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"Know oneself and know the other, and never lose a hundred battles; know oneself without knowing the other, and win and lose one; do not know the other, do not know oneself, and every battle will be lost."
This is a sentence in the plot and attack section of Sun Tzu's Art of War, which means: In combat command, we know both the enemy and ourselves, we will not lose a hundred battles, we will not lose if we do not understand the enemy but only ourselves, the possibility of victory or defeat is half, we do not understand the enemy and we do not understand ourselves, then every battle is dangerous.
As an excellent military commander, it is often easy to understand oneself, but it is often difficult to understand the enemy, especially for unfamiliar enemies, the earlier understanding of the enemy will grasp the initiative earlier, which will reduce losses.
On August 25, 1937, Xu Xiangqian was appointed deputy commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and he led the troops to the front line of the anti-Japanese resistance, because Xu Xiangqian had fought with the Kuomintang Central Army, the warlord troops, and the bandits, but had not dealt with the Japanese army, and Xu Xiangqian was eager to understand the weapons and equipment of the Japanese army and the ideological situation of the personnel.
After several hand-to-hand combat with the Japanese army, I personally experienced the excellent weapons and equipment of the Japanese army, but how to understand the japanese army's combat will and ideological status? Xu Xiangqian thought of a very effective method, and he issued an order to solve it satisfactorily:
The Japanese war reports and materials captured during the battle, as well as the letters of the japanese troops who died, including the captured Japanese troops, should all be translated and used to understand the situation of the Japanese army. There are several letters that Xu Xiangqian found particularly valuable:
"The roads in Shanxi are completely different from those in Hebei, almost all of them are mountainous areas, the roads are all stones, quite suffering, and the local anti-Japanese ideology is particularly fierce, and they are attacked by the enemy every day." This is a letter from a Japanese soldier.
"Pushing vehicles to the top of a high hill, charging forward towards the flooded enemy position, fighting hunger all day long, and encountering guerrilla warfare with Chinese characteristics, that is, a battle of five miles forward and five miles backwards, it is really an inexhaustible labor!" This is a letter from a Japanese named Kiyoshi.
"The enemies nearby are the Communist army led by Zhu De, and they use natural dangers to carry out guerrilla warfare, which is extremely difficult to fight, and at the same time they are good at propaganda, and even the villagers are rebelling against us, so we must pay attention here at all times." This is a letter written by a soldier in the Lu'an Security Department.
"It often rains in Shanxi now, standing or walking on rainy nights or under the twinkling stars, and what comes to mind is always the matter of the family or the children, how do you miss me in your hometown?" This is a letter from Dai Masanori to her wife Bozi on March 27.
Through these letters, having a basic understanding of the Japanese army's will to fight and ideological situation, Xu Xiangqian concluded:
1. Japanese devils are also human beings, not every Japanese army has a strong Bushido spirit, and most of them are homesick.
2. Our army's guerrilla tactics are very effective, and the Japanese army is not afraid of position warfare, but it is afraid of guerrilla warfare, especially guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.
3. The Japanese army's logistical support is difficult, and it is necessary to make full use of the terrain to fight ambush battles, especially to ambush the enemy's logistics units.
So Xu Xiangqian ordered these letters to be preached among cadres and soldiers on the one hand to boost morale, and on the other hand, Xu Xiangqian put forward many military theories against the Japanese army, such as:
Small fights can not be big hits, live hits can not be beaten to death, fast hits can not be slow hits, steady hits can not be brute force.
Xu Xiangqian is a person who seeks truth from facts, for example, with regard to small fights but not big fights, he said: Under the situation where the enemy is strong and we are weak, the enemy is large and we are small, and the enemy's weapons and equipment are superior and inferior, we must carry out guerrilla warfare, fight more small battles and win battles, and accumulate small victories into big victories. In view of the fact that some commanders despised small battles, Xu Xiangqian patiently criticized and taught.
On the evening of October 19, 1937, the 769th Regiment of the 385th Brigade of the 129th Division, led by deputy regimental commander Wang Naigui, smuggled across the Tuotuo River and raided the Japanese airfield at Yangmingbao, and after only one hour of fighting, it destroyed and wounded 24 enemy aircraft, annihilated more than 100 enemy guards, and won a nationally renowned victory in battle.
After the victory of the battle, as soon as Chen Xilian and Wang Naigui saw Xu Xiangqian, they described the whole battle to him in detail, but Wang Naigui was not very interested, thinking that this battle was too small, and he was slightly ashamed, and he said to Xu Xiangqian:
"Deputy Division Commander Xu, I have reviewed to you, and several planes have been destroyed, and not even a division commander or brigade commander has been caught."
Xu Xiangqian listened, feeling a little surprised, he criticized:
"Also review what, it's a big win!" Although your battle was small, these aircraft were used by the Japanese army for the Battle of Xinkou, and if they were destroyed, the Japanese Kou who were attacking furiously would lose their air support capabilities, forcing the enemy to strengthen the rear garrison with considerable strength, containing the enemy, and putting forward resistance to the friendly forces was undoubtedly an extremely powerful support, showing the mighty guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines of the Eighth Route Army. ”
Although it is a criticism, the meaning of teaching is stronger. Although he only said a few simple words, he suddenly said the great significance of this battle, which made Wang Naigui convinced, and to a certain extent, eliminated their idea of wanting to fight a big battle, after all, in 1937, when the Japanese army's all-out invasion of China began, with the strength of the Eighth Route Army, it did not have the conditions to fight a big battle, and it was even more difficult to capture a Japanese division commander and brigade commander.
Xu Xiangqian made full use of the "Art of War of Sun Tzu," fully understood the enemy and himself, sought truth from facts in combat, was by no means too ambitious, fully understood the enemy before the war, analyzed the enemy, and grasped the enemy's weaknesses.