Editor's Guide:
Since the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, people's evaluation of Zheng Jing has always remained at the point of divergent opinions. Some people believe that he has made a great contribution to promoting Taiwan's economic, cultural and military development during his reign, while others believe that he is "not ambitious, partial to small and good game fishing." The specific historical records are as follows:
Deep ploughing, fish and salt, appeasing the soil, trading foreign countries, and those who are afraid of it, now joy is a happy land. - Nguyen Min Suk: "Observations on the Sea"
People are not ambitious, partial to the small, can not be with the generals, good game fishing color, under the many rebels. ——Zheng Da: "Wild History Without Literature"
So what kind of person is the historical Zheng Jing? From what angle should we make an assessment of him? And is it unfair to impose negative comments such as "not ambitious, small and good game fishing" as mentioned above? In view of this, in this article, the author takes the materialist view of history as the guide, makes full use of the historical document analysis method, and makes a comprehensive and objective study of Zheng Jing himself on the basis of the research results of his predecessors.
Portrait of Zheng Chenggong
The research content of this article:
01. The struggle for succession
Since ancient times, civil unrest has tended to erupt whenever power is granted.
In May of the first year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1662 AD), Zheng Chenggong, who was hailed by posterity as a "national hero", died of illness in Taiwan. Zheng Chenggong's departure has once again plunged the "Ming Zheng regime" in a corner into a thick haze. A series of matters to be resolved, such as how to develop the dominant position and whose position the Yanping King should fall into, are firmly entangled in this young regime that still adheres to the Ming Dynasty as the right Shuo.
According to historical records, there were two main parties involved in the struggle for the throne in Yanping, one of which was Zheng Chenggong's brother Zheng Xun, and the henchmen were mainly Huang Zhao and others in Houchong Town; the other was Zheng Jing, the son of Zheng Chenggong, and the main henchmen were Huang An of Zuo Chong Town, Marquis Hongxu of Zhongzhen, and others. The rest of the courtiers were basically in a state of wait-and-see. At first, the "Pro-Uncle Faction" used Zheng Jing's charges of "incest" and "refusal of father" to forge Zheng Chenggong's last words and support Zheng's attack on the throne, while secretly contacting Zheng Tai, who was stationed in the town of Kinmen, and forming an alliance with him. In addition, the Manchu rulers, after learning of the outbreak of civil unrest in the "Ming Zheng regime", also took the opportunity to launch a fierce offensive to lure Zheng Jing. Obviously, Zheng Jing in this period not only faced a difficult situation of "royal power", but also needed to deal with the offensive launched by the Qing government in an appropriate way. It is no exaggeration to say that as long as any of the difference pools appear in these two "checkpoints", it is possible to bury Zheng Jing and his henchmen, and even bury the entire "Ming Zheng regime".
Fortunately, Zheng Chenggong did not misread his son, and zheng jing, who was only 20 years old, finally successfully completed this historical mission through his own efforts, not only successfully cutting off Zheng Xun and his henchmen, but also cleverly getting rid of the offensive launched by the Qing government, creating a brief opportunity for developing his own strength to resist the Qing court.
Portrait of Zheng Jing
02. Eradicate Zheng Tai
Looking at the entire succession dispute, there is one person who cannot be ignored, that is, Zheng Tai, who once had a little collusion with Zheng Xun. As for why Zheng Jing did not attack Zheng Tai after cutting off Zheng's one-party forces, in the author's opinion, Zheng Tai's important position in the entire "Ming Zheng regime" is a considerable interference factor. Economically, in the twelfth year of Shunzhi (1655 AD), this person succeeded Hong Xu as a household official, and was in charge of the financial and trade power of the entire Zheng clique, and historical records record that this person:
Accumulate more than one million dollars, do not send 400,000 to Japan.
The above facts are enough to see the economic strength of this person. In addition, in the military, Zheng Tai also had a fearsome strength (after Zheng Tai's death, Zheng Tai's brother and son led more than 400 officials, more than 180 large and small ships, tens of thousands of personnel, and the millions of family wealth left by Zheng Tai to Quanzhou to surrender, causing heavy losses to the strength of the "Ming Zheng regime"). A person who is so strong in all aspects has been in opposition to Zheng Jing on the issue of the succession of the "Ming Zheng regime", and it is bound to easily attract Zheng Jing's suspicion. Therefore, as far as the future interests of Zheng Jing himself and even the entire Zheng clique are concerned, eradicating Zheng Tai is also a step that Zheng Jing, as the supreme ruler of the "Ming Zheng regime", must not take.
In March of the second year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1663 CE), with the assistance of the courtier Chen Yonghua, Zheng Jing successfully seduced Zheng Tai. After that, Zheng Tai's brother and son led the people to qing, and learned that Zheng Tai, who had no hope of escape, finally hanged himself. At this point, Zheng Tai's forces were cut off in one fell swoop. The demise of Zheng Tai's power means, in a sense, that Zheng Jing's position in the entire "Ming Zheng regime" has really been established.
When the times came, some people said that although Zheng Jing's move strangled the ambitions of Zheng Tai's forces in the cradle, it killed a thousand enemies and lost eight hundred, which can be said to be more than worth the loss. So, is Zheng Jing's practice of seducing Zheng Tai really wrong? In the author's opinion, as far as the current environment facing the entire "Ming Zheng regime" (the Dutch colonists are trying to collude with the Qing government to launch an attack on Taiwan), Zheng Jing's move is naturally inappropriate, because although Zheng Tai has differences with Zheng Jing on the issue of succession to the throne of King Yanping, he is still an important member of the entire "Zheng clique" and has always stood in the same camp with Zheng Jing on the issue of foreign anti-Qing. However, in the long run, there is nothing wrong with Zheng Jing's move, after all, Zheng Tai's heart of self-reliance is already clear, if it is not eradicated as soon as possible, it will inevitably hinder the future development of the entire "Ming Zheng regime". To sum up, rather than saying that Zheng Jing's move was "killing a thousand enemies and losing eight hundred to himself", it was better to say that "a strong man broke his wrist".
03. Vigorously develop the economy, culture and military
In June of the second year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1663 AD), the Dutch governor, after learning of Zheng Chenggong's death, sent a 12-plywood ship and 1284-man expeditionary fleet led by Baltasha Potter, then admiral of the Dutch East India Company, to Fuzhou, hoping to form a coalition with the Qing government to attack Zheng. At this time, the Qing government's naval construction was relatively weak, and if it wanted to conquer the Zheng clique, it had to rely on the assistance of external forces, so the Qing and The Dutch reached an agreement on the joint attack on Zheng. In October, the Qing-Dutch coalition forces pounced on Jinxia, and although under the leadership of Zhou Quanbin, they severely defeated the Qing army at Wusha Port, but in the end Jinsha was lost. The following year, Zheng Jing led the entire army to retreat to Taiwan, and the anti-Qing base of the "Zheng Clique" in the interior completely ceased to exist. After several frictions, the situation at sea was temporarily calm.
As the supreme ruler of the "Ming And Zheng regime", Zheng Jing took advantage of the relatively stable situation at this moment to develop Taiwan's economy, culture, and military in order to further survive. During this period, the reuse of Chen Yonghua played a key role in the entire development process. The following author will make a specific exposition on the three aspects of economy, culture and military:
Economically, Zheng Jing and Chen Yonghua attached great importance to the development of agriculture. They inherited the policies formulated by Zheng Chenggong during his lifetime,
"Cultivating millet in school", "Distributing wasteland in various towns, and educating soldiers in agriculture"
In peacetime, they cultivate and accumulate grain in various local garrisons, and in wartime, they use the food resources accumulated in peacetime to maintain the battle. Objectively speaking, this move is to a large extent the so-called "Tun Tian system", which on the surface seems to be outdated in the 17th century, but in fact it is very suitable for the development of Taiwan's economy at that time. It turned out that this move not only expanded the area of arable land in Taiwan, but also shared considerable financial pressure for the ruling regime at that time. In addition, Zheng Jing and others vigorously advocated the development of local handicrafts and the development of cross-border trade and other benign policies. Its specific historical records are as follows:
Merchant ships were sent to the ports to purchase ship materials, "loaded with sugar, deerskins, and other goods to japan, made copper, knife armor, and minted eternal money to sell Siam, Jiaotong, and all over Tokyo to enrich the country." Since then, Taiwan's Rishengtian domain city has not allowed the mainland to be reckless. ”
Culturally, Chen Yonghua suggested to Zheng Jing to quickly build a holy temple and set up a school to absorb useful talents. Shortly thereafter, Taiwan successfully began the establishment of a system similar to the mainland's examination system.
Militarily, Zheng Jing also carried out drastic reforms, improving the original 23-town system (that is, 5 towns of the five-town system, 5 towns of the Weifeng system, 4 towns of the aid and suppression system, 3 towns of the Xuanyi system, 5 towns of the five-soldier system, and 1 town of the five permanent system, a total of 23 towns), and incorporated some of the military towns into the pro-army to enhance the strength of the pro-army, and at the same time, the two towns of Weiwei and Yongwei were formed in imitation of the Ming Dynasty's system of guarding and pro-army. In addition, in order to concentrate the advantages of firearms, Zheng Jing also formed a separate Western firearms town, that is, the guard town. Its specific troop garrisons are as follows:
From the above three aspects, it can be roughly deduced that it is indeed unfair to impose such negative evaluations on Zheng Jing as "not ambitious, small and good game fishing color" and so on, and the historical Zheng Jing will never be as mediocre and incompetent as it is interpreted on TV dramas. (To state, the author does not want to "whitewash" Zheng Jing through this article, but only stands at the level of historical truth, with a more objective and fair attitude to restore history and study history as much as possible, not to mention that the Qing Dynasty has been reduced to ashes.) If there is any deficiency, I also hope that the reader friend Haihan. ）
bibliography:
Huang Yuzhai: "Ming Yanping Wang III", "Zheng Chenggong and Taiwan"
Chen Xin: Zheng Jing Research
Nguyen Min Tin: "Records of Maritime Observations", etc