In March 1947, the Northeast Min(Main) Coalition Army, which had withdrawn to the area east of the Songhua River, decided to detour back to the enemy's flank on the south bank of the Songhua River with a part of its troops according to the prominent advance of the enemy's 70th Army, which is the famous "Three Lower Jiangnan".
On the evening of March 8, the 14th Regiment of the 5th Division of the 2nd Column was ordered to depart from the Wanfatun area and arrive at Bajiazi in the north of ChaoyangChuan the next day to set up a position to look for opportunities to annihilate the enemy.
When regimental commander Wu Guozhang was reconnoitring the enemy's situation, he found that there were enemy cars driving south in the direction of Paoshantun. He concluded that the enemy was retreating to the Dehui area, and immediately reported to the division command post and requested to pursue and annihilate the fleeing enemy.
After receiving the report, division commander Zhong Wei, political commissar Wang Fengwu, chief of staff Wang Liangtai, and others disagreed on whether to annihilate the enemy on the spot or carry out the order to advance east.

There is no doubt that there are enemy cover troops in the mountain tuns, but the problem is that our army does not know exactly how many troops this enemy has.
Zhong Wei insisted on annihilating the enemy on the spot and flatly stated: "This battle must be fought, and if it is wrong, I am responsible alone!" ”
Zhong Wei immediately ordered the regiments to attack decisively, of which the 14th Regiment was wedged in from Guanjiatun to find an opportunity to annihilate the enemy around the Maojia shack, and then acted as the second echelon of the attack on Shantun.
At 18:00, the first battalion of the Fourteenth Regiment, under the leadership of the battalion commander Wang Fuzhi, advanced to Shilipu, but found that the enemy had withdrawn from there.
The local people reported that the enemy had just retreated to the east ten minutes earlier, while the Chiang army in the Mao family shack had withdrawn south.
Under such circumstances, there was no point in going to the Maojia shack again, and Wang Fuzhi decided to pursue the enemy instead to the area of Jiangjiadian to the south.
Unexpectedly, the regimental political commissar who marched with the first battalion resolutely disagreed with this practice and demanded that the first battalion still march towards the Mao family shack as originally planned.
Although the regimental political commissar was a superior leader, Wang Fuzhi believed that the fighter planes were fleeting and must strike decisively, so he insisted on pursuing the enemy in the direction of Jiangjiadian and resolutely said to the political commissar: "If this battle is fought wrong, I alone will bear the responsibility." ”
Subsequently, Wang Fuzhi led a battalion to rush to the Jiang family store.
Jiangjiadian is located in the southeast of Shilipu, and there are four interconnected compounds in the village, and there are relatively complete fortifications.
It was later learned that it was an enemy reinforcement battalion (including 3 infantry companies, 1 Bayi mortar company, and 1 107 chemical mortar company) stationed here.
At this time, it was overcast, it looked like it was going to snow, and it was even darker after nightfall, with visibility not exceeding 10 meters.
At about 20:00 that night, a battalion entered a village north of Jiangjiadian and found the enemy. The company commanders quickly organized their troops according to the brief deployment made by Wang Fuzhi on an impromptu basis and advanced forward.
The third and second companies moved rapidly, rushing into the village in the blink of an eye, and the first company detoured to the southeast, responsible for cutting off the enemy's retreat and blocking the enemy's reinforcements.
Wang Fuzhi saw a tall turret in the northwest corner of the village, overlooking the entire village. He immediately ordered Li Yuheng, deputy instructor of the Third Company, to lead a platoon into the northwest compound of the village first and quietly occupied the enemy artillery tower.
Subsequently, a platoon used the enemy's two heavy machine guns in the turret to fiercely strafe the enemy in the courtyard, blocking the four compounds held by the enemy.
After a battalion attacked the village, the enemy stubbornly held the four compounds in a vain attempt to make a final struggle.
Subsequently, the second and third companies adopted the means of continuous blasting and then rapid impact, and crushed the enemy who was shrinking in the courtyard.
The battle lasted only an hour before it ended, with a battalion of more than 150 enemy killed and more than 350 captured. At the same time, our army also captured a batch of sophisticated American weapons and equipment. A battalion paid a very small price of 19 wounded and 7 dead.
After the war, it was learned from the captive deputy battalion commander that Han Zengdong, commander of the enemy's 88th Division, and others had just come to Jiangjiadian from Paoshantun to inspect the deployment of the five companies of Paoshantun to cover the retreat of the five companies.
After the battle began, a company tasked with encircling and reinforcing quickly surrounded the entire village outside the village.
At this time, as soon as Han Zengdong heard the gunshots, he immediately fled on foot with 15 guards, not even the jeep.
The Battle of Jiangjiadian was the first time that our army in the northeast annihilated a reinforced battalion armed with American-style equipment (a total of more than 500 enemy personnel) with the strength of a battalion, and became another exemplary example of our army winning a strong victory with inferior victories and winning more with fewer victories.
It is worth mentioning that Chiang Kai-shek's army, which had advanced equipment in the northeast, had not yet suffered a major blow from our army before, and it was precisely when it was domineering and sharp, but it was completely annihilated by a battalion of our army at Jiangjiadian at a very small cost, so it was of great significance.
There is a coincidence that our army won this great victory, that is, the division commander Zhong Wei and the battalion commander Wang Fuzhi both said the same thing: "I am responsible for the mistake."
It is conceivable that if Zhong Wei and Wang Fuzhi cannot adhere to their own opinions and resolutely go to war instead of sticking to the rules, then it is very likely that they will miss the opportunity and watch the enemy slip away.
Wang Fuzhi also became famous because of this battle, and gradually grew into an excellent commander of our army. He was awarded the rank of colonel in 1955 and promoted to major general in 1964.