preface:
In the book "Selected Works of Marx and Engels (Volume IV)", there is a classic interpretation of "historical inevitability":
"Every stage in the process of the infinite development of society is inevitable, and therefore has its raison d'être in terms of the epochs and conditions under which it takes place."
Based on this view, the author ventures to add another auxiliary point of view, that is, all objective phenomena produced in history must have a certain rationality at that time, at the same time
To a large extent, the emergence of these objective phenomena is also caused by the collision of many subjective factors.
Taking the "San Francisco Rebellion" in the early Qing Dynasty as an example, although most people have many prejudices against Wu Sangui, the mastermind of this war, in the author's opinion, most people still evaluate his character, and aside from the bad impression that he has portrayed in people's minds by repeatedly "changing the court", I believe that there are still some people who are willing to complain about it. Of course, the author in this article does not have a hint of want to be unfair or "whitewashed", but just want to simply follow
Economic, political and military
These three angles to make a specific causal analysis of the outbreak of the "San Francisco Rebellion", that's all. Because the author finds that most history lovers' cognition of the "San Francisco Rebellion" is still stuck on the surface, that is, Wu Sangui alone provoked the "San Francisco Rebellion". But in fact, people who really understand this history should know that the essential factors that caused the "San Francisco Rebellion" are multifaceted, and they are by no means from Wu Sangui alone, as the author wrote at the beginning of the article: Everything is in history... At the same time, the emergence of these objective phenomena is also caused by the collision of many subjective factors to a large extent.
The research content of this article:
01, from the economic point of view of the analysis
There is no doubt that before the outbreak of the "San Francisco Rebellion" in the early Qing Dynasty, the san francisco forces and the central government of the Qing Dynasty had an intractable contradiction in many aspects such as economy, politics and military, and it was precisely the collision of these factors that ultimately promoted the successful outbreak of frontal conflict between the two sides. In the author's personal opinion, the "economic" factor occupies a considerable proportion here, so in this case, the analysis of the "economy" is focused on.
In the previous article
Talk about what "capital" "San Francisco" dares to raise troops to rebel
Among them, the author briefly analyzed with readers and friends the number of troops directly controlled by Wu Sangui before the rebellion, and finally came to the conclusion that before the outbreak of the "San Francisco Rebellion", the number of Wu Sangui's troops was about 90,000 or so, of which about 22,000 were soldiers within the establishment, and the rest belonged to his privately recruited or annexed soldiers. What needs to be particularly explained here is that although only more than 22,000 of the troops supported by Wu Sangui belong to the military expenses allocated by the imperial court, for Wu Sangui, it is certainly unrealistic for the imperial court to provide for Wu Sangui's soldiers according to the level of ordinary green battalion soldiers, and Wu Sangui himself is bound to not agree, and moreover, when Wu Sangui enters Yunnan, the imperial court still needs to rely on Wu Sangui's strength to a large extent to pacify the local forces in the Yungui region that refuse to compromise, such as the Longna and Shuixi Tusi forces. In addition, in order to consolidate his rule in the Yunnan-Guizhou region and enhance his position in the hearts of the Manchu rulers, Wu Sangui also listened to the strategy given by Hong Chengzu that "we must not leave central Yunnan without incident for a day".
The so-called "cannot make central Yunnan idle for a day" is to put it bluntly, that is, it is necessary to establish its dominance in the Yunnan-Guizhou region, and to make the Yunnan-Guizhou region ostensibly unable to live in peace (otherwise it will not be able to play its role). Based on this reason, from the moment Wu Sangui entered Yunnan, he began his plan to drink ma Dianqian. Historical records record: In the eighteenth year of Shunzhi, Wu Sangui sent troops to conquer Burma; in the second year of Kangxi (1663 AD), he suppressed Longna; the following year, he conquered Shuixi and destroyed Tusi Ankun; in the fifth year of Kangxi, he sent troops to suppress Tusi Luchangxian in Longzhen. It can be said that since Wu Sangui was stationed in Yunnan, the turmoil in the Yunnan-Guizhou region has not really stopped for a moment on the surface. However, Wu Sangui's perennial operation of this plan will inevitably attract the suspicion of others, and a record in the historical "Records of the Court" is the best proof:
Sangui sealed the territory with weight, Zhang Huangbian affairs, and conceited the Great Wall. The town will bully the governor, the three gui deceive the imperial court, the worry of hiding the bow and cooking the dog, the idea of the deep market power to fix the position, and the heavy labor of the king and the master who hurt the wealth.
Passport of the Military Department of the Wu Sangui Regime
The direct result of the perennial conquest was to put pressure on the Qing government's fiscal expenditure. As we all know, the state financial situation in the early Qing Dynasty can be said to be insufficient, and the tax arrears of the gentry class in the Jiangnan area caused the tax revenue of the imperial court in the jiangnan region, which has always been rich, to be basically unsatisfactory (a series of cases later broke out to suppress the gentry in Jiangnan), and the huge military expenditure spent by San Francisco further aggravated the financial situation of the Qing government. According to historical records such as the Records of the Ancestors of the Qing Dynasty and Ai Yuanzheng: "Juntun Province Salary", in 1667 (Kangxi 6), only the imperial court of Wu Sangui and Yifan needed to spend more than 3 million taels of money and silver every year, and the taxes levied by his own province were not as good as those of The King of Pingxi. The details are as follows:
Directly save money and grain, most of which is spent on the salaries of the soldiers of Yunnan, Fujian, and Guangdong. As far as Yun Guiyan was concerned, the officers and men under the clan needed to be paid more than three million taels of money for the years.
The province's taxes are not enough to provide for it
First, it is difficult to last.
Until five years later, in the eleventh year of the Kangxi Dynasty, although the imperial court ordered Wu Sangui to carry out a series of measures to streamline military expenditure, the salary required by the Pingxi King Yifan still needed more than 2.2 million taels. The details are as follows:
Yunnan needs more than 1.6 million yuan, and Guizhou needs more than 500,000 yuan... Fujian needs more than 1.6 million yuan, and Guangdong needs more than 1.2 million yuan.
There is no doubt that the annual fixed fiscal expenditure of more than 5 million taels is definitely a big expense for the Qing government, which has just gained a foothold in the Central Plains. Taking the household income of shunzhi in the eleventh year of Shunzhi as an example, the salary expenditure of San Francisco accounted for about one-third of the entire Qing government's fiscal revenue (the author only queried the data of shunzhi eleven years, and the financial revenue data of the Qing government in the early Qing Dynasty did not increase too much, speculating that the financial revenue of the Qing government in the eleventh year of Kangxi was about 25 million to 30 million taels, so the financial expenditure of San Francisco was about one-fifth). In particular, these data can also be speculated about the degree of economic contradiction between the "San Francisco" and the imperial court.
Dutch envoy Neuhof's pen is still gratifying
02. Analyze from a political point of view
To distinguish whose right to rule a place is in the hands of not only the tax affiliation, but also the right to appoint and dismiss officials in the region. At the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, in order to win over Wu Sangui, the Qing court did everything possible to give him the power he could enjoy. In addition to having the right to "act cheaply", the Qing government also granted Wu Sangui the great power to "elect officials and promote them", which also created conditions for Wu Sangui to make friends with his henchmen. The so-called "upper can restrain the governor, the lower can suppress the county order" is derived from this. Relying on the support of great power, Wu Sangui dared to dominate one side and ignore the imperial court. Although the kings of Guangdong and Fujian did not have the greater rights enjoyed by Wu Sangui, they also had the right to "act cheaply" granted by the imperial court, which also created an environment for them to accumulate wealth and govern.
In this situation, the area where the three major feudal kings were stationed resembled an independent kingdom detached from the imperial court, so that the central government of the Qing Dynasty had the right to rule over the area where the "San Francisco" was located in name only. This is a political factor that the "San Francisco Rebellion" is bound to break out.
The King of Jingnan in the Dutch pen
03, from the military point of view of the analysis
As mentioned earlier, wu Sangui had about 90,000 troops. The historical material "Kangxi Dynasty Reimbursement Book" records: In the early years of Kangxi,
"The state has more than half an eighty-thousand soldier."
In terms of quantity alone, Wu Sangui's military strength did account for only about one-eighth of the country's total military strength, but unlike the imperial court, Wu's subordinates were all battle-hardened generals, and they were directly commanded and supported by them for a long time. Over time, ideologically, Wu Sangui's soldiers subconsciously thought that they were the king of the clan, but in essence they did not belong to the imperial court. Although the soldiers in some of these formations were paid and supported by the imperial court, from another point of view, what the imperial court did was only to make a wedding dress for Wu Sangui and other clan kings. In addition, the concentration of troops in the "San Francisco" was also unmatched by the Qing court.
bibliography:
Liu Jian: "Tingwen Record"
Records of the Ancestors of the Qing Dynasty, vol. 94
《Hirasada 3 Reverse Strategy》
"History of China's Military Expenditure", Haichao Publishing House, edited by Liu Zhaoxun and others