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Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops? In this article, I will talk to you about this topic.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Combined with the strength, equipment, and tactical levels of the two sides at that time, if the Shu army was properly commanded, the street pavilion had a chance to hold.

Zhang Gao's initial arrival force is likely to be only more than 10,000

The strength of the two sides on the battlefield of the street pavilion is not detailed in the history books. There are statements in the General History of Chinese Military Affairs and Taiwan's History of Chinese Wars in Past Dynasties, but the original source is not indicated.

After Cao Rui learned of Zhuge Liang's attack, "Naibu Le soldiers and horses rode 50,000 troops and horses to resist Liang", that is, a total of 50,000 infantry horses were allocated to support the Yongliang battlefield.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Zhang Gao's initial arrival of more than 10,000 troops was as follows:

1. If Zhang Gao wants to reach the street pavilion battlefield as soon as possible, he must be a forced army of pure cavalry.

Most of the Chinese troops allocated by Cao Rui were near Luoyang. From Luoyang to Jieting, 1600 miles. As for Zhang Gao's original headquarters, it was farther away in Jingzhou. The speed of the infantry's march, light travel 50 miles / day, heavy travel 30 miles / day, at this speed, when you walk to the street kiosk, the yellow broccoli is cold. However, pure cavalry can be reached in about 10 days.

The record of long-distance marching during the Three Kingdoms period at the end of the Han Dynasty was maintained by Zhang Guo. (When the tiger and leopard rode in pursuit of Liu Bei on the Changshan Slope, they traveled 300 miles a day and a night, which was a short pursuit, and it was impossible for a long-distance march to travel day and night without sleep)

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

When Sima Yiping Mengda, he traveled 120 miles a day, and also the cavalry forced the army. In Xiahou Yuan's battle to pacify Longyou, "five hundred in three days, one thousand in six days", the vanguard of which was Zhang Gao.

Judging from the average daily marching speed of 160 miles, Zhang Gao arrived at the front line of the street pavilion around the 10th, maintaining the record set by him and Xiahou Yuan that year! Of course, the commander could only lead the cavalry.

2. Cao Wei's step riding configuration is at most 2:1

Assuming that Cao Rui gave all the cavalry to Zhang Gao (possibly), how many cavalry did Zhang Hao have?

During the Three Kingdoms period, the highest proportion of cavalry was, of course, the northern battlefield, which was conducive to galloping.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

As far as the northern battlefield was concerned, there were two battles with a higher proportion of cavalry: Gongsun Zhan in the Battle of Jieqiao and Cao Zhang in the Battle of Wuhuan. The walking ratio is around 2:1. It is conceivable that the normal proportion of Cao Rui's army should be difficult to exceed this ratio. That is to say, when Zhang Gao arrived at the Jieting battlefield, he had a cavalry unit of up to 1/3 of 50,000, 10,000 5. There are also many theories about the strength of the troops under Ma Mo, but they also lack authoritative data.

However, with common sense, the street kiosk is in a critical place, and with 15,000 troops, Zhuge Liang can still take it out to give to Ma Chen. When Zhuge Liang reflected after the war, he said: Our army has more troops than the enemy in Qishan and Jigu, which shows that the strength of Zhang Gao's army is far from being unstoppable.

Field Defense: Whether the street pavilion city defense is intact or not has little to do with Ma Mo's choice to go up the mountain

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

The location of the ancient battlefield of the Battle of Jieting is still controversial in historiography, so I personally do not recommend using the current map to show the defensive situation at that time. Many friends speculated on the integrity of the street pavilion city defense at that time. This doesn't really mean much.

Of course, Zhuge Liang knew: How strong can a unit of this level of street kiosks, even if the city walls are intact, be? (The history books never record that there were strong castles and important strongholds built before the site.)

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

From the beginning, the Battle of the Street Pavilion was a field defensive battle, not a city defense battle. In fact, regardless of whether the old city defense of the street kiosk was intact or not, in terms of the level of field defense at that time, it was entirely possible for the infantry to resist the cavalry here and gradually improve the defensive situation.

During the Battle of Weishui, Xu Huang forcibly crossed Pusaka, and when the position was not formed, he resolutely blocked the Western Liang cavalry and persisted until Cao Cao crossed the river; Tian Yu also faced the enemy with a vehicle formation when facing the Wuhuan cavalry several times larger than himself. In fact, for the field battle to ride in steps, Zhuge Liang already had strict rules.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Zhuge Liang's own "Thief Riding to Teach" is also emphasized in the form of an edict: the use of vehicle soldiers + rapid-fire crossbows to resist enemy cavalry.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Later, the Western Jin Dynasty Ma Long used the Zhuge Eight Formation as a bias van, and fought and walked, defeating the Liangzhou rebels continuously. In fact, Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition was not afraid to engage in field battles with the Wei army. In the later period of the Northern Expedition, Sima Yi avoided field battles with Zhuge Liang. It can be seen that in the case of proper organization, the cavalry unit at that time did not have absolute superiority. Moreover, the street pavilion was facing the valley mouth, and the Wei army was not easy to unfold, and it was not a suitable place for cavalry to perform. Therefore, it is untenable to say that the city was not consolidated and ma Mo had to retreat up the mountain.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Ten thousand steps back said that with Zhuge Liang's method of battle, "there is no speed to advance, no retreat to go", even if the Shu army cannot resist, it will never collapse in a short period of time.

It will be slightly lost and the initiative will be ceded

The street kiosk failure is far more than just a camp mistake, nor is it as simple as not paying attention to water sources. He gave way to the avenue and occupied the mountain. The reason why mountain warfare is beneficial to the defender is that the mountain limits the opponent's athletic ability. But on the other hand, the mountains also limit the athleticism of the defenders. It's easy for you to go up the hill to defend, and it's hard to rely on the mountain organization to counterattack on a large scale!

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Therefore, the essence of going up the mountain is that Zhang Gao must obediently attack himself. Of course, it is a taboo for all generals. This is a typical passive defensive, sticking to the way of playing.

The question is: Who else can save you?

For this "steadfastness", the avenue was ceded to Zhang Gao, and Zhang Gao grasped the initiative. For Zhang Guo, who is good at camping, once he has mastered the initiative, even if he does not cut off the way to draw water, he can find n ways to solve the battle.

It will be a little lost, and it will be a failure

At the same time as the defeat of Jieting, The Jigu and Shu armies were also defeated.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

However, after Zhao Yun personally broke off, the organization continued, and although the Shu army was defeated, the materials were not damaged, and the soldiers would not be lost. What if such a failure occurred in a street kiosk?

Similarly, let's talk about Zhang Gao on the other side.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

In that year, in the Ditch canal, Zhang Gao was beaten by Zhang Fei and only took more than 10 people to climb the mountain to escape. However, after escaping, he was able to gather the scattered crowd and lead the crowd back to Nanzheng. If Ma Mo calmly reorganized his team and retreated back to Liucheng to save the main force, then would Zhang Hao dare to continue to go deep into Long Right?

After Ma Mo was besieged, the organization of the breakthrough was unfavorable, the army was in chaos, the soldiers were lost, and the whole army completely lost its unified command. Wang Ping, who only had more than 1,000 people, was still calmly deployed, collecting some scattered soldiers, and even being able to stop Zhang Gao's pursuit with suspected soldiers. It can be seen that there is no need for Wei Yan and Zhao Yun, but if Ma Mo has such a general as Wang Ping, the Shu army may also be able to save most of the main force and continue to compete with the Wei army.

Therefore, at the Battle of Jieting, the Wei army was not so strong, and the Shu army was not so weak.

Although it was wrong for Ma Mo to lose the street kiosk, could he really hold the street kiosk in the face of Zhang Gao's 50,000 troops?

Before the battle, Ma Mo took it for granted that he had deployed his defenses and surrendered the initiative; when he encountered setbacks, he was defeated again, and he could not gather his troops, and he would lose a little, and indeed he could not wash away the mistakes. If the Shu army commanded the Battle of Jieting with experienced generals such as Wei Yan, it was entirely possible that it would be a battle with Zhang Gao, even if it was unfavorable, it would not be so badly defeated.

The defeat of the street pavilion was mainly due to Zhuge Liang's improper employment of people, and this conclusion could not be overturned for the time being.

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