Editor's Guide:
From the beginning of the initial stabilization of Zheng Jing's dominance in Taiwan in the second year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1663 AD) until the death of a stroke in the first month of the twentieth year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1681 AD), the relationship between the "Ming Zheng regime" and the Qing government under the "helm" of Zheng Jing was basically stagnant. The main reason is that there is a certain "flaw" in the comparison of military strength (mainly referring to the strength of the marine division) between the two, that is, they are unable to attack and destroy each other in a short period of time. Although the overall military construction of Zheng Jing in a corner is weak, it has a relatively strong sea power, while the Qing Dynasty, although the overall military construction is strong, lacks amazing combat effectiveness and trustworthy sailors, so that the two can only spy on each other, sometimes negotiating, and sometimes breaking out small-scale military frictions. Obviously, none of this is enough to allow for a fundamental change in the relationship between the two parties.
There is no doubt that as zheng chenggong's carefully selected heir, Zheng Jing's actions must have a major impact on the development direction and development prospects of the entire "Ming Zheng regime", and at this point, although many modern works have deliberately denigrated their ability and image, it is ultimately difficult to hide his positive role in the development of the "Ming Zheng regime" and the development of Taiwan as a whole. On the other hand, although the development of the "Ming Zheng regime" during Zheng Jing's reign reached an unprecedented peak, it is also difficult to blame for the frequent outbreak of civil strife within the regime in his later years due to personal reasons, which indirectly created an opportunity for the Manchu Rulers to "close the country". In this article, the author starts from the strategy implemented by the Qing government against Zheng Jing, and at the same time combines some relevant historical records to make a detailed inquiry into the development process of the entire "Ming Zheng regime" during Zheng Jing's reign (in three steps) with a more objective and fair attitude.
Portrait of Zheng Chenggong
The research content of this article:
01, in the face of surrender, refuse to accept
In the fifth year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1666 AD), Zheng Jing reoccupied Xiamen with the local rebel army from Fujian that had come to support it, and used it as a political, economic and military base for communicating with the mainland and resisting the Qing dynasty and restoring the Ming Dynasty. In the years prior to this, the Qing court did the opposite, not only decisively dismissing the Admiral of the Fujian Water Division, but also transferring shi Lang, Zheng Mingjun, and other major military generals who were good at naval warfare to the Beijing Division and incorporating them into the Eight Banners.
Sure enough, the Qing government sent envoys to Taiwan twice in the first month of the sixth year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1667 AD) and the eighth year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1669 AD). Historical records record that during these two negotiations, the Qing government agreed to Zheng Jing's
"Xu Qi's domain is sealed, and the world guards Taiwan"
Zheng Jing also agreed to the imperial court's proposal to "withdraw from the coast and claim to be a vassal", but there were considerable differences between the two sides on the issue of "shaving". Zheng Jing insisted
"Aid north Korea case, do not cut hair"
The Qing court considered North Korea to be foreign,
"The Jeong clan is a Chinese person", "Chinese people should not cite the example of North Korea"
As a result, a compromise could not be reached, and the negotiations ended in failure. The specific historical records are as follows:
Korea is a foreign country that has never been owned, Zheng Jing is a Chinese person, and Taiwan is China's territory. If it is not easy to obey, it is difficult to return to sincerity, on what basis? - "Historical Materials of the Ming and Qing Dynasties"
Portrait of Zheng Jing
In fact, readers and friends familiar with this history should be clear that the number of negotiations between the "Ming Zheng regime" and the Qing government during the Zheng Jing administration was by no means more than the two times mentioned above, but the final outcome was basically the same, that is, it all ended in failure. So what exactly is the reason for this ending? In the author's opinion, there is always an essential conflict between the position upheld by Zheng Jing and the situation that the Qing government wants to achieve, to take the most obvious example, on the surface, Zheng Jing wants to achieve it through negotiations."
Xu Qi's domain is sealed, and the world guards Taiwan"
The purpose, but in fact these are not what he covets, there is only one thing he really wants to do, that is, to inherit his father's legacy and restore the Ming Dynasty through his own efforts, as to whether he can live in Taiwan and enjoy lifelong wealth, I think these are actually dismissive for him in his early years. This is also the fundamental reason for the inevitable failure of several negotiations between Qing and Zheng. It is true that through several negotiations between Zheng Jing and the Qing government, it is also possible to "taste" the ambition of Zheng Jing.
02. Participated in the "San Francisco Rebellion" in an attempt to "oppose the Qing Dynasty and restore the Ming Dynasty"
In November of the twelfth year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1673 AD), Wu Sangui, the king of Pingxi, who received a signal from the imperial court to agree to "withdraw the domain", officially rebelled. The following year, Shang Kexi, the king of Pingnan, and Geng Jingzhong, the king of Jingnan, also responded with troops, and at this point, the "San Francisco Rebellion" broke out in an all-round way. With the further extension of the territory occupied by "San Francisco", the slogan of "anti-Qing and restoration" has also become increasingly high. Such a rare and valuable situation naturally will not sit idly by for the "Ming Zheng regime" far abroad, so for Zheng Jing, joining the anti-Qing contingent of the "San Francisco" is a great opportunity to complete the goal of "anti-Qing and restoration" in advance. According to historical records, Wu Sangui and Geng Jingzhong had frequent communication with Zheng Jing long before the outbreak of the "San Fan Rebellion", and on the eve of the uprising, Geng Jingzhong, who was stationed in Fujian, wrote to Zheng Jing again, asking him to meet with him and claimed
"Your clan will be water and land, Jiangsu and Zhejiang are at your fingertips"
。 Even Wu Sangui, who was far away in Yunnan, instigated Zheng Jing:
Take Jinling, or arrive in Tianjin, cut off its grain route, and cut off its throat. - "Taiwan WaiJi"
The following year, Zheng Jing officially sent an army to the west. However, it should be noted that Zheng Jing's purpose of participating in the "San Francisco Rebellion" was different from that of Wu and Geng. As we all know, the reason why Wu Sangui wanted to provoke the "San Francisco Rebellion" was ostensibly to oppose the Qing Dynasty and restore the Ming Dynasty, but in fact its real purpose was nothing more than to serve his own selfish interests, and the same was true for Shang and Geng, while on the contrary, Zheng Jing's participation in the "San Francisco Rebellion" was really aimed at restoring the old dynasty. This can be indirectly confirmed by the fact that he once urged Wu Sangui to choose the descendants of Liming after being rejected, and that Wu Sangui's "cute thoughts have been poor", and that he learned that Wu Sangui called the empress dowager and scolded him for being "old and anti-foolish, arrogant and arrogant".
Because they were contrary to the real purpose of the "San Francisco" army, the contradictions between Zheng Jing and Geng Jingzhong intensified day by day, and eventually militarily, they simply did not cooperate with Wu and Geng's Northern Expedition, but only stayed in the Fujian-Guangzhou area to "fish in muddy waters" and try to seize a larger territory in order to obtain taxes and consolidate dongning security. From the thirteenth year of Kangxi to the fifteenth year of Kangxi (1676 AD), Zheng Jing gained a large number of generals from the Qing army and the Geng army through a conservative strategy of gradual encroachment, and successively captured the fujian provinces of Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, Tingzhou, Xinghua, shaowu and other provinces, and even some prefectures and counties under the jurisdiction of Chaozhou Prefecture and Huizhou and Guangzhou in Guangdong were also successively taken into his arms. It is no exaggeration to say that the "Ming Zheng regime" at this time reached its peak in political and military power. Regrettably, however, Zheng Jing's conservative strategy, which he had thought was foolproof, had quietly led himself into a desperate situation. As mentioned earlier, although Zheng Jing eroded a large amount of his strength during Geng Jingzhong's military campaign, once Geng Jingzhong lost his position, he would inevitably be in a state of isolation, and once he was isolated, the Qing army's soldiers would naturally point to themselves, and the so-called "cold lips and dead teeth" refers to this truth.
Unsurprisingly, in the sixteenth year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1677 AD), after quelling the rebellion of Geng Jingzhong, the Qing court immediately took the opportunity to attack the Zheng clan, and finally expelled all of Zheng Jing's forces from the interior within a few months, and at this point, all the rich achievements of Zheng Jing in the western expedition were lost.
03. The original intention has been changed, and the "Ming Zheng regime" has completely fallen into feudal division
From the sixteenth year of Kangxi to the eighteenth year of Kangxi (1679 AD), Yao Qisheng, who was then the governor of Fujian, sent envoys to Taiwan several times to solicit help, but in the end they all failed for various reasons. Later, in order to trap Zheng Jun, Yao Qisheng, who was quite determined to solve the Ming-Zheng problem, moved the boundary while adopting the strategy of division and disintegration. For example, in the eighteenth year of the Kangxi Dynasty, a "XiulaiGuan" was set up in the interior to buy and disperse the hearts of zhengbu with the high-ranking official Houlu. Its specific historical records are as follows:
Wen wu surrenders, that is, with the original title, please, and the permission to make up for it according to the post. The military attaché surrendered, one side of the question please return the za, the other side of the question to protect the current. Soldiers and civilians who have all their hair are rewarded with fifty taels of silver per person; if their hair is short, they are rewarded with twenty-two taels of silver per person; Those who wish to return to the peasants will be sent back to the village, and the county will be installed, and no strong bullying and revenge will be taken. ——Jiang Risheng: "A Tale of Taiwan"
According to historical statistics, from June 17 of the Kangxi Dynasty to June 26 of the 19th year of the Kangxi Dynasty, in addition to those who voluntarily returned to the peasants, the number of officials who surrendered to the peasants was as high as 5,153 and the number of soldiers was as high as 25,677.
Portrait of Yao Qisheng
Under yao Qisheng's various policies and applications, the "Ming Zheng regime" completely destroyed the original intention of resisting the Qing Dynasty, and as the supreme decision-maker of the regime, Zheng Jing also felt that his dreams were shattered after the failure of the Western Expedition and indulged in wine all day long. He also declared with great ambition:
"I'm far away from the island, but I can't worry about it."
It can be seen from this that his original intention of resisting the Qing Dynasty and restoring the Ming Dynasty in his early years has completely disappeared, and the entire "Ming Zheng regime" has gradually fallen into feudal division.
In the first month of the 20th year of the Kangxi Dynasty (1681 AD), Zheng Jing died of a stroke at the age of 39. In view of his later "degeneration", the future of the "Ming Zheng regime" was destined to follow in his footsteps and be buried in the dirt.
bibliography:
Jiang Risheng: "Taiwan Foreign Chronicles"
Historical Materials of the Ming and Qing Dynasties
Huang Yuzhai: "Zheng Chenggong and Taiwan", "Ming Yanping Wang III"
Chen Xin: "Zheng Jing Research" and so on