Chiang Kai-shek's habit of "commanding the Kuomintang troops beyond their ranks" has been discussed and explored to varying degrees by many historians in modern and modern times. Generally speaking, the academic community mostly has a negative evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's behavior of "commanding beyond the level.". To put it simply, the substantive impact and actual results of Chiang Kai-shek's "command overstepping one's ranks" were all failures, unfavorable, and negative.
And why did Chiang Kai-shek like, or insist on , "commanding the army beyond his ranks"? From June 1942, Chiang Kai-shek was in charge
Chief of Staff of the Chinese Theater, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces Command in Southeast Asia, Commander of the Chinese Army in India, etc
Several positions
target
Stilwell's complaint can be seen:
Chiang Kai-shek believed that he would only skip the command level when his deployment ability was insufficient and he could not achieve the desired goal; the generals in the army were too stupid to give them command beyond the level, and they would do many stupid things.
Is this really the case? Does Chiang Kai-shek have every reason to command beyond his ranks? From the perspective of war, was Chiang Kai-shek right to do so?
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the highest military decision-making organ of the wartime command system of the Kuomintang army was transferred from the Supreme Council of National Defense to the Supreme Council of National Defense, and the Supreme CommandIng Body was transformed into a Military Commission. The military command department and the military commission, the two departments have clear terms of reference, and there is basically no overlap and similarity.
With the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Kuomintang government reformed the institutional system of the Military Commission in order to meet the needs of the Wartime War of Resistance Against Japan, set up a base camp, and added the first to sixth departments, the management department, the ministry of health, and so on, and the general office was divided into the general office and the secretary hall. In formulating and implementing a new system, there must be some problems. The same is true of the Kuomintang government's current restructuring, which has been running for several months and has too many shortcomings and has to be revised again.
In November 1937, the Supreme Council of National Defense was convened, the base camp was abolished, and the military establishment was reorganized again, in which the General Staff Headquarters and the First Department were merged into the Military Command. In January of the following year, the Supreme Council of National Defense adopted a new organizational outline for the Military Commission, which regulates the functions of the ministries. The decision-making and meetings of the Military Commission are the main basis for the military command to formulate operational guidelines and the command platform for carrying out operations.
Here, we have to mention He Yingqin. He Yingqin was the brother of Chiang Kai-shek and the first of Chiang Kai-shek's confidants of the Eight Great Kongs, in 1945
The Chinese theater was demoted to the rank of commander-in-chief, and his position in the Kuomintang army was second only to that of Chiang Kai-shek. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, He Yingqin was for a long time the minister of military affairs and the chief of staff of the Kuomintang government, and he had no actual military power in his hands, which was both trusted by Chiang Kai-shek and recognized by all factions of the Kuomintang army.
Don't look at He Yingqin's posture of high authority, in fact, it is only a superficial phenomenon, he cannot decide on major matters, the relevant departments of the central affairs departments handle it themselves, and small matters are handled by staff. Chiang Kai-shek once said to others:
"The command of the Kuomintang army is completely in my own hands, and even He Yingqin cannot command the Central Army (commonly known as the army of the Huangpu Department)."
Commanding the organization and work, which has always been handled in the attendant room and the military headquarters, He Qingyuan gave advice.
Ruan Shaochang, chief of staff of the General Office of the Military Commission, asked He Yingqin for operational instructions, and He Yingqin waved his hand and said:
"I don't participate in any opinions in combat, and personnel need to be looked through by me."
Tang Shengzhi laughed at He Yingqin's position and role:
"It is a strange story of Chinese and foreign chiefs of staff in ancient and modern times."
The Military Command Department is specifically responsible for the operational guidance of the Kuomintang army. Whether the judgment of the military command is accurate and whether the guidance is successful or not directly affects the victory or defeat of the campaign.
He Yingqin, the chief of staff, was the chief of staff who guided the various departments and offices under the Military Commission and assisted Chairman Chiang Kai-shek in handling all the affairs of the Military Commission, but he did not play much of a role, more like a mud tire puppet in a temple, and even with the meeting of the highest staff that he needed to organize, he did not play a relatively positive role. He Yingqin and other aides played a limited role in the military and in the military commission. So, is the military command useful?
There is no overlap in the functions of the various departments of the Military Commission, and the division of labor is very clear, but in actual operation and operation, the operational guidance work of the military command department, which was originally subordinate to the military command, has been interfered with by many organs, departments, meetings, and personnel, such as the chief and deputy chief of staff, the general office of the military commission, the attendant room, the meeting of the top staff, the members of the military committee, the members of the various departments of the military commission, the military operations bulletin, and so on. Many personnel are involved in the operational guidance work, and the chaos in the specific implementation is also a matter of course.
Specifically, at the Battle of Hengyang in June 1944, the famous general Xue Yue ordered the Huang Tao division of the 62nd Division to control the area around Tanzishan and Zengping, pinch the enemy crossing the Xiang River, and arrange other troops to assist, but the 62nd Division did
"On the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, he set out from Tan Zishan and moved to Qiyang"
。 Shocked, Xue Yue let out an "ah" sound, acting at a loss.
Modern historians specifically mention this battle in the book "General Xue Yue and the National Revolution":
The various combat instructions of the Kuomintang High Command are like ideal plans, non-theater commanders, and remote control of the war situation. Bai Chongxi directly ordered the troops in Guilin, and the troops also took Bai Chongxi's orders and ignored the orders of Xue Yue, the commander of the theater commander of the immediate boss, as if this battle had nothing to do with Xue Yue, he was just a bystander, and there was no room for interference.
It was there since ancient times
"Will be outside, the king's destiny will be spared"
And this happens to be a concerted response to the rapidly changing battlefield. In the anti-Japanese drama "Bright Sword", Chang Naichao, commander of the Provisional Seventh Division of the Kuomintang Army, said in a lesson on "Military Campaign Studies" given to Li Yunlong, Kong Jie, Ding Wei, and others:
"The orders of the national army are made by geniuses, but carried out by fools."
Privately, didn't he think so, was Xue Yue stupid in the Battle of Hengyang? Could it be that the vast majority of the middle and high-ranking generals who directly command the battles of the Kuomintang army are stupid people who cannot fight?
The orders issued by Bai Chongxi and other high-level commanders changed one at a time, formulated a good battle plan, and directly intervened in the front-line command. As everyone knows, the plan has spread to the battlefield, the actual situation has long changed, the battlefield environment for implementing the superior plan is ineffective, the commander of the front line will naturally consider receiving the order, and plan and implement it in combination with the actual situation on the battlefield, but the high command of the high command believes that the orders and instructions transmitted by the command are correct, and also compulsorily requires the commanders of the units participating in the battle to carry out the orders and ignore the instructions of the superiors.
These practices of the High Command can be said to have a great deal to do with Chiang Kai-shek's failure to stop them. Why didn't he stop it? Because Chiang Kai-shek was also the one who did this, he set off such a trend. Chiang Kai-shek's "command over the ranks" is based on his strong self-confidence in his own strategic and tactical level. Did Chiang Kai-shek have military talent? Of course there is, and not low. From serving as the principal of the Whampoa Military Academy in the early days of the Chinese revolution to winning the Victory in the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek fought many victorious battles and the Battle of Cotton Lake, which "won more with less."
Chiang Kai-shek's military ability is undeniable, but the difference lies in the level of military ability. Chiang Kai-shek believed that his military command ability was very high, otherwise he would not have carried out so many cross-level commands. Chiang Kai-shek often bypassed the normal command system and issued orders to front-line field armies, divisions, regiments, and even battalion-company-level combat units by telephone, secret orders, and warrants, and directly mobilized troops to carry out combat tasks.
In terms of warrants, the number of warrants issued by Chiang Kai-shek is jaw-dropping and unimaginable. According to the incomplete statistics of a staff member of the attendant room of the Military Commission for a long time, from 1936 to 1948, the attendant room accumulated more than 120 boxes of Chiang Kai-shek's warrants. Someone helped him explain that Chiang Kai-shek's use of warrants to cross the command line and replace the military system with morale and popular will give the people below a feeling that Chairman Chiang Kai-shek's ears are being raised to his fate, and the other side will feel that the responsibility is unshirkable.
Chiang Kai-shek's warrant was an expedient measure in wartime. Chiang Kai-shek liked to command operations at higher levels, in large part because he had long commanded small units in combat and lacked experience in commanding large corps. The order of hand is similar to the order issued by the ancient emperor without formal administrative agencies, in short, it has no government effect, and it is endorsed in the name of an individual (from the Qin Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty, it was the same). The Minister may not obey the order.
The use of Chiang Kai-shek's warrants is extremely wide, such as local public toilets, civil service uniforms, and standard hairstyles for female students. Chiang Kai-shek's handwriting habits, which are most criticized by later generations, are:
There were too many warrants, and the local military and political chiefs were too tired to deal with normal business; secondly, this undermined the rules of the system.
Li Zongren has publicly stated:
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the greatest shortcoming of the nationalist government's military command system was Chiang Kai-shek's personal command overstepping his ranks.
The Military Commission had shortcomings, but compared with Chiang Kai-shek's over-the-top command, it was insignificant, and it led to the results of upward and downward effects.
Chiang Kai-shek sat in the central headquarters and directly commanded the operations in the front; during the War of Resistance, he often sent a telephone or telegram to directly command the commanders of the divisions at the front; during the civil war, he even intervened in the regimental commanders of the more frontlines. Therefore, the central authorities in charge of military orders and operations, as well as the local theater chiefs, the commanders-in-chief of the group armies, and the commanders of the armies, knew nothing about this, and had no idea where the troops had gone, what they were doing, and whether the troops were marching and fighting according to their own plans. Although afterwards, the head of the attendant office would notify the military command and issue orders, but this was
"Cut first, play later"
finish. In addition, this situation is not occasional, but often.
To this end, the central combat departments and senior commanders on the front line are seriously absent from the same command line, and small ones misunderstand and large ones make mistakes. Chiang Kai-shek's command overstepping his ranks directly caused chaos in the original command system. At the Battle of Xinkou in 1937, Yan Xishan, the supreme commander of the 2nd Theater, commanded the troops originally stationed at Wanshou Mountain to transfer defenses, and Yan Xishan's order was to send early and arrive late, and Chiang Kai-shek's order was to arrive late, which overwhelmed the ministry. You savor this.
Toward the end of the Liberation War, Liu Anqi, who was the commander of the Qingdao Appeasement District, said bitterly:
"Except for Yan Xishan, a few people like Guangzhou, a few people in Taiwan, and the Ministry of National Defense, all have to come and direct me remotely." Of course, the highest status is still the old gentleman (that is, Chiang Kai-shek). ”
Liu Anqi's evacuation from the northeast battlefield to Qingdao was also arranged by Chiang Kai-shek himself by telephone.
Some people may think that Chiang Kai-shek was looking at the dishes and thinking that Liu Anqi was a "small person" before he pointed fingers and commanded with electricity; in fact, people such as Xue Yue and Chen Cheng were also treated like this by old Chiang Kai-shek. The troops under his command were directly mobilized, and the Kuomintang generals dared to be angry and dare not speak out. In the first Burmese war, Chiang Kai-shek made Stilwell the commander-in-chief, but directly fought Du Yuming and Luo Zhuoying, which made Stilwell angry and almost tore his face. The contradictions between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek were sometimes so great that they required the president of the United States to mediate. Stilwell was not a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek, and naturally would not tolerate this
"Offensive behavior"
。
If we say that Chiang Kai-shek's command overstepping his ranks can often achieve unexpectedly good results, it is enough, but the result is not the same. Chiang Kai-shek's orders to cross the line of command are even more excessive than those of the day and night, changing four or five times a day, often without thinking clearly, and issuing orders as soon as their heads are hot, and when the army is halfway mobilized, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly changes his mind and changes the instructions of a few hours ago, making the officers and men up and down confused.
In this way, Li Zongren believed that Chiang Kai-shek had not been a middle- and lower-level officer and lacked practical experience on the battlefield; Xu Yongchang thought that Chiang Kai-shek had used troops without careful consideration, and did not agree with his staff and generals. No one dared to accuse the old Chiang Kai-shek of the mistakes of the commander in person, but he still heard the wind and explained that his warrants were actually not so much, and sometimes it was just to give a "better" opinion to the various departments for reference. This is nothing more than a cover-up that dare not admit it.
In June 1942, Chiang Kai-shek complained to Stilwell about the incompetence of the generals in the army, and it was their lack of ability that he would carry out cross-level command. Chiang Kai-shek's exact words were as follows:
"At night, I had to lie awake in bed, think about what stupid things they might do, and then write them down and tell them not to do them. But they are so stupid that unless you think about it for them beforehand, they will do a lot of stupid things. That's the secret to bringing them along – you have to think about everything they might do wrong and then warn them in advance. ”
Chiang Kai-shek was the principal of the Whampoa Military Academy, and most of Chiang Kai-shek's generals were students who graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy, so Chiang Kai-shek naturally had a "sense of distrust" toward the generals of the Kuomintang army, always feeling that they were children, easy to do wrong things, and as a big parent, he could not trust them to do anything, so everything interfered.
"Fill in the gaps"
。 Except for Chiang Kai-shek, who did it himself, he could understand it, and no one else could understand it.
Li Zongren, Chen Cheng, Xue Yue and other veteran generals, Chiang Kai-shek also looked down on and did not trust. In the Battle of Wuhan in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek personally served as the commander-in-chief and surveyed the overall situation, and Chen Cheng and Li Zongren were responsible for combat tasks on the front line. Because he was very saddened by Li Zongren's "passive use of troops," he personally went to eastern Hubei to supervise the battle; he was surprised that Chen Cheng was "cowardly and ignorant, and did not know the priorities", and sincerely believed that there was no one under his command and that it would be rare for him to be a general. In short, of the many Kuomintang generals, Chiang Kai-shek saw very few. Why did Chiang Kai-shek like to command beyond the ranks so much? In the end, I feel that the level of force commander is not as good as my own.
According to the recollection of Yan Daogang, director of the Attendant Office, in 1935, after the Zunyi Conference, the Red Army's Long March entered the second stage, chiang Kai-shek was deeply threatened by the Red Army, and appointed himself as the commander of the battlefield, leaving aside the Guizhou Appeasement Office and the former enemy general headquarters (the highest commander was Xue Yue), personally calling to mobilize troops, making Xue Yue a staff officer and senior commander.
Sometimes when the battle was lost below, Chiang Kai-shek would blush and scold Xue Yue incessantly. At that time, every order and instruction of the Guizhou Appeasement Office and the General Headquarters of the Former Enemy had to be checked by Chiang Kai-shek, and without Chiang Kai-shek's permission, Xue Yue had no right to make decisions at all. Let's talk about it, what's the matter? Chiang Kai-shek's most famous and representative battlefield exercise was the Battle of Songhu on August 18, 1937.
On the Shanghai front, the Kuomintang army fought with the Japanese.
Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army and Right Wing Army
Zhang Fakui wanted to mobilize one of his precious artillery companies to give the Japanese who launched the charge layer by layer to give a fierce blow, but he did not expect to find the artillery company. Zhang Fakui was so anxious that he quickly called and asked his boss Feng Yuxiang (then.)
Commander of the Third Theater):
"I was about to give the charging Japanese Kou a head-on blow, but an artillery company on the front line didn't know where to go, did you transfer away?"
At this time, Feng Yuxiang was also a monk of Zhang'er - I can't figure it out, you don't even know where your artillery has gone, how do I know? He replied:
"I didn't give the order, and I don't know."
Zhang Fakui was quite annoyed, which fool who was not afraid of death did not transfer troops without my consent! Feng Yuxiang reassured him on the phone not to worry, we looked for it together.
In the end, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Fakui investigated layer by layer for half a day, only to find that Chiang Kai-shek had sent a telegram from the general headquarters to the regimental headquarters of the artillery company on the front line, and ordered the regiment to transfer the company to Chiang Kai-shek's designated position. Chiang Kai-shek, who was the commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang army, commanded at a higher level, crossed a string of formations such as theater commanders, group army commanders, army commanders, division commanders, and brigade commanders, and directly commanded a company. What a talent, a company of micro-manipulations, it is really a strange story.
Feng Yuxiang's memoirs of life many years later, remembering this matter, angrily wrote:
"What is this commanding law?"
The military command within the Nationalist Army also complained that the high command interfered too strictly and lost the mobility of the front. However, this is of little use. The Kuomintang army's unfavorable war of resistance and the Kuomintang's rout in Taiwan were entirely to Chiang Kai-shek's own fault, and in one after another he crossed the line of command, he buried a very good situation. Micro-manipulation, which was meant to bring good results by subtle operations, was made pejorative by Chiang Kai-shek.