24] At the end of October 1927, the peasants of Hailufeng in Guangdong, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, decided to hold a third uprising. In November, it occupied Haifeng, Lufeng and the surrounding areas, organized the Red Army, and established the workers' and peasants' power. By March 1928, the Red Army in this area had been defeated by the siege of the superior enemy and the blind movement of the "Left" in the leadership command.
[25] In July 1936, after the Red Fourth Front and the Red Second Front met, due to the active struggle of the CPC Central Committee and the struggle of Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, and other commanders and fighters of the Fourth Front, Zhang Guotao was forced to agree to go north with the Second Front, and arrived in Huining, Gansu in October of the same year. In late October, the First Unit of the Fourth Front was instructed by the Central Military Commission to cross the Yellow River in the west and carry out the Ningxia Campaign Plan. In early November, according to the decision of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, the troops crossing the river were called the Western Route Army. They fought alone for four months under extremely difficult conditions, annihilating more than 20,000 enemy troops, but finally lost in March 1937 because the enemy was outnumbered.
[26] See Marx's letter of 12 April 1871 to Kugelmann on the Paris Commune (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 4, People's Publishing House, 1972, pp. 392-393); see section 17 of Engels's Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 1, People's Publishing House, 1972, pp. 585-586).
[27] The Tale of the Water Margin is a famous Chinese novel depicting peasant wars, which is said to have been written by Shi Nai'an in the late Yuan and early Ming dynasties in the fourteenth century AD. Lin Chong and Chai Jin are both heroes in the book. Hong Jiaotou is a martial arts teacher in Chai Jin's home. For the story of lin chong and HongJiaotou's competition, see the ninth time in "Water Margin", "Chai enters the door to attract the world's guests, And Lin Chong beats Hongjiao's head with a stick".
[28] Lu and Qi were two states in China during the Spring and Autumn Period (722 BC – 481 BC). Qi was a great power, in the central and northeastern parts of present-day Shandong Province; the State of Lu was smaller, in the south of present-day Shandong Province. Duke Zhuang of Lu was the ruler of the state of Lu from 693 BC to 662 BC.
[29] Zuo Qiuming, a native of the Lu state at the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, is said to have been the author of the famous chronicle Zuo Zhuan of the Spring and Autumn Period. For an article cited in this article, see "The Ten Years of Zuo Chuan Zhuang Gong".
[30] "Meat eater" refers to an official. "And what is the place" means "why go to the toilet". In the sentence "Sacrifice the jade veil, if you dare to add it, you will believe it", the sacrifice of the jade veil is an item of worship to the gods, and "plus" means false retribution. Lu Zhuanggong said that he reported the sacrifice truthfully, indicating that he kept his word to God. "Loyalty to the genus also. Can fight a war", "loyalty" is to try to do their duty. Cao Jie means that if a monarch handles prison lawsuits reasonably, he will get the support of the people, so he can fight. The "drums" of the "Gong General Drum" and the "Qi Ren Three Drums" are both said to be singing drums to direct the soldiers to charge. The "shi" of "climbing and looking out" is a horizontal log that supplies the handrail of the passenger in front of the car, and it is in a higher position on the car, so the board can look far away.
[31] The ancient city of Chenggao was located in the northwest of present-day Xingyang County, Henan Province, and was an ancient military stronghold. In 203 BC, Liu Bang, the King of Han, and Xiang Yu, the King of Chu, held each other here. At that time, Xiang Yu attacked Xingyang and Chenggao one after another, and Liu Bang almost collapsed. But later, Liu Bang finally waited for the opportunity for the Chu army to cross the river and break the Chu army and retake Chenggao.
[32] The ancient city of Kunyang was in present-day Ye County, Henan Province. In 23 AD, Liu Xiu (later known as emperor Guangwu of the Eastern Han Dynasty) defeated Wang Mang's army here (emperor in 8 AD, with the title of new). In this war, the strength of the two sides was very different, Liu Xiu only had 8,000 or 9,000 people, while Wang Mang had more than 400,000 people. However, Liu Xiu took advantage of Wang Mang's generals Wang Xun and Wang Yi to light the enemy's slackness, and broke through the backbone of Wang Mang's army with three thousand elite troops, taking advantage of the sharp attack to greatly break the enemy army.
[33] Guandu was northeast of present-day Zhongmu County, Henan Province. In 200 AD, Cao Cao's army and Yuan Shao's army fought here. At that time, Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, while Cao Cao's soldiers ran out of food. However, Cao Cao took advantage of the lack of light enemy preparedness of the Yuan army and carried out a sneak attack by light troops, burning the weight of the Yuan army. The Yuan army panicked, and the Cao army attacked and annihilated the main force of the Yuan army.
[34] Wu refers to Sun Quan and Wei refers to Cao Cao. Chibi was on the south bank of the Yangtze River in the northwest of present-day Puxi County, Hubei Province. In 208, Cao Cao led hundreds of thousands of troops to attack Sun Quan. Sun Quan sent 30,000 troops, and joined forces with Liu Bei, taking advantage of the fact that the Cao army had an epidemic and was not accustomed to water warfare, and burned the Ships of the Cao Army with fire in the Chibi area, and greatly destroyed the Cao Army.
[35] Yiling was in present-day Yichang County, Hubei Province. In 222, the Wu general Lu Xun defeated Liu Bei of the Shu Han here. At the beginning of this war, the Shu army was victorious in successive battles, and entered the Yi Tombs, which had entered the Wu realm for five or six hundred miles. Lu Xunshou did not fight in July and August, and waited for Liu Bei to "be tired and depressed, and his plan was not revived", and used the downwind to set fire to the Shu army.
[36] In 383, the Eastern Jin general Xie Xuan defeated the Qin king Jian Jian at Shuishui, Anhui. At that time, Jian jian had more than 600,000 infantry, 270,000 cavalry, and more than 30,000 guards, and the Eastern Jin Dynasty only had 80,000 water and land troops. When the two armies were facing each other across the water, the Jin generals asked the Qin army north of the water to give up a battlefield so that the Jin army could cross the water for a decisive battle. The Qin army agreed to retreat, but once it retreated, it was unstoppable, and the Jin army took the opportunity to cross the water to attack, defeating the Qin army.
[37] On August 1, 1927, the Communist Party of China launched an armed uprising in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, to oppose the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei and to continue the revolutionary cause of 1924-1927. Under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, secretary of the Committee of Former Enemies of the CPC, he Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De, and Liu Bocheng, the rebel forces occupied the city of Nanchang after fierce battles. This uprising fired the first shots of the Chinese people's armed resistance against the Kuomintang reactionaries. Thus began a new period in which the Communist Party of China independently led the revolutionary armed struggle. The rebel troops withdrew from Nanchang and moved south to Guangdong. In early October, it was besieged by superior enemy forces in the Chaozhou and Shantou areas and failed. Some of the surviving rebel troops reached the Hailufeng area and continued to struggle; the other part, under the leadership of Zhu De and Chen Yi, moved to Shonan and launched the Shonan Uprising, and in April 1928 met with the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army led by Mao Zedong at Jinggangshan.
[38] See this volume, Why Did the Red Regime in China Exist? Note [8].
[39] After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the Communist Party of China launched autumn harvest uprisings in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangdong and other provinces. The most famous of these was the uprising led by Mao Zedong in September at Xiushui, Tonggu, Pingxiang, Liling, Pingjiang, Liuyang and other places on the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi. The workers' and peasants' armed forces who participated in the uprising and the guard regiment of the General Headquarters of the Second Front Of the Former Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army formed the First Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. In October, Mao Zedong led this army to Jinggangshan, where the first rural revolutionary base was established.
[40] See note [5] in this volume, "Concern for the Livelihood of the Masses and Attention to Work Methods".
[41] See Sun Tzu's Military Struggle.
[42] The AB Regiment was an anti-communist rightist organization of the Kuomintang established in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province at the end of 1926, and did not exist for a long time. From May 1930 onwards, the so-called struggle to eliminate the AB regiment was carried out in the Southwest Jiangsu Region. The struggle has continued to expand, seriously confusing the contradiction between the enemy and ourselves.
[43] Refers to the area in central Jiangxi Province between the two rivers of the Ganjiang And Fuhe rivers.
[44] See Warring States Policy, Wei Ce. The original text reads: "He who desires to be defeated will be supplemented by him; and he who will desire to take it will be followed by him." ”
[45] Abyssinia is Ethiopia. In October 1935, Italian fascists sent troops to attack Ethiopia. The Egyptians engaged in trench warfare, which was defeated in May 1936. After the start of World War II, the Ethiopian people, in 1941, in coordination with the anti-fascist allies, drove out the Italian invading army and restored the country's independence.
[46] The Tibetans referred to here mainly refer to the Tibetans in Xikang (now belonging to Sichuan and Tibet) and Gansu. The Hui people mentioned here refer to the Hui people in Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang.
[47] Liu refers to the Kuomintang army Liu Heding Division.
[48] During the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign, Chiang Kai-shek served as commander-in-chief of the "encirclement and suppression" army, and He Yingqin served as commander-in-chief of the front, and his headquarters were all stationed in Nanchang. Subordinate areas: Left Wing Group Army, With He Yingqin as Commander-in-Chief; Right Wing Group Army, With Chen Mingshu as Commander-in-Chief, stationed in Ji'an; Reserve Army, with Wei Lihuang as Commander-in-Chief, stationed in Linchuan.
[49] Jiang Guangnai was originally the commander-in-chief of the Nineteenth Route Army, and during the second "encirclement and suppression", Cai Tingkai served as the acting commander-in-chief. During the third "encirclement and suppression", the 60th Division of Cai Tingkai, the 61st Division of Dai Ji, and the 52nd Division of Han Deloitte of the 19th Route Army were organized into the First Army of the Right Wing Group Army, with Cai Tingkai as the acting commander-in-chief. "Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, han Deloitte" here should be "Cai Tingkai, Dai Ji, Han Deloitte"; the following "Jiang, Cai, Han" should be "Cai, Dai, Han", "Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai" should be "Cai Tingkai, Dai Ji".
[50] During the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the Red Army attacked Guan Yunxiang's division, Hao Mengling's division, and Mao Bingwen's division, and the three victorious battles annihilated more than 10,000 enemy soldiers and surrendered more than 6,000 guns.
[51] The Battles of Nanxiong and Shuikou, including chijiang, Meilingguan, Dayu, and Shuikouwei, defeated fifteen regiments of Chen Jitang's Cantonese army. Among them, the Battle of Shuikou Wei defeated ten regiments of the Cantonese Army.
[52] The Eight Strands of Literature is a special style stipulated in the examination system of the ming and Qing dynasties of China. Each of the eight strands of text is composed of eight parts: breaking the topic, undertaking the topic, starting to speak, starting from the beginning, starting the stock, middle stock, back stock, and bundle stock. Breaking the problem is generally used in two sentences, saying the essence of the broken topic. The undertaking of the question is generally explained in three to five sentences, which undertakes the meaning of the broken question. To begin with a general introduction is the beginning of a discussion. Starting is where to start. The four paragraphs of the starting stock, the middle stock, the back stock and the bundle stock are the formal discussion, and the middle stock is the focus of the whole text. In these four paragraphs, each paragraph has two strands of dual text, a total of eight strands, so it is called eight strands of text, also known as eight ratios. Mao Zedong here uses the unfolding process of writing the Eight Strands of Literature from one part to another as a metaphor for the various stages of revolutionary development. But on ordinary occasions, Mao Zedong used things like the Eight Strands of Literature as metaphors and satirized dogmatism.
[53] See Zuo Chuan, The Second Year of Chenggong. In 589 BC, the armies of Qi and Jin fought at Yu (鞌, in present-day Licheng County, Shandong Province). At the beginning of the battle, Qi Qinggong thought that it would be easy to defeat the enemy and said, "Yu Gu Qi destroyed this and went to eat." "This" refers to these enemies. The meaning of this sentence is: first destroy these enemies, and then eat breakfast. As a result, the Qi army was defeated by the Jin army. Later, people often described it as being resolute in fighting spirit and wanting to destroy the enemy immediately.
![Admiral He Bingyan died young at the age of 47, sick and reluctant to eat fruit, where are his 6 children now?[fig]]()