This is an iconic photograph of the Red Army in World War II.
The regimental commissar Alexei Yelemenko held aloft the TT-33 pistol and shouted: Rush
This World War II photograph is only comparable to the one in which the Red Army planted a red flag on the high Reichstag after the Soviet occupation of Berlin in 1945.
In 1945, the Red Army raised the Soviet flag over the Reichstag in Berlin
On July 12, 1942, during a bloody battle between the 220th Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division of the 18th Army of the Soviet Army and the superior Forces of the German Army in the Luhansk region of present-day Ukraine, the regimental commissar Alexei Yelemenko held aloft the TT-33 pistol and shouted: Rush! The first jumped out of the trench and launched a counterattack on the German positions.
However, he was killed by German artillery fire a few minutes after this photo was taken.
As commissar of the Soviet army, he had no choice. The political commissar is the one who supervises the battle, encourages the soldiers to go forward bravely, can only advance, cannot retreat, and is never soft on the retreating soldiers. In the fierce battles of cruelty, the political commissar often charged forward with guns and bullets. Because, if the commissar was captured, he would also be shot on the spot by the Germans.
We often see details in many World War II movies: After the battle, the Germans came to the Soviet prisoners of war and asked menacingly, "Who is the commissar?" “
"Me!" Immediately, the commissar was dragged out and shot on the spot.
And in real war, the same is true.
Why did the Germans hate the Commissar of the Red Army so much?
What is the political commissar
The Commissar of the Soviet Army first appeared after the October Revolution, and it was founded by Trotsky, known as the "Father of the Red Army".
"Father of the Red Army" Trotsky
At the beginning of the founding of the Red Army, almost 100% of the officers in the Red Army came from the old army of the Tsarist period, and 80% of the soldiers came from the old army. These officers and men were demoralized, greedy and afraid of death.
After the establishment of the political commissar system, through their implementation and propaganda of the ideas and policies of Soviet power, the cultivation of revolutionary discipline, the bad officers and soldiers were turned into excellent commanders and fighters loyal to the Bolsheviks, and also played a key role in the final victory of the CPSU in the civil war.
These political commissars, strictly speaking, basically do not have military command capabilities, and for them, digging up saboteurs lurking in the army is even more fascinating.
But they have no small power and have the final say to stop military operations. As a result, the commissar gradually became a "stumbling block" for military commanders, most notably the Soviet-Finnish War.
Finnish soldiers
It is said that the political commissars in the Soviet army at that time, in order to show the heroism of the Soviet army, even required officers and soldiers to march arm in arm and sing the national anthem to the Finnish front.
Compared with the Finnish army's good use of terrain and features, officers and soldiers knew that wearing white clothes could be concealed and camouflaged, while the Soviet army, at the insistence of the commissars, still wore dark brown uniforms in the misty snow, and the vehicles were still painted olive green, and they could not lose the battle.
This is the disadvantage of Stalin's use of political commissars to supervise military commanders in combat, because political commissars generally do not understand the military, and they have great right to speak and make decisions, so that military commanders can only direct the battle according to books.
Many of the defeats of the Soviet army in the Soviet-Finnish War were caused by the blind command and decision-making of the political commissar.
For this reason, Stalin once ordered the abolition of the post of political commissar and the replacement of the "military commissar", subordinate to the military commander, with the primary duty of ensuring the unhindered implementation of operational orders.
However, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, the Red Army suffered heavy losses in the early stages of the war, and the morale of the troops was low and the morale of the troops was scattered.
Stalin reluctantly listened to the suggestion of Mehlis, director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, and re-established the system of political commissars.
As the biggest leader of the Soviet army commissars, Mahlis was also a very characteristic senior officer of the Red Army, and his story will be told in detail later.
Soon after, Stalin issued the famous "Order No. 227", which further clarified that the commissar could shoot soldiers who retreated without authorization at once.
This is also why whenever the Soviet military political commissar is mentioned, everyone can always think of the soviet military political commissar in the movie "Soldiers Coming to the City" in the soviet military political commissar set up a gun behind the troops to supervise the battle, no matter who it is, but if they retreat, they will all be killed.
Therefore, in the war, the grass-roots political commissars need to play an exemplary role, and when the soldiers of the Red Army cannot see the hope of victory, the political commissars must set an example, rush ahead, and carry out complete resistance.
For example, in a battle near PoselukTakishi, after a bitter battle, the Germans occupied the castle. Shortly thereafter, a large German army made a temporary stop at the square of the castle, where the tanks of the 11th German Tank Regiment were passing through the walls of the square.
At that time, the tank hatch was open, the tankers were relaxed, and the tank commander poked his head out of the turret, and suddenly the three tank commanders were shot at close range by the rifle.
After the commander was killed, the commander of the German tank regiment discovered that the shot had come from a narrow trench near the square wall, only 10 meters away from the wall.
German tanks immediately opened fire, and all 13 Soviet officers and men hiding in the trenches were killed.
Later, the Germans discovered that they were officers and men of a Soviet regimental headquarters, and that it was the political commissar who commanded them to "resist" in a position of taking aim with a rifle at the time of death.
Dogmatically counterattacked, not knowing how to strategically protect the troops and protect the officers and men. In the eyes of the political commissar, when others die and they are still alive, they can only die for death.
This also explains why Alexei Yelemenko, the regimental commissar in the first photo of this article, took the lead - holding his position and not retreating, which is the political commissar's requirement for the soldiers, and if the soldiers escape from the front, the political commissar can shoot and kill the fleeing soldiers.
It was precisely because of the political commissar's great ability to supervise and encourage the Red Army soldiers that the German army hated them to the bone.
Goebbels, who was in charge of public opinion propaganda in the German army, was well aware of the importance of propaganda, and he once ordered that the commissar of the Soviet army was not a soldier, but an ideological worker engaged in red propaganda, and that when he was caught, there was no need to treat prisoners of war like prisoners of war, but to shoot them and shoot them on the spot.
Therefore, on the battlefield, the political commissar also rushed the bravest, and if he did not die in battle, he would be shot by the German army if he was caught.
The Commissar of the Soviet Army awaiting execution
The highest-ranking commissar– McHelis
The disadvantage of the political commissar system is not that they are responsible for the most obnoxious ideology, but that they are given command, and whose command is they to listen to in the war? Apparently, the authority of the military commander was challenged by the commissar.
Political commissars in war always consider the situation from a political point of view rather than a military professional point of view, which is not good for winning the battle.
Mehlis, who served as head of the General Political Department of the Soviet Army, is a good example.
Mahlis
Mehlis has been working in Stalin's secretariat since the early 20s, and should be said to be Stalin's concubine, but his education level is not high, and it is said that he does not even know why the moon does not shine.
But don't look at his low level of education, but he is very good at things. As a secretary, he was good at pleasing Stalin, and his overzealous energy was sometimes overdoed even by Stalin himself.
But he only obeyed Stalin and a few senior leaders, but he was always serious about others, and he was particularly fond of the program.
If you disagree with him, he will jump like thunder at the light, and he will have to fight to the death.
If you really make a mistake, it will fall into his hands, let alone fall into his hands, and your life will definitely be gone. Even Stalin said of him, "He will only destroy, destroy, destroy." ”
Mahlis (middle)
On one occasion, after reporting to Stalin on the situation on the front line, Mehlis mentioned in passing that General Konstantin Rokossovsky, who was a gentleman and was known as one of the field troikas of the Soviet Army during World War II with Zhukov and Koniev, "had a problem with the style of life."
Stalin listened without a sound.
But Mehlis was not satisfied, insisting on striking at the general, and before leaving he asked Stalin: "What should we do with Comrade Rokossovsky?" He's too proud of women! ”
Stalin asked contemptuously, "What to do?" You can only look at the eyes. ”
General Konstantin Rokossovsky
The most typical example of a political commissar meddling in the decisions of military commanders to cause discord in the leadership and thus delaying the defeat of the fighters is the Crimean War.
Crimea
At the beginning of the Soviet-German war, he was sent by Stalin to the Western Front as a representative of the Supreme Command, and when he arrived there, he quarreled with the commander of the front at the time, Timoshenko.
After coming to the Crimean Front, Mehlis had frequent quarrels with commander Kozlov and others, and used the power he had to remove cadres and install his own people.
On the day of the German offensive, Mehlis also sent a telegram to Stalin reporting to the military commander Kozlov.
At the moment of the great enemy, the internal struggle between the commanders and officers has seriously undermined the unity of the leading body of the front army, weakened the leadership of the preparations for the battle and the ability to command the troops, and bears an unshirkable responsibility for the final defeat.
Later, in a sternly worded telegram to Mahlis, Stalin defined his position on the Commissar as: correcting the mistakes of military commanders, but assuming equal responsibility with military commanders if they suffer defeat.
Stalin in World War II
To put it bluntly, if the political commissar intervenes in command, if the battle is lost, both the political commissar and the military commander are responsible; not the political commissar only intervenes and is not responsible for winning or losing the war.
Stalin knew Maxhelis very well—How could He fight a war without any combat experience or training in military academies?
Stalin's criticism in the telegram was already very severe: ... Just passive criticism on the side, then your problem is more serious.
After the defeat, Mehelis was relieved of his duties as Deputy People's Commissar for National Defense and Director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, and his rank was demoted to the rank of Political Commissar.
Later, Mehlis gradually fell out of favor in front of Stalin.
Stalin sent him to Saratov for a "business trip" and supposedly arrested him secretly. After a secret interrogation, he confessed all the materials Stalin needed and died suddenly on February 13, 1953, at the age of 64.