Welcome to Shiyuan Epic No. 1028. The military system of the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan was called the "Jin Sui Army", in fact, during the War of Resistance Fu Zuoyi's troops gradually divided and became independent, and it was more appropriate for the Yan army to be called "Jin Army" during the Liberation War, but out of habit, it was still called the Jin Sui Army. After the surrender of the Japanese army in 1945, the liberation war did not immediately break out in full swing, and during the Peace Talks between the Kuomintang and the Republic of China, the Jin Sui Army actually took military action before the Central Department, and was the first to exchange fire with the Eighth Route Army in Changzhi, Shanxi. Logically speaking, the Jin Sui Army is good at defending, but it is not known for taking the initiative to attack, and it is not the concubine of old Chiang Kai-shek, so why should it scramble to be the "head bird" of this civil war? Let's take a look.
The Battle of Changzhi, also known as the Shangdang Campaign, is widely regarded as the first large-scale confrontation between the Kuomintang and the Communists after the victory of the War of Resistance. This battle was not forced by Old Jiang in the back (it was useless to force), but Yan Xishan himself wanted to fight. First of all, due to the needs of the division of labor during the War of Resistance Against Japan, the main forces of our army in the 1930s and 1940s concentrated in North China, Shandong, and Jiangsu. In North China, our army also takes Shanxi as an important base area, Yan Xishan is not only jealous of the Japanese army, but also very disgusted with the Eighth Route Army; the warlords have always regarded the territory as a lifeline; the Eighth Route Army has been active in Shanxi for a long time; and the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan regards our army as a huge threat.
Second, it is Yan Xishan's personal judgment. The Jin Sui Army itself was not good at attacking, but Yan Xishan had dealt with our army for many years during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and thought that it knew the characteristics of the Eighth Route Army very well, and although the Eighth Route Army's guerrilla warfare ability was outstanding, its obvious weakness was the lack of heavy weapons. He judged that with the equipment level of our army at that time, it was not capable of attacking the fortifications (our army in North China did have few artillery, the Shangdang campaign and the battle for the main cities in Shanxi for more than 3 years later, and most of our army's offensive weapons were explosives, plus long-term siege tactics), so he ordered Shi Zebo, commander of the 19th Army, to lead more than 10,000 people to quickly occupy Changzhi. In 1945, although the strength of the Jin Sui Army was not at its peak in history, there were still nearly 200,000 troops, and the supplies were well-equipped and well-armed, even if our army launched an attack on Changzhi, Yan Xishan could quickly send reinforcements to support Shi Zebo. (Later, more than 20,000 reinforcements from Peng Yubin's troops were indeed sent, but they were also annihilated.)
Finally, Yan Xishan dared to go to war with our army first, and there was another political factor that he thought was favorable, that is, in September 1945, the top level of the Chinese Communist Party was engaged in peace negotiations with the government in Chongqing. According to common sense, the high-level people go deep into the tiger's den, and the local troops are easily tied up in battle, and dare not let go of the decisive battle, so as not to be more threatened to the safety of the chiefs who are already in danger. The cunning Yan Xishan precisely wanted to seize this sensitive period and take advantage of the Changzhi area. During the negotiations, taking into account the concerns of the officers and men of the troops, the leaders of our army took the initiative to give instructions: The better and more fiercely Changzhi fights, the more capital our side has in Chongqing for negotiations; if it is defeated by Yan Xishan's Jin Sui Army, the Central Department and old Chiang Kai-shek will be even more arrogant, the negotiations will inevitably fall into passivity, and personal safety will be more difficult to guarantee.
Facts have proved that although Yan Xishan's abacus in 45 years was well played, he underestimated the strength of our army, and in the end, the "head bird" of the Jin Sui Army suffered a disastrous defeat as soon as it came up, and the Liberation War did not recover for several years, purely self-inflicted.